Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Oct 30 2026, 8:54 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Mahde M. Dannon, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff October 30, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-2954 Appeal from Marion Superior Court The Honorable Charnette Garner, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D35-1812-F6-43784 Opinion by Judge May Judges Pyle and Scheele concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 1 of 11 May, Judge. [1] Mahde M. Dannon pursues an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order denying his motion to dismiss the charges pending against him. He raises one issue, which we restate as whether the Interstate Agreement on Detainers1 (“IAD”) requires dismissal of the charges. We affirm. Facts and Procedural History [2] On December 12, 2018, the State filed a criminal information in Cause Number 49D35-1812-F6-43784 (“Cause 43784”) alleging Dannon committed Level 6 felony criminal confinement2 and Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury.3 After Dannon posted bond, federal authorities arrested him in connection with unrelated charges pending against him in federal court. On June 11, 2019, Dannon failed to appear for a pretrial conference in Cause 43784 because he was in federal custody. The trial court noted Dannon was in federal custody and issued a failure-to-appear bench warrant. [3] In his federal case, Dannon was found guilty of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization and sentenced to 240 months in prison. On March 11, 2022, the Federal Correctional Institution in Sandstone, Minnesota (“FCI Sandstone”) sent a detainer action letter to the Marion County 1 Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4. 2 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3. 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 2 of 11 Prosecutor’s Office (“MCPO”). The letter noted the bench warrant and pending charges against Dannon. It asked for an update regarding disposition of the case and asked the MCPO to respond with either a request for a formal detainer or a letter indicating it had no further interest in prosecuting Dannon. The MCPO did not respond to the detainer action letter. [4] On January 21, 2025, Dannon, proceeding pro se, filed a motion to dismiss in Cause 43784 that asserted he was incarcerated at FCI-Sandstone and his projected release date was not until July 2036. He asked that the charges against him be dismissed so that he could be eligible to participate in rehabilitative programs. With the motion to dismiss, Dannon submitted a copy of the detainer action letter to which the MCPO had not responded. The trial court denied Dannon’s motion to dismiss. [5] Dannon subsequently obtained counsel and filed a motion to dismiss in Cause 43784 on September 3, 2025. Dannon argued that because he had not been brought to trial within 180 days of filing the detainer action letter with the trial court, he was entitled to dismissal of the charges against him pursuant to the IAD. On September 25, 2025, the trial court issued an order denying Dannon’s motion to dismiss. In its order, the trial court found: 1. On September 3, 2025, Defendant by counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss Detainer. 2. The Court took the motion under advisement, and gave the State until September 12, 2025, to file a response. The State failed to file a response. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 3 of 11 3. Defendant contends that he requested a fast and speedy trial on January 21, 2025, when a Detainer Action Letter was filed in the case. 4. This letter does not comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), and therefore the Defendant did not properly invoke his right under the IAD. (App. Vol. II at 68.) Dannon moved for the trial court to certify its order denying his motion to dismiss for interlocutory appeal, and the trial court granted Dannon’s motion. We then agreed to accept jurisdiction. Discussion and Decision [6] Dannon contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss. “The ruling on a motion to dismiss under the IAD is a question of law that we review de novo. However, we review the findings underlying the ruling under a clearly erroneous standard. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record lacks any facts or reasonable inferences to support them.” Noelker v. State, 148 N.E.3d 345, 350 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. [7] Dannon argues the failure-to-appear bench warrant is a detainer and his January 21, 2025, motion to dismiss4 was a request for final disposition that 4 While represented by counsel, Dannon sent two letters to the trial court pro se asking for his charges to be dismissed so that he could participate in rehabilitative programming. Such communications were improper, and the trial court correctly took no action on the letters other than distributing them to counsel. See Finnegan Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 4 of 11 triggered the IAD’s 180-day clock for the State to try him on the underlying charges. The IAD is a compact between Indiana, the federal government, and various other governmental entities designed “to ‘encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding] charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints.’” State v. Thompson, 687 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 720 (1985)) (brackets in Thompson). The IAD provides: Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the continuance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty (180) days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint[.] Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 3(a) (emphasis added). [8] “A detainer is ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’” Webb v. State, 437 N.E.2d 1330, 1331 (Ind. 1982) v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1186, 1192 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (holding trial court did not err by not considering a speedy trial request that a represented defendant filed pro se), trans. denied. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 5 of 11 (quoting U.S. v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 359 (1978)); see also Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993) (explaining that a “detainer” “is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is imminent”). “Generally, the IAD process begins when a state bringing charges against a prisoner in custody in another IAD jurisdiction files a detainer. Once a detainer is filed, the defendant may file a request for final disposition, which triggers the requirement that he be brought to trial within 180 days.” State v. Robinson, 863 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted), trans. denied. [9] Dannon contends the failure-to-appear bench warrant is a detainer because the trial court issued the warrant “to effectuate [Dannon’s] appearance for prosecution in Indiana.” (Appellant’s Br. at 12.) Dannon asserts the bench warrant was “a public notice advising that Dannon is wanted to face pending criminal charges in Indiana,” and it “was also issued after an information was filed and the charges were untried.” (Id. at 12-13.) [10] The State contends the IAD does not apply because “no formal detainer has ever been lodged against” Dannon. (Appellee’s Br. at 9.) It argues the bench warrant is not a detainer based on “any untried indictment, information or complaint,” Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. (3)(a), because “[i]ts legal basis is the court’s inherent authority to enforce its own orders and manage its own docket, not a charging instrument supported by probable cause that the defendant committed a new criminal act.” (Appellee’s Br. at 12.) However, a bench Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 6 of 11 warrant ceases to exist when the underlying cause is dismissed. Dearing v. State, 95 N.E.2d 832, 835 (Ind. 1951). Indiana Code section 35-33-10-1 gives the trial court authority to issue a warrant for a criminal defendant’s immediate arrest if the defendant is released on his own recognizance or on bail and fails to appear in court at a designated time after receiving notice. The failure to appear is itself an arrestable offense and gives rise to probable cause to arrest. Clark v. State, 367 N.E.2d 1117, 1118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977). [11] In Crawford v. State, our Indiana Supreme Court held that an arrest warrant related to a 1965 murder was not a detainer because it was not based upon an untried indictment, information, or complaint. 669 N.E.2d 141, 148-49 (Ind. 1996). The Court explained the warrant was not based on an untried indictment or information because, at that time, a trial for murder could only occur as a result of a grand jury indictment and no grand jury had returned an indictment for the murder. Id. at 148. The warrant was a mechanism for the defendant to be held pending the grand jury probable cause determination. Id. The Court also held the warrant was not a complaint within the meaning of the IAD because “a complaint must be more than just the affidavit upon which an arrest warrant is based.” Id. at 149. Unlike in Crawford, the bench warrant for Dannon’s arrest was issued after the State had filed a formal information charging him with Level 6 felony criminal confinement and Class A misdemeanor battery, and it was based upon a probable cause determination that Dannon had failed to appear for a scheduled pretrial conference. Consequently, we conclude the arrest warrant was sufficient to serve as a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 7 of 11 detainer for purposes of the IAD.5 See, e.g., Noelker, 148 N.E.3d at 351 n.4 (holding that an arrest warrant based on untried charges sufficed as a detainer for IAD purposes). [12] Nonetheless, “[t]he procedures set forth in the IAD are not mere technicalities . . . strict compliance is required.” State v. Smith, 882 N.E.2d 739, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). The IAD outlines the procedure the prisoner must follow to request final disposition and start the 180-day period for the State to bring him to trial. The period begins only after the prisoner “shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint[.]” Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 3(a). The prisoner’s request shall be accompanied by a certificate of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, 5 In State v. Robinson, we held that a bench warrant issued after a defendant failed to appear for a pretrial conference was not a detainer under the IAD. 863 N.E.2d at 897. However, unlike in the present case, the trial court in Robinson was not aware that Robinson was incarcerated in a different jurisdiction when it issued the bench warrant. Id. at 895. The trial court knew Dannon was in federal custody when it issued the bench warrant and issued the warrant to ensure Dannon was returned to Indiana following his release from federal custody. Moreover, in Robinson, the panel postulated that “[i]f the prosecutor does not file a formal detainer, the incarcerated defendant does not suffer the consequences thereof while imprisoned and the prosecutor’s decision to permit the case to go unresolved is of no consequence.” Id. at 897. Yet, Dannon notes the pending bench warrant and charges prohibit him from accessing rehabilitative programming while in federal custody. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 8 of 11 and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the prisoner. Id. In addition, the IAD outlines the procedure for delivering the request for final disposition: The written notice and request for final disposition . . . shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, commissioner of correction or other official having custody of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 3(b). These procedures allow for the custodial authority to corroborate the information relayed by the prisoner so that the prosecutor in the receiving state may make an informed decision regarding whether to continue with prosecution. See State v. Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d 579, 582 (Ind. 1996) (“Validation of information from the official having custody is important to prosecuting officials in the receiving state.”). [13] While Dannon filed a motion to dismiss on January 21, 2025, that motion was not a proper request for disposition under the IAD. It was a document Dannon filed directly with the trial court, but the IAD requires that a prisoner’s request for final disposition be forwarded by the official with custody over the prisoner via registered or certified mail to the prosecutor and the trial court. See Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 3(b). The IAD’s 180-day period does not begin to run until the prisoner’s request for final disposition has been delivered to the court and the prosecutor. Fex, 507 U.S. at 52. In addition, Dannon’s motion did not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 9 of 11 include a certificate by the official having custody of him stating his term of commitment, his time already served, his time remaining to be served, his amount of good time credit earned, the time of parole eligibility, or any decisions of a parole agency related to him. See Ind. Code § 35-33-10-4, Art. 3(a). While the detainer action letter listed Dannon’s tentative release date as July 22, 2036, much of the information required by the IAD is not included. Dannon contends that the principles of equity should lead to dismissal of the charges against him, but he cites no controlling authority that stands for the proposition that equity should excuse a prisoner’s failure to properly request final disposition under the IAD. Because Dannon did not submit a request for final disposition in accordance with the IAD, we affirm the trial court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Greenwood, 665 N.E.2d at 582 (holding that attempts to request final disposition that did not comply with the IAD did not start the 180-day period for the State to bring the defendant to trial). Conclusion [14] The failure-to-appear bench warrant issued by the trial court when the trial court knew Dannon was in federal custody constituted a detainer under the IAD. However, Dannon did not follow the procedure outlined in the IAD for requesting final disposition of the charges pending against him. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Dannon’s motion to dismiss. [15] Affirmed. Pyle, J., and Scheele, J., concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 10 of 11 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Casey Farrington Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Tyler Banks Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-2954 | October 30, 2026 Page 11 of 11