State of Indiana v. William Templin
CourtIndiana Court of Appeals
Date FiledOctober 23, 2026
Docket26A-CR-1219
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
State of Indiana,
Appellant-Plaintiff
FILED
Oct 23 2026, 8:57 am
v.
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
William Templin,
Appellee-Defendant
October 23, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-CR-1219
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable James B. Osborn, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49D21-2602-F6-005401
Opinion by Judge Felix
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur.
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Felix, Judge.
Statement of the Case
[1] The State charged William Templin with voyeurism for using a hidden
bathroom camera to film his nude relatives in the shower. The alleged offenses
occurred over a decade ago. The trial court granted Templin’s motion to
dismiss the charges pursuant to the statute of limitations. The State now
appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused
its discretion by dismissing the charges against Templin.
[2] We reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On February 23, 2026, the State charged Templin with two counts of voyeurism
as Level 6 felonies based on acts committed against two separate victims in
August and September 2014. According to the charging information, Templin
committed these offenses by “peep[ing], without the consent of [the victim],
into an area where the [victim] could reasonably be expected to disrobe . . . by
means of a camera.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8.
[4] The probable cause affidavit provided further details regarding the alleged
offenses. During an investigation concerning distribution of child sexual
exploitation images, law enforcement discovered an online account by the
username “williamtemplin1961” with files that “revealed several adult females
whose images were used to create pornography.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at
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11. Law enforcement officers searched Templin’s residence and electronic
devices and discovered images of Templin’s adult female relative that
“appeared to have been taken without [her] knowledge . . . as she was exiting a
shower.” Id. The officers then searched for files located in Templin’s Google
accounts, which revealed that Templin used a “camera . . . under a door of a
bathroom facing a shower” to surreptitiously record the relative. Id. at 13.
Templin obtained similar recordings of a second female relative by the same
means.
[5] On March 11, 2026, Templin filed a motion to dismiss the charging
information. Templin argued (1) the charges were not brought within the five-
year statute of limitations period, and (2) the charging information did not
allege facts sufficient to show that Templin “conceal[ed] that a crime had been
committed” so as to justify tolling the statute of limitations. Appellant’s App.
Vol. II at 37. In response, the State argued that Templin concealed evidence of
the crime by “film[ing] both victims secretively,” id. at 44, so that “no one aside
from him knew that he had made the videos,” id. at 45, and “[t]he only reason
that these videos were found was that law enforcement had probable cause to
search [Templin’s] devices and accounts for Child Sexual Abuse Material,” id.
[6] After a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Templin’s motion to
dismiss. The trial court determined that Templin’s “mere private possession of
a video is not a positive act of concealment from law enforcement.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 47. This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
The Trial Court Erred by Dismissing the Charging Information
[7] The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the
charging information. We generally review a trial court’s dismissal of the
charging information for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or
if the trial court misinterprets the law. State v. Gomez, 284 N.E.3d 1029, 1034
(Ind. 2026) (quoting A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012)).
“However, ‘[w]e review a matter of statutory interpretation de novo because it
presents a question of law.’” Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 950 (Ind. 2015)
(quoting Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ind. 2011)), cert. denied. When
reviewing the trial court’s decision regarding dismissal of the charging
information, we take the facts alleged in the charging documents as true. State
v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 441 (Ind. 2022); Hernandez v. State, 220 N.E.3d 68, 71
(Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Tanoos v. State, 137 N.E.3d 1008, 1015 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2019), trans. denied).
[8] The State charged Templin with voyeurism as a Level 6 felony for using a
hidden camera to “peep” into the bathroom while his relatives showered.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8. “Peep[ing]” includes “using a concealed camera
with the intent of capturing an intimate image,” Ind. Code § 35-45-4-5(a)(2)(B),
as well as “any looking of a clandestine, surreptitious, prying, or secretive
nature,” id. § -5(a)(2)(A).
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[9] Pursuant to the statute of limitations, a prosecution for a Level 6 felony—such
as the voyeurism charges here—“is barred unless it is commenced . . . within
five (5) years after the commission of the offense.” I.C. § 35-41-4-2(a)(1). The
“indictment or information” shall “stat[e] the date of the offense with sufficient
particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of
limitations applicable to that offense.” Id. § 35-34-1-2(a)(5). A trial court may
dismiss an untimely charging information upon the defendant’s motion. Id. §
35-34-1-4(a)(8).
[10] Under the concealment-tolling provision, the period a prosecution must be
brought within “does not include any period in which . . . the accused person
conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person
with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have
been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence.” I.C. § 35-41-4-
2(h)(2). This provision “serves the State’s interest of ensuring that it can later
prosecute a criminal suspect even if, for a time, he conceals evidence of the
offense such that authorities are unaware and unable to determine that a crime
has been committed.” Reeves v. State, 938 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(quoting Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied.
[11] Here, the prosecution was not brought within five years of the offenses, so we
must determine whether the concealment-tolling provision preserves the
timeliness of the prosecution. We first address the documents a court may
consider when determining whether the State has sufficiently alleged facts
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supporting concealment. We then address whether the facts supporting
concealment in this case are sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.
a. A Court May Consider the Probable Cause Affidavit Alongside
the Charging Information
[12] The parties agree that the charging information in this case does not allege facts
supporting concealment and that the State relies solely on facts alleged in the
probable cause affidavit. Templin argues that the failure to allege the facts
supporting concealment in the charging information warrants dismissal,
whereas the State argues that the probable cause affidavit may supply those
facts.
[13] This court has disagreed on this issue. 1 In Reeves v. State, the panel held that the
trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the
charging information “did not contain any sort of allegation of the concealment
of evidence” even though the probable cause affidavit arguably did. 938
1
The Indiana Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding the concealment-tolling provision, Study v.
State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 949 (Ind. 2015), provides limited guidance. In reciting the procedural history of the
case, the Study court noted the defendant’s pre-trial argument that the “State’s charging information did not
demonstrate on its face why the charge was not barred by the five-year statute of limitations”; that the trial
court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge in question “as it was originally charged, but later
granted the State leave to file an amended charging information”; and that the “amended charge” included
the State’s allegations of concealment. Id. The Study court added in a footnote, “If the State is relying upon
the concealment-tolling provision, ‘courts have required the State to plead those circumstances [of
concealment] in the information so that a defendant is apprised of the facts upon which the State intends to
rely and may be prepared to meet that proof at trial.’” Id. n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Willner v. State,
602 N.E.2d 507, 508–09 (Ind. 1992)).
Although Study suggests that the facts regarding concealment must be alleged in the charging information,
the Study court was neither presented with nor answered the question of whether the probable cause affidavit
can fill in the charging information’s gaps regarding concealment. Study therefore is not dispositive.
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N.E.2d at 17–18. The Reeves panel suggested this deficiency could be cured on
remand by amending the charging information. Id. at 18.
[14] On the other hand, the panel in Woods v. State expressly disagreed with Reeves.
980 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The Woods panel explained that the
“overarching purpose” of the charging information is to provide notice to the
defendant and that “[s]ince the charging information and probable-cause
affidavit are filed together, they should be viewed in tandem to determine if
they satisfy the goal of putting the defendant on notice” regarding the
concealment-tolling provision. Id. The Woods panel relied on the Indiana
Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson v. State, 495 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Ind. 1986),
which held that although the charging information for murder did not set forth
the manner of death as required, “the probable-cause affidavit that supported
the charging information did contain the necessary details to apprise Patterson
of the charges against her.” Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 194 N.E.3d 98, 109
(Ind. Ct. App.) (relying on both the charging information and the probable
cause affidavit in determining that facts regarding concealment were sufficiently
alleged), trans. denied, 199 N.E.3d 780 (Ind. 2022); M.A. v. State, 83 N.E.3d
1221, 1230–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (same).
[15] We adopt the Woods panel’s interpretation because it represents the more
practical and sound approach. When the probable cause affidavit sufficiently
lays out facts supporting application of the concealment-tolling provision, the
defendant cannot complain that he lacks notice of the State’s intent to rely
thereon. Moreover, the Woods panel’s interpretation squares with Indiana
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courts’ longstanding principle that “where a charging [information] . . . lack[s]
appropriate factual detail, additional materials such as the probable cause
affidavit supporting the charging [information] may be taken into account in
assessing whether a defendant has been apprised of the charges against him.”
Gomez, 284 N.E.3d at 1034–35 (quoting State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113
(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied) (first alteration in original). To require
formal amendment of the charging information to reflect facts already alleged,
as the Reeves panel suggested, would be needlessly inefficient. Thus, a court
may consider the probable cause affidavit alongside the charging information to
determine whether the concealment-tolling provision applies.
b. Sufficient Allegations of Concealment
[16] The State argues that it alleged sufficient facts supporting concealment to justify
tolling the statute of limitations. The “primary purpose” of statutes of
limitations “is to protect defendants from the prejudice that a delay in
prosecution could bring, such as fading memories and stale evidence.” Study,
24 N.E.3d at 953 (quoting Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 920). Statutes of limitations
must “strike[] a balance between an individual’s interest in repose and the
State’s interest in having sufficient time to investigate and build its case.” Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 920). We construe
exceptions to the statute of limitations period “narrowly and in a light most
favorable to the accused.” Id. (quoting State v. Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d 314, 317
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied).
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[17] The concealment-tolling provision applies “only when there is a positive act
performed by the defendant that is calculated to prevent the discovery that a
crime has been committed.” Study, 24 N.E.3d at 957 (collecting cases). Such
an act must be geared toward “prevent[ing] awareness that a criminal offense
has even occurred.” Id. at 952. The inquiry is not merely whether the
defendant concealed evidence “about the offense or who committed the
offense” but whether he or she “concealed evidence . . . related to the existence
of the offense.” Id. Said another way, “the concealment, to avoid the running
of the statute, must be of the crime itself.” Id. at 957 (quoting State v. Hoke, 84
Ind. 137, 138 (1882)).
[18] The Indiana Supreme Court applied the positive-act test in Study v. State, 24
N.E.3d 947. There, the State alleged in connection with the defendant’s bank
robbery charge that he “concealed his identity by wearing a mask, and
concealed the getaway car, clothes worn during the crime, items taken from a
victim, the weapon used, and evidence linking the robbery to other robberies.”
Id. at 954. The Study court held that these allegations were insufficient to
trigger the concealment-tolling provision. Id. “[P]olice were aware that the
bank robbery . . . had occurred,” so the defendant’s actions did not “thwart[]
the progress of the police investigation.” Id. Moreover, the defendant’s actions
constituted mere “concealment of guilt” not concealment of the crime itself. Id.
at 956. As an example of acts that likely would pass the positive-act test, the
Study court suggested sufficient concealment would be present where an
individual committing a jewelry store heist “threaten[ed] the employee into
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forging sales receipts and altering accounting documents to make it appear as if
no robbery had occurred” or “continue[d] sending threatening mail or messages
to the employee to not report the robbery.” Id.
[19] Here, taking the facts alleged in the probable cause affidavit as true, Templin
filmed his relatives in the shower by way of a hidden camera that he placed
under the bathroom door. Unlike in Study, where law enforcement was aware
of the bank robbery and needed only to uncover the robber’s identity, Templin’s
use of the hidden camera prevented anyone else from learning that his perverted
acts even occurred. In other words, Templin concealed not merely his guilt in
the offenses, but the existence of the offenses themselves.
[20] Templin argues that his “use of a hidden camera is an element of the
[voyeurism] offenses,” and if such use is sufficient to toll the statute of
limitations, “the statute prescribing that period would cease to have meaning.”
Appellee’s Br. at 12; see I.C. § 35-45-4-5(a)(2)(B). Even when the act of
concealment has been interwoven with elements of the offense, this court has
held that the concealment-tolling provision applied. For example, in Johnson v.
State, the defendant was charged with selling unregistered securities and
“transacting business by an unregistered broker-dealer.” 194 N.E.3d at 110.
The Johnson panel held the State’s allegation that “[b]ecause the security was
not registered and because [the defendant] was not registered to offer or sell
securities, he kept himself out of the purview of both law enforcement and
industry regulators” was at least one of the reasons the concealment-tolling
provision applied. Id. at 111, 112.
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[21] Moreover, holding that Templin’s use of the hidden camera constitutes a
positive act of concealment does not render the statute of limitations
meaningless. In addition to a positive act of concealment, the concealment-
tolling provision also requires that “evidence sufficient to charge the person
with [the] offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have
been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence.” I.C. § 35-41-4-
2(h)(2). The clandestine nature of voyeurism does not invariably mean the
concealment-tolling provision will apply.
[22] In sum, considering the probable cause affidavit, the State alleged sufficient acts
of concealment to justify tolling the statute of limitations. The trial court erred
by granting the motion to dismiss. We reverse that decision.
[23] Reversed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Robert M. Yoke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Carter Gallagher
Marion County Public Defender Agency
Indianapolis, Indiana
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