Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0626 Filed November 18, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Trent Lee Drollinger, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Van Buren County, The Honorable Clinton R. Boddicker, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Chicchelly, P.J., Buller, J., and Doyle, S.J. Opinion by Doyle, S.J. 1 DOYLE, Senior Judge. Shortly after midnight on Christmas day 2023, Trent Drollinger shot his wife, Danielle, in the head. Danielle survived. Trent claimed the shooting was accidental. But the State believed otherwise and charged him with attempted murder, a class “B” felony, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11(1), (2) (2023). Following a trial in which Danielle testified to the events of Christmas Eve and the aftermath, the jury rejected Trent’s claim that the shooting was accidental and convicted him as charged. Trent now appeals. He argues that the district court erred when it prohibited certain testimony as hearsay during the defense’s cross-examination of Danielle that would have showed that Danielle first stated the shooting was accidental and her belief only changed after officers suggested to her that it was intentional. I. Prior Proceedings We limit our factual recitation to only the relevant portions of the trial relating to defense counsel’s cross-examination of Danielle. Defense counsel questioned Danielle about her interview with two investigators a little over a week after the shooting. Danielle could not recall portions of the interview, explaining her memory from that time was impacted by the fact that she had been in a coma shortly before then and on powerful medication. Danielle was asked if she remembered telling law enforcement officers during the interview what Trent had said: “the fact that he was so sorry and that there wasn’t even a bullet in there?” Danielle responded, “Yes.” Then, defense counsel asked Danielle, “Do you remember what the officer told 2 you?” The prosecutor made a hearsay objection, and defense counsel responded: Your Honor, I’m not stating it for the truth of the matter asserted. I am simply talking about what would have been within the confines of the conversation and what would have been the flow for what she was simply going through and experiencing as she was in the midst of this investigation and simple interrogation. The district court overruled that objection and permitted Danielle to answer. Danielle responded, “If I remember correctly, he told me that if—when he pulled the slide [of the gun] back, nothing popped out, then he had to put something into the gun to load it.” At that point the prosecutor objected again, reiterating the hearsay objection and arguing that “[i]t’s speculation.” The court agreed that “[i]t does call for speculation.” And it sustained the objection. Defense counsel again provided rationale for why the defense wanted to ask the question, again focusing on why the defense believed the answer would not qualify as hearsay. The court noted the question would be more appropriate for the officer because defense counsel was asking Danielle “about a statement the [officer] made about some theory apparently that the [officer was] making” and reiterated that the objection was sustained. Defense counsel continued cross-examination, asking Danielle, “Following your statement, did [the officer] continue to describe his theories to you about what occurred?” She responded, “Not that I recall.” Defense counsel began another question that would have included what the officer purportedly said to Danielle, but the prosecutor interjected, arguing defense counsel was attempting to introduce hearsay and that Danielle “said she doesn’t remember it anyway, so there’s no—she has no personal knowledge of it.” The court stated, “the witness indicated she didn’t remember.” 3 Defense counsel asked to make a record outside the jury’s presence, and the court obliged. Once the jury was outside the courtroom, defense counsel explained, “at this time we are, again, not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted. My question was not going to be specifically what the officer said. I was asking her—.” But before defense counsel could finish, the court interjected as follows: “No. Wait a minute. Your question didn’t have to be what the officer said because you were telling everybody what the officer said. Your question told everybody what the officer said. So how is it not about what the officer said?” Then the following exchange occurred between defense counsel, the court, and the prosecutor: DEFENSE COUNSEL: But, again, I’m not asking for the truth of the matter asserted. It is not hearsay. I wanted to ask in reference to where his reply was to her. I am dealing with asking her about the questions as we are moving forward. I asked her the question about what she had said and then he has responded to her with what his theory was, and I was simply asking her if he provided her his theory. The objection that the State then gave was that she stated she did not know what his theory was. She had already previously stated in her response that he objected to that she did understand or didn’t know what it was, so that’s not the case. And I guess if we’re going back now and saying that it is hearsay or we’re going back and saying that it is something that is objectionable, this is one of the largest theories of our case because it is our theory that law enforcement and their leading statements on January 5th have somehow dealt with her—the reliability of her memory. And that is why we are dealing with not necessarily what was said but just simply how they are responding to the statements that she’s making. So as she’s giving her statements, he is responding with his theories and so that is why we—we’re responding with the questions that we are asking her. So I’m not asking the court to grant us to provide hearsay. I’m not asking for the court to allow for the matter asserted to come in. It’s not for the truth of the matter asserted and it’s not something that she has a 4 lack of knowledge of. She’s already testified in her answer previously before he entered his second objection. THE COURT: But aren’t you asking—first of all, she’s already answered the question. She said she doesn’t recall. It doesn’t appear to me that you’re trying to impeach her with anything in any sort of proper— or by any sort of proper impeachment method. It doesn’t seem to me that you’re trying to refresh her recollection. She’s testified she doesn’t recall. And the question that you’re asking her is to comment about some speculation that [the officer] made. So if you have questions about [the officer]’s theories, why wouldn’t you ask [the officer] that instead of somebody who’s testified in open court that she doesn’t recall? DEFENSE COUNSEL: And we intend to refresh her recollection on multiple things, Your Honor, but I intend to do it all at once. I’m not going to cause her to come back and forth out of the courtroom. I have a few things already that I intend to do that on, but I was not going to require her to come back and forth out of the courtroom. I do have the recording of this particular interview. I’m just not going to require her to walk in and out of the courtroom to refresh her recollection on multiple sections of a recording and have it be all at once. That’s my intent is to cue up multiple stages of the recording instead of having her do it multiple times leaving the courtroom so I can go through it and do it that way. I just do not intend to take her out of the courtroom ten times in a way that would be not fair to her. THE COURT: All right. [Prosecutor], response? THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, I think you’ve already identified the basis of our objection. We would stand on that. If [the officer] had theories or whatever it was he was saying in the interview—first of all, [Danielle] says she doesn’t recall. I mean, we’re getting into the weeds of the statements that she may have been, you know, present in a hospital room where she had just received a fairly serious head injury and treatment and the officers are talking to her. So I think I would stand on the lack of personal knowledge and hearsay. So we would stand on those objections as the court has already identified as well. So that’s it. THE COURT: Well, the objection’s sustained. I think you can ask these questions in a different way. But if she says she doesn’t recall, there’s a remedy available to you for a witness who doesn’t recall something. So 5 you should use that remedy if that’s what you want to do. The objection’s sustained. The jury returned to the courtroom, and defense counsel continued to cross- examine Danielle. Defense counsel never called either officer to testify. II. Discussion Now we turn to Trent’s appellate claim that the district court erred in excluding certain portions of Danielle’s cross-examination as eliciting hearsay. We typically review evidentiary challenges for an abuse of discretion, but we review hearsay rulings for legal error. See State v. Dessinger, 958 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2021). “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial offered in evidence to prove the matter asserted.” State v. Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up). What the officer said to Danielle when interviewing her clearly amounts to an out-of-court statement, but Trent insists that he was not seeking to admit it for the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, he only sought to establish that Danielle’s belief as to whether the shooting was accidental shifted after the officers theorized otherwise to her. And statements offered for some other reason besides the truth of the matter asserted are not to be prohibited as hearsay, though they may be excluded on some other relevant ground. See id. Trent’s claims run into several practical problems. The first time the prosecutor raised a hearsay objection, the district court overruled the objection and allowed Danielle to answer. The second time that the prosecutor objected, it was based on both hearsay and that the answer called for speculation. When the court sustained the objection, it did so because the question called for speculation, not on the basis of hearsay. When the prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s attempt to couch what the officer 6 said to Danielle within the body of the question, the prosecutor based the objection both on hearsay grounds and lack of personal knowledge. And the district court sustained the objection without limiting the basis for its ruling. So the sustained hearsay objections were also coupled with other objections that Trent does not challenge on appeal. But even if the district court should have permitted the questioning and testimony over the prosecutor’s objections, Trent is not entitled to relief because the omission did not impact his substantial rights. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103(a); Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 153–54. Because the purported evidentiary error does not amount to a constitutional violation, we apply a harmless-error analysis. State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006). “To determine whether the error is harmless we ask: ‘Does it sufficiently appear that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the error or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice?’” Id. (cleaned up). “We presume prejudice—that is, a substantial right of the defendant is affected— and reverse unless the record affirmatively establishes otherwise.” Id. (cleaned up). From the evidence presented at the trial, Trent’s substantial rights were not affected, obviating the need for reversal. First, the jury still knew his claim was that the shooting was accidental and Danielle initially believed so as well.1 Plus Danielle answered defense counsel’s first question about what the officer told her when she was interviewed in the hospital. And even if counsel completed the question that included what the officer purportedly said, Danielle made clear that her memory from that day was not good and said that she did not recall any additional information about what the officer said beyond her initial response. Even had counsel completed the question 1 Danielle can be heard in the background of a 911 call saying, “I don’t blame you.” 7 and Danielle answered it, it would not have added much. The jury had already heard that the officer had offered up information to Danielle to cast doubt on any belief she still had that the shooting was accidental. And the evidence that Trent intended to shoot Danielle is strong. See Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 154–55 (considering strength of evidence of the defendant’s intent to kill when concluding that erroneous exclusion of evidence as hearsay was not prejudicial). Audio from a recording taken by Danielle in the days leading up to the shooting captured Trent degrading Danielle and threatening to physically harm her. He told her to “just shut up or fucking die.” He can be heard talking about how he wants to beat and kick her. And, most disturbingly, he says that he wants to shoot her in the head using the type of gun he used in the shooting. He warned her, “I will be the last thing you see.” And he said he would “blow a fucking hole through [her] fucking forehead.” At trial, Danielle explained what happened on Christmas Eve just before the shooting. Trent was angry with her. He walked in the room and told her, “[T]he last thing you see before you die is me shooting you in the fucking head.” He picked up the gun, held it to his shoulder, pulled back the slide on the gun, and pointed it at her. She turned away and tucked her chin down. She closed her eyes, heard the gunshot, and felt it hit the back of her head. And the physical evidence contradicted Trent’s claim that the shooting was accidental. Trent told a first responder that he threw the gun up against the wall and the guns in the room had fallen over. 2 But an investigator with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation’s Criminalistics Laboratory explained that projectile mapping showed that the bullet had to 2 Photos of the crime scene show several long guns on the floor and propped up against the wall with their butts on the floor. 8 have been discharged at a downward angle originating at four feet, eight and a half inches off the ground. So we conclude that Trent is not entitled to any relief and affirm his conviction for attempted murder. AFFIRMED. 9