In the Interest of L.M., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-2091 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of L.M., Minor Child, L.M., Minor Child, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Hardin County, The Honorable Paul G. Crawford, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Melissa A. Nine of Nine Law Office, Marshalltown, attorney for appellant minor child. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Katherine Wenman, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Buller, JJ. Opinion by Buller, J. 1 BULLER, Judge. L.M. appeals his adjudication as a juvenile delinquent for the acts of sexual abuse in the second degree and extortion. His sole challenge is the sufficiency of the evidence. Because substantial evidence supports the adjudication, we affirm. Thirteen-year-old L.M. was hanging out with his friend and football teammate J.H. (also a thirteen-year-old boy) when they invited L.C. (a twelve- year-old girl) to join them. L.C. rode her bike to join the boys at a park. At some point, the trio were all sitting down, and L.M. whispered to J.H. that J.H. should have sex with L.C.—and that if J.H. didn’t do so, L.M. would tell “everybody” at school that they had sex anyway. To J.H., spreading that rumor would’ve been bad, and he felt threatened or intimidated into having sex based on L.M.’s statements J.H. penetrated L.C.’s vagina with his penis, with L.M. nearby. The sex acts lasted at least five minutes, until a car drove past; after, J.H. ran home to his grandmother’s. According to L.C., she repeatedly told the boys she did not want to have sex and kept saying “no.” J.H. claimed he did not know L.C. didn’t want to have sex. After J.H. ran off, L.C. was left alone with L.M. L.M. dropped his shorts and asked L.C. to “suck his penis.” She told him “no,” but he pushed her onto her knees and guided her head onto his penis anyway. This sex act also lasted at least five minutes. Eventually a report was made to Eldora police through an anonymous reporting program. Officers interviewed L.M.; his version of events was that he saw J.H. and L.C. having sex and that L.C. rubbed his crotch, leading him to believe she wanted to perform oral sex on him. He testified similarly at 2 trial, at one point asserting he was the one who did not consent to sex and that L.C. was the aggressor. In rebuttal, L.C. testified that L.M. had performed nonconsensual sex acts on her previous to the event with J.H. The court adjudicated L.M. delinquent of sexual abuse in the second degree (as a principal) and extortion. Although the court recognized the State was not required to prove the sex act was done by force or against L.C.’s will due to her age, the court credited L.C.’s testimony as “more believable about the event being by force or against her will” based on her repeatedly saying “no” and the details of her testimony, particularly as compared to L.M.’s testimony. The court found sufficient evidence L.M. extorted J.H. based on the threat to tell others at school that J.H. and L.C. had sex. L.M. appeals the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the sexual- abuse and extortion counts. Our review is de novo, with deference to the fact- findings of the juvenile court, “especially” on questions of credibility. In re A.K., 825 N.W.2d 46, 49 (Iowa 2013). For the sexual-abuse count, L.M. claims this was a “he said, she said” case and asserts: “The ‘she said’ portion is not credible.” But, as our recent en banc decisions have made clear, appellate courts do not ordinarily substitute our credibility judgments for those of the lower courts. See State v. Lang, 30 N.W.3d 757, 766 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc); State v. Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d 502, 507–08 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). Even on de novo review, we give substantial deference to credibility findings. A.K., 825 N.W.2d at 49. And, even if we were empowered to substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court, we would decline to do so here: It was essentially undisputed that L.C. was below the age of consent and that L.M. engaged in a sex act with her; that satisfies the elements without any need for a credibility determination. See Iowa Code §§ 709.1, .3(1)(b) (2025). 3  For the extortion count, L.M. primarily argues that “[t]he only evidence that J.H. was threatened by L.M. came from J.H. and it was self- serving.” This is, again, a credibility challenge, and for the same reasons we decline to disturb the juvenile court’s findings. See A.K., 825 N.W.2d at 49; Lang, 30 N.W.3d at 766; Hernandez, 20 N.W.3d at 507–08. Although not entirely clear to us, a small passage of L.M.’s appellate brief could be read to challenge whether L.M. extorted J.H. for purposes of obtaining “anything of value, tangible or intangible.” The State’s theory at trial was that L.M. encouraged J.H. have sex with L.C. to make L.C. more receptive to L.M.’s sexual advances. That is a reasonable inference to draw about the reasoning of a thirteen-year-old boy on these facts, and we have little trouble concluding a thirteen-year-old boy could perceive an increased probability of engaging in a sex act to be “of value” to him. See Iowa Code § 711.4(1); State v. Crone, 545 N.W.2d 267, 272–73 (Iowa 1996), abrogated on other grounds by, State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 197–98 (Iowa 2022). AFFIRMED. 4