Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0099 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rafael Shay Ramirez, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, The Honorable Susan Cole, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Austin Jungblut of Parrish Kruidenier L.L.P., Des Moines, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Buller and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 1 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. A jury found Rafael Ramirez guilty of possession of methamphetamine.1 Ramirez filed a motion for new trial claiming the district court erred in giving a verdict-urging instruction. The court denied the motion and sentenced Ramirez. Ramirez appeals, reprising his challenge to the instruction. We review for abuse of discretion. See State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 8, 21 (Iowa 2022) (noting that the standard of review is for an abuse of discretion if a jury instruction is discretionary and then concluding that “[t]he trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing [the] verdict-urging instruction”). We only grant a new trial based on the decision to give a verdict-urging instruction when the instruction “coerced or helped coerce the jury’s verdict.” State v. Church, 997 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 2023). To determine whether coercion occurred, we look at the totality of the circumstances, including (1) the content of the instruction; (2) the timing related to the verdict; and (3) the polling responses of jurors. Id. As to the content of the challenged instruction, Ramirez lodges no complaint. Nor could he persuasively do so, as the verdict-urging instruction here is nearly identical to that found proper in Church. See id. at 20. We conclude the content of the instruction was not coercive. As to the polling responses of jurors, Ramirez declined the court’s invitation to poll the jurors, so we have no responses to review that could reveal potential coercion. That leaves us with the timing of the challenged instruction and the 1 Ramirez later stipulated to prior offenses, making this charge a third offense. 2 verdict. “[T]he essence of the inquiry is whether the length of the jury’s post-instruction deliberations evidenced the jury engaged in new, real, and worthwhile deliberation that terminated the disagreement.” Id. at 21. There is no significant disagreement between the parties about the timing of events. Once the case was submitted to the jury, the jurors deliberated for about one hour and twenty-five minutes before reporting an inability to reach a unanimous verdict. The court then gave the challenged verdict-urging instruction, the jury deliberated for an additional forty minutes, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. In determining whether the jury engaged in new, real, and worthwhile deliberation during those forty minutes, we note that this was a short trial, taking little more than half a day for the entire trial prior to jury deliberations. It was also a trial with a simple fact pattern. Police arrested Ramirez on an unrelated charge. While searching him incident to that arrest, officers found a baggie of methamphetamine in his pocket. Given the shortness and lack of complexity of the trial, the length of the original deliberations, and the length of the deliberations after the verdict-urging instruction, we find nothing coercive about the timing of the verdict. See State v. Myers, 140 N.W.2d 891, 898 (Iowa 1966) (finding forty-one minutes of post-instruction deliberation sufficient to show new, real deliberations that terminated the jury’s prior disagreement). Based on the totality of the circumstances and consideration of the relevant factors, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to give the verdict-urging instruction. AFFIRMED. Sandy, J., concurs; Buller, J., specially concurs. 3 BULLER, Judge (specially concurring). I join the majority in full and write separately only to explain why I believe a litigant’s failure to poll the jury affirmatively weighs against granting relief when reviewing an Allen charge2 on appeal. Under our case law, the party challenging an Allen charge bears the burden to prove the instruction coerced the verdict. See State v. Campbell, 294 N.W.2d 803, 808–09 (Iowa 1980). And on appeal, we assess coercion by focusing on the content of the instruction, the timing surrounding the verdict, and the responses from juror polling. State v. Church, 997 N.W.2d 16, 19 (Iowa 2023). Jury polling is the best and typically only direct evidence of whether any individual jurors were actually coerced. Polling tests each juror’s assent in open court and is uniquely capable of exposing a coerced verdict. See Middle States Utils. Co. v. Inc. Tel. Co., 271 N.W. 180, 184 (Iowa 1937) (finding coercion when juror asked “Is that your verdict?” responded: “No—I had to”). Conversely, a clean poll revealing no hesitation or qualification is strong affirmative evidence there was no coercion. See State v. Davis, 975 N.W.2d 1, 21 (Iowa 2022). So what should courts do when an appellant asserts error in an Allen charge after expressly declining the trial court’s invitation to poll the jury? In my view, when a party affirmatively chooses not to develop the best evidence on an issue, the evidentiary void weighs against the appellant. It should be exceedingly difficult to satisfy the burden to prove coercion after declining to develop the evidence that would best answer the question. I specially concur because I would affirm for this additional reason. 2 An Allen charge is the common term for a verdict-urging instruction. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 500–02 (1896). 4