Full Opinion

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana State of Indiana, Appellant-Plaintiff FILED Oct 23 2026, 8:57 am v. CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court William Templin, Appellee-Defendant October 23, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-CR-1219 Appeal from the Marion Superior Court The Honorable James B. Osborn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 49D21-2602-F6-005401 Opinion by Judge Felix Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 1 of 11 Felix, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] The State charged William Templin with voyeurism for using a hidden bathroom camera to film his nude relatives in the shower. The alleged offenses occurred over a decade ago. The trial court granted Templin’s motion to dismiss the charges pursuant to the statute of limitations. The State now appeals and presents one issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the charges against Templin. [2] We reverse. Facts and Procedural History [3] On February 23, 2026, the State charged Templin with two counts of voyeurism as Level 6 felonies based on acts committed against two separate victims in August and September 2014. According to the charging information, Templin committed these offenses by “peep[ing], without the consent of [the victim], into an area where the [victim] could reasonably be expected to disrobe . . . by means of a camera.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8. [4] The probable cause affidavit provided further details regarding the alleged offenses. During an investigation concerning distribution of child sexual exploitation images, law enforcement discovered an online account by the username “williamtemplin1961” with files that “revealed several adult females whose images were used to create pornography.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 2 of 11 11. Law enforcement officers searched Templin’s residence and electronic devices and discovered images of Templin’s adult female relative that “appeared to have been taken without [her] knowledge . . . as she was exiting a shower.” Id. The officers then searched for files located in Templin’s Google accounts, which revealed that Templin used a “camera . . . under a door of a bathroom facing a shower” to surreptitiously record the relative. Id. at 13. Templin obtained similar recordings of a second female relative by the same means. [5] On March 11, 2026, Templin filed a motion to dismiss the charging information. Templin argued (1) the charges were not brought within the five- year statute of limitations period, and (2) the charging information did not allege facts sufficient to show that Templin “conceal[ed] that a crime had been committed” so as to justify tolling the statute of limitations. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 37. In response, the State argued that Templin concealed evidence of the crime by “film[ing] both victims secretively,” id. at 44, so that “no one aside from him knew that he had made the videos,” id. at 45, and “[t]he only reason that these videos were found was that law enforcement had probable cause to search [Templin’s] devices and accounts for Child Sexual Abuse Material,” id. [6] After a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Templin’s motion to dismiss. The trial court determined that Templin’s “mere private possession of a video is not a positive act of concealment from law enforcement.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 47. This appeal ensued. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 3 of 11 Discussion and Decision The Trial Court Erred by Dismissing the Charging Information [7] The State argues that the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing the charging information. We generally review a trial court’s dismissal of the charging information for an abuse of discretion, which occurs only if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or if the trial court misinterprets the law. State v. Gomez, 284 N.E.3d 1029, 1034 (Ind. 2026) (quoting A.-H.Y. v. State, 975 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ind. 2012)). “However, ‘[w]e review a matter of statutory interpretation de novo because it presents a question of law.’” Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 950 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ind. 2011)), cert. denied. When reviewing the trial court’s decision regarding dismissal of the charging information, we take the facts alleged in the charging documents as true. State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 441 (Ind. 2022); Hernandez v. State, 220 N.E.3d 68, 71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Tanoos v. State, 137 N.E.3d 1008, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied). [8] The State charged Templin with voyeurism as a Level 6 felony for using a hidden camera to “peep” into the bathroom while his relatives showered. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8. “Peep[ing]” includes “using a concealed camera with the intent of capturing an intimate image,” Ind. Code § 35-45-4-5(a)(2)(B), as well as “any looking of a clandestine, surreptitious, prying, or secretive nature,” id. § -5(a)(2)(A). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 4 of 11 [9] Pursuant to the statute of limitations, a prosecution for a Level 6 felony—such as the voyeurism charges here—“is barred unless it is commenced . . . within five (5) years after the commission of the offense.” I.C. § 35-41-4-2(a)(1). The “indictment or information” shall “stat[e] the date of the offense with sufficient particularity to show that the offense was committed within the period of limitations applicable to that offense.” Id. § 35-34-1-2(a)(5). A trial court may dismiss an untimely charging information upon the defendant’s motion. Id. § 35-34-1-4(a)(8). [10] Under the concealment-tolling provision, the period a prosecution must be brought within “does not include any period in which . . . the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence.” I.C. § 35-41-4- 2(h)(2). This provision “serves the State’s interest of ensuring that it can later prosecute a criminal suspect even if, for a time, he conceals evidence of the offense such that authorities are unaware and unable to determine that a crime has been committed.” Reeves v. State, 938 N.E.2d 10, 17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied. [11] Here, the prosecution was not brought within five years of the offenses, so we must determine whether the concealment-tolling provision preserves the timeliness of the prosecution. We first address the documents a court may consider when determining whether the State has sufficiently alleged facts Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 5 of 11 supporting concealment. We then address whether the facts supporting concealment in this case are sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. a. A Court May Consider the Probable Cause Affidavit Alongside the Charging Information [12] The parties agree that the charging information in this case does not allege facts supporting concealment and that the State relies solely on facts alleged in the probable cause affidavit. Templin argues that the failure to allege the facts supporting concealment in the charging information warrants dismissal, whereas the State argues that the probable cause affidavit may supply those facts. [13] This court has disagreed on this issue. 1 In Reeves v. State, the panel held that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the charging information “did not contain any sort of allegation of the concealment of evidence” even though the probable cause affidavit arguably did. 938 1 The Indiana Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding the concealment-tolling provision, Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947, 949 (Ind. 2015), provides limited guidance. In reciting the procedural history of the case, the Study court noted the defendant’s pre-trial argument that the “State’s charging information did not demonstrate on its face why the charge was not barred by the five-year statute of limitations”; that the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the charge in question “as it was originally charged, but later granted the State leave to file an amended charging information”; and that the “amended charge” included the State’s allegations of concealment. Id. The Study court added in a footnote, “If the State is relying upon the concealment-tolling provision, ‘courts have required the State to plead those circumstances [of concealment] in the information so that a defendant is apprised of the facts upon which the State intends to rely and may be prepared to meet that proof at trial.’” Id. n.4 (alteration in original) (quoting Willner v. State, 602 N.E.2d 507, 508–09 (Ind. 1992)). Although Study suggests that the facts regarding concealment must be alleged in the charging information, the Study court was neither presented with nor answered the question of whether the probable cause affidavit can fill in the charging information’s gaps regarding concealment. Study therefore is not dispositive. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 6 of 11 N.E.2d at 17–18. The Reeves panel suggested this deficiency could be cured on remand by amending the charging information. Id. at 18. [14] On the other hand, the panel in Woods v. State expressly disagreed with Reeves. 980 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). The Woods panel explained that the “overarching purpose” of the charging information is to provide notice to the defendant and that “[s]ince the charging information and probable-cause affidavit are filed together, they should be viewed in tandem to determine if they satisfy the goal of putting the defendant on notice” regarding the concealment-tolling provision. Id. The Woods panel relied on the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Patterson v. State, 495 N.E.2d 714, 719 (Ind. 1986), which held that although the charging information for murder did not set forth the manner of death as required, “the probable-cause affidavit that supported the charging information did contain the necessary details to apprise Patterson of the charges against her.” Id.; see also Johnson v. State, 194 N.E.3d 98, 109 (Ind. Ct. App.) (relying on both the charging information and the probable cause affidavit in determining that facts regarding concealment were sufficiently alleged), trans. denied, 199 N.E.3d 780 (Ind. 2022); M.A. v. State, 83 N.E.3d 1221, 1230–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (same). [15] We adopt the Woods panel’s interpretation because it represents the more practical and sound approach. When the probable cause affidavit sufficiently lays out facts supporting application of the concealment-tolling provision, the defendant cannot complain that he lacks notice of the State’s intent to rely thereon. Moreover, the Woods panel’s interpretation squares with Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 7 of 11 courts’ longstanding principle that “where a charging [information] . . . lack[s] appropriate factual detail, additional materials such as the probable cause affidavit supporting the charging [information] may be taken into account in assessing whether a defendant has been apprised of the charges against him.” Gomez, 284 N.E.3d at 1034–35 (quoting State v. Laker, 939 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied) (first alteration in original). To require formal amendment of the charging information to reflect facts already alleged, as the Reeves panel suggested, would be needlessly inefficient. Thus, a court may consider the probable cause affidavit alongside the charging information to determine whether the concealment-tolling provision applies. b. Sufficient Allegations of Concealment [16] The State argues that it alleged sufficient facts supporting concealment to justify tolling the statute of limitations. The “primary purpose” of statutes of limitations “is to protect defendants from the prejudice that a delay in prosecution could bring, such as fading memories and stale evidence.” Study, 24 N.E.3d at 953 (quoting Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 920). Statutes of limitations must “strike[] a balance between an individual’s interest in repose and the State’s interest in having sufficient time to investigate and build its case.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sloan, 947 N.E.2d at 920). We construe exceptions to the statute of limitations period “narrowly and in a light most favorable to the accused.” Id. (quoting State v. Lindsay, 862 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 8 of 11 [17] The concealment-tolling provision applies “only when there is a positive act performed by the defendant that is calculated to prevent the discovery that a crime has been committed.” Study, 24 N.E.3d at 957 (collecting cases). Such an act must be geared toward “prevent[ing] awareness that a criminal offense has even occurred.” Id. at 952. The inquiry is not merely whether the defendant concealed evidence “about the offense or who committed the offense” but whether he or she “concealed evidence . . . related to the existence of the offense.” Id. Said another way, “the concealment, to avoid the running of the statute, must be of the crime itself.” Id. at 957 (quoting State v. Hoke, 84 Ind. 137, 138 (1882)). [18] The Indiana Supreme Court applied the positive-act test in Study v. State, 24 N.E.3d 947. There, the State alleged in connection with the defendant’s bank robbery charge that he “concealed his identity by wearing a mask, and concealed the getaway car, clothes worn during the crime, items taken from a victim, the weapon used, and evidence linking the robbery to other robberies.” Id. at 954. The Study court held that these allegations were insufficient to trigger the concealment-tolling provision. Id. “[P]olice were aware that the bank robbery . . . had occurred,” so the defendant’s actions did not “thwart[] the progress of the police investigation.” Id. Moreover, the defendant’s actions constituted mere “concealment of guilt” not concealment of the crime itself. Id. at 956. As an example of acts that likely would pass the positive-act test, the Study court suggested sufficient concealment would be present where an individual committing a jewelry store heist “threaten[ed] the employee into Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 9 of 11 forging sales receipts and altering accounting documents to make it appear as if no robbery had occurred” or “continue[d] sending threatening mail or messages to the employee to not report the robbery.” Id. [19] Here, taking the facts alleged in the probable cause affidavit as true, Templin filmed his relatives in the shower by way of a hidden camera that he placed under the bathroom door. Unlike in Study, where law enforcement was aware of the bank robbery and needed only to uncover the robber’s identity, Templin’s use of the hidden camera prevented anyone else from learning that his perverted acts even occurred. In other words, Templin concealed not merely his guilt in the offenses, but the existence of the offenses themselves. [20] Templin argues that his “use of a hidden camera is an element of the [voyeurism] offenses,” and if such use is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, “the statute prescribing that period would cease to have meaning.” Appellee’s Br. at 12; see I.C. § 35-45-4-5(a)(2)(B). Even when the act of concealment has been interwoven with elements of the offense, this court has held that the concealment-tolling provision applied. For example, in Johnson v. State, the defendant was charged with selling unregistered securities and “transacting business by an unregistered broker-dealer.” 194 N.E.3d at 110. The Johnson panel held the State’s allegation that “[b]ecause the security was not registered and because [the defendant] was not registered to offer or sell securities, he kept himself out of the purview of both law enforcement and industry regulators” was at least one of the reasons the concealment-tolling provision applied. Id. at 111, 112. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 10 of 11 [21] Moreover, holding that Templin’s use of the hidden camera constitutes a positive act of concealment does not render the statute of limitations meaningless. In addition to a positive act of concealment, the concealment- tolling provision also requires that “evidence sufficient to charge the person with [the] offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence.” I.C. § 35-41-4- 2(h)(2). The clandestine nature of voyeurism does not invariably mean the concealment-tolling provision will apply. [22] In sum, considering the probable cause affidavit, the State alleged sufficient acts of concealment to justify tolling the statute of limitations. The trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss. We reverse that decision. [23] Reversed. Tavitas, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Robert M. Yoke Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE Carter Gallagher Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1219 | October 23, 2026 Page 11 of 11