Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1662 Filed September 23, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Justin Wayne Glenney, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, The Honorable Kathryn E. Austin, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., Badding, J., and Bower, S.J. Opinion by Badding, J. 1 BADDING, Judge. Justin Glenney was charged with third-degree sexual abuse after a midnight trip to a local park with his daughter’s twenty-year-old friend. Although Glenney denied that any misconduct took place during the encounter, he later entered an Alford guilty plea 1 to a reduced charge of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. The parties’ plea agreement provided that the State would recommend prison, while Glenney was free to “argue for any other applicable sentence.” At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that Glenney should be sentenced to prison because he “committed a violent crime that [was] sexual in nature, that involve[d] a victim who is a minor,” and that “required lots of planning and intention.” Defense counsel disputed the prosecutor’s characterization of the offense, contending: We would further, respectfully, argue that the defendant being sent to prison without first affording him an opportunity to complete probation would not be supported by any aggravating factors in this case. There was no force, violence or threat of violence contained in the allegations. Mr. Glenney, as I stated previously, has no history of prior sexual abuse. There is no evidence of planning or premeditation. There was no use of weapons. There was no evidence of any serious injury. Counsel also argued that mitigating factors supported Glenney’s request for probation. Those factors included Glenney’s compliance with the conditions of his pretrial release, stable employment, and letters of support from his family and members of the community. Counsel additionally noted that, aside from a misdemeanor conviction in 2019, Glenney’s criminal history 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1970) (permitting a criminal defendant to enter a guilty plea without admitting guilt by acknowledging strong evidence of guilt and “voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent[ing] to the imposition of a prison sentence” based on that evidence). 2 was “over 20 years old” and did not include any “prior history of sexual deviancy or abuse.” Finally, counsel corrected the prosecutor’s statement that the victim was a minor. The prosecutor—who was covering for another attorney in her office—acknowledged her mistake, telling the court: “I misspoke when I said ʻminor.’ I should have said ʻyoung adult.’” After the parties made their sentencing recommendations, an advocate read a victim impact statement to the court. Throughout the statement, the victim described Glenney’s offense as “rape.” She also told the court that she was “a mother now to a beautiful, healthy, smart baby girl.” The victim ended her statement by telling Glenney: “An innocent man does not stop and take a plea deal, but you took it. Must be the guilt built up. We all know you raped me, and we all know you deserve nothing but punishment for it.” The district court sentenced Glenney to prison, citing his age, his criminal history, “the facts and circumstances of the case, the recommendation of the parties, as well as the need to protect the community from further criminal offenses and [his] need for rehabilitation.” Glenney appeals this sentence,2 claiming it should be vacated for two reasons: (1) the court “relied on misstatements of fact” by the prosecutor, who intended “to advance improper emotional appeals to the court”; and (2) the court “failed to weigh and consider all pertinent considerations.” Because the prison sentence imposed by the district court was within the statutory limits, it “is cloaked with a strong presumption in its favor.” State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105–06 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “We 2 Because Glenney is challenging a sentence that was neither mandatory nor agreed to as part of his plea bargain with the State, he has established “good cause” to appeal under Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (2025). State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020). 3 will not reverse a sentence unless there is ʻan abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” Id. at 103 (citation omitted). “A district court abuses its discretion when it exercises its discretion on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.” State v. Duffield, 16 N.W.3d 298, 302 (Iowa 2025) (citation omitted). Neither of Glenney’s challenges entitles him to relief under this deferential standard of review. Glenney’s first claim of error asserts a denial of his “right to a fair sentencing” due to prosecutorial misconduct. He argues the prosecutor violated that right and disparaged his character by calling the victim a minor and describing the assault as a planned and violent attack. He also argues the prosecutor improperly allowed a victim impact statement “that wrongly referred to” rape, suggested “this ʻrape’ produced a baby,” and commented on his innocence. But, as the State points out, none of the cases that Glenney cites in support of this claim are about sentencing recommendations. Instead, they concern standards for a prosecutor’s conduct during trial. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 870 (Iowa 2003). And at sentencing, we trust the court to “filter out any improper or irrelevant material.” State v. Canady, 4 N.W.3d 661, 675 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up). Even if those cases applied, we agree with the State that—aside from the prosecutor’s statement that the victim was a minor—the prosecutor’s comments were permissible inferences from the minutes of testimony.3 See State v. Phillips, 226 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 1975) (noting that during closing arguments, a prosecutor “may draw conclusions and argue all permissible inferences which may reasonably flow from the record which do not misstate the facts”). And once defense counsel pointed out that the victim was not a 3 Glenney agreed the district court could use the minutes to establish a factual basis for his plea. 4 minor, the prosecutor corrected her statement. As for the prosecutor’s comments on Glenney’s character, we have said that is a proper factor for the court to weigh in its sentencing decision. See State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 10 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). The State is also correct that “[n]either the State nor the sentencing court erred by permitting the victim’s written impact statement to be read at the sentencing hearing, as required by law.” See Iowa Code § 915.21; Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(2)(d)(5). “[I]t is essential to the purpose of the victim impact statement that the victim be given an opportunity to fully convey the impact a crime has had.” State v. Sailer, 587 N.W.2d 756, 764 (Iowa 1998). While this may “result in the airing of allegations which are unproven, we trust that our district courts, when weighing such statements as part of the sentencing determination, will filter out improper or irrelevant evidence.” Id. Glenney does not point to anything in the record that establishes the district court relied on improper material in the victim impact statement. See State v. Schooley, 13 N.W.3d 608, 619 (Iowa 2024) (“Even if improper material is presented at sentencing, it is reversible error only if the district court relied on it.”); Sailer, 587 N.W.2d at 762 (“In order to overcome the presumption the district court properly exercised its discretion, there must be an affirmative showing the court relied on improper evidence.” (cleaned up)). Instead, he argues that because the court simply “paid obligatory lip service” to the applicable sentencing factors,4 the “only explanation” for its decision is that the court “considered untrue and improper statements made at the 4 We note that Glenney does not raise a separate challenge to the adequacy of the reasons the court gave for its sentencing decision. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (noting that while our rules of criminal procedure require “a statement of reasons on the record, a ʻterse and succinct’ statement may be sufficient” (citation omitted)). 5 hearing.” However, “[w]e will not draw an inference of improper sentencing considerations which are not apparent from the record.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002). Glenney’s second challenge fares no better than his first. He argues “it is apparent from the record as a whole that the sentencing judge failed to consider all pertinent matters before it.” Glenney then discusses the mitigating factors that he believes supported his request for probation. While the district court did not discuss each factor highlighted by Glenney on appeal, it was not required to do so. See Boltz, 542 N.W.2d at 11. Distilled down, Glenney is simply asking us to substitute the district court’s decision with our own, which we cannot do. See Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106 (“Our task on appeal is not to second-guess the sentencing court’s decision.”). Finding no abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 6