Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-1657 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Sylvis Brandon Nelson, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, The Honorable Tom Reidel, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Jack E. Harper of New Point Law Firm, PLC, Ames, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joseph D. Ferrentino, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 1 CHICCHELLY, Judge. A jury convicted Sylvis Brandon Nelson of second-degree murder. On appeal, Nelson argues the district court erred by allowing a rebuttal witness to testify in violation of a witness sequestration order. Nelson also contests the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Nelson asserts that the cumulative effect of these errors requires reversal. After reviewing Nelson’s claims, we find no grounds to reverse his conviction. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS Nelson and Cobrianda Anderson were in a long-term relationship. On March 24, 2021, the two fought after Anderson accused Nelson of breaking her cigarettes. The fight escalated and became physical after Anderson accused Nelson of cheating on her while he was out the previous night. The two eventually ended up on the ground where Anderson put Nelson in a headlock. Nelson bit Anderson to break free. Nelson then put Anderson in a headlock of his own. Nelson told Anderson that he would let her go when she stopped trying to fight, as she continued to try to swing and hit him. According to Nelson, he released the headlock immediately after Anderson stopped trying to fight. Upon releasing Anderson from the headlock, Nelson thought she was playing a “sick joke” because she was not moving or breathing and was unresponsive. After unsuccessfully attempting to perform CPR and trying to pick up Anderson so he could take her to the hospital, Nelson called 911.1 Emergency services arrived and attempted CPR before pronouncing Anderson dead. 1 During the call, Nelson lied and said that Anderson had an asthma attack. 2 Nelson was later arrested and charged with first-degree murder. A jury trial was held in June 2025. The jury convicted Nelson of the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder. The district court sentenced Nelson to a prison term not to exceed fifty years with a mandatory minimum of seventy percent of the sentence before being eligible for parole. Nelson appeals. DISCUSSION I. Sequestration Order Violation Nelson first argues the district court erred by allowing a rebuttal witness to testify in violation of a sequestration order. “We review a district court’s ruling on the violation of sequestration orders for abuse of discretion.” State v. Lillie, No. 21-1393, 2022 WL 2824779, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 20, 2022). The purpose of an order of exclusion is “to lessen the danger of perjury, or at least of a suggestion to following witnesses of what their testimony should be to correspond with that previously given; to put each witness on his own knowledge of the facts to which he testifies rather than to have his memory refreshed, even guided, and his testimony colored by what has gone before.” State v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 574 (Iowa 1980) (citation omitted). “In the absence of prejudice we cannot say that a reversal is required.” State v. Sharkey, 311 N.W.2d 68, 70 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Griffin, No. 10–1104, 2011 WL 2420788, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2011) (“Iowa courts do not presume prejudice in cases of a sequestration error.”). On the first day of trial, Nelson moved to exclude Anderson’s family members that had been interviewed by the police and would be present in the courtroom from testifying. The district court granted the motion. 3 Following the State’s case-in-chief, Nelson testified in his own defense that neither Anderson nor anyone else cried out for help during the fight. The State then sought to offer rebuttal testimony from two witnesses to refute Nelson’s claim. The first rebuttal witness testified that while he was walking by the house on the day of the fight, he heard loud noises and screaming coming from the house.2 The witness further testified he heard a female’s voice and that it sounded like a fight was happening. The witness could not recall the time he heard the noise but testified that he called Bridgett Morrow to let her know about the noises he heard coming from the house, as Morrow lived nearby and was related to Anderson. Having used the first rebuttal witness’s testimony to lay a foundation, the State then called Morrow to further rebut Nelson’s testimony. The State asserted that Morrow’s testimony would put a “solid timestamp” on when she received the phone call from the first rebuttal witness. Nelson objected to Morrow testifying on the grounds that it would violate the sequestration order, as she was a relative of Anderson and was present in the courtroom for some days of the trial.3 The district court overruled the objection. Morrow then testified she had received a call “[l]ate that morning” from the first rebuttal witness in which he was concerned because of the noises he heard coming from the house. 2 This witness had not been in the courtroom during any of the previous days of trial and was unrelated to Anderson. Thus, the witness’s testimony did not violate the sequestration order. His testimony is not at issue on appeal. Nelson objected to both rebuttal witnesses testifying on other grounds as well. 3 However, this is the only ground relevant on appeal. 4 Nelson contends that the State went beyond asking about a timestamp, and instead repeatedly asked Morrow prejudicial questions. Nelson further contends that he was prejudiced by Morrow’s testimony because she was the last witness to testify and gave beneficial testimony to the State’s case because it indicated to the jury that Anderson was fighting and under duress before her death. After considering Nelson’s arguments, we conclude that even if the district court abused its discretion by allowing Morrow to testify, Nelson has not shown that he was prejudiced. While Morrow was in the courtroom at various points during the trial—including during the State’s case-in-chief— she was not in the courtroom when Nelson testified that neither Anderson nor anyone else cried out for help during the fight. Thus, Morrow was unaware of Nelson’s testimony. 4 Moreover, Morrow’s testimony was extremely limited.5 Morrow testified that she was related to Anderson, that she lived near Anderson, and that she had received a phone call from the first rebuttal witness in which he sounded concerned and nervous because he heard noises coming from Anderson’s house. And by the time Morrow testified, the State had presented abundant evidence of the crime to the jury. Therefore, Nelson has not shown that he was prejudiced by Morrow’s 4 Nelson claims that Morrow discussed the case with an unknown number of people during trial and recesses. According to Nelson, this is proof that the State’s witnesses engaged in collusion and that Morrow was not a credible witness because her testimony was tailored. However, Nelson offers nothing to support this claim beyond mere speculation. 5 We acknowledge that Morrow’s testimony veered from the exact reason the State offered it for, and the record also shows that the two rebuttal witnesses were surprise witnesses to Nelson. Nonetheless, neither reason is sufficient to show prejudice. 5 testimony. Finding no prejudice, we conclude that reversal is not proper on this ground. II. Sufficiency of the Evidence Nelson next argues the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. “We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for the correction of errors at law.” State v. Cook, 996 N.W.2d 703, 708 (Iowa 2023). “We will uphold a jury’s verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. “There is substantial evidence if the evidence ‘would convince a rational fact finder the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Crawford, 974 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). “We consider all evidence, not just the evidence supporting the conviction, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, ‘including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the record evidence.’” State v. Ernst, 954 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). But “[e]vidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient.” State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1992) (en banc). And “it is not the province of the court to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the jury.” State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 519 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). For the jury to find Nelson guilty of second-degree murder, it had to find: 1. On or about the 24th day of March, 2021, [Nelson] strangled, choked, and/or assaulted []Anderson. 2. . . . Anderson died as a result of being strangled, choked and/or assaulted. 6 3. [Nelson] acted with malice aforethought. 4. [Nelson] was not acting with justification. Addressing each element in turn, first, there is sufficient evidence in the record that Nelson strangled, choked, and/or assaulted Anderson. Nelson testified he put Anderson in a headlock, and the jury saw photos of the bruises and scratches on Anderson’s neck. Moreover, the medical examiner that performed Anderson’s autopsy testified her injuries were consistent with strangulation. There is also sufficient evidence that Anderson died as a result of being strangled, choked, and/or assaulted. Here, the medical examiner testified that the cause of death was strangulation and blunt force head injuries. As to the third element, the jury instructions defined malice as: [A] state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act to the injury of another out of actual hatred, or with an evil or unlawful purpose. It may be established by evidence of actual hatred, or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do injury. It may be found from the acts and conduct of the defendant, and the means used in doing the wrongful and injurious act. Malice requires only such deliberation that would make a person appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of passion. The jury instructions further defined malice aforethought as “a fixed purpose or design to do some physical harm to another which exists before the act is committed. It does not have to exist for any particular length of time.” Nelson’s deliberate actions are sufficient evidence that he acted with malice aforethought. Nelson put Anderson in a headlock. The medical examiner testified that when a person is strangled, they lose consciousness in about ten seconds and “death can follow within a few minutes.” Furthermore, Anderson’s birthday was the day before she died. Anderson 7 spent the evening of her birthday with her family, and when she returned home around 11:00 p.m. that night, Nelson left and spent the night elsewhere. Nelson testified that he knew Anderson did not like it when he was out all night. Nelson further testified that he was not upset Anderson had spent the evening of her birthday without him.6 When Nelson returned the next morning, the fight broke out and escalated after Anderson accused Nelson of infidelity. Thus, there is sufficient evidence Nelson acted with malice aforethought. See State v. Newell, 710 N.W.2d 6, 21 (Iowa 2006) (“[T]he prior relationship between the defendant and the victim, including bad feelings, quarrels, and physical acts, is a circumstance that may be shown to prove the defendant’s state of mind and motivation at the time of the crime.”). Lastly, there is sufficient evidence that Nelson acted without justification. “When self-defense is raised, the burden rests with the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the justification did not exist.” State v. Fordyce, 940 N.W.2d 419, 426 (Iowa 2020). One way in which the State can meet its burden is by showing that the force used by Nelson was unreasonable. See id. Nelson contends he was acting in self-defense because Anderson started the physical confrontation and that the State did not provide sufficient evidence to contradict his belief that he acted out of fear for his safety. However, evidence presented at trial showed that Nelson sustained minor injuries from the fight. And based on the medical examiner’s testimony, Anderson would have had to have been strangled for minutes after she lost consciousness to have died. Thus, the State provided 6 The jury was under no obligation to believe Nelson’s testimony. See State v. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Iowa 2006) (“The jury was not required to believe [the defendant’s] self-serving version of the facts.”). 8 sufficient evidence that Nelson’s use of force was unreasonable, proving that Nelson acted without justification. In sum, the State presented substantial evidence for each required element to prove second-degree murder. We therefore reject Nelson’s sufficiency of the evidence claim. III. Cumulative Effect of Errors Nelson’s final argument is that cumulative errors resulted in an unfair trial. For the reasons explained above, we find no individual errors. Therefore, there is no cumulative error. See State v. Atwood, 602 N.W.2d 775, 785 (Iowa 1999) (“[B]ecause we have determined that no errors were committed in the trial court[,] whether the claims of error are considered individually or collectively, the defendant is not entitled to a new trial.”). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we find no reversible error. We therefore affirm Nelson’s conviction of second-degree murder. AFFIRMED. 9