Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0546 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Brock Matthew Warwick, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, The Honorable Stuart P. Werling, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Rachel C. Regenold, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Alexis W. Grove, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. Brock Warwick pleaded guilty to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. See Iowa Code § 709.11(3) (2024). The State asked the district court to impose a two-year prison sentence, highlighting that the offense was “especially heinous and demonstrative that [Warwick] is a danger to the community at large” and that the presentence-investigation report (“PSI”) also recommended incarceration. Warwick urged the court to place him on probation. He pointed out that “he has no prior criminal history,” “has picked up no other crimes since” being charged, and “has done everything he’s needed to do” while the case was pending. And he argued that he was “not a danger to the community at large” and had “shown that he can still be a productive member of society.” The district court agreed with the State and imposed a two-year prison sentence. Warwick now appeals his sentence, arguing that the court abused its discretion by considering only a single factor—the nature of the offense—and by improperly considering unproven charges when discussing his criminal history. We review a district court’s discretionary sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gordon, 998 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Iowa 2023). This deferential standard of review recognizes that the court’s decision “to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). And “our task on appeal is not to second guess the decision made by the district court, but to determine if it was unreasonable or based on untenable grounds.” Id. at 725. When selecting an appropriate sentence, the court must decide which sentencing option “will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further 2 offenses by the defendant and others.” Iowa Code § 901.5. To do so, “the court must consider the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.” Gordon, 998 N.W.2d at 862 (cleaned up). A court cannot rely on only a single factor. See State v. Dvorsky, 322 N.W.2d 62, 67 (Iowa 1982) (reversing manslaughter sentence when court gave only one reason—that the defendant caused “the loss of life”). But placing “considerable emphasis” on a particular factor at sentencing is not an abuse of discretion so long as the court also “considered other factors pertinent to sentencing.” State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 216–17 (Iowa 2006). Here, the district court did not consider only the nature of the offense as Warwick claims. The court explained its selection of Warwick’s sentence: The Court has heard the statements of counsel. The Court has reviewed the recommendation of the [PSI] author which is for incarceration. The Court notes that the statements of defense counsel I believe are accurate. This defendant has a minimal criminal history of any importance. That being said, this offense is a very serious offense. In considering all the factors required by statute to be taken into consideration, the Court believes that incarceration is an appropriate sentencing option in this matter, that the defendant will benefit from the services and treatment options available to him through the Department of Corrections. Accordingly, pursuant to the recommendation of the [PSI] author, based on the nature of this offense and the defendant’s needs per the [PSI], the Court will impose a term of incarceration. These reasons show that the court also considered Warwick’s circumstances highlighted by defense counsel, including his lack of criminal history. And it considered the PSI’s assessment of Warwick’s rehabilitation needs. According to the PSI, those included—among others—the need “to be held accountable for [his] criminal behavior” and “to actively engage in and successfully complete sexual offense treatment.” And so, the PSI 3 recommended incarceration and the use of the Iowa Department of Corrections’ resources. To be sure, the court gave much weight to Warwick’s offense being “very serious.” But that is not the same as considering only that factor. See id. Warwick’s first challenge to his sentence thus fails. Warwick next takes issue with the court’s statement that “[t]his defendant has a minimal criminal history of any importance.” He contends that this shows the court improperly considered some unproven offense because he had no criminal history. True, it is an abuse of discretion for a court to consider “unproven or unprosecuted offenses . . . unless the defendant admits them or facts are presented to prove them.” State v. Fetner, 959 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Iowa 2021). But “[w]e will not draw an inference of improper sentencing considerations which are not apparent from the record.” Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725. And in context, the court’s statement was agreeing with defense counsel that Warwick’s lack of any prior convictions was a mitigating factor. The court made the challenged statement immediately after noting “that the statements of defense counsel I believe are accurate.” Defense counsel had emphasized that Warwick “has no prior criminal history.” And while the court might have spoken more carefully to avoid any confusion, one meaning of “minimal criminal history” is “the least possible” criminal history, which would not necessarily be inconsistent with having no prior convictions. See Minimal, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 741 (10th ed. 1997). Warwick has failed to show that the court improperly relied on unproven offenses. Because Warwick has failed to show that the district court abused its considerable discretion in exercising its sentencing judgment, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 4