Ivy Sisson v. State of Indiana

FILED Sep 04 2026, 8:56 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Ivy Sisson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff September 4, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-3174 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Angela Dow Davis, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D27-2109-F3-29143 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judge Mathias concurs in part and concurs in result in part with a separate opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 1 of 55  Judge Kenworthy concurs. DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] After abducting his estranged wife from her employer’s parking lot and subjecting her to a violent ordeal in which he repeatedly beat and threatened to kill her, Ivy Sisson was charged a litany of offenses. They included kidnapping as Level 3 and Level 5 felonies, criminal confinement as Level 3 and Level 5 felonies, domestic battery as a Level 5 felony, and two counts of intimidation as Level 5 felonies. A jury found Sisson guilty as charged, the trial court convicted him of all counts, and Sisson received an aggregate sentence of thirty-one years. Sisson challenges his convictions on appeal and raises two issues. First, he contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence seized after a warrantless search of his girlfriend’s condo. Second, he argues that all his convictions except for Level 3 felony kidnapping and Level 5 felony domestic battery violate substantive double jeopardy and must be vacated. [2] We first hold that the warrantless search of the condo violated neither the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution nor Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution, as Sisson’s girlfriend gave his arresting officers voluntary consent to search her home and garage. Thus, evidence seized from her residence was properly admitted at trial. Second, we conclude that Sisson’s multiple convictions put him in substantive double jeopardy and thus affirm Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 2 of 55  only his convictions for Level 3 felony kidnapping and Level 5 domestic battery. We remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate Sisson’s other convictions and their corresponding sentences. Facts and Procedural History [3] Sisson and Kristina Hannah 1 met and started dating sometime around 1999. They had a son together shortly after they started dating but separated sometime after his birth. Sisson and Hannah rekindled their relationship in 2012 and were married in 2015. In 2021, they separated again and discussed getting a divorce. [4] At the time of their second separation, Hannah worked in the IU Health lab at the Methodist Medical Plaza South in Indianapolis. On September 16, 2021, Hannah was scheduled to arrive at work between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m. At around 4:45 that morning, a security guard monitoring the plaza’s parking lot saw a middle-aged or older black man walking from behind a COVID-19 testing tent. Assuming the man was homeless, the security guard told him that he needed to leave. Apparently without objection, the man walked out of the parking lot toward the main road. Shortly thereafter, the guard noticed an unfamiliar white car parked in the lot. When he peered through its windows, he saw rope and a roll of “thicker-type tape” inside. Transcript Vol. 2 at 224. 1 When she and Sisson were married, Hannah’s last name was the same as Sisson’s. She later changed it to Hannah, which is how we refer to her throughout this opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 3 of 55  Thinking the car might belong to someone working construction at the medical center, the guard left it alone and drove to a spot at the northwest corner of the building where he could monitor staff arriving for their morning shifts. [5] A few minutes later, out of the corner of his eye, the security guard saw the white car “spe[e]d away” to the south side of the parking lot, out of the guard’s view. Id. at 217. Fifteen to twenty minutes after that, the car drove back to the north side of the parking lot with its headlights off before doing a U-turn and exiting the lot. After observing that odd behavior, the security guard called the police, and an IMPD officer was dispatched to the plaza at around 5:40 a.m. The officer spoke with the guard and drove around the building, but he didn’t see anything notable and left the scene. [6] Meanwhile, Hannah had arrived for the start of her shift at around 5:30 a.m. She parked her SUV near the COVID-19 tent and started walking toward the building’s entrance. Moments later, without warning, Sisson approached her from behind and hit her on the back of the head with a handgun. The pair briefly struggled as Sisson tried to force Hannah back into her vehicle, but he couldn’t gain control of her keys. Sisson then grabbed Hannah by the arm, pointed the gun at her back, and told her to start walking. She tried to break free from his grip, but he held onto her “[v]ery forceful[ly].” Tr. Vol. 3 at 20. He led Hannah at gunpoint across the plaza’s parking lot, through a wooded Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 4 of 55  area, and into the parking lot of a hardware store. There, Sisson had parked his white Nissan Sentra. 2 [7] Sisson initially tried to put Hannah into the trunk of his car. But after Hannah begged him not to, he placed her in the back seat, took her cell phone and book bag from her, and started driving. He pulled onto I-65 North and told Hannah he was driving to a remote location where he would “bury [her] in the cornfields.” Id. at 22. Later during the drive, he explained that he planned to kill her so he could collect on an insurance policy. [8] At some point during the drive, Sisson demanded that Hannah tell him the passcode to unlock her phone. When she refused, he used the gun to hit her on her knees, arms, hand, and head. After landing one of these blows, Sisson dropped the gun and had to pull over at a rest stop to pick it back up. When the car stopped, Hannah tried to escape, but Sisson had enabled the child locks so she could not open the door. Sisson retrieved the gun, got back on the interstate, and continued to beat Hannah until she finally gave him her passcode. Sisson then used Hannah’s phone to text her coworkers, who had noticed her absence from work and were trying to reach her. [9] After driving for about an hour, Sisson exited the interstate and “went out through the cornfields.” Id. at 25. He stopped, made Hannah get out of the 2 The Nissan was registered to Hannah, but Sisson had it in his possession before, during, and after Hannah’s abduction. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 5 of 55  car, retrieved a shovel from the trunk, and led Hannah at gunpoint down into a ditch. He forced her to her knees, held the gun to the back of her head, told her he was going to kill her, and started reciting the Lord’s Prayer. As he did, Hannah begged for her life. Sisson eventually agreed not to kill Hannah, telling her that “he still loved [her]” and saying “something about [Hannah’s] daughter needing [her] and how much he loved her.” Id. at 26. He helped Hannah out of the ditch, put her back in the car, and drove her to IU Health West Hospital in Avon. [10] Sisson dropped Hannah outside the hospital’s entrance and drove away, which was captured by the hospital’s security cameras. Though Sisson is not visible in the hospital security footage, he was captured on Hannah’s home security system three days later driving the same white Nissan that dropped her off at the hospital. Hannah was treated for two lacerations on the back of her scalp and her left forehead, and she had bruises on her face, shoulder, wrist, fingers, knees, and thigh, as well as a third laceration on her wrist. Many of her fingers were swollen, and the ring finger on her left hand suffered a minor fracture. While in the hospital, Hannah told a physician’s assistant “that she had been physically assaulted . . . [b]y her husband.” Id. at 58. [11] Hannah’s coworkers and family reported her missing shortly after she failed to show up for work, and police were already investigating her disappearance when she arrived at the hospital. After learning that Hannah had been found, an IMPD detective went to the hospital to speak with her. Officers put together an application for a warrant to arrest Sisson based on the information Hannah Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 6 of 55  provided. An arrest warrant was issued on September 21, and lead Detective Anthony Weaver asked the U.S. Marshals Service for help locating Sisson. [12] A day later, law enforcement tracked Sisson to a condo on Deerwood Court in Indianapolis where his girlfriend, Michelle Dunklin, lived. Sisson was arrested at Dunklin’s residence on September 22, and officers saw his Nissan while performing what they described as “a protective sweep of the garage area which had separate access.” Exhibits Vol. 1 at 14. Later that day, officers obtained and executed warrants to search the residence, garage, and the Nissan. In the garage, officers found and seized a shovel, a loaded handgun, a holster, a box of ammunition, zip ties, and various tools. DNA analysis later revealed a mixture of two DNA profiles on the gun’s slide grip: Hannah’s and that of an unrelated male. The male DNA profile was inconclusive and could not be compared to Sisson’s. In Sisson’s Nissan (which was also seized), officers found apparent blood stains on the back seat and rear passenger-side grab handle. Analysis later confirmed those stains were from Hannah’s blood. [13] On September 20, 2021, the State charged Sisson with seven counts: • Count I – Kidnapping, as a Level 3 felony; 3 • Count II – Criminal Confinement, as a Level 3 felony; 4 3 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-2(a), (b)(3)(A) (2019). 4 Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(3)(A) (2019). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 7 of 55  • Count III – Kidnapping, as a Level 5 felony; 5 • Count IV – Criminal Confinement, as a Level 5 felony; 6 • Count V – Domestic Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon, a Level 5 felony; 7 • Count VI – Intimidation, as a Level 5 felony; 8 and • Count VII – Intimidation, as a Level 5 felony. 9 Sisson was represented by counsel from the date of his initial hearing on September 27, 2021 to January 2023. At a hearing on January 26, 2023, Sisson expressed his desire to proceed pro se. The trial court permitted Sisson’s attorney to withdraw so Sisson could represent himself. [14] A few days later, on January 31, Sisson filed a pro se “Motion to Suppress Evidence” and a memorandum of law supporting that motion. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 220. He sought to suppress evidence obtained from Dunklin’s condo, garage, and his Nissan on the grounds that the “protective sweep” conducted by the arresting officers violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 225. In the memorandum, he asserted the following “facts”: 5 I.C. § 35-42-3-2(a), (b)(1)(B). 6 I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(1)(C). 7 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (c)(2) (2021). 8 Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1), (b)(2)(A) (2019) (amended 2022). 9 I.C. § 35-45-2-1(a)(4), (b)(2)(A). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 8 of 55  On September 22, 2021, [officers] arrested [Sisson], outside [Dunklin’s condo], on a body attachment/arrest warrant. Officers then opened the screen door and exterior door of said residence, without authority, pulled a female from the residence to the outside, asked the female [if] there [was] anyone else present, then took the female and [Sisson] back into the residence, and proceeded to search the residence. Id. at 223-24. Sisson argued that because he was not arrested inside the condo, the officers had no valid justification to conduct a “protective sweep” after taking him inside. Id. at 225. He also noted that the “arresting officers will state that the homeowner gave them permission to search the residence.” Id. at 226. However, according to Sisson, Dunklin did not voluntarily consent because she had been “yank[ed] . . . from her doorway outside, and then [was] co[]erc[ed] into giving [officers] consent to search by placing her under arrest/detainment in her own home.” Id. at 228. [15] The court held a trifurcated hearing on the motion to suppress on February 8, March 21, and April 18, 2023. 10 On February 8, Sisson called Dunklin to testify. According to Dunklin, she became alarmed that day when she saw law enforcement standing outside her front door “in full armor . . . with their guns drawn[ and] their protective wear on.” Supplemental Tr. at 8. She opened the door because she was afraid the police were about to knock it down. Dunklin described that Sisson stood behind her as she spoke with the officers, who told 10 The State did not file a written response to the motion to suppress. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 9 of 55  her “that they were looking for Mr. Sisson[.]” Id. She said, “[H]e’s right here[,]” and the officers “pulled” her and Sisson “out of the house.” Id. She then claimed that after asking her a few questions about Sisson, they took Sisson back inside the residence but kept speaking with her outside. [16] Dunklin further testified that because it was raining, and since she wanted to get back to her work-from-home call center job, she asked the officers if she could go back inside. Dunklin explained what happened next as follows: [T]hey allowed me to come back in, and one of the police officers . . . came up with me while I continued to do my job, and they had [Sisson] sit on the couch. . . . [The officers] told me that . . . they were looking for . . . a few items. Then they read me my rights. After reading me my rights, they wanted to know . . . if they could do a search because they were just looking for a few things. At this point, unfortunately, I should know better, but I don’t know anything about the law. Never been in trouble. So I am like, okay, well, whatever you’ve got to do because at this point, I just want you out of my house. . . . I did sign a consent for [a] search[.][ 11] Id. at 8-9. Dunklin claimed she was “under distress” when she signed the consent form because she had “never been in that type of situation before” and 11 Neither Sisson nor the State offered a copy of Dunklin’s written consent into evidence at the suppression hearing, and we do not have a copy of it in the record on appeal. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 10 of 55  “was also working and underneath pressure.” Id. at 9. She also said that though officers informed her of her “rights[,]” 12 she didn’t understand them. Id. [17] After brief cross-examination by the State, the trial judge asked Dunklin if Sisson was living with her when he was arrested. Dunklin said no, and the court asked if Sisson “[h]ad . . . stayed . . . overnight at [her] residence prior to the police showing up[.]” Id. at 10. The following exchange then occurred: [DUNKLIN]: Well, he had stayed over, you know, like he was having problems, didn’t have anywhere to stay. So I mean, he stayed over maybe like a night or two, but it was not like a consistent stay where I could say that he was in my dwelling place and – and you know, and was living there. THE COURT: But as far as the night before leading up to this, he had stayed overnight at your location, and that is why he was there at that time, or he had simply stopped by? [DUNKLIN]: Oh, he had simply stopped by. THE COURT: Do you remember the last time he had stayed overnight at your residence? [DUNKLIN]: That, I am not sure. Id. at 10-11. 12 Neither Sisson nor the State presented evidence of what specific rights Dunklin was informed of before the officers asked for her consent. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 11 of 55 [18] On re-direct, Sisson asked, “[T]he night before . . . this incident happened, had I spent the night over at your house?” Id. at 11. Dunklin answered, “Yeah, I guess so.” Id. The State pressed Dunklin to clarify her testimony on re-cross. She apologized to the judge, explained that she wanted “to take back what [she] said[,]” and reiterated that Sisson “had spent the night [with her] the night before” his arrest. Id. at 12. No other witnesses or evidence was presented on February 8. [19] On March 21, the State called two witnesses. First, Detective Weaver described that when he arrived at Dunklin’s condo on September 22, 2021, a task force had already arrived on scene to arrest Sisson inside. He saw members of that task force knock on Dunklin’s door, after which “[t]hey went inside . . . .” Tr. Vol. 2 at 8. Weaver “came in moments later, after [Sisson] was already secured, sitting on a couch in the front room.” Id. According to Weaver, the officers asked Dunklin for permission to sweep the entire property, and she consented. At some later point, Weaver passed along certain “information” to Detective Leo George, who “was running . . . the operation” but was not at Dunklin’s home. Id. at 9. George put together applications for warrants to search Dunklin’s home and Sisson’s Nissan, and the officers on the scene waited for those warrants to be issued by a judge. 13 Weaver was not 13 As noted below, initially, George only applied for a warrant to search Dunklin’s home and garage. Officers seized Sisson’s Nissan while executing that first warrant, and only then did George apply for another warrant to search the vehicle. Thus, Weaver’s testimony appears to be inaccurate insofar as he suggested that George applied for both warrants at the same time. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 12 of 55  present when the warrants were executed. On cross-examination, Weaver reiterated that he did not see Sisson’s arrest, and he entered Dunklin’s home only after Sisson was already “inside sitting down on th[e] couch.” Id. at 11. [20] Second, the State called Detective George. During his brief testimony, George confirmed that he applied for warrants to search Dunklin’s home and Sisson’s car based on information provided by officers who were at the scene of Sisson’s arrest. The State then offered copies of the search warrant applications into evidence, and the trial court admitted them over Sisson’s objection. Both warrant applications described what Hannah told officers about the ordeal she suffered on September 16, 2021, and noted that a warrant had been issued for Sisson’s arrest. The application for a warrant to search Dunklin’s residence and garage—which George submitted at 1:42 p.m.—described Sisson’s arrest and the subsequent “protective sweep” as follows: On September 22, 2021, at approximately 12:00 PM, [officers] tracked Ivy Sisson to an address located at . . . Deerwood Court, Indianapolis, Indiana where he was taken into custody for his warrant. Also at the residence was Ms. Michelle Dun[klin], who identified herself as the lease holder. As part of securing the residence for officer safety, officers asked Ms. Dun[klin] permission to do a protective sweep of the garage area which had separate access. Ms. Dun[klin] gave them permission. While doing so, . . . officers observed . . . there to be a white, 2010 Nissan Sentra . . . located in the garage. The residence, garage[,] and Mr. Ivy Sisson have been secured until such time a search warrant could be prepared. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 13 of 55  Ex. Vol. 1 at 14. A judge issued a warrant to search Dunklin’s residence and garage at 1:59 p.m. Then, at 4:22 p.m., George applied for a warrant to search the Nissan, which officers had seized from Dunklin’s garage. That warrant was issued at 4:34 p.m. [21] After the search warrant applications were entered into evidence, the court continued the rest of the suppression hearing to April 18. On that date, Sisson called Detective Michael Hewitt, who was present for Sisson’s arrest but couldn’t recall if he was “the one who put handcuffs on [Sisson] or not.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 38. He also didn’t remember whether Sisson was inside or outside Dunklin’s residence when he was arrested, though he said, “If my memory serves me correctly, . . . I believe [Sisson] stepped outside, I think, I think.” Id. When Sisson asked if it was “customary . . . if you are serving an arrest warrant, to take a defendant or arrestee back into a residence[,]” Hewitt said, “[Y]ou were staying at that residence and the lady invited us back in, if I recall that correctly.” Id. at 39. Hewitt clarified on cross-examination that Dunklin gave him permission to take Sisson back into the house because it was raining. Hewitt was not involved in conducting the protective sweep, and he provided no testimony about the search of Dunklin’s residence and garage. [22] As his final witness, Sisson re-called Dunklin. She testified about Sisson’s arrest and the consent-search of her home consistently with the account she provided on February 8. On cross-examination, Dunklin again explained that law enforcement “read [her her] rights and asked for [her] consent to search[,]” but she claimed she felt coerced “[b]ecause [she] was in the middle of [her] Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 14 of 55  workday.” Id. at 50-51. She also said she felt the officers pressured her “because they were police and they were asking questions[.]” Id. at 52. After Dunklin’s testimony, the State and Sisson indicated they had no additional evidence on the suppression issue. [23] From the bench, the court explained the following to Sisson: . . . [T]estimony from Ms. Dunklin indicated that you stayed there from time to time. Her first portion of her testimony, she said that you had not spent the night there beforehand. But then on redirect she said, I guess so – saying that you had spent the night there beforehand, which could be a shaky foundation for saying that you were an overnight guest to begin with. But even granting you that, . . . if we’re moving on and saying that you do have standing to assert your challenge here, which for the sake of argument, I have granted here, I am still not seeing the misconduct by police that would warrant the suppression in this case. . . . [T]hey asked the homeowner, Ms. Dunklin, can we search this place, and then subsequently got a search warrant signed by a judicial officer to seize certain items of evidence. That’s what I’m seeing. Id. at 63. After the hearing, the court issued a minute order denying the motion to suppress. [24] On November 8, 2023, the trial court released Sisson from pretrial detention and put him on a GPS monitor. On December 1, the court issued a warrant for Sisson’s arrest after he removed the monitor and fled the state. Sisson was not located and re-arrested until April 5, 2025. Because Sisson absconded and due Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 15 of 55  to several continuances throughout the pendency of the case, Sisson’s two-day jury trial did not commence until October 28, 2025. A few months before trial, Sisson changed his mind about proceeding pro se, and a public defender was appointed to represent him. [25] At trial, numerous witnesses testified to the facts of Sisson’s crimes described above, including Hannah, her supervisor at the health lab, a coworker, the security guard, the physician’s assistant who treated Hannah, Detective Weaver, and other law enforcement representatives who participated in the investigation. Among other exhibits, the State offered photographs taken during the search of Dunklin’s home and garage; the firearm, magazine, holster, and shovel found in the garage; photographs of the interior and exterior of the Nissan; and DNA swabs and other samples from the car that were submitted to the crime lab for testing. Sisson asserted a continuing objection to all this evidence based on his “pretrial arguments on [the] issue of the search” which he “maintain[ed] was not constitutional.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 87. The court admitted the evidence over Sisson’s objections. 14 [26] Ultimately, the jury found Sisson guilty as charged. With the verdict forms, the jury sent the court a handwritten note informing it of the following: The jury has come to a conclusion that charges 6 and 7 are very similar. We feel as though [b]oth charges should have been 14 We outline other relevant evidence presented at trial in our discussion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 16 of 55  rolled into one charge. We the jury ask to keep this in mind during sentencing. Appellant’s App. Vol. 5 at 72. When the jury was released, the trial judge showed that note to the attorneys and said that Counts VI and VII (the intimidation charges) were “[p]robably going to merge anyway, so it’s moot.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 213. [27] At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the court to impose an aggregate sentence of twenty-two years, made up of: (1) a fourteen-year sentence on the Level 3 felony kidnapping charge; (2) a consecutive four-year sentence on the Level 5 felony domestic battery charge; (3) a consecutive four-year sentence on one of the Level 5 intimidation charges; and (4) concurrent sentences on each of the remaining counts. The State argued the sentences for the Level 3 felony kidnapping, the Level 5 felony domestic battery, and one of the Level 5 felony intimidation charges should be consecutive because “those are the crimes that are easily separated from each other.” Id. at 226. However, according to the State, the remaining counts were “a bit more intertwined[.]” Id. Sisson’s counsel “ask[ed] the [c]ourt to run all of the[] charges together concurrently” and argued, I see this as one prolonged act that begins with the attack and kidnapping, the drive, which is the confinement, with the domestic battery as part of that kidnapping, the intimidation as part of that kidnapping, in an effort to make her . . . comply with what he wanted to do. I believe that all of these actions are part of one picture, and that these charges should all run together. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 17 of 55  Id. at 226-27. [28] After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court entered judgments of conviction on all seven counts and imposed an aggregate sentence of thirty-one years in the Department of Correction as follows: Count Offense Sentence I Level 3 felony kidnapping 15 years II Level 3 felony criminal confinement 10 years – consecutive to Count I III Level 5 felony kidnapping 6 years – concurrent with Count II IV Level 5 felony criminal confinement 6 years – concurrent with Count II V Level 5 felony domestic battery 6 years – consecutive to Count II VI Level 5 felony intimidation 6 years – concurrent with Count V VII Level 5 felony intimidation 6 years – concurrent with Count V [29] Sisson now appeals. Discussion and Decision 1. Admission of Evidence [30] Sisson first argues that “[t]he trial court erroneously admitted evidence unlawfully recovered from Dunklin’s home.” Appellant’s Brief at 14. We Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 18 of 55  review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence at trial following the denial of a pre-trial motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion and will “reverse only if a ruling is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party’s substantial rights.’” Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998, 1001 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013)). When “the evidence is conflicting,” we “consider only that evidence which tends to support the trial court’s ruling” and will “uphold the trial court if the ruling is supported by substantial evidence of probative value.” Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 535 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied, cert. denied. However, “the ultimate ‘ruling on the constitutionality of a search’ is a legal conclusion that we review de novo[.]” McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Garcia-Torres v. State, 949 N.E.2d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2011)). [31] According to Sisson, the “protective sweep” of Dunklin’s home was unlawful under both the federal and state constitutions, and thus any evidence seized “pursuant to the subsequent search warrants was inadmissible fruit of the poisonous tree.” Appellant’s Br. at 22. Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (which Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution mirrors), “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV; see also Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11. Both provisions “protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ramos-Osario v. State, 280 N.E.3d 784, 789 (Ind. 2026). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 19 of 55 [32] The privacy rights protected by Article 1, Section 11 and the Fourth Amendment are personal, and a defendant cannot vicariously challenge the constitutionality of a search under either. Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 532, 534. To challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, the defendant has the burden to show he had “a legitimate expectation of privacy in that which [was] searched.” Barker v. State, 96 N.E.3d 638, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 532), trans. denied. Similarly, “Indiana law has . . . imposed a requirement of standing to challenge a search or seizure” under the state constitution. Peterson, 674 N.E.2d at 534. Put simply, “a defendant cannot successfully object to a search of the premises of another if such search does not unlawfully invade his own privacy.” 15 Id. [33] Here, the trial court observed that Sisson’s claim to have a legitimate privacy interest in Dunklin’s condo lies on “a shaky foundation . . . .” Tr. Vol. 2 at 63. But because the State does not contest Sisson’s standing, we assume without deciding that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises 15 Though a defendant must have had a reasonable expectation of privacy to challenge a search under both the state and federal constitutions, “the U.S. Supreme Court has abandoned the concept of ‘standing.’” Allen v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1092, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), reh’g denied, trans. denied. As previously explained by this Court, In Rakas, the United States Supreme Court determined that the “definition of those [personal] rights [that is, whether the proponent is asserting his own legal rights and interests rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third parties] is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.” Id. (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978), reh’g denied) (alterations in original). However, “Indiana courts have continued to use the ‘standing’ terminology when discussing Fourth Amendment claims.” Barker, 96 N.E.3d at 648 n.3 (quoting Allen, 893 N.E.2d at 1097 n.4). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3174 | September 4, 2026 Page 20 of 55  searched. 16 However, as we explain below, even with that assumption, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that Dunklin gave the officers voluntary consent to conduct a “preliminary search” of her residence and garage before applying for a search warrant. Id. at 62. Moreover, even if the trial court did err, that error did not affect Sisson’s substantial rights. Voluntariness of Dunklin’s Consent [34] To be lawful under the state and federal constitutions, “it is axiomatic that a search requires a warrant unless certain narrow exceptions apply[.]” State v. Cunningham, 26 N.E.3d 21, 25 (Ind. 2015). One such exception is where the officers had consent to search, as “a ‘search based on lawful consent is consistent with both the Indiana and Federal Constitutions.’” Id. (quoting Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 600 (Ind. 2008)). As summarized by our Supreme Court, Under both the Fourth Amendment and the Indiana Constitution, the State carries “the burden of proving ‘that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress 16 Sisson did not live with Dunklin, but he may have had a legitimate privacy interest in the premises if he stayed there the night before his arrest as an overnight guest. See Best v. State, 821 N.E.2d 419, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]n overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the householder may not.” (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90 (1998))) (alteration in original), reh’g denied, trans. denied. Dunklin gave equivocating testimony at the suppression hearing about whether Sisson stayed with her the night before his arrest. She first testified in response to a question from the court that Sission had not stayed the night before but had “simply stopped by” on the day of his arrest. Supp. Tr. at 11. She then recanted that testimony on re-direct, answering, “Yeah,