Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this opinion until it is certified. FILED Nov 06 2026, 9:06 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Brian English, Appellant-Respondent v. Curtis Jones, Appellee-Petitioner November 6, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-MI-479 Appeal from the Miami Circuit Court The Honorable Timothy P. Spahr, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 52C01-2509-MI-1149 Opinion by Judge Scheele Judges May and Pyle concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 1 of 11 Scheele, Judge. Case Summary [1] Curtis Jones, pro se, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus following his incarceration on a parole violation. Brian English, warden of the Miami Correctional Facility (MCF), and Jones filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Jones, concluding the application of Indiana Code section 35-50-6-1(j) to Jones violated his constitutional rights, and ordered Jones’ immediate release from incarceration. English appeals. Finding that the sentencing law in effect at the time Jones committed his offense did not prohibit his time incarcerated on a different offense from counting toward his time served on parole, we affirm. Facts and Procedural History [2] On June 16, 1995, Jones fired at least four bullets into a house, and three of the bullets struck Troy Williams, causing his death. See Jones v. State, 689 N.E.2d 722, 724 (Ind. 1997). In December 1996, an Allen County court sentenced Jones to sixty-five years for murder. Following his direct appeal, his sentence was amended to sixty years. Id. After accounting for pretrial time credits, Jones’ effective sentence date was June 26, 1995, and his maximum release date was February 12, 2056. App. Vol. II p. 67. While Jones was incarcerated, a Madison County court convicted him of several battery counts and sentenced him to four years to be served consecutively to his murder sentence. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 2 of 11 [3] Jones was discharged to a two-year parole term on his murder sentence “either in September 2022 or October 2022.” 1 Id. at 232. At the same time he began serving parole on his murder sentence, Jones began serving his four-year sentence for his battery convictions. While Jones was incarcerated, the parole statute was modified effective July 1, 2023, to add: “Time served while confined to a jail or prison does not count toward time served on parole.” Ind. Code § 35-50-6-1(j) (2023). [4] The Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) then paused Jones’ parole on the murder sentence from July 1, 2023, until he completed his battery sentence. Up to that date, Jones had served 256 days of this two-year parole term for his murder sentence. On February 17, 2024, Jones was discharged to parole on his battery convictions. Jones simultaneously began serving the 474 days remaining on his murder-sentence parole, which the DOC calculated would conclude on June 5, 2025. [5] On May 27, 2025, Jones was arrested for a parole violation after self-reporting his unauthorized out-of-state travel. On that date, Jones’ parole stopped running and his time awaiting a hearing was credited toward any portion of his 1 Jones contended he was discharged to parole on September 26, 2022, see App. Vol. II p. 32, while English contended he was discharged on October 17, 2022, see id. at 69. The trial court noted the discrepancy was immaterial and did not preclude summary judgment in light of its decision that Indiana Code section 35-50-6- 1(j) did not apply to Jones as a matter of law. If that section did apply to Jones, his parole discharge date would be material and determinative of whether he was on parole when his alleged May 27, 2025 violation occurred. Because we also conclude that section 35-50-6-1(j) does not apply to Jones, his parole term would have run before May 27, 2025, regardless of whether it started in September or October 2022. Accordingly, we also conclude this dispute does not create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 3 of 11 remaining sentence that may be imposed post-revocation. The State pursued revocation of Jones’ parole for his murder sentence only; it did not pursue revocation of his parole for his battery sentence. Following an August revocation hearing, Jones’ parole was revoked and he was ordered to serve the balance of his murder sentence. [6] In September, Jones filed a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that Indiana Code section 35-50-6-1(j) was an ex post facto law and unconstitutional as applied to him. He claimed his murder-sentence parole should not have been paused, and he should have been released from parole on that sentence before the May 27, 2025 incident occurred. Jones and English each moved for summary judgment on Jones’ ex post facto claim. [7] On January 23, 2026, the court granted Jones’ motion for summary judgment and denied English’s. The court concluded section 35-50-6-1(j) had been applied to Jones retroactively and was an ex post facto law as applied. Thus, the court concluded Jones’ murder-sentence parole continued to run during his incarceration for battery, and was completed as of September or October 2024, well before the May 2025 conduct occurred. Accordingly, the court found Jones was unlawfully restrained and ordered his immediate release. English now appeals. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 4 of 11 Discussion and Decision [8] English contends that the trial court improperly concluded section 35-50-6-1(j) was a retroactive and ex post facto law. English argues we should reverse and order summary judgment in his favor. 2 We disagree. [9] “We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court[.]” Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). In doing so, we consider only the evidence designated to the trial court and draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor. Ebert v. Ill. Cas. Co., 188 N.E.3d 858, 863 (Ind. 2022). “The moving party bears the initial burden of making a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Manley v. Sherer, 992 N.E.2d 670, 673 (Ind. 2013) (internal quotations and citation omitted). “Summary judgment is improper if the moving party fails to carry its burden, but if it succeeds, then the non-moving party must come forward with evidence establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Id. Our standard of review is not altered by the fact that the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the same issue. Kelley v. Med-1 Sols., LLC, 952 N.E.2d 817, 827 (Ind. Ct. App. 2 As an initial matter, we note Jones’ argument that English’s appeal is forfeited as untimely. Our review of the record reveals that English’s notice of appeal bears an electronic-file stamp dated February 23, 2026, the date the notice was due. Therefore, his notice of appeal was timely filed. Alternatively, Jones argues the case should be dismissed as moot because he has been released and his parole supervision has ended. He relies on the trial court’s February 18, 2026 order denying outstanding motions on grounds that Jones’ battery- sentence parole ended on February 17, 2026, so Jones was no longer under any supervision. However, English appeals the court’s January 23, 2026 order on summary judgment, and our determination on review of that order dictates whether Jones should have been released from DOC supervision. Were we to reverse and conclude that section 35-50-6-1(j) applies to Jones, his DOC supervision would not have ended. As such, effective relief is available, and this case is not moot. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 5 of 11 2011), trans. denied. “Instead, we must consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 260 N.E.3d 253, 258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. [10] English disputes the trial court’s conclusion that Jones was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the basis that Jones was illegally incarcerated because Indiana Code section 35-50-6-1(j) did not apply to him. “Every person whose liberty is restrained, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of the restraint, and shall be delivered from the restraint if the restraint is illegal.” Ind. Code § 34-25.5-1-1 (1998). “A petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus only if he is entitled to immediate release from unlawful custody.” Harrison v. Knight, 127 N.E.3d 1269, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Hawkins v. Jenkins, 374 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind. 1978)). [11] In his petition for habeas corpus, Jones contended the version of section 35-50- 6-1 in effect when he committed his crime in 1995 called for a maximum of twenty-four months of parole, which ran concurrently with his sentence on an unrelated cause under the relevant law at the time. He thus argued the 2023 amendment to section 35-50-6-1(j), providing that “[t]ime served while confined to a jail or prison does not count toward time served on parole[,]” did not apply to him or, alternatively, that application to him violated the prohibition against ex post facto laws. [12] “Generally, the sentencing statutes in effect at the time a defendant commits an offense govern the defendant’s sentence.” Whittaker v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1063, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 6 of 11 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Indiana Code section 35-50-6-1 governs the length of a criminal offender’s parole and falls under Title 35, Article 50, which explicitly governs criminal sentences. As we have previously done, we treat section 35-50- 6-1 as a sentencing statute. See Crittenden v. State, No. 24A-PC-423, *3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2025) (mem.) (treating section 35-50-6-1 as a sentencing statute and concluding that the version in effect when the defendant committed his offense governed his sentence, including the length of his parole); see also State ex rel. Dorton v. Cir. Ct. of Elkhart Cnty., 412 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ind. 1980) (observing that the sentencing law in effect when an offense was committed governs a convicted person throughout the term of his sentence and that courts have viewed parole as an extension of the sentencing process). [13] The version of the sentencing statute in effect at the time Jones committed the relevant offense provided: Sec. 1. (a) Except as provided in subsection (d), when a person imprisoned for a felony completes his fixed term of imprisonment, less the credit time he has earned with respect to that term, he shall be released: (1) on parole for a period not exceeding twenty-four (24) months, as determined by the parole board; or (2) to the committing court if his sentence included a period of probation. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d), a person released on parole remains on parole from the date of his release until his fixed term expires, unless his parole is revoked or he is discharged from that term by the parole board. In any event, if Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 7 of 11 his parole is not revoked, the parole board shall discharge him after the period set under subsection (a) or the expiration of the person’s fixed term, whichever is shorter. (c) A person whose parole is revoked shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his fixed term. However, he shall again be released on parole when he completes that remainder, less the credit time he has earned since the revocation. The parole board may reinstate him on parole at any time after the revocation. (d) When an offender (as defined in I.C. 5-2-12-4) completes the offender’s fixed term of imprisonment, less credit time earned with respect to that term, the offender shall be placed on parole for not more than ten (10) years. I.C. § 35-50-6-1 (1994) (formatting altered). [14] This version of the statute contained no restriction disallowing time served while imprisoned from counting toward time served on parole. And, prior to the 2023 amendment, it was a well-settled common-law principle that an offender’s parole ran even while he remained incarcerated on a separate sentence. See, e.g., Hannis v. Deuth, 816 N.E.2d 872, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that part of the defendant’s parole period passed while he was in prison serving an unrelated sentence); Arnold v. Butts, 92 N.E.3d 1123, 1125-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (observing that it was then well settled that an offender may be on parole for one offense while incarcerated for another offense). Moreover, when the Legislature added subsection (j), it did not explicitly state that the amendment applied retroactively, see I.C. § 35-50-6-1(j) (2023), although it could have done so. And absent explicit language to the contrary, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 8 of 11 statutes generally do not apply retroactively. Lawrence v. State, 214 N.E.3d 361, 362-63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing N.G. v. State, 148 N.E.3d 971, 973 (Ind. 2020)). 3 [15] Still, English contends that section 35-50-6-1(j) governs an offender’s current custody status and that, because Jones remained in custody after the statute’s effective date, application of subsection (j) to Jones is prospective. We are not persuaded. “The critical first step in the retroactivity inquiry is identifying the conduct or event that triggers the statute’s application.” Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 587-88 (Ind. 2022). In identifying that event, we “look to the subject matter regulated by the statute and consider its plain language to determine the precipitating or triggering event,” because “the proper triggering event is that which the statute intends to regulate.” Id. (citation omitted). No person would be subject to the terms of section 35-50-6-1 but for his commission of an offense triggering application of our State’s sentencing scheme. Section 35-50-6-1 specifically governs the length and manner in which an offender must serve the parole portion of his punishment for an offense. As such, the operative event that triggers the statute, including subsection (j), is the commission of the offense. Here, Jones’ commission of the 1995 offense is the statute’s triggering event—not his later custody status. Application of subsection (j) to him is therefore retroactive. 3 Neither party argues that section 35-50-6-1(j) is remedial and, thus, subject to an exception from the general principle. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 9 of 11 [16] Because Jones committed the murder in June 1995, the then-effective 1994 version of section 35-50-6-1 applied to him. That version of the statute did not stop Jones’ parole from running while he served his battery sentence. Accordingly, his murder-sentence parole should not have been stopped on July 1, 2023. Instead, his parole should have continued to run through the end of the twenty-four month maximum, at which point he should have been discharged. See I.C. § 35-50-6-1(a)-(b) (1994). Therefore, Jones’ murder-sentence parole ended in either September or October 2024—long before his alleged parole violation in May 2025—and his subsequent incarceration was unlawful. [17] On the facts of this case, Jones made a prima facie showing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and that he was therefore entitled to immediate release. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in Jones’ favor and denied English’s motion. 4 We affirm. [18] Affirmed. May, J., and Pyle, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General 4 Both parties address whether section 35-50-6-1(j) is an ex post facto law as applied to Jones. We need not address this issue because the general rule that the sentencing statute in effect when the offense was committed controls is dispositive. And, although the trial court granted summary judgment in Jones’ favor by concluding that section 35-50-6-1(j) was an ex post facto law as applied, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. State v. Chavez, 956 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 10 of 11 Tyler G. Banks Section Chief, Capital and Habeas Litigation Indianapolis, Indiana APPELLEE PRO SE Curtis Jones Fort Wayne, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-MI-479 | November 6, 2026 Page 11 of 11