Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. FILED Nov 04 2026, 8:53 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana State of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Benjerman Hoffman, Appellee-Defendant November 4, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-428 Appeal from the Floyd Superior Court The Honorable Maria D. Granger, Judge The Honorable Joseph P. Weber, Senior Judge Trial Court Cause No. 22D03-2508-F1-1369 Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 1 of 20 Opinion by Chief Judge Tavitas Judges Bradford and Felix concur. Tavitas, Chief Judge. Case Summary [1] The State of Indiana appeals the trial court’s suppression of Benjerman Hoffman’s interview with the police. Although Hoffman was not given warnings as discussed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), we conclude that Hoffman was not in custody during the interview and, thus, Miranda warnings were not required. The trial court, accordingly, erred by suppressing Hoffman’s interview. We reverse and remand for further proceedings. Issue [2] The State raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by suppressing Hoffman’s interview with the police. Facts [3] In 2025, fifteen-year-old Victim reported to a therapist that Hoffman, who was born in 1994, had molested her. In a later forensic interview, Victim described an incident that took place a few years earlier at a baseball field. Detective Patrick Clarke of the New Albany Police Department was assigned to the investigation. [4] On Wednesday, July 30, 2025, Detective Clarke spoke with Hoffman’s wife and mother-in-law and asked them to have Hoffman contact him. Detective Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 2 of 20 Clarke explained that he would be out of the office the following week and hoped to talk with Hoffman on Thursday. According to Hoffman, he called Detective Clarke on Thursday but did not receive a reply. On Friday, August 1, 2025, Hoffman went to the police station and was waiting in the lobby when Detective Clarke arrived. 1 [5] Detective Clarke was wearing a polo-style shirt, cargo pants, a badge, and a handgun in a holster on his belt. Detective Clarke escorted Hoffman to the elevator, and they went to another floor, to the restroom, and then to the interview room. They went through three or four doors to get to the interview room. A keycard or key fob was needed to enter the interview room, but nothing was needed to exit. [6] The interview room had carpet, two doors, no windows, a table, and three chairs in it. Detective Clarke had Hoffman sit in a chair next to one of the doors. Detective Clarke told Hoffman that the door behind Detective Clarke would lock when closed but that the door behind Hoffman was not locked. Referring to the door behind Hoffman, Detective Clarke said, “This door stays 1 In the videotaped interview, Detective Clarke stated that he had not expected Hoffman to be there that morning. St. Ex. 1 at 13:05. Hoffman said that “they” had told him he needed to come in before the weekend because the detective was going somewhere. Id. at 13:06. Hoffman said that he had called Detective Clarke, and Detective Clarke acknowledged receiving Hoffman’s voicemail but said he had been busy with other investigations. Hoffman later testified that his wife received a call from Detective Clarke asking whether Hoffman was “still showing up Friday,” and that Detective Clarke knew Hoffman was coming on Friday. Tr. Vol. II p. 10. Detective Clarke, however, testified that he did not know Hoffman was coming to the police station on Friday. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 3 of 20 unlocked. Alright. So if you need anything, you just kind of knock ‘hey’ alright? I’ll be right back,” and Detective Clarke then briefly left the room. St. Ex. 1 at 0:25. A different officer came into the room, used a wand to scan Hoffman for safety purposes, and had a brief, friendly conversation with Hoffman. [7] Detective Clarke then returned and asked Hoffman if he wanted something to drink, but Hoffman declined. Detective Clarke explained that the interview would be video and audio recorded. Detective Clarke did not advise Hoffman of his Miranda rights. Tr. Vol. II p. 7; St. Ex. 1. Detective Clarke was the only officer questioning Hoffman and did not raise his voice throughout the interview. [8] Detective Clarke said that he appreciated Hoffman coming in for the interview and stated: You’re not under arrest. You’re not in custody or anything like that. I’m sure you’re aware of the accusations and investigations going on. So I appreciate you coming down here on your free will to just talk to me. . . . If we get to a point where you’re done talking to me for whatever reason, like I said, that door is unlocked, or you just tell me. . . . [B]ut remember this door does secure. I can’t help you there, but . . . that door’s unlocked. If you just tell me you’re done, we’re done. St. Ex. 1 at 5:23-5:48. Hoffman replied, “alright.” Id. at 5:49. Detective Clarke sat down across the table from Hoffman, and he did not block Hoffman from the unlocked door. Hoffman stated that he wanted to “get it done and over Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 4 of 20 with” because of his involvement with the military and the military’s desire to know what was happening. Id. at 5:52-5:54. [9] Hoffman and Detective Clarke then had a fifteen-minute discussion about their respective military service, firearms, Hoffman’s overseas service, Hoffman’s new job, and Hoffman’s marriage. Hoffman was concerned about his work schedule, and Detective Clarke stated, “we’ll try to get you out of here and get you to work man.” Id. at 14:55-14:58. [10] Detective Clarke then asked Hoffman if he understood the allegations against him. Hoffman responded that he was accused of raping Victim and that she had made the allegations before. Hoffman denied the allegations, and they discussed why Victim would make the allegations against him. 2 [11] Detective Clarke asked Hoffman what he thought the detective’s role was, and Hoffman replied that it was “to figure out what’s going on.” Id. at 23:40-23:42. Detective Clarke stated that he was in the “middle,” that he would either prove the allegations were true or false, and that he worked for “both” sides. Id. at 23:52-24:03. Detective Clarke stated that cooperation and truthfulness were important and that truthfulness would help him determine whether the allegations were true. If the allegations were not true, he wanted people to know that Hoffman was innocent; similarly, if the allegations were true, he 2 Hoffman stated that he had allowed Victim to drink alcohol in front of him, and Detective Clarke responded, “that’s not this investigation.” St. Ex. 1 at 22:23-22:24. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 5 of 20 wanted justice and healing for Victim. He also said that remorse and apologies can impact the process. He emphasized that he was not saying Hoffman was either guilty or innocent. [12] Hoffman and Detective Clarke then spent twenty-five minutes discussing Victim’s prior allegations against Hoffman in 2023, and Hoffman stated that he had been cleared. They discussed Hoffman’s understanding of what those allegations had been and why Hoffman thought Victim made allegations against him. [13] Detective Clarke asked Hoffman about an incident in which he took Victim to a baseball field. Hoffman said he took Victim there to “blow some steam off” and talk about why she was mad. Id. at 51:53-56:54. Detective Clarke said that Victim had undergone a forensic interview and had given some details that had a “little bit of credence” and that the allegations were not “baseless.” Id. at 58:37-58:48. Hoffman denied touching Victim but admitted that, when drunk, he said some “sexual things” to Victim. Id. at 59:45-59:51. [14] Detective Clarke reiterated the need for Hoffman to be honest. Hoffman said that he did stupid things when drunk and that he “probably” sent messages to her “like hey let’s do this.” Id. at 1:00:55, 1:01:44-1:01:48. Hoffman also stated that he “probably” texted Victim, “let’s have sex.” Id. at 1:02:18-1:02:22. Detective Clarke said: “Not probably, you know if you did or not. Let’s not play that game.” Id. at 1:02:22-1:02:25. Detective Clarke asked about Victim’s response, and Hoffman responded with “probably like a typical . . . .” Id. at Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 6 of 20 1:02:54-1:02:56. Detective Clarke interrupted, “there is no probably Benjerman, you know the answer to these questions.” Id. at 1:02:56-1:02:59. Detective Clarke told Hoffman not to take him as “adversarial,” that he understood it was a tough topic to discuss, and that Hoffman would be familiar with how Victim responded to his texts. Id. at 1:03:10. Hoffman stated that Victim responded, “no, I don’t want to do that.” Id. at 1:03:48-1:03:53. [15] Hoffman said that Victim later approached him about his offer, stating that “hey, if you go do this, I’ll do this with you.” Id. at 1:05:46-1:05:49. Detective Clarke attempted to clarify what “this” meant, and Hoffman said, “I guess having sex.” Id. at 1:05:50-1:05:53. Detective Clarke replied, “I need you to be honest,” and told him, “when you’re scared, you . . . you’re omitting.” Id. at 1:06:40-1:06:54. When Hoffman again described the messages in general terms, Detective Clarke said: “She’s not using the word ‘this’, Benjerman. . . . I need you to be honest with me now. This is where I’ve been open and honest with you. I need you to return it. You know what I’m saying? It doesn’t make any sense what you’re saying.” Id. at 1:07:36-1:07:46. [16] When Hoffman continued describing the messages in vague, general terms, Detective Clarke said: Okay, so listen. I’m just going to ask you point blank. I’ll make it easier for you. I won’t make it come out of your mouth. I want you to tell me if I’m right or wrong. Okay, she would . . . tell you, if you take me to do these things, I will let you do things to me in a sexual nature. Is that . . . correct? Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 7 of 20 Id. at 1:08:00-1:08:15. Hoffman said, “Yes.” Id. at 1:08:15. Detective Clarke asked, “Did she tell you that you could have sex with her?” and Hoffman responded, “Yes.” Id. at 1:08:19-1:08:22. Hoffman said that this conversation with Victim happened two or three times. [17] Detective Clarke then asked again about the baseball field. Hoffman answered, “I f**ked up, and I regret it.” Id. at 1:09:54-1:09:58. Hoffman claimed Victim said that, if Hoffman would take her to do something, they could have sex. Hoffman said that he had sexual intercourse with Victim in his white van by the baseball field. Hoffman stated that he did not wear a condom and did not “finish.” Id. at 1:11:11. Hoffman said that the incident happened in September 2023. [18] Hoffman stated that he was punishing himself for the incident and contemplated taking his own life. Detective Clarke and Hoffman then spent several minutes discussing whether Hoffman was still suicidal and whether he would be going to jail. Detective Clarke told Hoffman that he would not be going to jail on that day. Detective Clarke stated that he would be right back, asked Hoffman if he would like something to drink, and told Hoffman to “sit tight for me.” Id. at 1:16:40. Detective Clarke reminded Hoffman, “if you change your mind, this door is unlocked,” and Detective Clarke left the room. Id. at 1:16:46. [19] Other officers then entered the room and searched Hoffman again for “[his] safety.” Id. at 1:17:43. Detective Clarke returned to the interview room and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 8 of 20 asked for consent to search Hoffman’s cell phone, which Hoffman granted. Detective Clarke told Hoffman that they were concerned about Hoffman’s suicidal thoughts and that they were going to arrest him. In total, the interview lasted for one hour and twenty-six minutes. [20] On August 1, 2025, the State charged Hoffman with child molesting, a Level 1 felony, for sexual intercourse with thirteen-year-old Victim in September 2023. The State later amended the charging information and charged Hoffman with five counts of child molesting, Level 1 felonies. [21] Hoffman filed a motion to suppress his interview with Detective Clarke. Hoffman argued that he did not receive Miranda warnings and that he was in custody and being interrogated during the interview. The trial court held a hearing on the motion to suppress on December 17, 2025, and Detective Clarke and Hoffman testified. The video of the interview was admitted as State’s Exhibit 1. On January 7, 2026, the trial court granted Hoffman’s motion to suppress the interview conducted by Detective Clarke. The State requested that the trial court certify the order for interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. This Court then accepted the interlocutory appeal. Discussion and Decision I. Standard of Review [22] The State argues that the trial court erred by suppressing Hoffman’s interview with Detective Clarke. “As the party appealing from a negative judgment, the State ‘must show that the trial court’s decision was contrary to law—meaning Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 9 of 20 that the evidence was without conflict and all reasonable inferences led to a conclusion opposite that of the trial court.’” State v. Diego, 169 N.E.3d 113, 116 (Ind. 2021) (quoting State v. E.R., 123 N.E.3d 675, 678-79 (Ind. 2019)). “Whether a defendant is in custody is a mixed question of fact and law.” Id. “The circumstances surrounding the interrogation are matters of fact and ‘we consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the suppression ruling.’” Id. (quoting E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 679). “‘Whether those facts add up to Miranda custody is a question of law’ which we review de novo.” Id. (quoting E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 679). 3 II. Custody under Miranda [23] Under Miranda, if Hoffman “was under ‘custodial interrogation,’ the police were required to give him certain warnings about his rights, and the absence of those warnings precludes the use of his statements to prove guilt.” E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 679-80 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)). The parties agree that Hoffman was subject to an interrogation. Accordingly, this case turns on whether Hoffman was in custody during the interview with Detective Clarke. [24] Custody is “‘a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’” Diego, 169 N.E.3d at 117 (quoting 3 The parties disagree regarding the impact of the trial court’s general order rather than an order with findings of fact. Regardless, we must consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the suppression ruling. Diego, 169 N.E.3d at 116. Again, we review de novo whether the facts constitute custody. Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 10 of 20 Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508-09 (2012)) (emphasis in original). “There is no bright line rule requiring Miranda warnings be given prior to an interview simply because a particular defendant is questioned in a police station.” Id. In fact: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.” Id. (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam)). [25] “Custody under Miranda occurs when two criteria are met.” Id. “First, the person’s freedom of movement is curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest.” Id. “And second, the person undergoes the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. [26] Under the first custody criterion, freedom of movement is curtailed when a reasonable person would feel not free to terminate the interrogation and leave. E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 680 (citing Howes, 565 U.S. at 509). “This freedom-of- movement inquiry requires a court to examine the totality of objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation—such as the location, duration, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 11 of 20 and character of the questioning; statements made during the questioning; the number of law-enforcement officers present; the extent of police control over the environment; the degree of physical restraint; and how the interview begins and ends.” Id. “The benchmark for this inquiry is whether the level of curtailment is akin to formal arrest.” Diego, 169 N.E.3d at 117 (citing E.R. 123 N.E.2d at 680). [27] “The second custody criterion asks whether the circumstances exert the coercive pressures that drove Miranda.” E.R., 123 N.E.3d at 682 (citing Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010)). “When the case involves ‘the paradigm example of interrogating a suspect at a police station,’ the answer to this question is generally ‘obvious, in the absence of unusual facts.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ellison, 632 F.3d 727, 729 (1st Cir. 2010)). [28] The parties’ arguments focus on our Supreme Court’s decisions in E.R. and Diego, which reached different results regarding whether the defendant was in custody. We conclude that this situation is more comparable to Diego, in which our Supreme Court found the defendant was not in custody during his interrogation. As in Diego, the first criterion—freedom of movement—is dispositive here. Accordingly, we do not address whether the second custody criterion—inherently coercive pressure—is present. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 12 of 20 III. E.R. and Diego reached differing results on custody. [29] The State argues that this case is similar to Diego, while Hoffman argues that it is similar to E.R. Given the importance of these opinions to this case, we explain these cases in detail. [30] In E.R., as here, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the interview, and the State appealed. Our Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. The Court determined that the defendant was in custody during his police interview and that the lack of Miranda warnings required the suppression of the defendant’s interview. 123 N.E.3d at 677. [31] The Court noted that the officer appeared at the defendant’s residence, said that he needed to interview the defendant at the police station, and did not give the defendant other options for a time or location. The defendant was then interviewed at the police station in a small, windowless room. The exit route from the interview room was a “labyrinthine . . . with many obstructions to egress.” Id. at 681. Although the first officer told the defendant that “he could walk out of the interrogation-room door,” when a second officer arrived, he shut the door to the interview room and “took on the role of interrogator,” and the defendant “was not told that he could leave or that the first officer’s initial statement remained valid.” Id. at 678. The officers told the defendant to “sit tight” multiple times. Id. at 681. [32] The officers questioned the defendant “in an accusatory and focused way in a room behind several closed doors” without reading the Miranda rights to the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 13 of 20 defendant. Id. at 678. The officers did not tell the defendant that he was not under arrest; that he could end the interrogation at any time; or that he was free to leave once the second officer “injected himself into the interrogation and began aggressive questioning.” Id. at 681. The officers explicitly said that they believed the defendant had engaged in the accused conduct and the questions were “accusatory—not exploratory.” Id. Moreover, one of the officers was deceptive—“saying that the person who made the accusations had passed a lie- detector test.” Id. Finally, the officers suggested that, if the defendant failed to “talk right then about what he had done, they would make things worse for him in the future—because they would worry that he wasn’t honest and that he had done ‘something more’ than the alleged wrongdoing.” Id. at 683. The interview lasted almost an hour. [33] The Court concluded that “the curtailment-of-movement criterion was met” because “the circumstances surrounding the interrogation add up to a situation in which a reasonable person would not feel free to end the interrogation and leave.” Id. at 682. Additionally, the Court concluded that the station-house questioning exhibited “the coercive pressures that Miranda targeted.” Id. The Court, thus, concluded that the “totality of the circumstances, supported by substantial, probative evidence in the record, amount to Miranda custody” and affirmed the suppression of the defendant’s statement. Id. at 683. [34] On the other hand, in Diego, our Supreme Court concluded that the defendant was not in custody during his police interview. As here, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the interview, and the State appealed. Our Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 14 of 20 Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s English proficiency was limited and that he required a translator. In Diego, an officer went to the defendant’s residence and asked the defendant to go to the police station for an interview. A few days later, the defendant and his girlfriend went to the police station. They were led upstairs to the officer’s personal office, where the officer interviewed the defendant with a translator. [35] During the forty to forty-five minute interview, the door was unlocked, but the defendant was unaware of this. The officer did not give the defendant the Miranda warnings. The officer’s interview style was “constant” and “less dramatic” than the interview in E.R. 169 N.E.3d at 118. The officer told the defendant that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave anytime. The officer told the defendant he had listened to a recording of the victim’s father confronting the defendant and that lying to the officer would make things worse. The officer also falsely implied that he had spoken directly with the victim, but the officer’s “line of questioning was exploratory rather than accusatory or aggressive.” Id. at 119. The defendant made several potentially incriminating statements. At the end of the interview, the officer asked if the defendant wanted to write an apology letter to the victim but did not require him to do so. The officer allowed the defendant and his girlfriend to leave after the interview. [36] The Court “dispose[d]” of the in custody question “under the first of E.R.’s two- factor test: the freedom-of-movement inquiry.” Id. at 117. The Court concluded that, “given the casual atmosphere, exploratory and conversational Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 15 of 20 line of questioning, and relatively unimpeded pathway to the room, the totality of these objective circumstances does not represent a curtailment akin to formal arrest.” Id. at 120. Accordingly, the defendant’s “freedom of movement was not curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest,” and the first in custody criterion was dispositive. Id. at 118. The Court, thus, concluded that the defendant was not in custody and that the interview was admissible. IV. Hoffman was not in custody during the interview. [37] The State argues that “the uncontradicted evidence objectively showed that [Hoffman] was not in custody at the time of the interview and, thus, Miranda warnings were not required.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15. Hoffman, however, argues that he was in custody and that the evidence is disputed. With E.R. and Diego in mind, we will address the first in custody criterion—whether Hoffman’s freedom of movement was curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. As in Diego, we conclude that Hoffman’s freedom of movement was not curtailed to this degree. Accordingly, Hoffman was not in custody during the interview. [38] The relevant facts here are undisputed.4 Hoffman went to the police station voluntarily after Detective Clarke asked Hoffman’s wife if Hoffman would be 4 Hoffman argues that the evidence is in conflict on three points: (1) whether Detective Clarke knew that Hoffman was coming to the police station on Friday; (2) whether Hoffman knew that the door behind him was unlocked; and (3) whether Hoffman had an easy route out of the building. We do not find Hoffman’s arguments to be persuasive. Although there is a conflict in the evidence as to whether Detective Clarke knew Hoffman was coming on Friday, that evidence is not relevant to the freedom of movement inquiry. It is undisputed that Hoffman Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 16 of 20 interviewed. Detective Clarke led Hoffman to the interview room, which was upstairs and through a few doors. Detective Clarke immediately and repeatedly explained to Hoffman that the door behind Detective Clarke was locked, but the door closest to Hoffman was unlocked. [39] Only Detective Clarke interviewed Hoffman, and the tenor of the interview was casual, non-threatening, and friendly. Detective Clarke did not use deception during the interview. Detective Clarke told Hoffman that he was not under arrest, not in custody, and free to leave at any time. Hoffman said that he wanted to complete the interview due to the military’s concerns over the investigation. Detective Clarke repeatedly told Hoffman that he would be going to work that day. [40] The two had a lengthy conversation about their mutual military service and the nature and impact of Victim’s prior allegations against Hoffman. They then discussed the incident at a baseball field and Hoffman’s text messages to voluntarily came to the police station; whether Detective Clarke knew Hoffman was arriving on Friday is simply irrelevant to whether Hoffman was in custody. As for the unlocked door, Detective Clarke repeatedly told Hoffman that the door behind Hoffman was unlocked and that the door behind Detective Clarke did lock. Hoffman argues that Detective Clarke told him that he would need to “knock” on the door behind him to leave. The video actually shows that Detective Clarke said, “This door stays unlocked. Alright. So if you need anything, you just kind of knock ‘hey’ alright? I’ll be right back,” and Detective Clarke then briefly left the room. St. Ex. 1 at 0:25. Accordingly, the undisputed evidence shows that Detective Clarke told Hoffman to knock if he needed anything, not that he needed to knock to leave. Finally, Hoffman contends that the unlocked door opened into an office with at least four other officers, implying that he did not have an easy route out of the police station. Detective Clarke repeatedly told Hoffman that he was free to leave at any time. Hoffman’s subjective views as to whether he had an easy escape route are irrelevant. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (holding that the defendant’s “subjective views” are irrelevant and the custody determination “involves no consideration of the actual mindset of the particular suspect subjected to police questioning”) (internal quotation omitted). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 17 of 20 Victim. Although Hoffman was initially vague about the messages, he eventually admitted to requesting sexual intercourse from Victim. He also admitted to having sexual intercourse with Victim at the baseball field in his van. Although the interview was more than an hour long, much of that time was spent in casual conversation about the military and Victim’s prior allegations. [41] Hoffman contends that his freedom of movement was curtailed due to the character of the questioning. Hoffman argues that the interview took an “accusatory” turn during discussions of the text messages. Appellee’s Br. pp. 19, 28. But the record, including the video, does not support this characterization. Hoffman repeatedly used vague language in describing the text messages and was reluctant to be specific. Detective Clarke said that he understood that Hoffman was scared and simply began asking yes or no questions instead. Throughout the interview, Detective Clarke’s tone was conversational, not accusatory. [42] Hoffman also argues that Detective Clarke’s references to remorse and leniency impacted the character of the questioning. This case is distinguishable from E.R., where the officers told the defendant that they believed he had engaged in the charged conduct and suggested that, if he did not talk “right then about what he had done, they would make things worse for him in the future.” 123 N.E.3d at 683. The State concedes that Detective Clarke “did imply that things would go better for [Hoffman] if he told the truth because of what he would convey to the prosecutor[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 27. Detective Clarke, however, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 18 of 20 repeatedly told Hoffman that he was in the “middle” and not an adversary. St. Ex. 1 at 23:52-24:03. Detective Clarke did not suggest that he thought Hoffman was guilty of the allegations, and nothing he said suggested that Hoffman could not leave. To the contrary, Detective Clarke repeatedly stated that the door behind Hoffman was unlocked and that Hoffman would be able to go to work. Detective Clarke’s discussion of remorse and leniency did not demonstrate a curtailment of movement akin to formal arrest. [43] After Hoffman confessed to having sexual intercourse with Victim, Hoffman told Detective Clarke that he had considered suicide, and they spent several minutes discussing whether Hoffman was still suicidal. Detective Clarke did tell Hoffman to “sit tight” one time, but Hoffman had already confessed by that point in the interview. Even then, Detective Clarke reminded Hoffman, “if you change your mind, this door is unlocked.” St. Ex. 1 at 1:16:46. Ultimately, however, Detective Clarke decided to arrest Hoffman that day. [44] The totality of the objective circumstances here mirrors Diego rather than E.R. The “tone and tenor” of the interview was “less dramatic” than the interrogation in E.R. Diego, 169 N.E.3d at 118. Detective Clarke’s interview of Hoffman is perhaps even less dramatic than the interrogation in Diego, where an interpreter was also present at the interview, the defendant had limited English proficiency, and the officer used some minor deception. As in Diego, we conclude that the undisputed facts here demonstrate that Hoffman’s freedom of movement was not curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 19 of 20 [45] Because Hoffman’s freedom of movement was not curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest, as in Diego, we need not address the coercion criterion. Hoffman was not in custody during his interview with Detective Clarke, and accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting Hoffman’s motion to suppress the interview. Conclusion [46] The trial court erred by granting Hoffman’s motion to suppress his interview with Detective Clarke. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. [47] Reversed and remanded. Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Daylon L. Welliver Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE A. David Hutson Hutson Guilfoyle LLP New Albany, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-428 | November 4, 2026 Page 20 of 20