State of Iowa v. Trent Lee Drollinger
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-0626
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0626
Filed November 18, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Trent Lee Drollinger,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Van Buren County,
The Honorable Clinton R. Boddicker, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee.
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Considered without oral argument
by Chicchelly, P.J., Buller, J., and Doyle, S.J.
Opinion by Doyle, S.J.
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DOYLE, Senior Judge.
Shortly after midnight on Christmas day 2023, Trent Drollinger shot
his wife, Danielle, in the head. Danielle survived. Trent claimed the
shooting was accidental. But the State believed otherwise and charged him
with attempted murder, a class “B” felony, in violation of Iowa Code
section 707.11(1), (2) (2023). Following a trial in which Danielle testified to
the events of Christmas Eve and the aftermath, the jury rejected Trent’s
claim that the shooting was accidental and convicted him as charged. Trent
now appeals. He argues that the district court erred when it prohibited
certain testimony as hearsay during the defense’s cross-examination of
Danielle that would have showed that Danielle first stated the shooting was
accidental and her belief only changed after officers suggested to her that it
was intentional.
I. Prior Proceedings
We limit our factual recitation to only the relevant portions of the trial
relating to defense counsel’s cross-examination of Danielle.
Defense counsel questioned Danielle about her interview with two
investigators a little over a week after the shooting. Danielle could not recall
portions of the interview, explaining her memory from that time was
impacted by the fact that she had been in a coma shortly before then and on
powerful medication.
Danielle was asked if she remembered telling law enforcement officers
during the interview what Trent had said: “the fact that he was so sorry and
that there wasn’t even a bullet in there?” Danielle responded, “Yes.” Then,
defense counsel asked Danielle, “Do you remember what the officer told
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you?” The prosecutor made a hearsay objection, and defense counsel
responded:
Your Honor, I’m not stating it for the truth of the matter asserted.
I am simply talking about what would have been within the confines of the
conversation and what would have been the flow for what she was simply
going through and experiencing as she was in the midst of this investigation
and simple interrogation.
The district court overruled that objection and permitted Danielle to answer.
Danielle responded, “If I remember correctly, he told me that if—when he
pulled the slide [of the gun] back, nothing popped out, then he had to put
something into the gun to load it.” At that point the prosecutor objected
again, reiterating the hearsay objection and arguing that “[i]t’s speculation.”
The court agreed that “[i]t does call for speculation.” And it sustained the
objection. Defense counsel again provided rationale for why the defense
wanted to ask the question, again focusing on why the defense believed the
answer would not qualify as hearsay. The court noted the question would be
more appropriate for the officer because defense counsel was asking Danielle
“about a statement the [officer] made about some theory apparently that the
[officer was] making” and reiterated that the objection was sustained.
Defense counsel continued cross-examination, asking Danielle,
“Following your statement, did [the officer] continue to describe his theories
to you about what occurred?” She responded, “Not that I recall.” Defense
counsel began another question that would have included what the officer
purportedly said to Danielle, but the prosecutor interjected, arguing defense
counsel was attempting to introduce hearsay and that Danielle “said she
doesn’t remember it anyway, so there’s no—she has no personal knowledge
of it.” The court stated, “the witness indicated she didn’t remember.”
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Defense counsel asked to make a record outside the jury’s presence, and the
court obliged.
Once the jury was outside the courtroom, defense counsel explained,
“at this time we are, again, not offering it for the truth of the matter asserted.
My question was not going to be specifically what the officer said. I was
asking her—.” But before defense counsel could finish, the court interjected
as follows: “No. Wait a minute. Your question didn’t have to be what the
officer said because you were telling everybody what the officer said. Your
question told everybody what the officer said. So how is it not about what the
officer said?” Then the following exchange occurred between defense
counsel, the court, and the prosecutor:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: But, again, I’m not asking for the truth of
the matter asserted. It is not hearsay. I wanted to ask in reference to where
his reply was to her. I am dealing with asking her about the questions as
we are moving forward. I asked her the question about what she had said
and then he has responded to her with what his theory was, and I was
simply asking her if he provided her his theory. The objection that the
State then gave was that she stated she did not know what his theory was.
She had already previously stated in her response that he objected to that
she did understand or didn’t know what it was, so that’s not the case.
And I guess if we’re going back now and saying that it is hearsay or
we’re going back and saying that it is something that is objectionable, this
is one of the largest theories of our case because it is our theory that law
enforcement and their leading statements on January 5th have somehow
dealt with her—the reliability of her memory. And that is why we are
dealing with not necessarily what was said but just simply how they are
responding to the statements that she’s making.
So as she’s giving her statements, he is responding with his theories
and so that is why we—we’re responding with the questions that we are
asking her. So I’m not asking the court to grant us to provide hearsay. I’m
not asking for the court to allow for the matter asserted to come in. It’s not
for the truth of the matter asserted and it’s not something that she has a
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lack of knowledge of. She’s already testified in her answer previously
before he entered his second objection.
THE COURT: But aren’t you asking—first of all, she’s already
answered the question. She said she doesn’t recall. It doesn’t appear to
me that you’re trying to impeach her with anything in any sort of proper—
or by any sort of proper impeachment method. It doesn’t seem to me that
you’re trying to refresh her recollection. She’s testified she doesn’t recall.
And the question that you’re asking her is to comment about some
speculation that [the officer] made. So if you have questions about [the
officer]’s theories, why wouldn’t you ask [the officer] that instead of
somebody who’s testified in open court that she doesn’t recall?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: And we intend to refresh her recollection
on multiple things, Your Honor, but I intend to do it all at once. I’m not
going to cause her to come back and forth out of the courtroom. I have a
few things already that I intend to do that on, but I was not going to require
her to come back and forth out of the courtroom.
I do have the recording of this particular interview. I’m just not
going to require her to walk in and out of the courtroom to refresh her
recollection on multiple sections of a recording and have it be all at once.
That’s my intent is to cue up multiple stages of the recording instead of
having her do it multiple times leaving the courtroom so I can go through
it and do it that way. I just do not intend to take her out of the courtroom
ten times in a way that would be not fair to her.
THE COURT: All right. [Prosecutor], response?
THE PROSECUTOR: Judge, I think you’ve already identified the
basis of our objection. We would stand on that. If [the officer] had theories
or whatever it was he was saying in the interview—first of all, [Danielle]
says she doesn’t recall. I mean, we’re getting into the weeds of the
statements that she may have been, you know, present in a hospital room
where she had just received a fairly serious head injury and treatment and
the officers are talking to her. So I think I would stand on the lack of
personal knowledge and hearsay. So we would stand on those objections
as the court has already identified as well. So that’s it.
THE COURT: Well, the objection’s sustained. I think you can ask
these questions in a different way. But if she says she doesn’t recall, there’s
a remedy available to you for a witness who doesn’t recall something. So
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you should use that remedy if that’s what you want to do. The objection’s
sustained.
The jury returned to the courtroom, and defense counsel continued to cross-
examine Danielle. Defense counsel never called either officer to testify.
II. Discussion
Now we turn to Trent’s appellate claim that the district court erred in
excluding certain portions of Danielle’s cross-examination as eliciting
hearsay. We typically review evidentiary challenges for an abuse of
discretion, but we review hearsay rulings for legal error. See State v. Dessinger,
958 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2021).
“Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial offered in evidence to prove the matter asserted.” State
v. Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d 141, 151 (Iowa 2023) (cleaned up). What the officer
said to Danielle when interviewing her clearly amounts to an out-of-court
statement, but Trent insists that he was not seeking to admit it for the truth
of the matter asserted. Rather, he only sought to establish that Danielle’s
belief as to whether the shooting was accidental shifted after the officers
theorized otherwise to her. And statements offered for some other reason
besides the truth of the matter asserted are not to be prohibited as hearsay,
though they may be excluded on some other relevant ground. See id.
Trent’s claims run into several practical problems. The first time the
prosecutor raised a hearsay objection, the district court overruled the
objection and allowed Danielle to answer. The second time that the
prosecutor objected, it was based on both hearsay and that the answer called
for speculation. When the court sustained the objection, it did so because
the question called for speculation, not on the basis of hearsay. When the
prosecutor objected to defense counsel’s attempt to couch what the officer
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said to Danielle within the body of the question, the prosecutor based the
objection both on hearsay grounds and lack of personal knowledge. And the
district court sustained the objection without limiting the basis for its ruling.
So the sustained hearsay objections were also coupled with other objections
that Trent does not challenge on appeal.
But even if the district court should have permitted the questioning
and testimony over the prosecutor’s objections, Trent is not entitled to relief
because the omission did not impact his substantial rights. See Iowa R.
Evid. 5.103(a); Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 153–54. Because the purported
evidentiary error does not amount to a constitutional violation, we apply a
harmless-error analysis. State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 19 (Iowa 2006). “To
determine whether the error is harmless we ask: ‘Does it sufficiently appear
that the rights of the complaining party have been injuriously affected by the
error or that he has suffered a miscarriage of justice?’” Id. (cleaned up). “We
presume prejudice—that is, a substantial right of the defendant is affected—
and reverse unless the record affirmatively establishes otherwise.” Id.
(cleaned up).
From the evidence presented at the trial, Trent’s substantial rights
were not affected, obviating the need for reversal. First, the jury still knew
his claim was that the shooting was accidental and Danielle initially believed
so as well.1 Plus Danielle answered defense counsel’s first question about
what the officer told her when she was interviewed in the hospital. And even
if counsel completed the question that included what the officer purportedly
said, Danielle made clear that her memory from that day was not good and
said that she did not recall any additional information about what the officer
said beyond her initial response. Even had counsel completed the question
1
Danielle can be heard in the background of a 911 call saying, “I don’t blame you.”
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and Danielle answered it, it would not have added much. The jury had
already heard that the officer had offered up information to Danielle to cast
doubt on any belief she still had that the shooting was accidental.
And the evidence that Trent intended to shoot Danielle is strong. See
Krogmann, 998 N.W.2d at 154–55 (considering strength of evidence of the
defendant’s intent to kill when concluding that erroneous exclusion of
evidence as hearsay was not prejudicial). Audio from a recording taken by
Danielle in the days leading up to the shooting captured Trent degrading
Danielle and threatening to physically harm her. He told her to “just shut up
or fucking die.” He can be heard talking about how he wants to beat and kick
her. And, most disturbingly, he says that he wants to shoot her in the head
using the type of gun he used in the shooting. He warned her, “I will be the
last thing you see.” And he said he would “blow a fucking hole through [her]
fucking forehead.” At trial, Danielle explained what happened on Christmas
Eve just before the shooting. Trent was angry with her. He walked in the
room and told her, “[T]he last thing you see before you die is me shooting
you in the fucking head.” He picked up the gun, held it to his shoulder, pulled
back the slide on the gun, and pointed it at her. She turned away and tucked
her chin down. She closed her eyes, heard the gunshot, and felt it hit the back
of her head.
And the physical evidence contradicted Trent’s claim that the
shooting was accidental. Trent told a first responder that he threw the gun
up against the wall and the guns in the room had fallen over. 2 But an
investigator with the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation’s Criminalistics
Laboratory explained that projectile mapping showed that the bullet had to
2
Photos of the crime scene show several long guns on the floor and propped up
against the wall with their butts on the floor.
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have been discharged at a downward angle originating at four feet, eight and
a half inches off the ground.
So we conclude that Trent is not entitled to any relief and affirm his
conviction for attempted murder.
AFFIRMED.
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