State of Iowa v. Sean Ryan Sheets
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledJune 24, 2026
Docket25-1271
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-1271
Filed June 24, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Sean Ryan Sheets,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County,
The Honorable Stuart P. Werling, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer,
Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.
Opinion by Greer, P.J.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.
Sean Sheets appeals the sentence imposed after a panel of this court
remanded his case for resentencing because the district court was unaware it
had discretion to consider the Iowa Risk Revised (IRR) assessment contained
in the presentence investigation report (PSI). State v. Sheets, No. 23-1380,
2025 WL 546705, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2025) (noting the State
conceded resentencing was appropriate). This time, Sheets argues that the
district court abused its discretion because it failed to “truly” consider the
IRR assessment at resentencing because the court imposed the same
sentence. Because the district court confirmed at the resentencing hearing
that it had read, reviewed, and considered the PSI, including the IRR
assessment, and set out proper considerations for the sentence, we find it
appropriately exercised its discretion. We affirm Sheets’s sentence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
In 2023, after a jury trial, Sheets was convicted of five counts of
second-degree sexual abuse, six counts of lascivious acts with a child, and two
counts of indecent contact with a child. See id. at *1–3 (discussing facts
underlying Sheets’s conviction). Before the first sentencing hearing, the
Iowa Department of Correctional Services conducted a PSI, including
evaluating Sheets with the IRR assessment. The PSI summarized the IRR
assessment results, which showed that Sheets scored in the low category for
future violence and future victimization.
In the first sentencing order, the district court imposed consecutive
sentences on all counts, resulting in a maximum sentence of 189 years with a
mandatory minimum sentence of 87.5 years. Sheets appealed the sentence
arguing the court incorrectly believed it could not consider the IRR
assessment contained in the PSI. Id. at *5. We vacated the sentence and
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remanded for resentencing for the court to “exercise its discretion in all
respects, including considering the risk assessment contained in the PSI.” Id.
(cleaned up). On remand, the district court imposed the same sentence.
Sheets appeals.
II. Standard of Review.
We review criminal sentences for abuse of discretion. State v. Wickes,
910 N.W.2d 554, 564 (Iowa 2018). An abuse of discretion occurs “[w]hen the
district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were
clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Thompson, 856 N.W.2d 915, 918
(Iowa 2014). “[T]he decision of the district court to impose a particular
sentence within the statutory limits is cloaked with a strong presumption in
its favor.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “To
overcome the presumption the district court properly exercised its
discretion, there must be an affirmative showing the court relied on improper
evidence.” State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 762 (Iowa 1998) (cleaned up).
III. Analysis.
In this appeal, Sheets argues that the district court did not truly
consider his IRR assessment in the PSI during resentencing. Sheets reasons
that failure is clear because “[a] court does not sentence an accused to the
maximum possible sentence when the accused scores in the low category for
future violence, the low category for future victimization and has no criminal
history.” Sheets takes issue with the reasons given by the district court in
setting his sentence. Those reasons given were summarized in the district
court’s imposition of the sentence at the resentencing hearing:
The Court has heard the statements of the defendant, his
attorneys, and the attorney for the State. The Court has reviewed the
letters in support of the defendant filed. The Court has heard . . . the
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victims’ statements that were read into the record here. The Court has also
reviewed the PSI including the IRR recommendation, that was the Iowa Risk
Revised recommendation that was included as part of that report.
Based on the nature of this offense, the attending circumstances,
the defendant’s age, character and propensity for reform, to protect the
public and to deter criminal activity, the Court will now impose sentence
in this matter which the Court intends to impose the same sentence that
was imposed originally. The Court believes that that sentence maximizes the
defendant’s opportunity for rehabilitation and reform in a controlled
environment, and as indicated previously protects the public from further
criminality.
The sentencing contemplates consecutive sentencing, and the
Court believes that consecutive sentencing is required and justified and
needed again to protect the public and to provide this defendant with the
maximum opportunity for reform within that controlled environment.
(emphasis added).
“Absent proof to the contrary, we take the district court’s statements
at face value.” State v. Rasmussen, 7 N.W.3d 357, 363 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned
up). The district court’s explanation contradicts Sheets’s claim that the
court did not consider the IRR assessment scores. Sheets offered no
evidence of any improper factor utilized in establishing his sentence other
than his opinion that the court did not take his scores on the IRR assessment
into account. Imposing the original sentence on remand is not an abuse of
discretion in isolation. See generally State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695
(Iowa 2001) (affirming imposition of same sentence upon resentencing).
From our review of the record, the district court was concerned with
protecting the public and providing the opportunity for reform. The court
had the discretion to rely on these factors in its sentencing decision. State v.
August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (stating that district courts should
weigh and consider, among other things, “the nature of the offense, the
attending circumstances, defendant’s age, character and propensities and
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chances of his reform” (citation omitted)). Finally, we recognize the
“‘strong presumption’ that the defendant’s sentence is valid because it is
within the statutory limit.” Rasmussen, 7 N.W.3d at 363 (citation omitted).
Because the district court considered proper factors, including the IRR
assessment, before imposing the sentence, we find it exercised the discretion
afforded to it under our caselaw.
IV. Conclusion.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. We therefore affirm
Sheets’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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