Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1286 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Marc Moon, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Tabitha Turner, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 1 AHLERS, Judge. Marc Moon appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11(3) (2025). He claims the district court abused its discretion by imposing a prison sentence when the parties jointly recommended probation. We have jurisdiction over Moon’s appeal despite his guilty plea because he challenges the sentence imposed, which was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of the parties’ plea agreement. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (limiting when a defendant may appeal as a matter of right following a guilty plea); State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). Because Moon’s sentence was within statutory limits, it is presumed valid and will only be overturned for consideration of improper factors or an abuse of discretion. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105–06. Abuse of discretion occurs when the sentencing decision is based on grounds or reasons that are clearly untenable or unreasonable. Id. at 106. Moon’s challenge is based entirely on the claim that the district court abused its discretion by deciding to impose a term of incarceration. Attacking the court’s sentencing rationale, he complains that the district court noted that alcohol did not play a factor in his offense. He highlights that the presentence investigation report (PSI) stated he smelled like alcohol when he was arrested. But the PSI preparer noted that information came from the minutes of testimony, which the district court agreed not to consider at Moon’s insistence. And the PSI also included this statement: “The defendant reported that he does not have a problem with alcohol and was not under the influence of alcohol at the time of his offense.” So, the court did 2 not abuse its discretion or consider an improper factor when it stated that alcohol was not a factor in the instant offense. Moon also complains about the court commenting on his acknowledgement of having some unknown mental-health diagnosis but never receiving any treatment for that diagnosis. He contends that in doing so the court “failed to fairly or accurately consider the possibilities for” his rehabilitation because the court did not have the full context as to why he had not treated or identified his mental-health diagnosis. We disagree with Moon’s contention that the district court’s observation about his lack of treatment without further detail meant it failed to consider the possibilities for his rehabilitation. The court’s statements do not constitute an abuse of its discretion or consideration of an improper factor. Generally, Moon’s challenge is based on his dissatisfaction with his sentence and his desire for us to weigh sentencing factors differently than the district court. But that we cannot do. Deciding what weight to give relevant factors is the district court’s task, not ours. State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Iowa 1983) (“The right of an individual judge to balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate sentence inheres in the discretionary standard.”). We will not second-guess the district court’s decision and weigh the relevant factors anew. We find nothing untenable or unreasonable about the grounds or reasons the court gave for deciding to sentence Moon to a term of incarceration; the district court did not abuse its discretion. See id. Accordingly, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 3