State of Iowa v. Brock Matthew Warwick
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket26-0546
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0546
Filed November 18, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Brock Matthew Warwick,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County,
The Honorable Stuart P. Werling, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Alexis W. Grove, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.
Opinion by Langholz, J.
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LANGHOLZ, Judge.
Brock Warwick pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual
abuse. See Iowa Code § 709.11(3) (2024). The State asked the district court
to impose a two-year prison sentence, highlighting that the offense was
“especially heinous and demonstrative that [Warwick] is a danger to the
community at large” and that the presentence-investigation report (“PSI”)
also recommended incarceration. Warwick urged the court to place him on
probation. He pointed out that “he has no prior criminal history,” “has
picked up no other crimes since” being charged, and “has done everything
he’s needed to do” while the case was pending. And he argued that he was
“not a danger to the community at large” and had “shown that he can still
be a productive member of society.” The district court agreed with the State
and imposed a two-year prison sentence. Warwick now appeals his sentence,
arguing that the court abused its discretion by considering only a single
factor—the nature of the offense—and by improperly considering unproven
charges when discussing his criminal history.
We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023).
This deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to
impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a
strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724
(Iowa 2002). And “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision
made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based
on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725.
When selecting an appropriate sentence, the court must decide which
sentencing option “will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation
of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further
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offenses by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5. To do so, “the
court must consider the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances,
the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.”
Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 862 (cleaned up). A court cannot rely on only a single
factor. See State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982) (reversing
manslaughter sentence when court gave only one reason—that the defendant
caused “the loss of life”). But placing “considerable emphasis” on a
particular factor at sentencing is not an abuse of discretion so long as the
court also “considered other factors pertinent to sentencing.” State v.
Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa 2006).
Here, the district court did not consider only the nature of the offense
as Warwick claims. The court explained its selection of Warwick’s sentence:
The Court has heard the statements of counsel. The Court has reviewed
the recommendation of the [PSI] author which is for incarceration. The
Court notes that the statements of defense counsel I believe are accurate.
This defendant has a minimal criminal history of any importance. That
being said, this offense is a very serious offense. In considering all the
factors required by statute to be taken into consideration, the Court
believes that incarceration is an appropriate sentencing option in this
matter, that the defendant will benefit from the services and treatment
options available to him through the Department of Corrections.
Accordingly, pursuant to the recommendation of the [PSI] author, based
on the nature of this offense and the defendant’s needs per the [PSI], the
Court will impose a term of incarceration.
These reasons show that the court also considered Warwick’s
circumstances highlighted by defense counsel, including his lack of criminal
history. And it considered the PSI’s assessment of Warwick’s rehabilitation
needs. According to the PSI, those included—among others—the need “to
be held accountable for [his] criminal behavior” and “to actively engage in
and successfully complete sexual offense treatment.” And so, the PSI
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recommended incarceration and the use of the Iowa Department of
Corrections’ resources. To be sure, the court gave much weight to Warwick’s
offense being “very serious.” But that is not the same as considering only that
factor. See id. Warwick’s first challenge to his sentence thus fails.
Warwick next takes issue with the court’s statement that “[t]his
defendant has a minimal criminal history of any importance.” He contends
that this shows the court improperly considered some unproven offense
because he had no criminal history. True, it is an abuse of discretion for a
court to consider “unproven or unprosecuted offenses . . . unless the
defendant admits them or facts are presented to prove them.” State v. Fetner,
959 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 2021). But “[w]e will not draw an inference of
improper sentencing considerations which are not apparent from the
record.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. And in context, the court’s statement
was agreeing with defense counsel that Warwick’s lack of any prior
convictions was a mitigating factor. The court made the challenged statement
immediately after noting “that the statements of defense counsel I believe are
accurate.” Defense counsel had emphasized that Warwick “has no prior
criminal history.” And while the court might have spoken more carefully to
avoid any confusion, one meaning of “minimal criminal history” is “the least
possible” criminal history, which would not necessarily be inconsistent with
having no prior convictions. See Minimal, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 741 (10th ed. 1997). Warwick has failed to show that the court
improperly relied on unproven offenses.
Because Warwick has failed to show that the district court abused its
considerable discretion in exercising its sentencing judgment, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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