Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1668 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Loren Patrick Cramblit, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Paul D. Scott, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED AND REMANDED _______________ Erin M. Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Adam Kenworthy, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, P.J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge. Loren Cramblit appeals following guilty pleas for assault causing bodily injury in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2(2) (2024) and fourth-degree criminal mischief in violation of sections 716.1, 716.6(a)(1), and 716.6(b), asserting the district court abused its discretion when fashioning the sentence and imposed an illegal sentence. Upon our review, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of relevant sentencing factors but remand to the district court for the limited purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc order to correct a mathematical error concerning the length of the sentence. I. Background Facts & Proceedings At an intersection in West Des Moines, Cramblit got out of his vehicle and punched the back window of the victim’s car, causing the window to shatter. The victim got out of her vehicle and approached Cramblit. Cramblit then struck the victim in the face with his hand, causing injury. The State charged Cramblit with willful injury resulting in bodily injury and fourth-degree criminal mischief. Cramblit entered into a plea agreement in which he would plead guilty to assault causing bodily injury and fourth-degree criminal mischief in exchange for the State recommending thirty days’ incarceration and a year of probation. At sentencing, Cramblit argued the court should neither place him on probation nor order incarceration. The district court sentenced Cramblit to a suspended sentence of 365 days in jail on each count, to be run consecutively, and placed him on probation for two years. When fashioning the sentence, the court considered several factors, including the nature of the offense, Cramblit’s criminal 2 history, his age, his need for rehabilitation, the protection of the community, and the harm to the victim. Cramblit now appeals, arguing the district court illegally sentenced him by exceeding the statutory maximum sentence. He also argues the court abused its discretion in fashioning the sentence. II. Analysis We first consider Cramblit’s assertion that the district court abused its discretion in fashioning the sentence. “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor, and will only be overturned for an abuse of discretion or the consideration of inappropriate matters.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). Abuse of discretion in sentencing occurs when “the decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Id. “In applying the abuse of discretion standard to sentencing decisions, it is important to consider the societal goals of sentencing criminal offenders, which focus on rehabilitation of the offender and the protection of the community from further offenses.” Id. “It is equally important to consider the host of factors that weigh in the often arduous task of sentencing a criminal offender, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.” Id. at 725. “Furthermore, before deferring judgment or suspending sentence, the court must additionally consider the defendant’s prior record of convictions or deferred judgments, employment status, family circumstances, and any other relevant factors, as well as which of the sentencing options would satisfy the societal goals of sentencing.” Id. 3 Cramblit argues the district court disregarded mitigating factors, including that he completed an anger management course, maintained a business, and did not commit another crime since the offense, which amounted to an abuse of discretion. Here, the district court appropriately considered Cramblit’s history and characteristics, his age, his needs for rehabilitation and correctional treatment, the nature of the offenses, and the protection of the community. The court also considered Cramblit’s completion of an anger management course. That the court did not specifically reference other mitigating factors does not amount to an abuse of discretion. See State v. Barnes, No. 24-1958, 2025 WL 3171298, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2025) (noting “the court has no obligation to address each claimed mitigating factor or the evidence supporting it”). We find the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Cramblit’s sentence. We next turn to Cramblit’s illegal sentencing challenge. A challenge to an illegal sentence may be raised at any time. Dorsey v. State, 975 N.W.2d 356, 363 (Iowa 2022). “A challenge alleging that a sentence is illegal is reviewed for errors at law.” State v. Boehmer, 967 N.W.2d 191, 193 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021). Cramblit asserts that the district court illegally sentenced him to a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for two serious misdemeanors, which is 730 days, or 365 days per count. Iowa Code § 903.1(1)(b). Here, the court’s oral sentencing pronouncement and the sentencing order stated the total term of incarceration was not to exceed 760 days. The State concedes the court made a mathematical error. 4 We find the errors in the sentencing pronouncement and order were clerical in nature. See State v. Kramer, 11 N.W.3d 794, 799 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024). Errors are considered clerical when they are “not the product of judicial reasoning and determination.” State v. Hess, 533 N.W.2d 525, 527 (Iowa 1995). “[W]hen the record unambiguously reflects that a clerical error has occurred, we will direct the district court to enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct the judgment entry.” Id. Accordingly, we remand to the district court to enter a nunc pro tunc order to reflect the maximum term of incarceration on the consecutive counts to be 730 days. III. Conclusion We find no abuse of discretion in the court’s consideration of relevant sentencing factors, but we remand to the district court for the limited purpose of entering a nunc pro tunc order to reflect the maximum term of incarceration on the consecutive counts to be 730 days. AFFIRMED AND REMANDED. 5