Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Nov 20 2026, 8:39 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Byron Robinson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff November 20, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-860 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable Heather M. Barton, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 49D27-1805-F6-16726 Opinion by Judge DeBoer Judge Foley concurs with separate opinion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 1 of 19 Judge Felix concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. DeBoer, Judge. Case Summary [1] Byron Robinson appeals his convictions for strangulation and domestic battery, arguing they violate substantive double jeopardy. He also claims the trial court improperly assessed fees against him without holding an indigency hearing. Concluding Robinson’s convictions subject him to substantive double jeopardy and that the trial court should have held a hearing to determine whether Robinson was indigent as to the domestic violence fees only, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the domestic battery conviction and to conduct an indigency hearing. Facts and Procedural History [2] In 2018, Robinson was in a relationship with Stephanie Martin. On May 20, Martin told Robinson she was breaking up with him and asked him to leave her apartment. In response, Robinson grabbed her by the neck and pushed her up against the wall. Martin freed herself from his grip, grabbed her daughter, and went to her friend’s apartment in the same complex. Her friend called the police, and when they arrived, they accompanied Martin to her apartment. [3] Martin immediately noticed Robinson had destroyed the place. In the kitchen, he had thrown food everywhere and stabbed knives into the cabinet doors. He Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 2 of 19 had dumped milk on the bathroom floor and poured bleach on their clothes in the bathtub. In the bedrooms, he had smashed TVs and knocked over furniture and other items. After the police photographed everything, Martin left to see her aunt, Adriana Cole. [4] When Martin arrived at Cole’s house, Cole told her she could stay there. Martin went back to her apartment to get some personal items, but unbeknownst to Martin, Robinson was following her. He trailed her into the apartment, grabbed her by the neck, put her in the bathtub, and yelled at her while he choked her. When Robinson let go, Martin ran downstairs, out the back door, and returned to Cole’s house. [5] Immediately after Martin arrived at Cole’s house, Robinson knocked on the door. When Cole answered the door, Robinson put his hands around Martin’s neck, dragged her out of the house, and bit her face. He briefly held her in a chokehold before fleeing. Cole called the police, and within a short time, they arrived there to make a police report about the altercation. Three days later, Detective Tiffany Lamle took statements from Martin and Cole. As a result, 1 the State charged Robinson with: Count 1: Strangulation, as a Level 6 felony; 2 Counts 2 and 3: Domestic Battery, as Class A misdemeanors; and Count 4: 1 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c)(1) (2017). 2 Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2016). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 3 of 19 3 Criminal Mischief, as a Class B misdemeanor. The State also sought to elevate 4 both battery charges to Level 6 felonies due to Robinson’s prior domestic battery conviction. [6] At the bench trial on March 5, 2026, Detective Lamle and Martin testified consistently with the facts above. The trial court found Robinson guilty of Counts 1, 2, and 4, and not guilty of Count 3. Robinson stipulated to his prior domestic battery conviction, and the court elevated Count 2 to a Level 6 felony. The court sentenced Robinson to concurrent terms of two years on Counts 1 and 2, and zero days on Count 3. Robinson now appeals. Discussion and Decision 1. Robinson’s strangulation and domestic battery convictions violate substantive double jeopardy. [7] Robinson first argues that his convictions for strangulation and domestic battery violate Indiana’s prohibition against substantive double jeopardy. We review such claims de novo. McGraw v. State, 243 N.E.3d 394, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Our Supreme Court has fashioned two distinct substantive double jeopardy frameworks. The first, articulated in Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), and refined by A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060 (Ind. 2024), “addresse[s] scenarios when ‘a single criminal act or transaction violates 3 Ind. Code § 35-43-1-2(a) (2017). 4 I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(b)(1). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 4 of 19 multiple statutes with common elements.’” Moyers v. State, 277 N.E.3d 33, 38 (Ind. 2026) (quoting Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 263 (Ind. 2020)). The second, expressed in Powell, “addresse[s] ‘multiplicity,’ which occurs ‘when a single criminal act or transaction violates a single statute and results in multiple injuries.’” Id. (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 263). [8] Here, because Robinson was convicted under two statutes defining separate base offenses, the former applies. Under Wadle and A.W., we must “consider whether: (1) the charging statutes permit multiple punishments; (2) either offense is included in the other; and (3) the defendant’s acts constitute a single transaction.” Easter v. State, 281 N.E.3d 896, 908 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026). Step 1 [9] At step one, we examine the statutory language to determine whether “either statute clearly permits multiple punishment, either expressly or by unmistakable implication.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1066 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). If so, “the court’s inquiry comes to an end and there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). Here, both parties agree that neither the strangulation statute nor the domestic battery statute permits multiple punishments, so we proceed to step two. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 5 of 19 Step 2 [10] Step two calls for application of the “included-offense statutes to determine 5 statutory intent.” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248). An offense can be included in another “either inherently or as charged.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. Here, the parties agree—and this Court has made clear—that domestic battery is not inherently included in strangulation. See Baker v. State, 223 N.E.3d 1142, 1147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (strangulation includes an element domestic battery does not: applying pressure to the throat or neck to impede breathing or blood circulation; domestic battery includes an element 6 strangulation does not: the victim was a “family or household member”). [11] Turning then to factual inclusion, “[a]n offense is factually included in another if the charging information alleges ‘that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’” 5 When a defendant is found guilty of both “an offense and an included offense,” statute provides that “judgment and sentence may not be entered against the defendant for the included offense.” Ind. Code § 35- 38-1-6 (1983). An “included offense” is one that: (1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged; (2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or (3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission. Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (2012). 6 Baker was convicted of the same offenses as Robinson but under different versions of the strangulation and domestic battery statutes. See id. at 1144 (August 2022 offense date). But because the language in both versions of each statute is the same, we find Baker persuasive here. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 6 of 19 McGraw, 243 N.E.3d at 401-02 (quoting Norris v. State, 943 N.E.2d 362, 368-69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied)). When conducting this assessment, we “may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (emphasis omitted). If “ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant’s favor, and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2.” Afolabi v. State, 279 N.E.3d 939, 954 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069), trans. denied. The State can rebut that presumption at Step 3. Id. [12] Such ambiguity “exists when it is ‘conceivable,’ but not certain, from the facts presented on the face of the charging instrument that the means used to commit the alleged greater offense includes all the elements of the alleged lesser offense.” Id. (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1070). In this case, the charging information provided, in relevant part: [Count 1 – Strangulation] . . . Robinson in a rude, insolent or angry manner, did knowingly apply pressure to the throat or neck of . . . Martin in a manner that impeded normal breathing or blood circulation of . . . Martin; [Count 2 – Domestic Battery] . . . Robinson did knowingly touch . . . Martin, a family or household member, in a rude, insolent or angry manner by dragging her on a walkway and/or biting her[.] Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 7 of 19 Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 15 (emphasis added). [13] As drafted, Robinson’s battery charge was based on the allegation that he dragged Martin, bit her, or both. And, as Robinson points out, if he dragged Martin by her neck in a manner that impeded her breathing or circulation, “it is conceivable that the strangulation and battery were accomplished by the same means.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. We must construe this factual ambiguity in favor of Robinson and find a presumptive double jeopardy violation. See A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069 (factual ambiguity must be construed in favor of the defendant). Thus, we proceed to the final step of the analysis. Step 3 [14] At this step, we examine “the underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to determine whether a defendant’s actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Id. at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). A defendant’s convictions violate substantive double jeopardy if the facts show “only a single continuous crime,” but not if the facts show two separate crimes. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249. [15] To apply the continuous crime doctrine in this context, “we must first identify which of the defendant’s actions to analyze.” Easter, 281 N.E.3d at 910 (quoting Afolabi, 279 N.E.3d at 955). “This is not a call for post hoc explanations of how the evidence could have been allocated between the offenses to avoid substantive double jeopardy.” Id. (quoting Afolabi, 279 N.E.3d Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 8 of 19 at 955). “Rather, ‘[t]he State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact- finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Ratliff v. State, 242 N.E.3d 1070, 1078-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied). “Failure to hold the State to this standard would render [the] presumption of double jeopardy largely without meaning.” Id. Moreover, the presumption should operate the same whether the defendant is tried by a jury or the court. [16] On appeal, the State attempts to rebut the presumption of double jeopardy by arguing that Robinson committed two separate offenses when he “strangled [Martin] at [her] apartment and battered her at [Cole’s] house.” Appellee’s Brief at 11. However, the State did not make this distinction clear in its 7 presentation of evidence or during closing arguments. Indeed, the evidence showed that Robinson strangled Martin three times in one day, including during the altercation at Cole’s house. In closing, the deputy prosecutor failed to distinguish these three incidents, instead arguing Robinson “strangled [Martin] more than once” which, in the State’s view, was “enough to meet the lead count[,] strangulation.” Transcript at 49. But the deputy prosecutor then cited the altercation at Cole’s house, during which Robinson “put his hands 7 The State claims “the prosecutor’s closing argument during the trial is irrelevant to the statutory substantive jeopardy analysis.” Appellee’s Br. at 11. But our Supreme Court has very clearly held that during this step of the analysis “actual evidence and arguments at trial” may be considered. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1070 (emphasis added). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 9 of 19 around her neck and dragged her a couple feet outside,” as the basis for the domestic battery charge. Id. (“That meets the next charge.”). Since the State relied on the same evidence—that Robinson put his hands around Martin’s neck and dragged her—to support Counts 1 and 2, both convictions cannot stand without violating substantive double jeopardy. The State must show it made clear to the fact-finder (1) the different charges were based on different actions of the defendant, and (2) those actions were not so compressed in time, place, singleness of purpose, continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction. [17] We acknowledge the State could have distinguished the domestic battery count by relying on the evidence that Robinson bit Martin while he strangled her. Indeed, we see no reason why a defendant’s domestic battery conviction should be vacated simply because he battered his victim while strangling her, using different means to commit both crimes. But while the State briefly mentioned the bite in its closing argument, it unequivocally relied on the “dragging” portion of the altercation as the basis for the domestic battery count. And since it cited that same evidence as the basis for the strangulation charge, Robinson’s dual convictions put him in substantive double jeopardy. Thus, Robinson’s 8 domestic battery conviction must be vacated. 8 We note that the State could have also saved this domestic battery conviction by making clear that the earlier strangulations formed the basis of Count 1 and the altercation at Cole’s house was the basis for Count 2. In any event, A.W. requires the State to make the evidentiary distinction clear to the fact-finder. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 10 of 19 2. The trial court abused its discretion by assessing the domestic violence fee, but not the probation fees, against Robinson without holding an indigency hearing. [18] Next, Robinson argues—and the State concedes—the trial court improperly 9 assessed fees against him without holding an indigency hearing. We review the trial court’s imposition of costs and fees for an abuse of discretion. Holder v. State, 119 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). We will reverse “only when a decision ‘is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court[.]’” Spells v. State, 225 N.E.3d 767, 771 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1083 (Ind. 2022)). Moreover, when, as here, the State has conceded the issue, the appellant need only make a prima facie showing of error. In re K.W., 247 N.E.3d 1250, 1261 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). [19] Here, the trial court assessed Robinson a $50 domestic violence prevention fee, $100 adult probation fee, and $280 in adult probation user fees without first holding an indigency hearing. Under Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3(a), “when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the [defendant] is indigent.” (emphasis added). “Costs” include the fees listed under Indiana Code section 33-37-4-1, such as the domestic violence prevention fee. Spells, 225 N.E.3d at 775. Thus, the trial court should have conducted an 9 Robinson appeals only the fact that an indigency hearing was not held, not that the fees were improperly assessed. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 11 of 19 indigency hearing before it assessed the fee and abused its discretion by failing to do so. [20] However, probation fees are excluded from the statute and thus are not “costs.” “At the latest, an indigency hearing for probation fees should be held at the time a defendant completes his sentence.” Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by assessing probation fees and was permitted to wait until Robinson completed his sentence before determining he was indigent. We remand for an indigency hearing on the domestic violence prevention fee only. Conclusion [21] For these reasons, we reverse and remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate the domestic battery conviction and to conduct an indigency hearing. [22] Reversed and remanded. Foley, J., concurs with separate opinion. Felix, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha Griffin Marion County Public Defender Agency Appellate Division Indianapolis, Indiana Matthew D. Anglemeyer Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 12 of 19 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana Caroline Templeton Assistant Section Chief, Criminal Appeals Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 13 of 19 Foley, Judge, concurring. [1] I concur fully in Judge DeBoer’s opinion, including its substantive double jeopardy analysis. I also acknowledge Judge Felix’s point that in a bench trial we presume the trial court knows and follows the applicable law. See, e.g., Porter v. State, 272 N.E.3d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Under the circumstances of this case, however, that presumption is insufficient to overcome the State’s failure to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 3 of the Wadle/A.W. framework—an ambiguity the State itself invited by how it charged and argued the case. See Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 249 (Ind. 2020); A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1069 (Ind. 2024). The presumption that a court follows the law cannot supply the factual distinction the State never drew, particularly where nothing the trial court said or found reflects that distinction. I write separately to add a further point. A trial court is free to enter special findings in a criminal bench trial. See, e.g., Meyers v. State, 547 N.E.2d 265, 267 (Ind. 1989). And in assessing whether the trial court applied the correct law, we may consult such findings. Porter, 272 N.E.3d at 1000. Had the trial court entered findings specifying which facts it relied upon to distinguish the domestic battery conviction from the strangulation conviction, I may well have reached a different conclusion on the double jeopardy claim. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 14 of 19 Felix, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. [2] I agree with the majority regarding the fees assessed against Robinson. I respectfully dissent, however, with regard to the majority’s double jeopardy conclusion. I would hold that Robinson’s strangulation and domestic battery convictions do not violate Indiana’s protection against double jeopardy. [3] I agree with the majority’s analysis under Wadle Steps 1 and 2. That is to say, I agree that the relevant statutes do not permit multiple punishment, Robinson’s offenses are included as charged, and we must therefore presume a double jeopardy violation. [4] I part ways with the majority at Wadle Step 3. In this step, the State bears the burden of rebutting the presumptive double jeopardy violation by using the facts presented at trial to demonstrate a “distinction between what would otherwise be two of the ‘same’ offenses.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1071 (Ind. 2024) (citing Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227, 249 n.27 (Ind. 2020)). We “probe the underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to determine whether a defendant’s actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’” Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). Importantly, “there is no absolute rule regarding the exact amount of time necessary between acts to consider them separate,” but “temporal breaks and intervening acts enable the defendant to form a new criminal intent, rendering the acts separate and distinct.” Brabson v. State, 242 N.E.3d 519, 524 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 15 of 19 Gammage v. State, 277 So. 3d 735, 742 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)). “If the underlying facts reveal the two offenses are indeed ‘separate,’” there is no double jeopardy violation. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). If, however, the “facts show only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). [5] Martin testified that Robinson strangled her “[t]hree” times. Tr. Vol. II at 41. The first strangulation occurred during the argument in Martin’s apartment when Robinson “grabbed [her] by [the] neck” and “had [her] up on the wall.” Id. at 19. The second occurred when Martin returned to her home to gather her belongings and Robinson “[g]rabbed [her] by [the] neck and put [her] in the tub.” Id. at 25. The third occurred at Cole’s house when Robinson put his hands “[a]round [Martin’s] neck,” id. at 11; “dr[agged her] out [of] the house,” id.; and “bit [her] on the face,” id. at 12. [6] During closing arguments, the State emphasized this evidence and the multiplicity of Robinson’s strangulations. [Martin’s] been through a lot as she testified to, but what didn’t wa[]ver was the fact that [Robinson] strangled her more than once. She testified that she was unable to breathe. That is enough to meet the lead count strangulation. Further, [Martin] described how at [Cole’s] residence [Robinson] had put his hands around her neck and dragged her a couple feet outside. She didn’t consent to that. It was painful. That meets the next charge [domestic battery]. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 16 of 19 Tr. Vol. II at 49. The State then highlighted the “first visible incident . . . at [Martin’s] apartment,” where Robinson “strangled” Martin, id., and the incident at Cole’s house, where Robinson “strangled [Martin], pulled her outside and bit her,” id. at 50. 10 [7] Viewed as a whole, the evidence and argument at trial showed that Robinson strangled Martin three times, and the two strangulations at Martin’s apartment were each wholly “separate” from the domestic battery at Cole’s house. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071. Those two strangulations occurred earlier in the day and at a different location. The State mentioned the third strangulation in the context of the domestic battery count, and that count was also independently based on Robinson biting Martin. 11 The record is sufficient to rebut the presumption of double jeopardy because it shows that separate acts support the strangulation and domestic battery charges, which resolves the ambiguity under Wadle Step 2. [8] The majority argues that the State has not shown on appeal that it made “clear” at trial that the strangulation count was based only on Robinson’s conduct at 10 For reasons unclear from the record, the State did not specifically mention in its closing argument the second strangulation near the tub. See Tr. Vol. II at 25. 11 I disagree with the majority’s contention that the State “unequivocally relied on the ‘dragging’ [by the neck] portion of the altercation”—and not Robinson biting Martin—“as the basis for the domestic battery count.” See ante ¶ 17. The State charged Robinson with domestic battery for “dragging her . . . and/or biting her.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 15 (emphasis added). During its closing argument, the State discussed Robinson both dragging and biting Martin. See Tr. Vol. II at 49–50. In fact, the State mentioned biting several times. Nothing in the record suggests that the State abandoned the biting evidence and relied solely on Robinson dragging Martin for the domestic battery count. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 17 of 19 Martin’s apartment and that the domestic battery count was based on his conduct at Cole’s house. Ante ¶ 16. The State was permitted to pursue the strangulation count based on any act of strangulation. Wadle Step 3 does not ask whether the State expressly limited a certain charge to a subset of evidence to avoid a double jeopardy result. Rather, Wadle Step 3 asks whether in light of the entire record and the convictions ultimately entered, separate acts support each conviction. See A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071. [9] I thus disagree with the majority’s claim that “[t]he State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.” Ante ¶ 15 (quoting Easter v. State, 281 N.E.3d 896, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. not sought). This language is problematic in that it encourages an overly skeptical reading of the State’s closing argument at the expense of the greater evidentiary record—the “underlying facts” presented in the “charging instrument and adduced at trial,” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). [10] Moreover, and respectfully, this language misconstrues what the Indiana Supreme Court said in A.W. There, the court said Wadle Step 3 “serves an important, practical role in our double jeopardy analysis: to facilitate the distinction between what would otherwise be two of the ‘same’ offenses.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249 n.27). A.W. was describing our double jeopardy analysis on appeal; it was not imposing a requirement that prosecutors fastidiously sort evidence into mutually exclusive Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 18 of 19 buckets at trial. It is common practice for prosecutors to charge and try various counts that rely on the same, similar, or overlapping evidence. Though prosecutors should be mindful of double jeopardy, substantive double jeopardy is concerned with end-of-the-road convictions, not the charges pursued along the way. [11] Finally, though my conclusion would not change had Robinson been tried before a jury, I am mindful that Robinson was tried before the bench. One of our strongest presumptions is that in bench trials, unless the trial court’s comments clearly show otherwise, the trial court “knows and applies the law correctly.” Gluys v. State, 276 N.E.3d 1270, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App.) (citing Porter v. State, 272 N.E.3d 996, 1000 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied, 276 N.E.3d 628 (Ind. 2026)), reh’g granted on other grounds, 281 N.E.3d 19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. not sought; accord Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993). In concluding that Robinson’s strangulation and domestic battery convictions constitute double jeopardy, the majority implicitly assumes the trial court entered both convictions based on the same single act of strangulation and was blind to all evidence and argument regarding the other two. Nothing in the record persuades me that the trial court made this mistake. In my view, the trial court entered convictions for both strangulation and domestic battery because of the ample evidence that independently supported each of them. I would thus hold that Robinson’s convictions do not violate Indiana’s protection against double jeopardy. [12] For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-860 | November 20, 2026 Page 19 of 19