Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 25-0633 Filed October 21, 2026 _______________ State of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Joseph Edwin Long III, Defendant–Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, The Honorable Mark D. Fisher, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Webb L. Wassmer of Wassmer Law Office, PLC, Marion, attorney for appellant. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Langholz, J. 1 LANGHOLZ, Judge. A jury convicted Joseph Long III of willful injury causing bodily injury and assault while using a dangerous weapon for intentionally driving his car into a bicyclist.1 See Iowa Code §§ 708.4(2), 708.2(3) (2024). Long appeals these convictions, arguing that the district court erred by instructing the jury that “[a]n intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner” and that “[s]uch intent may be inferred even though the wound inflicted does not prove fatal” as a part of the instruction defining a dangerous weapon. But the jury instructions, as a whole, accurately stated the law and were not misleading or confusing. And regardless, any error would be harmless—meaning it could not have changed the outcome— because of the strong evidence of Long’s guilt. We thus affirm Long’s convictions. We review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law. State v. Johnson, 7 N.W.3d 504, 510 (Iowa 2024). In reviewing jury instructions, we consider them “as a whole rather than in isolation to determine whether they correctly state the law.” State v. Benson, 919 N.W.2d 237, 242 (Iowa 2018). An error “does not warrant reversal unless it prejudiced the complaining party.” Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 508. “Prejudice results when jury instructions mislead the jury or materially misstate the law.” Benson, 919 N.W.2d at 241–42. “An instruction is misleading or confusing if it is very possible the jury could reasonably have interpreted the instruction incorrectly.” Johnson, 7 N.W.3d at 510 (cleaned up). But “if a review of the instructions leads to the inevitable conclusion that the jury could not have misapprehended the issue, then the challenge is without merit.” Id. 1 Long was also convicted of leaving the scene of an accident resulting in injury. See Iowa Code § 321.261(2) (2024). But he does not appeal that conviction. 2 (cleaned up). And at bottom, the “instructions must convey the applicable law in such a way that the jury has a clear understanding of the issues it must decide.” Id. (cleaned up). Long makes no challenge to the core marshaling instructions for either of his appealed convictions. Those instructions said that to find Long guilty of willful injury causing bodily injury—as the jury did—it had to find that Long: (1) “hit [the victim] with a car”; (2) “specifically intended to cause a serious injury to [the victim]”; and (3) “caused a bodily injury.” And to find Long guilty of assault while using a dangerous weapon, it had to find that Long (1) “committed an assault against [the victim]” and (2) “used a dangerous weapon in connection with the assault.” Other instructions defined “bodily injury,” “specific intent,” and “assault” as used in those marshaling instructions. And the instruction that Long challenges in part on appeal defined “dangerous weapon”: A “dangerous weapon” is any device or instrument designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury, and when used in its designed manner, is capable of inflicting death. It is also any sort of instrument or device which is actually used in such a way as to indicate the user intended to inflict death or serious injury, and when so used, is capable of inflicting death. An intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner. Such intent may be inferred even though the wound inflicted does not prove fatal. Only the last two sentences are at issue. The district court included those sentences at the request of the State—and over Long’s objection— after concluding that they were “an accurate statement of the law.” On appeal, Long argues that this instruction was erroneous because State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 2023), which the State had cited to the district court as the source of the instruction, involved a shooting and the 3 issue of transferred intent—unlike here—and because Long’s charged offenses did not require an intent to kill. He thus contends that “the additional language was not appropriate for the offenses that Mr. Long was charged with” and “had a high probability of causing jury confusion as to what exactly the State had to prove.” While we question whether the challenged sentences added much to the jury’s understanding of this case, they were an accurate statement of the law and were not misleading or confusing to the jury. As the supreme court highlighted in Mong, it has “held repeatedly that an intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon in a deadly manner. Such intent may be thus inferred though the wound inflicted does not prove fatal.” Mong, 988 N.W.2d at 315 (quoting State v. Mart, 20 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1945)); see also State v. Greene, 709 N.W.2d 535, 537 n.1 (Iowa 2006) (noting “that the phrase ‘dangerous weapon’ . . . is substantially identical to the phrase ‘deadly weapon’”); State v. Hunt, No. 24-1363, 2025 WL 3654135, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2025) (affirming use of nearly identical instruction). True, the facts and the legal issue were different in Mong. See Mong, 988 N.W.2d at 314–15. But the legal principle in the instruction is not limited to guns or other devices designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury, as Long contends. See Mart, 20 N.W.2d at 64–66 (applying the inference where the defendant stabbed a man with a pocket knife and quoting even older precedent approving of its use for a “penknife” while reasoning that “[a] penknife may or may not be a deadly weapon” depending on “the manner of its use”); State v. Duff, No. 13-0145, 2014 WL 667637, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014) (inferring specific intent to injure from the manner in which the car was driven and noting that “[a] motor vehicle, when driven in a way that indicates intent to cause serious injury or death, may be a dangerous weapon”). 4 So we disagree with Long’s argument that including the instruction “confuses these two alternatives for a dangerous weapon”—especially when the State was clear throughout trial that it did not claim a car was designed to inflict death or injury. Long is correct that these added sentences focused only on an inference of intent to kill rather than the lesser intent to cause serious injury that was an element of the dangerous-weapon definition and his willful-injury offense. But we fail to see how this emphasis would have misled or confused the jury given the rest of the instructions. If the jury applied the challenged part of the instruction and found that the State had proved an intent to kill based on the manner in which Long drove— repeatedly swerving toward the victim and then speeding up and hitting him—meeting that higher threshold would have easily satisfied the intent to cause serious injury needed for the willful-injury offense and for a finding that the car was a dangerous weapon. And so, even if we were to assume that the added emphasis on an intent to kill in these sentences would confuse the jury into believing the State needed to prove that intent and not merely an intent to cause injury, Long suffered no prejudice by holding the State to that higher burden. The instruction was not improper. What’s more, even assuming that the district court erred in instructing the jury with the added sentences, any error was harmless because the State presented overwhelming evidence that Long intentionally drove his car into a bicyclist and was thus guilty of willful injury causing bodily injury and assault while using a dangerous weapon. See State v. Kraai, 969 N.W.2d 487, 496–97 (Iowa 2022) (holding that the presumption of prejudice for an instructional error was “overcome when the jury received strong evidence of a defendant’s guilt” (cleaned up)); State v. Thompson, 35 N.W.3d 569, 574–82 (Iowa 2026) (reaffirming that jury instruction errors—even of a constitutional dimension—are subject to harmless-error review and holding 5 that district court’s error in giving a marshaling instruction that “was technically defective on a point that was not contested at trial” was harmless). The bicyclist-victim testified that he first met Long a month or two before Long drove his car into him. The victim had gotten a text from a female friend saying “she was stuck inside this room” and “wanted to leave, but she was afraid to say something, so she wanted [him] to come up and help her get out of there.” The victim agreed, pounded on the door, “exchanged words” with Long for less than a minute, and then left with his friend. The victim testified that he next encountered Long while running errands on his electric bike one afternoon. While in a store’s parking lot, the victim saw Long drive by and “smile[] all weird at [him].” At first the victim did not recognize him. But then as the victim rode his bike down the street, Long “drove up right next to” the victim, “went the same speed as” him, and then asked him “Hey, are you [victim’s last name]?” The victim responded “[y]eah”—still not recognizing Long because “[i]t happened too fast.” But as the victim responded, “it clicked” who Long was. And then Long “smiled real big, flipped [the victim] off, and then he—he jerked the steering wheel to try and hit [the victim].” But the victim braked, “so [Long’s] car went right in front of [him].” The victim then rode his bike past Long and as he did so, he “flipped [Long] off because [the victim] didn’t think” Long was “trying to actually hit [him].” But the victim described that after “I flipped him off, and then the next thing you know, I was up in the air and I was hitting the ground.” The victim said, “I got hit and I was flying up in the air and I was landing on my face on the ground. . . . I was in the street originally, and then I was, like, five feet . . . onto the grass.” The victim also testified to his many injuries from being hit by Long: 6 I—I had road rash all over my face. The ground was—the ground was really, really dry at the time, so the ground felt like it was cement. There was hardly any grass. It was mainly the dirt and whatever. But, yeah. It tore my face up pretty good. I had scabs and cuts and all over my face because I mainly landed on my face. I think I had some on my arms, but just a little bit, and then I had a good size scab and cuts on my hip from when I landed on my hip too . . . My hands were tore up, but it was mainly my face that was hurting and my head. According to the victim, Long then “sped off” without offering any help. Eventually, “a lot of people came to help [the victim].” According to the victim, one woman gave him her information, saying “Oh my gosh. I saw everything. That guy just hit you on purpose.” That eyewitness also testified at trial. She did not see the driver. But she explained: I saw a silver car coming down the hill of 18th Street, and I noticed that he kept swerving over to where a bicyclist was, and then once he got to the bottom of the hill, he sped up a little bit and hit a bicyclist, and [the bicyclist] went up on the grass and was laying on the ground. .... I noticed the car—the every time the bicyclist was trying to get over, the car would move over the—and the bicyclist would get over and—and the car would move over. So it caught my attention because it was just strange that a car kept trying to go right directly behind the bicyclist. An investigating law enforcement officer also testified. He went to the victim’s house after the incident and saw the many “fresh” injuries on the victim—calling them “road rash” on the victim’s face and arms. He also took photographs at that time which were submitted to the jury. The victim also gave a description of Long’s car and what Long was wearing. 7 The officer, along with other officers, also met with Long later that day. He was wearing clothes consistent with the victim’s description. Long denied striking the victim with his car but admitted that he had the earlier verbal altercation with the victim. The officer observed Long’s car—also consistent with the victim’s and the eyewitness’s description. And he saw damage to the passenger side of the vehicle that appeared fresh because “the plastic was still sharp” and there were remnants of frayed paint. The damage included scrape marks that the officer said were consistent with the height and width of a bike pedal, and the passenger-side mirror was missing. Long told the officer the scratches had been there “for weeks.” Photos of the car’s damage and one of Long standing near the back of his car during the officers’ encounter were also submitted to the jury. A second officer who was present for the encounter with Long also testified. He agreed that the damage on the bumper looked fresh and that the mirror was gone. That officer had also stopped Long the night before the incident. And during that traffic stop, the officer observed that the mirror was still attached. A still photo from another officer’s bodycam of that evening stop—showing the mirror attached—was submitted to the jury too. That photo also showed no signs of damage to the bumper area where the scratches were present the next day, but it was not clear or close enough to definitively say no scratches were present. From all this, there was overwhelming evidence for the jury to find that Long hit the victim with his car, specifically intending to cause serious injury and causing a bodily injury. And there was similarly strong evidence for it to find that those actions were also an assault and that Long used his car as a dangerous weapon in committing that assault. 8 Plus, contrary to Long’s argument on appeal that intent was “a central issue” to the case and thus the jury would need to decide “Did Mr. Long intend to hit [the victim] with his vehicle and cause injury or did Mr. Long intend to scare [the victim] and accidentally hit [the victim],” that was not how he argued the case to the jury. He never argued that he accidentally hit the victim or even conceded that the victim had been hit by a car at all. Rather, at closing, he argued that the State failed to prove that anything had happened beyond a reasonable doubt. He contended that the jury could not trust the victim’s or the eyewitness’s testimony—raising questions about their credibility, highlighting minor inconsistencies in the evidence, and pointing to the lack of damage to the victim’s bicycle. Neither the State nor Long ever even mentioned the challenged sentences of the instruction. And by convicting Long, the jury necessarily rejected this defense and believed the victim and eyewitness about what happened. Nothing in the two challenged sentences of the instruction would have changed that. And so, if there was an error in the jury instruction, it was harmless. We thus affirm Long’s convictions. AFFIRMED. 9