Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified. FILED Nov 16 2026, 1:43 pm CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Indiana Supreme Court Supreme Court Case No. 26S-CR-399 Matthew Joseph Dirig, Appellant/Defendant, –v– State of Indiana, Appellee/Plaintiff. Argued: April 23, 2026 | Decided: November 16, 2026 Appeal from the Huntington Circuit Court No. 35C01-2212-F1-398 The Honorable Davin G. Smith, Judge On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals No. 25A-CR-119 Opinion by Justice Molter Chief Justice Rush and Justice Massa concur. Justice Slaughter dissents with separate opinion. Justice Goff did not participate in the decision of this matter. Molter, Justice. Matthew Dirig was at home with his girlfriend’s eight-year-old son when the child, alone in a locked bedroom, committed suicide by tightening a zip tie around his neck. A jury held Dirig responsible, finding him guilty of Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. He argues on appeal that the trial court made a fundamental error by instructing the jury that it should consider whether he unreasonably placed the child in danger rather than considering only whether he knowingly did so. Because we agree the instructions were a fundamental error, we vacate his conviction and remand for a new trial. Facts and Procedural History I. Factual Background Matthew Dirig and Ashlee Cochrane met and began dating in April 2022. Two months later, Dirig, who had no children, moved in with Cochrane and her eight-year-old son. From the start, Cochrane was upfront with Dirig about her parenting struggles. While her son was loving, smart, funny, and adventurous, he also had mental health challenges. His behavioral and emotional issues included diagnoses of Oppositional Defiant Disorder and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. Cochrane told Dirig that her son would sometimes have “horrendous meltdowns,” that he had threatened to kill himself, and that he had wrapped a cord around his neck. Ex. Vol. 7 at 81. She also told Dirig that when she tried to commit her son to Parkview Behavioral Health, the staff there apparently viewed his behavior as merely attention seeking. After Dirig moved in with Cochrane, she viewed him as her son’s co- parent. That co-parenting included disciplining the child, and Dirig suggested corporal punishment to deter some of his misbehavior. But Cochrane disagreed, so neither ever punished the child physically. Dirig also wanted to modify the door to the child’s room so that it locked from the outside because the child would leave his room without permission Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 2 of 20 during time outs. Cochrane reluctantly agreed but told Dirig her son should be locked in his room for only short periods of time. Throughout the summer and fall of 2022, the child’s struggles continued. He had an individualized education plan at school that included shortened days and classes in a room for children with emotional disabilities, but he was aggressive with staff and his fellow students. He also often acted out at the Boys & Girls Club and at his babysitters’. Once, while at a babysitter’s, he had an outburst and wrapped a towel around his throat, which Dirig later learned about. In September, the child had a particularly bad outburst at school, so Cochrane picked him up and took him to the Parkview emergency room. The child was admitted and received treatment over a period of several days. Dirig, Cochrane, and the child also attended a family session at Parkview, where they developed a safety plan to help when the child was having a crisis. The plan, which Dirig signed, included removing choking hazards from the home. After his discharge from Parkview, the child started new medication, and his behavior improved significantly. His misbehavior at school decreased and eventually stopped entirely, with no recorded incidents in October or most of November. The single November incident was minor: The child misbehaved, recognized his misbehavior, placed himself in time out, and expressed a desire to “turn his day around.” Tr. Vol. 4 at 171. On November 22, 2022, the child had another good day at school. But after school, at the Boys & Girls Club, he had an aggressive outburst that prompted the staff to call Cochrane and ask that she take him home. Cochrane was working and couldn’t pick him up, so Dirig agreed to do so instead. When Dirig arrived, he and a staff member had a difficult time handling the child. Dirig had to physically pick him up to carry him to the car, and the child hit and kicked Dirig as he did so. A staff member texted Cochrane, telling her Dirig handled the situation very well. The child was still upset when he arrived home, and Dirig calmly told him to relax. The child’s outburst continued, so Dirig decided to lock him in his room. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 3 of 20 Then, for the next hour, Dirig played video games while the child was locked in his room alone. When Cochrane arrived home, she saw Dirig playing his video games on mute and without his headphones on. She then went to check on the child in his room and found him unresponsive with a zip tie wrapped and tightened around his neck. First responders were unable to revive the child, and he was pronounced dead. When police later questioned Dirig about the presence of the zip ties in the child’s room, he told them he used the zip ties for work and gave some to the child to do crafts and play with. II. Procedural History The State charged Dirig with Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. A person commits felony neglect when they are responsible for “the care of a dependent” and they “knowingly or intentionally” “place[] the dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent’s life or health.” Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a), (a)(1). Neglect elevates from a Level 6 to a Level 1 felony if the person is at least 18 years old and the neglect results in the death of a dependent who is less than fourteen years old. I.C. § 35-46-1-4(b)(3). Dirig pleaded not guilty, but after a five-day trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict. The trial court then entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced Dirig to forty years, with thirty-eight to be served in the Department of Correction and two suspended to probation. Dirig appealed his conviction on three grounds. First, he argued the State introduced insufficient mens rea and causation evidence. The State failed to prove a criminal state of mind, he argued, because “[t]he rarity and unpredictability of suicide in a child under 10—combined with the lack of expert guidance advising against locking [the child] in his room— undermine the inference that Dirig knowingly exposed [the child] to an actual and appreciable danger.” Appellant’s Br. at 18. For causation, he argued there was no evidence of cause in fact—that “but for Dirig’s actions, [the child] would not have taken his life”—nor evidence that the suicide was foreseeable because “[t]he law does not expect caregivers to anticipate such an unlikely and tragic outcome.” Id. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 4 of 20 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, concluding that Dirig’s knowledge of the child’s history of suicide attempts and suicidal ideation was sufficient to establish Dirig’s mens rea. Dirig v. State, 268 N.E.3d 1239, 1246–47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), vacated. The court also held there was evidence that Dirig was the cause-in-fact of the child’s death because a jury could reasonably conclude that “[b]ut for Dirig locking an emotionally reactive [child] in a room by himself with strangulation implements and without any supervision, [the child] would not have died.” Id. at 1247. And the child’s death was foreseeable, the court reasoned, because while “[s]uicide may be unpredictable in some instances, . . . this was not one of them.” Id. Second, Dirig argued that although he failed to object at trial, the trial court committed fundamental error by giving two mistaken jury instructions. Those instructions, Dirig says, “introduced a civil negligence standard—what a ‘reasonable caregiver’ would have done—despite longstanding Supreme Court precedent mandating a subjective mens rea: that the defendant must be aware of a high probability that his conduct placed the child in danger.” Appellant’s Br. at 18–19. The Court of Appeals agreed those two instructions incorrectly explained the State had to prove Dirig acted only unreasonably, not knowingly, but it concluded another instruction cured the error, so Dirig suffered no prejudice. Dirig, 268 N.E.3d at 1249. Further, the court reasoned, if anything, when read together with other instructions, the challenged instructions collectively “placed an additional burden on the State, not Dirig, by requiring the State to prove not just Dirig’s subjective awareness but his awareness of an objective standard of reasonableness as well.” Id. Third, Dirig argued the trial court abused its discretion by admitting over his objection evidence that he consumed some of the child’s medication five weeks before the charged incident, which Dirig argued “bore no relevance to his conduct on November 22, 2022.” Appellant’s Br. at 19. The Court of Appeals agreed the trial court erred but found the error harmless. Dirig, 268 N.E.3d at 1245–46. Dirig now seeks transfer to our Court, arguing two related issues should compel us to exercise our discretion to review his appeal. One Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 5 of 20 issue is whether the Court of Appeals’ decision conflicts with our precedent and due process requirements “by holding that legally erroneous instructions on negligence and the reasonable person standard increased rather than decreased the State’s burden of proving Dirig committed neglect of a dependent.” Pet. to Trans. at 2. The other issue is deciding where the law “draw[s] the line between a caregiver who failed to prevent a child’s suicide and one who caused it.” Id. We agree those questions merit our consideration, so we now grant transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A). But we evaluate those issues only in the context of Dirig’s jury instruction arguments, so we summarily affirm the Court of Appeals’ opinion addressing Dirig’s other arguments about the admission and sufficiency of evidence. Standard of Review We normally review only issues the parties preserved at trial. That way, the trial court can correct a mistake before an appeal is necessary. Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 420 n.2 (Ind. 1997). So when a party fails to preserve an issue, it is waived on appeal. Finnegan v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1265, 1270 n.3 (Ind. 2024). But we will still review an otherwise waived claim for fundamental error, which is a narrow exception to waiver that only rarely applies. Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914–15 (Ind. 2024). Fundamental error is a difficult bar to clear: An error is fundamental only when it makes “a fair trial impossible” or constitutes “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process presenting an undeniable and substantial potential for harm.” Carr v. State, 274 N.E.3d 444, 460 (Ind. 2026) (quotations omitted). Since defense counsel didn’t object to the incorrect instructions at trial, we review them for fundamental error. Discussion and Decision The neglect statute required the State to prove not only that Dirig endangered the child but also that Dirig did so “knowingly or Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 6 of 20 intentionally,” and the State’s theory was that Dirig acted knowingly. I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). Two jury instructions explained those culpability requirements to the jury, but then two others directed the jury to consider what a reasonable caregiver would have done in the circumstances. Dirig argues those later instructions improperly substituted the tort law’s objective “negligence” standard for the criminal law’s subjective mens rea of “knowingly.” The State disagrees, responding that the challenged instructions about a reasonable caregiver addressed only what it means to endanger a dependent, not Dirig’s mens rea. We agree with Dirig. Below we first explain how the trial court’s instructions mistakenly diminished the State’s burden of proof, and then we explain why that error was fundamental. I. The jury instructions mistakenly diminished the State’s burden to prove Dirig acted knowingly. The trial court initially instructed the jury correctly, explaining that it should apply a “knowing” culpability standard. But then the court mistakenly watered down that standard by instructing the jury to consider whether Dirig acted as a reasonable caregiver would, which is instead a lower, negligence standard. A. Initially, the trial court correctly instructed the jury to apply a “knowing” culpability standard. At the start, the trial court instructed the jury correctly. Its Preliminary Instruction 5, given before the jury heard evidence and argument, accurately explained that the State had to prove five elements, including that Dirig acted knowingly: Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 7 of 20 Before you may convict the Defendant of Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Death, a Level 1 felony, the State must prove each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt: One, the Defendant, Matthew Joseph Dirig; two, knowingly; three, placed [the child] in a situation that endangered [the child]’s life or health; four, when . . . [the child] was a dependent, and when the Defendant had the care, custody, and control of [the child], whether assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation; five, and the offense was committed by a person at least 18 years of age and resulted in the death of [the child], who was less than 14 years of age. Tr. Vol. 2 at 137 (emphasis added). The court continued in the right direction as the trial neared the end. After the evidence closed but before closing arguments, the trial court gave the jury final instructions. And one of those instructions, Final Instruction 5, again correctly instructed the jury that the State had to prove Dirig acted knowingly. The culpability required for the offense charged is knowingly. A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct, he’s aware of a high probability that he’s doing so. The culpability requirement for this offense is required with respect to every material element of the prohibited conduct. Tr. Vol. 6 at 10. While those two instructions were correct, two later final instructions went astray. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 8 of 20 B. Two later instructions conveyed a negligence standard. 1. Final Instruction 6 mistakenly redefined the offense with a lesser culpability standard. Dirig was charged with “neglect,” and Final Instruction 6 defined “neglect” as a lack of reasonable care, which is a negligence standard. Neglect: Neglect is defined as the want of reasonable care that is the omission of such steps as a reasonable caregiver will take such as are usually taken in the course of ordinary experience. Id. (emphases added). There are two critical mistakes with this instruction. One problem is the instruction is irrelevant. The State charged Dirig with “neglect of a dependent,” and “neglect” is just the name of the offense. In this context, “neglect” is not a term of art, nor is it an element of the offense. If the trial court was intending to address the element that the defendant “endangered” the dependent, that is both a different term and the subject of a different instruction (which we discuss in the next section). So there was no need to define “neglect,” as the neglect offense is defined simply by its elements. And this instruction had no place in the final jury charge. But the jury probably didn’t see it that way because the trial court told the jury it had “to consider all the instructions”; none were superfluous. Id. (emphasis added). A natural understanding of Final Instruction 6, then, would be that by defining “neglect”—the crime charged—the instruction was providing a boiled down definition of the crime. Putting together that instruction with earlier instructions would convey that a defendant knowingly endangers a child (Preliminary Instruction 5 and Final Instruction 5) if the defendant fails to provide “reasonable care” or fails to act as “a reasonable caregiver” would “in the course of ordinary experience” (Final Instruction 6). That leads to the other, more significant problem. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 9 of 20 The instruction is wrong. Its language comes from Smith v. State, 408 N.E.2d 614, 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (quoting language that “[n]eglect is the want of reasonable care that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable parent would take, such as are usually taken in the ordinary experience of mankind,” and explaining that the statute requires the State to prove only “that the defendant parent was aware of facts that would alert a reasonable parent under the circumstances to take affirmative action to protect the child”). But our Court overruled Smith in Armour v. State while resolving a split in the Court of Appeals. 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985). The split we resolved had on one side cases holding the neglect statute called for “an objective standard wherein the State need only prove that defendant-caretaker was aware of the facts which would alert a reasonable caretaker under similar circumstances to take affirmative action to protect the child,” just as Final Instruction 6 directed here. Id. Another line of cases instead applied “the subjective standard mandated by our culpability [defining] statute.” Id. We held the first line of cases— cases with instructions like Final Instruction 6—were mistaken and the second line were correct because “the level of culpability required when a child neglect statute requires knowing behavior is that level where the accused must have been subjectively aware of a high probability that he placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.” Id.; see also Villagrana v. State, 954 N.E.2d 466, 469 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (“[N]egligence does not satisfy the requisite mens rea under the child neglect statute, which requires that the defendant engage in the prohibited conduct intentionally or knowingly. Put another way, Indiana does not criminally penalize those who negligently neglect a dependent.”); accord Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723, 737–38 (2015) (explaining that the “reasonable person” standard “is inconsistent with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some wrongdoing.” (quotations omitted)). Thus, Final Instruction 6’s invocation of a negligence standard mistakenly diminished the State’s burden of proof. And Final Instruction 6 wasn’t the only instruction with that mistake. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 10 of 20 2. Final Instruction 9 reiterated the mistaken negligence standard. A few instructions later, Final Instruction 9 explained what it means to endanger a dependent. Placing a dependent in a situation that endangers the dependent’s life or health for the purposes of the neglect of a dependent statute[:] a dangerous situation is one that exposes a dependent to an actual and appreciable danger to life or health. The risk of physical or mental harm must go substantially beyond the normal risks that accompany the activities of the average child. To prove that the Defendant placed the dependent in a situation that endangered the dependent’s life or health, the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was aware of facts that would alert a reasonable caregiver under the circumstances to take affirmative action to protect the child. Tr. Vol. 6 at 11 (emphases added). Final Instruction 9 built on the shaky foundation that Final Instruction 6 laid. Final Instruction 9 appropriately began with a discussion of the criminal act, explaining what it means to place a dependent in a dangerous situation. Compare id. with State v. Downey, 476 N.E.2d 121, 123 (Ind. 1985), and G.C.G. v. State, 817 N.E.2d 306, 309 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The instruction could have stopped there because both Preliminary Instruction 5 and Final Instruction 5 already directed that the “knowing” standard applied to this element. But instead the instruction pivoted to the culpability standard, once again invoking negligence principles by telling the jury that it could convict if Dirig was “aware of facts that would alert a reasonable caregiver under the circumstances to take affirmative action to protect the child.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 11 (emphasis added). Like Final Instruction 6, Final Instruction 9 carried an extreme risk of misleading the jury. Rather than continuing to refer to the applicable “knowing” culpability standard, both instructions instead used the Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 11 of 20 inapplicable language of negligence: “reasonable care,” “in the course of ordinary experience,” and “reasonable . . . under the circumstances.” These are all familiar and foundational tort law concepts. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 283, 298 (A.L.I. 1965); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 3 (A.L.I. 2010). And the tort of negligence is concerned with what reasonable people should have known, not what the defendant actually knew. C. The instructional error was in the State’s favor, not Dirig’s. The Court of Appeals held, and the State now argues, that the incorrect instructions increased the State’s burden. As they read them, the instructions required the State to prove Dirig acted knowingly and that he was subjectively aware of what a reasonable caregiver would do in his situation. See Dirig v. State, 268 N.E.3d 1239, 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), vacated. This theory relies on a convoluted reading of the instructions. The trial court instructed the jury (in Final Instruction 5) that the State had to prove Dirig acted knowingly as to every material element of the prohibited conduct. The same instruction provided that “[a] person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct, he’s aware of a high probability that he’s doing so.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 10. So, the argument goes, these statements made it clear that subjective awareness is required as to each element, while Final Instructions 6 and 9 required the State to also prove that Dirig acted knowing his conduct would be considered objectively unreasonable. That is one possible reading of the instructions, but it is not “the most natural reading.” Dirig, 268 N.E.3d at 1249. Final Instruction 9 attempts to explain one of the elements of neglect of a dependent: placing a dependent in a dangerous situation. The instruction concludes that to prove this element “the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was aware of facts that would alert a reasonable caregiver under the circumstances to take affirmative action to protect the child.” Tr. Vol. 6 at 11. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 12 of 20 Final Instruction 9 seems to set out everything the State must prove as to one of the elements of the crime. It at least isn’t obvious that Final Instruction 9 adds an additional culpability standard the State must prove. A more natural reading of the instructions is that Final Instruction 5 sets out the general definition of “knowingly,” and Final Instruction 9 then explains what “knowingly” means in the more specific context of one of the elements of the crime at issue. In other words, the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury that to knowingly place a child in a dangerous situation means to be “aware of facts that would alert a reasonable caregiver” of the danger. Id. At best, the instructions conflict with each other as to what culpability standard the State had to prove. As we discuss below, statements from counsel and the evidence at trial highlighted both the reasonableness of Dirig’s conduct and his subjective awareness that his actions placed the child in danger. While the instructions could be read as requiring the State to prove both unreasonable and knowing conduct, the jury would have to adopt an unnatural reading of the instructions to reach that conclusion. A more realistic interpretation of the instructions is that—at least as to one element—Dirig was guilty if a reasonable caregiver would have done something different than what he did. See Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 916 (“Where wording permits two contradictory interpretations, one correct and one erroneous, the jury may be misled as to the law.” (quotations omitted)). While we conclude that Final Instructions 6 and 9 mistakenly diminished the State’s burden of proof, Dirig did not object to the instructions. As a result, we must consider next whether the error was fundamental. II. The error was fundamental. Our Court “has found fundamental error where the jury was instructed that it could convict based on a lesser mens rea than that provided in the statute.” Hall v. State, 937 N.E.2d 911, 913 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Metcalfe v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1236, 1237 (Ind. 1999); Wilson v. State, 644 N.E.2d 555, 557 (Ind. 1994); Beasley v. State, 643 N.E.2d 346, 348 (Ind. 1994); Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 13 of 20 Greer v. State, 643 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ind. 1994); and Simmons v. State, 642 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ind. 1994)). But “error in an instruction on mens rea does not rise to the level of fundamental error where either the instructions as a whole sufficiently inform the jury of the required mens rea or the defendant’s mens rea was not a central issue at trial.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 872–73 (Ind. 2000); Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 1997); and Swallows v. State, 674 N.E.2d 1317, 1318 (Ind. 1996)). Dirig’s culpability was a central issue in the trial, and we conclude the mistaken instructions on that question were a fundamental error for two reasons. First, neither other instructions nor arguments from counsel cured the instructions’ potential to lead the jury astray, and the State’s evidence about how Dirig should have cared for the child made the problem worse. Second, the unusual facts of Dirig’s case leave us with serious concerns that the mistaken instructions led the jury to convict Dirig because he acted merely negligently, rather than knowingly as the law requires. Because the instructions were a fundamental error, Dirig’s conviction must be vacated and his case remanded for a new trial. Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 919. A. The mistaken instructions were not cured. 1. Other instructions did not cure the error. Incorrect and misleading jury instructions don’t always require reversal for fundamental error. Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 562 (Ind. 2019). Instructional error is fundamental only when the instructions as a whole mislead the jury. Id. at 559. Other instructions and counsels’ statements at trial can sometimes cure the harm from incorrect instructions. Isom v. State, 651 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ind. 1995); Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 917. Our decision in Batchelor, another case where incorrect instructions supplanted the correct “knowing” mens rea with a negligence standard, provides a good example. Batchelor was on trial for resisting law enforcement by fleeing because he failed to pull over immediately after Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 14 of 20 being directed to by law enforcement. Batchelor, 119 N.E.3d at 553. The trial court instructed the jury that the State had the burden to prove either that Batchelor acted with the intent to escape or that a reasonable driver in his position would have behaved differently. See id. at 555. Although that instruction “threatened to relieve the State of its burden to prove that Batchelor ‘knowingly or intentionally’ fled,” id. at 560, we held the error was not fundamental, id. at 562. In both that case and this one, the trial court gave other, correct instructions—instructions defining the correct mens rea, providing that the defendant must have acted knowingly or intentionally as to each material element, and that the jury had the right to determine the law and the facts. Id. at 560. But the differences between the two cases are more significant. First, here there were two instructions that diminished the State’s burden of proof, not just one, as in Batchelor. The additional mistaken instruction in this case makes it less likely that the other instructions kept the jury from being misled. While the dissenting opinion notes the “jury was repeatedly told the proper” standard, post, at 2, the jury was told the improper standard just as many times. Second, we noted in Batchelor that “the jury received no . . . instruction defining the term ‘negligently.’ And the lack of elaboration on this concept ‘made it even less likely that the jury was focused on it.’” Batchelor, 119 N.E.3d at 561 (citation omitted). But here, the jury did receive a general negligence instruction, Final Instruction 6, which may well have caused the jury to “focus[] on” this lesser standard and use it to convict Dirig. Id. As the dissent points out, the jury was also told to “consider all of the instructions together and not single out” any individual instruction, post, at 3 (quotations omitted), which makes it more rather than less likely that the jury followed the wrong instructions. While we agree with our dissenting colleague that sometimes an instructional error may be cured by other instructions, post, at 2–3, the two errors here weren’t cured. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 15 of 20 2. Counsels’ statements didn’t cure the error. Counsels’ statements at trial also didn’t cure the fundamental instructional error here. The State’s closing argument was as contradictory as the instructions, emphasizing both the incorrect negligence standard and the correct knowing standard. To be sure, both sides focused on subjective awareness at other points in their arguments. But with so many invocations of the improper standard mixed in, it’s just as likely counsels’ arguments compounded—rather than mitigated—the instructional error. See Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 917 (explaining that the State’s correct statement during closing argument wasn’t enough to cure the instructional error). 3. The State’s evidence proving the wrong standard made things worse. Also troubling is the amount of evidence that called into question the reasonableness of Dirig’s actions. The State elicited testimony from several witnesses—all professionals with experience handling children struggling with behavioral issues—about their practices for calming children down. This testimony established that the best practice is to resort to seclusion only after other methods have failed, to supervise the child while secluded, and to limit seclusion to between ten and fifteen minutes. While not explicit, the obvious thrust of this testimony considering the mistaken instructions was to establish what a “reasonable caregiver” would do and contrast it with what Dirig did. This evidence made it even more likely for the jury to home in on reasonableness rather than subjective awareness. Having concluded the error was not cured, we next examine the unusual nature of Dirig’s case, which further convinces us that the instructional error made a fair trial impossible. B. The nature of Dirig’s case also convinces us that the instructional error was fundamental. Part of what makes an error fundamental is the context in which it occurs. The “unusual operative and procedural facts” of a case can inform Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 16 of 20 whether instructional error is fundamental. Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 914 (quoting Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2015)). Dunn is a good example. There, trial counsel’s strategy was to defend against the murder charge by arguing defense of dwelling without raising self-defense. Id. at 918. On its own initiative, the trial court instructed the jury on both defense of dwelling and self-defense. Id. at 914. In doing so, the court lumped the defenses together, telling the jury the State had to disprove one defense “and/or” the other. Id. We held the use of “and/or” to be ambiguous, misleading, and ultimately fundamental error. Id. at 915. The “unusual operative and procedural facts” included that the trial court itself crafted the instructions meant to help Dunn, which ended up backfiring and making her trial unfair. See id. at 918. Further, Dunn presented a strong defense, which convinced us that “the misleading jury charge might have determined the outcome of the trial.” Id. at 919. The nature of Dirig’s case also leaves us with grave doubt. As Dirig aptly puts it, this is the niche category of cases exploring where the law “draw[s] the line between a caregiver who failed to prevent a child’s suicide and one who caused it.” Pet. to Trans. at 2. Neither side cites any Indiana cases confronting this question, and cases around the country tend to fall on a spectrum. One end has cases with egregious conduct that directly causes suicide, and the other end has cases with typically innocuous mistakes that only incidentally end up facilitating the suicide. For an example of egregious conduct, a defendant’s daughter committed suicide after he attempted to molest her, and she had responded to his past molestations by attempting suicide, so the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed his conviction for child abuse resulting in death. State v. Matteson, 985 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 2023). As another example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a conviction for involuntary manslaughter where the defendant encouraged her suicidal boyfriend to “get back in” a carbon-monoxide-filled truck. Commonwealth v. Carter, 115 N.E.3d 559, 566 (Mass. 2019). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 17 of 20 On the other hand, even civil liability is inappropriate for momentary and typically innocuous lapses in attention. This was the case in Johnstone v. City of Albuquerque, where the defendant police officer had left his gun unattended at home and his stepdaughter surreptitiously stole it to commit suicide. 145 P.3d 76 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006). The defendant was not negligent even though he knew his stepdaughter had attempted suicide a year and a half earlier. Id. at 81. Even sustained lapses in attention don’t result in criminal liability where their connection to suicide is attenuated. As an example, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a conviction for risk of injury to a child where the State alleged the defendant’s son’s suicide was evidence that her “extremely messy” home harmed his mental health. State v. Scruggs, 905 A.2d 24, 28 (Conn. 2006). Dirig’s case is unlike any other in the nation that we have found. His conduct was less culpable than the defendant’s in Matteson; the State does not claim he intentionally traumatized the child or otherwise encouraged him to commit suicide. At the same time, Dirig’s actions were not as innocuous as in Johnstone, where the stepdaughter deliberately exploited the defendant’s brief inattention, essentially misdirecting him so she could commit suicide. Perhaps the closest case to Dirig’s is the 1967 New York case McBride v. State, 277 N.Y.S.2d 80 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1967). There, the State of New York was held liable through its agents—two supervisors at a state-run facility for “troubled boy[s].” Id. at 88. The supervisors responded to one child’s misbehavior by striking him and then leaving him alone in a “hysterical condition” to report the situation. Id. at 87. While alone, the child committed suicide. Id. Key to the court’s decision (which imposed only civil, not criminal, liability) was that the State’s agents violated their training and the facility’s rules by inflicting corporal punishment and leaving a troubled child alone during an emergency. Id. at 89. What these suicide cases show is that the question of liability in these fraught situations involves complicated questions of intent, proximate cause, and foreseeability. Our point in examining these cases, none of which is a perfect factual or legal match with Dirig’s, is not to resolve these complex issues. Rather, the point is that for the jury to navigate and Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 26S-CR-399 | November 16, 2026 Page 18 of 20 decide these complex issues, it must be guided by correct instructions. Dunn, 230 N.E.3d at 919. The jury heard evidence that Dirig knew the child had a history of self- strangulation, that Dirig had signed a safety plan that included removing choking hazards from the home, and that he knew the zip ties were in the child’s room (having put them there himself). But the jury also heard evidence that the child’s last threat to self-harm was two months before his death, that he was doing much better on his new medication for the two months leading up to November 22, that he had only choked himself in front of adults who could easily stop him, and that in at least one professional’s opinion the self-harming behavior was merely attention seeking, not a serious suicide attempt (however incorrect or tragically misguided that opinion turned out to be). To determine Dirig’s guilt, the jury must understand the question is not whether a reasonable caregiver would have locked the child in his room. The question is whether Matthew Dirig, a man with no experience raising children, less than six months after becoming a secondary caregiver for a struggling eight-year-old with atypical challenges, was subjectively aware of a high p