State of Iowa v. Gary Lewis Scott

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0146 Filed October 21, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Gary Lewis Scott, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, The Honorable Crystal S. Cronk, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, J. 1 AHLERS, Judge. Gary Scott and another man were at a friend’s house in Ottumwa, Iowa when an argument escalated. The suggestion was made to take the dispute outside, and Scott and the other man followed the suggestion. Scott followed the other man out of the house, along the side of the house, and into the backyard. Once in the backyard, Scott stabbed the other man to death. Scott was charged with and a jury found him guilty of murder in the second degree, willful injury causing serious injury, assault while participating in a felony, and going armed with intent.1 Scott appeals. He contends insufficient evidence supports the finding that he acted with malice aforethought or without justification. I. Standard of Review We review sufficiency-of-evidence claims for correction of errors at law. State v. Gibbs, 36 N.W.3d 685, 689 (Iowa 2026). We uphold the jury’s verdict if substantial evidence supports it. Id. Substantial evidence is evidence that could convince a rational fact finder of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We review all “evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record.” Id. (cleaned up). II. Malice Aforethought To be found guilty of murder in the second degree, the State was required to prove that Scott acted with malice aforethought. See State v. 1 The court merged the willful-injury-causing-serious-injury and assault-while- participating-in-a-felony charges into the murder charge for purposes of sentencing. Neither party challenges the merger on appeal. 2 Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 207 (Iowa 2003). The jury received this instruction of malice and malice aforethought: “Malice” is a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act to the injury of another out of actual hatred, or with an evil or unlawful purpose. It may be established by evidence of actual hatred, or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do injury. It may be found from the acts and conduct of the defendant, and the means used in doing the wrongful and injurious act. Malice requires only such deliberation that would make a person appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion. “Malice aforethought” is a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another which exists before the act is committed. It does not have to exist for any particular length of time. The instructions also informed the jury that “[m]alice aforethought may be inferred from the defendant’s use of a dangerous weapon.” A dangerous weapon was defined as “any device or instrument designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury, and when used in its designed manner is capable of inflicting death” and any “instrument or device actually used in such a way as to indicate the user intended to inflict death or serious injury, and when so used is capable of inflicting death.” Because no objection was made to these instructions, they became the law of the case for purposes of Scott’s sufficiency challenge. 2 See State v. Schiebout, 944 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 2020). Reasonable jurors could have found that Scott acted with malice aforethought based on his conduct before, during, and after the fight. See State v. Berry, 549 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (finding that the 2 Scott’s only objection to the instructions at trial was to an instruction that he does not challenge on appeal. As he raises no issue with the instructions on appeal, we do not address his objection. 3 defendant’s conduct before and after the stabbing provided sufficient evidence of malice aforethought). Before the stabbing took place, Scott and the victim were arguing inside the house and were told to “knock it off” by the homeowner. Rather than stopping, the two men decided to go outside to continue the fight. The victim led the way for the 114 feet from the front door to the fenced-in backyard, with Scott following. A reasonable juror could conclude that Scott followed the victim to the backyard with the fixed purpose to do harm, especially because he was armed with a knife. Further, Scott’s use of a knife during a fistfight supports the finding of malice. See State v. Green, 896 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Iowa 2017) (holding that the dangerous-weapon presumption for malice aforethought “exists because a rational juror could infer that one who uses a dangerous weapon intends to cause physical harm, and even to kill”). No physical blows were exchanged until both men entered the yard, but within a few seconds of exchanging blows, a bloodstain could be seen on the victim’s shirt. By the end of the fight, the blood spread from the victim’s chest to his knees. The knife was found near the scene and had both the victim’s and Scott’s blood on it. While the knife was not a per se dangerous weapon because the blade was less than five inches long, a reasonable juror could find the knife was a dangerous weapon based on how Scott used it to inflict death or serious injury upon the victim who had no weapon. See Iowa Code § 702.7 (2023) (defining “dangerous weapon” to include “any instrument or device of any sort whatsoever which is actually used in such a manner as to indicate that the defendant intends to inflict death or serious injury upon the other, and which, when so used, is capable of inflicting death upon a human being”). Thus, Scott’s use of a dangerous weapon supports a finding of malice aforethought because stabbing someone carries the natural consequence of physical harm or death. See Green, 896 N.W.2d at 780. 4  Scott’s actions after stabbing the victim also support a finding of malice. After the victim collapsed from being stabbed, video evidence showed Scott standing by the fence doing nothing to help the victim. This lack of action supports the jury’s finding of malice. See State v. Swartz, No. 24-1712, 2025 WL 2794391, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2025) (finding a rational fact finder could infer malice from the defendant leaving the victim to suffer without calling for help). Also, during a recorded conversation with an investigating officer, Scott attempted to conceal the cause of the victim’s injuries, claiming he got blood on his jeans from helping the victim. This also supports the jury’s finding of malice. See State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 56 (Iowa 2021) (“A false story told by a defendant to explain or deny a material fact against him is by itself an indication of guilt and is relevant to show that the defendant fabricated evidence to aid his defense.” (cleaned up)). Finally, Scott argues the State did not prove malice aforethought because there was no history of animosity between the victim and him, the victim continuously pursued the fight, and the victim was larger than him. He contends these factors overcome the presumption of malice from the use of a dangerous weapon. But for sufficiency challenges, we do not reweigh the evidence nor do we draw inferences in the defendant’s favor. State v. McPhillips, 580 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1998). Additionally, the jury is free to credit or reject evidence, and we do not disturb those findings unless there is a lack of substantial evidence. Id. Reasonable jurors could have rejected Scott’s theory of why he did not act with malice aforethought. For the reasons described, substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of malice aforethought. Accordingly, we reject Scott’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of malice aforethought. 5 III. Self-Defense Scott also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his murder conviction based on his contention that he acted in self-defense and thus was justified in his use of deadly force.3 A person is justified in using reasonable force “when the person reasonably believes that such force is necessary to defend oneself or another from any actual or imminent use of unlawful force.” Iowa Code § 704.3. “ʻReasonable force’ . . . can include deadly force if it is reasonable to believe that such force is necessary to avoid injury or risk to one’s life or safety . . . .” Id. § 704.1(1). Justification, such as self-defense, is an affirmative defense. State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 2020). A defendant asserting a justification defense bears the burden to produce substantial evidence to support the defense. Id. at 628. Once the defendant produces such evidence, “the burden shifts to the State to prove lack of justification beyond a reasonable doubt” and the jury is instructed accordingly. Id. Here, the district court found sufficient evidence of justification as to the murder charge, so it instructed the jury that the State had to prove that Scott “acted without justification.” The court provided an explanatory 3 Although the conclusion portion of Scott’s appellate brief on this issue asks us to reverse Scott’s convictions for all four crimes, the substantive part of the brief only refers to the murder conviction. Further, the jury was not instructed to consider a justification defense to the assault-while-participating-in-a-felony and going-armed-with-intent charges, no objection was made to the failure to so instruct, and no issue was made of this failure on appeal. So, we limit our discussion of the justification defense to the murder charge. That said, as we will discuss, we find sufficient evidence to overcome Scott’s justification defense, so even if we could interpret his brief as also challenging his willful- injury conviction on the basis of his justification defense, we would reject his challenge to that charge as well. 6 instruction that informed the jury that Scott’s use of force was not justified if the State proved any of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. The defendant did not have a reasonable belief that it was necessary to use force to prevent an injury or loss. 2. The defendant used unreasonable force under the circumstances. 3. The defendant was engaged in illegal activity in the place where he used force, he made no effort to retreat, and retreat was a reasonable alternative to using force. Scott contends his use of deadly force was justified because (1) the victim was the aggressor and was substantially bigger and heavier than him and (2) he had no way to retreat. As with any sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Gibbs, 36 N.W.3d at 689. Viewed in that light, we reject both of Scott’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s rejection of his justification defense. As to his first argument that he was justified in stabbing the victim because he was significantly larger than Scott, we note that Scott willingly followed him around the house into the backyard before the physical fight started. A reasonable juror could find that Scott calmly following behind the victim for over one hundred feet to the backyard demonstrated that Scott intended to fight and did not reasonably believe force was necessary to defend himself from unlawful force. See Iowa Code § 704.3 (defining defense of self ); see also State v. Hall, No. 15-0628, 2016 WL 2748358, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 11, 2016) (finding sufficient evidence to overcome a justification defense in part based on evidence that the defendant followed the victim for 280 feet and the manner of the defendant’s approach showed that he intended to fight). Also, a reasonable juror could conclude that Scott used unreasonable force when “he brought a knife to a fistfight.” See State v. 7 Bowers, No. 18-1827, 2020 WL 1310290, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2020) (finding that a jury could find bringing a knife to a fistfight was an unreasonable use of lethal force based on the circumstances). We also reject his second argument that he had no way to retreat. The State produced evidence at trial that Scott arrived at the house on a bicycle. As already noted, after the victim and Scott argued and were told to take the argument outside, the victim left the house for the purpose of fighting and Scott followed behind him all the way to the backyard, where Scott stabbed him almost immediately. A reasonable juror could conclude that Scott had a reasonable alternative to retreat that he failed to take by failing to remain in the house, declining to ride off on his bike, and instead following the victim a considerable distance into the backyard with a knife. See Hall, 2016 WL 2748358, at *4. As such, substantial evidence supports the jury’s rejection of Scott’s justification defense, so we reject his corresponding challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. IV. Conclusion Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that Scott acted with malice aforethought and without justification. As a result, we affirm. AFFIRMED. 8