State of Iowa v. Thang Ding
CourtCourt of Appeals of Iowa
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket25-0926
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 25-0926
Filed November 18, 2026
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State of Iowa,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v.
Thang Ding,
Defendant–Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County,
The Honorable John J. Sullivan, Judge.
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AFFIRMED
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Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, attorneys for appellant.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester and Travis
Conder, Assistant Attorneys General, attorneys for appellee.
W. Charles Smithson, West Des Moines, attorney for amici curiae.
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Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Telleen, S.J.
Opinion by Telleen, S.J.
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TELLEEN, Senior Judge.
Thang Ding appeals from his conviction for first-degree kidnapping,
arguing the district court abused its discretion in permitting an expert
witness’s testimony, insufficient evidence supports the conviction, and Iowa
Code section 814.28 (2024) is unconstitutional. Because the district court
did not abuse its discretion and sufficient evidence supports his conviction,
we affirm. And because sufficient evidence supports Ding’s conviction under
each of the State’s submitted first-degree kidnapping theories, we do not
reach his constitutional challenge.
BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Ding lived with the victim, L.E., in Brandon, Iowa. The two also lived
with the victim’s aunt, Veronica, and Veronica’s mother-in-law, Pauline.
Both Veronica and Pauline required in-home care due to physical disability
and dementia/Alzheimer’s disease, respectively. Veronica and Pauline lived
on the first floor due to their health issues, and the victim provided them with
the care necessary to safely live in the home. Ding and the victim occupied
an upstairs bedroom, while Veronica and Pauline ordinarily remained
downstairs because they could not climb the stairs.
The victim described her relationship with Ding as dysfunctional and
often violent. Over the five years they were together “off and on” again, Ding
committed multiple acts of violence against the victim, including an incident
during which Ding punched the victim in the face and sent her to the hospital
where she received stitches. A no-contact order was put in place following
this assault by Ding. The victim testified that her physician told her that this
incident will cause her to go blind in one eye in “about five to six years.”
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On December 24, 2024, the victim returned from Christmas errands
and was confronted by Ding, who accused her of infidelity, produced a
recording device he had hidden in her vehicle, and disclosed that he had
monitored her location by GPS. The victim testified that, when she denied
having an affair, Ding slapped her, threatened her, and repeatedly punched
her in the ribs and near her left ear. According to the victim, Ding also
whipped her back, legs, and hand with a phone-charging cord, struck her
head with a screwdriver handle, punched and choked her, and tapped a
handgun’s barrel against her forehead while threatening to kill her and
himself. The victim testified that, whenever she attempted to leave the
bedroom, Ding moved to the door, ordered her to sit down, and threatened
that matters would become worse; she remained awake while he slept
because she did not trust him and believed leaving was not an option.
The following morning, Ding resumed accusing the victim of
infidelity, slapped her, pulled her hair, threw her onto the bed, and prevented
the victim from leaving until Veronica repeatedly called for her. The victim
eventually fabricated the name of a supposed partner because she wanted the
assaults to stop. Ding also denied her access to the downstairs bathroom,
causing the victim to urinate on bedding in an upstairs bedroom.
Ding directed the victim to contact the fabricated partner and obtain
money from him. Ding threatened that if she did not obtain employment and
pay him, Ding would sell her to other men for sexual services. After
accompanying the victim to purchase cigarettes on December 26, Ding
forced her to identify the location where she supposedly had met the
fictitious partner. The victim selected a rest area, where Ding initiated sex;
she testified that she did not want sex but believed her feelings no longer
mattered.
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The victim also testified that Ding demanded $14,000, selected a dress
for her, and took her to two bars with instructions to sell her sexual services
to others. At each bar, she avoided doing so by remaining in the bathroom
and later telling Ding that no suitable customer was available. A disinterested
witness recalled seeing an unfamiliar woman matching the victim’s general
description enter the Rush Park Tavern on December 27 between
approximately 6:00 and 8:00 p.m., ask for the bathroom, and later walk in
front of the bar.
Ding later required the victim to masturbate while he recorded her,
despite her objection, and discussed posting the recording online to make
money; she wore a mask because she did not want to be recognized. The
evidence included a false profile using the victim’s photograph, screenshots
of phone numbers Ding allegedly investigated because he suspected her of
infidelity, and a message containing the recording. The victim testified that
Ding controlled her cellphone and created accounts in her name to
communicate with men while posing as her. Investigators later obtained
records for a Facebook account created in the victim’s name that she denied
creating; the associated telephone number belonged to an iPhone in Ding’s
possession and was the number Ding provided during jail booking.
On the morning of December 28, Ding punched the victim, strangled
her while her head hung off the bed, attacked her injured hip, placed her in a
chokehold, and caused her to lose consciousness. After Ding permitted the
victim to take her dog outside, she concluded that either he would kill her or
she would kill him and secretly wrote Veronica a note stating that police
needed to be called because Ding was going to kill her and had a gun. The
victim concealed the note in a bag of candy, handed it to Veronica, and
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returned upstairs to avoid alerting Ding; Veronica then went outside and
called the police.
Deputy Blake Gallery responded to a report of a domestic assault
involving a firearm, encountered the victim visibly upset, nervous, and
shaken, and detained Ding without resistance after calling him downstairs.
Deputy Ben Ward found the victim visibly shaking, crying, and speaking
quietly; the victim reported that Ding had assaulted her and intended to kill
her, and she stated that she still did not feel safe after learning that Ding had
been handcuffed and placed in a patrol vehicle.
Ward observed and photographed marks or bruising on the victim’s
face, neck, arms, shoulders, ribs, back, legs, and knee, as well as a bleeding
toe and a cut inside her mouth. A medical examination revealed bruising
around the victim’s neck, a large bruise on her flank or side, bruising near an
armpit, and bruising along a leg; the examining physician assistant testified
that these injuries were consistent with the victim’s account. The victim’s
head examination revealed no outward trauma, her head CT scan was
normal, and the examiner did not consider neck imaging necessary based on
her clinical presentation. Officers found a loaded handgun on a clothes-
hamper rack in the upstairs bedroom shared by Ding and the victim. Three
phones were found together on the bed; investigators extracted data from
Ding’s two cellphones but did not extract or retain the victim’s cellphone.
The victim acknowledged uncertainty about the precise date of some
events because the days ran together, but she maintained that the events she
described occurred between December 24 and December 28. Ding was
ultimately charged with one count each of first-degree kidnapping,
possession of a firearm by a felon, and possession of ammunition by a
domestic-abuse offender, and three counts of assault committed by a person
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against whom a protective order is issued. Ding was also charged with human
trafficking, but that charge was dropped on March 19, 2025—the first day of
trial. The State relied on multiple theories for Ding’s kidnapping charge: that
he confined or moved the victim with the specific intent to “hold [her] for
ransom”; or “inflict serious injury upon” her; or “subject [her] to sexual
abuse”; or “secretly confine [her].” The State also argued the victim “was
subjected to torture”; or “was sexually abused.” The jury instructions
permitted the jury to arrive at a general verdict which “does not require each
juror to agree as to which theory or fact leads to his or her verdict” when
“two or more alternative theories are presented” or “where two or more
facts would produce the same result.” Ding waived his right to testify,
presented no evidence, and rested after the State completed its case.
Prior to trial, on March 9, the State filed additional minutes of
testimony, naming witness Teresa Davidson as “an expert in the field of
human trafficking” who would “provide expert testimony regarding human
trafficking” and “testify, generally, to the dynamics of the relationship
between traffickers and their victims.” The State described that the
testimony would extend to “any other relevant information that will help
aid[] the jury in understanding human trafficking.”
Following the State’s March 19 dismissal of the human-trafficking
charge, Ding requested on March 20 that any evidence related to trafficking
be excluded. The district court permitted trafficking evidence, determining
that the alleged forced sex work during the kidnapping and “discussed by the
state are inextricably intertwined” with themes of trafficking, but it directed
that the jury be admonished against finding guilt based on other bad acts. The
court continued to clarify that Ding could “make further record” as to the
admissibility of the expert’s testimony as those issues came up. Ding objected
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when Davidson was called to testify on March 24, arguing he lacked notice
due to the dismissal of the trafficking charge and considering Davidson’s
testimony’s purpose was to further that charge. Ding thus argued the
trafficking testimony was irrelevant. On March 25, the court ruled on the
objection—permitting Davidson to testify.
The jury found Ding guilty of one count each of first-degree
kidnapping, possession of a firearm by a felon, possession of ammunition by
a domestic-abuse offender, and three counts of assault committed by a person
subject to a protective order. The kidnapping charge was submitted under
alternative theories, and the jury returned a general verdict. The district
court denied Ding’s motion for a new trial. The court sentenced him to life
imprisonment without parole for first-degree kidnapping and concurrent
five-year terms on each remaining count, all concurrent with the life
sentence.
On appeal, Ding challenges the admission of Teresa Davidson’s expert
testimony, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his first-degree-
kidnapping conviction, and the constitutionality of Iowa Code
section 814.28.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review challenges to evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.
State v. Neiderbach, 837 N.W.2d 180, 190 (Iowa 2013); Heinz v. Heinz, 653
N.W.2d 334, 338 (Iowa 2002).
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for corrections
of legal error. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189, 202 (Iowa 2022). “In
conducting that review, we are highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. The
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jury’s verdict binds this court if the verdict is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id.
DISCUSSION
Ding argues that the district court erred in permitting the State to
introduce testimony from Teresa Davidson, who had been minuted as an
expert on human trafficking, given that the human-trafficking charge was
dismissed before trial. He contends the minutes of testimony created a lack
of notice and her testimony was not relevant and any probative value was
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
I. Teresa Davidson’s Testimony
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5(3) requires that the “minutes . . .
state the name and occupation of each witness upon whose expected
testimony the [trial] information is based and a full and fair statement of the
testimony.” The intent of this rule is to “provide meaningful minutes from
which a defense [can] be prepared.” State v. Walker, 281 N.W.2d 612, 613
(Iowa 1979).
Ding contends that the State’s minutes, which detailed that Davidson
would “[p]rovide expert testimony regarding human trafficking,” “testify,
generally, to the dynamics of the relationship between traffickers and their
victims,” including how traffickers obtain and groom their victims, as well as
provide “any other relevant information that will help aid the jury in
understanding human trafficking,” provided inadequate notice regarding her
testimony considering that the human-trafficking charge was ultimately
dropped. But as the State observes, rule 2.5(3) does not require that the
minutes cleanly limit specific testimony to specific offenses. And the court
specifically pointed out at the time it was considering the admission of
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trafficking evidence that the alleged forced sex work during the kidnapping
and “discussed by the state are inextricably intertwined” with themes of
trafficking. This means that regardless of the trafficking charge, “themes of
trafficking” are necessarily raised by Ding purportedly using trafficking
methods and relationship dynamics to commit the crime of first-degree
kidnapping. That was always the State’s theory of the case as it related to the
kidnapping charge.
II. Relevance and Danger of Unfair Prejudice
Evidence must be relevant to be admissible, and evidence is relevant if
it “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be
without the evidence” and “[t]he fact is of consequence in determining the
action.” Iowa Rs. Evid. 5.401, 5.402. The test for relevance is “not a high
bar,” and courts have “broad discretion” when considering admissibility.
Godfrey v. State, 962 N.W.2d 84, 119 (Iowa 2021) (Appel, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
But not all relevant evidence is admissible, as the district “court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. “Unfair prejudice
arises when the evidence would cause the jury to base its decision on
something other than the proven facts and applicable law, such as sympathy
for one party or a desire to punish a party.” State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116,
124 (Iowa 2004).
Here, Ding contends that the testimony of a trafficking expert is
unduly prejudicial because use of such an expert implies to the fact finder
that he was engaged in the “group venture” of human trafficking when he
was only alleged to have been “pimping or pandering” a single victim. But
Ding does not argue that Davidson suggested at any point that he participated
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in a larger group venture. Rather, she testified as to how very specific
trafficking methods can be used by a trafficker against individuals, which
would apply here where Ding was accused by the State of using trafficking
behaviors to groom and kidnap L.E., individually.
Ding does not describe how any of Davidson’s testimony about
trafficking behaviors would be inapplicable when applied to a defendant
accused of kidnapping and assaulting a victim as Ding did. Indeed,
Davidson’s testimony was directly relevant to the State’s case: that abusers
target vulnerable people by creating dependency and isolation, that the abuse
begins with “love-bombing” and ends with mental and/or physical abuse,
that the abuse gradually ratchets into commercial sex through a series of small
escalations, and that victims do not leave because they cannot see themselves
as victims. All those assertions are directly relevant to the allegations made
against Ding, and Davidson’s knowledge relating to group traffickers does not
automatically cause her testimony to create unfair prejudice.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Ding contends the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him
of first-degree kidnapping under any of the State’s alternative theories. The
theories the State relied on included that Ding moved or confined the victim
with the specific intent to “hold [her] for ransom”; or “inflict serious injury
upon” her; or “subject [her] to sexual abuse”; or “secretly confine [her].”
The State also argued the victim “was subjected to torture”; or “was sexually
abused.” We consider each alternative theory the State relied upon.
A. Move or Confine the Victim
The jury instructions defined confinement as follows:
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As used in these instructions, confinement requires more than
what is included in the commission of the crime of sexual abuse.
A person is ʻconfined’ when her freedom to move about is
substantially restricted by force, threat, or deception. The person may be
confined either in the place where the restriction began or in a place to
which she has been removed. No minimum time of confinement or
distance of removal is required. It must be more than slight. The
confinement must have significance apart from the sexual abuse.
In determining whether confinement exists, you may consider
whether:
1. The risk of harm to [the victim] was substantially increased.
2. The risk of detection was significantly reduced.
3. Escape was made significantly easier.
The State presented sufficient evidence of confinement. The victim
testified that Ding directed her to close the bedroom door, blocked her when
she approached it, ordered her to sit down, refused to let her use the
downstairs bathroom, and caused her to urinate on clothing in an adjoining
room three times during Christmas Eve and into Christmas Day. That control
was continuing: Ding repeatedly threatened the victim with a handgun,
retained her phone, accompanied her when she left the house, and generally
permitted her to leave the bedroom only to care for other household
members. And these acts were not merely incidental to the assaults, rather,
the prolonged bedroom confinement reduced detection, enabled the violence
to escalate, and substantially increased the victim’s risk of harm. The
Christmas Eve assault lasted for hours, while the December 27 to 28
confinements culminated in Ding strangling the victim until she lost
consciousness.
Likewise, the State presented sufficient evidence for removal. The
victim’s testimony reflected that Ding demanded money for her freedom,
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directed her to obtain it through prostitution, and forced her to go to two bars
in Independence, Iowa against her will.
B. Specific-Intent Theories
Intent to hold the victim for ransom: The State’s theory was that Ding
demanded an amount that increased from $4,000 to $14,000 as the price of
the victim being free from him. Evidence supporting that theory included the
victim’s testimony that Ding told her that she would have to pay him to leave
the home and forced her to visit bars to obtain the money through various
acts of prostitution priced between $20 and $150.
Intent to inflict serious injury: Evidence supporting this theory
included repeated punching, slapping, hair pulling, whipping with a charging
cord, striking the victim’s head with a screwdriver handle, pointing a gun at
her for five to ten minutes, and choking her. Most significantly, Ding
strangled the victim at least three times, including once until she could not
breathe and lost consciousness; the State argued that cutting off blood and
oxygen to the brain created a substantial risk of death and demonstrated the
intent and ability to inflict serious injury or death. Medical evidence included
bruising around the victim’s neck, a large flank bruise, bruising beneath an
armpit, and linear bruising on her leg; the emergency-room provider testified
that the injuries were consistent with her account and that flank bruising
generally requires extensive trauma.
Intent to subject the victim to sexual abuse: Ding told the victim she
would make him money “whether you like it or not” and then directed her to
masturbate while he recorded her behind the closed bedroom door. The
victim also testified that Ding initiated intercourse without asking; although
she said he did not physically force her, she did not want the intercourse,
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believed her wishes no longer mattered, and simply wanted the episode to
end. The court found this evidence generated a jury question on sexual abuse
because the victim described unwanted sexual activity undertaken after she
had been beaten down and because Ding forced her to create a masturbation
video intended to generate money online.
Intent to secretly confine the victim: The State’s theory was that Ding
kept the victim in the upstairs bedroom so the downstairs residents would
not know she was being beaten, strangled, whipped, and threatened.
Supporting evidence showed that Ding committed the abuse away from the
other residents, instructed the victim to remain quiet, prevented her from
using the downstairs bathroom, and required her to conceal facial injuries
with makeup. When Veronica heard thumping, she was told the victim had
fallen or that the dog had caused the noise; the victim ultimately hid a written
request for police assistance in the trash so Ding would not discover it.
C. First-Degree Result Theories
Torture: The jury instruction defined torture as “the intentional
infliction of severe physical or mental pain.” Substantial evidence consisted
of the cumulative proof of repeated assaults over several days, firearm
threats, whipping the victim’s legs with a charging cord, blows to the head
with a screwdriver handle, choking her to possible unconsciousness, coercive
demands that the victim prostitute herself, and compelled production of a
pornographic video. Evidence of severe mental pain included the victim’s
continuing terror after police arrived: she cried and shook, refused to leave
until Ding was removed, and still did not feel safe while he was handcuffed
and locked in a police vehicle.
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Sexual abuse: The sexual-abuse-result theory rested on the victim’s
testimony that her wishes no longer mattered, the compelled pornographic
recording, and the final sexual encounter that she said she did not really want
and merely wanted to finish. The instructions defined a sex act to include
touching one’s own genitals at another person’s direction, making the
compelled-masturbation evidence—precipitated by Ding telling the victim
she would “make [him] money” on pornographic websites “whether she
liked it or not”—directly relevant to the issue of sexual abuse. The
instructions also permitted sexual abuse to be established through force,
conduct against the victim’s will, or consent or acquiescence obtained by
threats of violence. In the case of the pornographic recording, the victim
testified that Ding shut the door during the recording, and she “kn[e]w better
than to go out that door” when it was shut.
IV. Constitutionality of Iowa Code section 814.28
Ding also argues that his kidnapping conviction should be reversed
because Iowa Code section 814.28 is unconstitutional. Section 814.28
restricts an appellate court’s ability to set aside a verdict on the basis of a
defective or insufficient theory if at least one of the presented theories is
sufficient to sustain the verdict. Under State v. West Vangen, we need not
“take up [a] challenge to Iowa Code section 814.28” if all the “theories
presented to the jury were supported by sufficient evidence.” 975
N.W.2d 344, 347 (Iowa 2022). Because the State presented sufficient
evidence against Ding on all kidnapping theories, “section 814.28 is therefore
not implicated, and we do not consider [his] constitutional challenges.” See
id. at 348.
We thus affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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