Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0629 Filed October 7, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Alan James Schultz, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County, The Honorable Patrick W. Greenwood, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy (argued), Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester (argued), and Monty Platz, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Sandy, J. 1 SANDY, Judge. Alan Schultz appeals from his conviction for first-degree murder. After one juror reported being approached by an unknown person who made statements attempting to influence the juror’s vote, Schultz argues the district court erred by refusing to allow him to poll the remaining members of the jury. Schultz also contends the court erred in granting the State’s mid- trial motion in limine preventing introduction of evidence of the victim’s intoxication at the time of death. The district court did not err in refusing to poll the jury nor in granting the State’s motion in limine. So we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On the evening of July 3 into the early morning hours of July 4, 2024, Schultz was drinking at a bar in Clearfield. The victim arrived at the bar around midnight, having walked there with a friend after attending an annual July 4th tractor pull. Schultz, thirty-seven years old at this time, made sexual comments about the nineteen-year-old victim’s teenage sister while she was dancing with a friend. The victim, who was within earshot when Schultz made those comments, was “pretty upset” about it and informed Schultz that the girl was his sister. The two argued back and forth, both yelling at one another. Although Schultz and the victim did not become physically violent in the bar, the manager kicked them out for causing a disturbance. The victim left, but Schultz stayed, got into a fight with another bar customer, and told that individual “he doesn’t fight, he makes people disappear.” The manager again kicked Schultz out of the bar. Schultz finally departed on his motorcycle. He drove over twenty miles to his home in the town of Bedford where he lived with his stepson. Schultz’s wife, who was working at the bar that night, tried calling her son to warn him that Schultz was coming home and was agitated and that it would be best if 2 he was not there when Schultz arrived. Once he got home, Schultz went to his stepson’s bedroom, woke him up, and explained while “pacing” and “cussing” that someone at the bar had made him angry. At some point during this stop, Schultz retrieved his .45-caliber Smith & Wesson handgun and left the house, leaving the front door wide open on his way out. After leaving his house, Schultz returned to Clearfield in a green SUV. Meanwhile, the victim had gone to a friend’s house after leaving the bar. But after another friend asked him to come back, the victim returned to the street block of the bar and socialized with a congregation of people standing in the bar’s parking area. It was around 3:00 a.m. at this time, and Schultz drove up the street and spotted the victim who shouted at Schultz while standing outside. Schultz parked—leaving his handgun in his vehicle—and walked across the street “straight to” the victim to confront him. Schultz came “nose-to-nose” with the victim, and the two argued about Schultz’s comments regarding the victim’s sister. Again, this interaction did not escalate to physical violence. Schultz then turned around and walked back to his vehicle. He reached for something on the vehicle’s passenger side, walked back to the victim, raised and cocked his handgun, and shot Schultz in the face with one shot at “point blank” range. After shooting the victim, Schultz “very casually” sat down, “tossed some keys on the ground,” and told a bar employee in a “very calm” demeanor to give them to his wife. Schultz had cleared the handgun chamber, removed the magazine, and placed the weapon on the ground near the victim’s body. When the employee asked Schultz, “Did you seriously fucking shoot somebody,” he replied, “I sure did.” The employee chided Schultz, explaining that the victim was “just a kid” and that the “[victim]’s life is 3 over.” Schultz replied, “Mine is too.” Schultz then stood up, walked over to his vehicle, and leaned against the hood until police arrived and arrested him. The State charged Schultz with first-degree murder and illegal possession of a firearm. Schultz pleaded guilty to the firearm-possession charge. Following his trial for first-degree murder, the jury convicted Schultz as charged, and he now appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW The State and Schultz both agree that the standard of review on the jury-polling question is unresolved. The State argues this issue should be subject to abuse-of-discretion review, and Schultz argues we should review de novo. While district court decisions related to jury bias or misconduct are typically subject to review for abuse of discretion, see State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 231 (Iowa 2015), Schultz contends that his concern that the jurors’ impartiality may have been affected by outside information involves his constitutional right to a fair trial—which we generally review de novo, see State v. Christensen, 929 N.W.2d 646, 676 (Iowa 2019). The State cites to State v. Gathercole, where when faced with a similar question, our supreme court concluded that “[t]he determination whether [outside influence on the jury] is so prejudicial that further inquiry is necessary is within the trial court’s discretion.” 877 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). And to the extent that Gathercole is not dispositive as to the claim before us, the State collects several federal cases in which courts have applied abuse-of-discretion review to appeals alleging jury misconduct and outside influence. See United States v. Lanier, 870 F.3d 546, 549 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Penson, 62 F.3d 242, 244–45 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Angulo, 4 F.3d 843, 847 (9th Cir. 1993); Teniente v. 4 Wyoming Atty. Gen., 412 Fed. Appx. 96, 106 (10th Cir. 2011). Regardless, we would arrive at the same holding under either standard of review and save this question for another day. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See State v. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d 611, 620 (Iowa 2022). “A district court abuses its discretion when it bases its decisions on grounds or reasons clearly untenable or to an extent that is clearly unreasonable,” which include when “it bases its conclusions on an erroneous application of the law.” Id. DISCUSSION I. Denial of Request to Poll Jury Prior to opening statements, shortly before the commencement of the second day of trial, Juror 7 reported to the court, outside of the presence of the rest of the jury, that a woman had approached her earlier that morning. THE COURT: [C]an you explain again what you heard? JUROR 7: Something to the effect that she was a veteran and something about PTSD and he is guilty. Make sure he is guilty or something like that. THE COURT: Okay. Do you—do you attribute the person who made the comments to either side of this case? JUROR 7: Well, I would assume it would be on the family’s side of the case I would assume. I don’t— THE COURT: Why do you assume that? JUROR 7: Why would she say that he was guilty—State’s side, I’m sorry. THE COURT: Other than assuming, you don’t know who this person is associated with? JUROR 7: No. 5 THE COURT: Can you be fair and impartial to both sides despite this? JUROR 7: Yes. THE COURT: And is your mind still open as to hearing all of the evidence? JUROR 7: Yes. THE COURT: Can you still follow the instructions of the Court as to the law? JUROR 7: Yes. Schultz then requested to poll all the jurors to ascertain if Juror 7’s report “changes anything” or if they “may feel pressured” by the presence of the victim’s family in the courtroom. After hearing a response from the State, the court found that further examination of the jury was “unwarranted.” Schultz moved for mistrial, which the court also denied and explained: Obviously, in admonishing the jury, circumstances like this are contemplated, that a juror, as they are coming and going to the courthouse or to the jury deliberation room, may overhear other people speaking about the case. Further, there may be instances where people directly attempt to engage them about the case. The jurors were admonished that that was a possibility. They were instructed as to what to do if that were to happen, and I think in this circumstance [ Juror 7] did exactly what she was expected to do. And, again, at this point of the proceeding, there has been no showing that this has influenced the jury, and the Court finds and concludes there is no basis for a mistrial. And, so, that request is denied. 6 Schultz now appeals his conviction based on those denials by the court.1 In State v. Bigly, the supreme court adopted the position that “on motion of either party,” the court “shall . . . question each juror, out of the presence of the others, about” each juror’s exposure to the outside- influencing material if the potentially objectionable material (1) “goes beyond the record,” and (2) “ raises serious questions of possible prejudice.” 202 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Iowa 1972) (emphasis added). The supreme court later held that district court’s obligation to investigate misconduct, including incidents of outside influence, are dependent on the “unique facts of [the] case.” State v. Liggins, 978 N.W.2d 406, 417 (Iowa 2022). As the Gathercole court clarified, the district court’s investigatory duty is only triggered when potential misconduct “raises serious questions of possible prejudice.” 877 N.W.2d at 427. And that determination “is within the trial court’s discretion.”2 Id. (citation omitted). 1 The State contests error preservation on the basis that Schultz “never specified on what legal basis he made these [jury-polling] requests.” We disagree, as the court directly considered whether Schultz should be permitted to examine the jurors for the purpose of determining whether they had been affected by outside influence—the same basis for this present appeal. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Iowa 2012) (explaining that error is preserved where a court considers and necessarily rules on an issue, even when the reasoning is ‘incomplete or sparse’”). 2 Schultz proposes we should adopt an “irrebuttable presumption of prejudice when the State improperly obstructs the resolution of the jury’s impartiality.” Schultz does not explain how such a standard would be applicable to this case beyond suggesting that the State’s verbal resistance to his motion for mistrial and jury-polling request qualify as “obstruction.” We can find no case law supporting the position that entering an objection somehow inhibits the district court from fully exercising its power to consider the motion at issue. 7 Here, we are unconvinced that the individual’s actions in approaching Juror 7 raised a serious question of possible prejudice. The individual did not use threats, intimidation, or other forms of coercion. Juror 7 did not know who the individual was. Juror 7 did not even fully recall exactly what words the individual used and did not engage with the individual at all. From the record available to us, it appears the juror calmly walked away and promptly reported the interaction. Not only did no other juror interact with the individual, but the district court noted that “it was clear that [ Juror 7] was not the least bit afraid or shaken.” We cannot infer the remaining members of the jury would have been influenced by the interaction when Juror 7 barely understood what the individual had said to her. Neither the incident nor secondhand knowledge of the incident are “the kind of inflammatory disclosure with a strong likelihood of causing prejudice to [Schultz].” There was no error in the court’s decision to not poll the jury or grant a mistrial. II. Motion in Limine Midway through the third day of trial, the State moved in limine, requesting the court prohibit Schultz’s introduction of any evidence or testimony relating to the victim’s level of intoxication on the night of the murder. Noting that the motion was untimely, the district court nonetheless granted the motion, concluding “this would be a topic that would need to be addressed outside of the presence of the jury anyway. And, so, I would simply consider this . . . regular from a procedural standpoint.” Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.11(4) dictates that any motion in limine must be raised prior to trial. Rule 2.11(6) provides that the time for filing such motions is limited to “no later than 9 days before the trial date.” While “the court may establish different deadlines” on a party’s request, a motion in limine “must be raised prior to trial.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.11(4), (6). 8 If a motion in limine is sustained, the party seeking to introduce the evidence must make an offer of proof. Thoren, 970 N.W.2d at 621. “Error arises when the evidence is introduced at trial, not from ruling on the motion in limine.” Id. An exception to this rule applies when the district court makes clear its ruling on a motion in limine is a final evidentiary ruling. Id. There is no dispute that the State’s motion in limine was untimely: the district court admitted as much. But as our caselaw clarifies, error does not arise from the nonfinal ruling on the motion in limine—it comes from the final evidentiary ruling. So although the district court granted the State’s untimely motion, that grant did not deprive Schultz of his opportunity to attempt introduction of the intoxication evidence. He still attempted to introduce the evidence at trial and had the opportunity to make an offer of proof—just as he would have if the State had never moved in limine. Thus, we cannot say that the court’s decision to grant the motion due to timeliness concerns was in itself error. And even if we assume without deciding the court erred in not admitting the toxicology report, any such error would have been harmless when considering the circumstances under which Schultz committed the murder. Schultz willfully left interactions with the victim at multiple points. After their first interaction, he drove over twenty miles home, retrieved his firearm, and drove twenty miles back to the bar. After confronting the victim a second time, he again left the victim—for the second time that night, he had an opportunity to disengage. But he instead walked over to his vehicle, pulled a firearm out, walked back to the victim, and shot him in the face at point-blank range. Even “quarrelsome” behavior caused by the victim’s intoxication would permit a reasonable fact finder to conclude that Schultz committed first-degree murder under these facts. AFFIRMED. 9