Full Opinion

IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana Amanda Marie Sayger, FILED Appellant-Defendant Sep 25 2026, 9:06 am CLERK Indiana Supreme Court v. Court of Appeals and Tax Court State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff September 25, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-3221 Appeal from the Cass Circuit Court The Honorable Stephen R. Kitts II, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 09C01-2310-F1-5 Opinion by Judge Weissmann Judges Bailey and Brown concur. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 1 of 23 Weissmann, Judge. [1] Amanda Sayger repeatedly arranged for an adult man to molest her 13-year-old daughter (Child Victim) in exchange for money.1 She was convicted of seven 1 Indiana Code sections 35-32-4-1 to -4 (2026), dictating how to refer to children in documents filed in criminal cases, took effect after this case was briefed. We flag reservations about the statutes’ scope and constitutionality when applied to cases, like this one, in which a family relationship between the defendant and the victim is critical to the result. In criminal actions—including criminal appeals—the statutes require redacting the names of child victims and witnesses, as well as those of everyone whose names could be used to identify those children. Ind. Code §§ 35-32-4-1, -2(1)–(2). Each such name must be replaced by “a descriptive anonymous designator,” which cannot be the person’s initials or a reference to a family relationship. Ind. Code § 35-32-4-3. These requirements conflict, at least in part, with the way child witnesses must be anonymized under our Supreme Court’s rules. See Ind. Access to Court Records Rule 5(C)(2) (requiring use of child witnesses’ “initials or similar designation” in cases involving sex offenses). The statutes thus potentially interfere with the Supreme Court’s authority to promulgate rules of procedure controlling how such cases are litigated and decided. See Mellowitz v. Ball State Univ., 221 N.E.3d 1214, 1221 (Ind. 2023). More to the point, the statutes carry startling, and presumably unintended, consequences. As discussed, filings must redact the names of persons linked to child victims. Ind. Code § 35-32-4-2(2). Hence, in a case involving crimes committed by a family member against a child, the very name of the defendant seemingly would need to be redacted. That result would be virtually unprecedented in the confidentiality it conferred on the convicted defendant. It would also conflict with the policies behind other statutes. For example, it would largely obviate the need for covered defendants to seek expungement of conviction records, and it would counteract the aim of protecting the public by placing offenders’ names on the sex offender registry. Alternatively, courts could seek to comply with the statutes by using defendants’ names while redacting from public documents details of family relationships and confidentially filing unredacted documents for the parties alone. See Ind. Code § 35-32-4-4. But in this case, for example, that would leave us unable to explain to the public that the defendant was the child victim’s mother and that she used her parental control to expose her child repeatedly to a molester. Likewise, we could not explain how our sentencing analysis turns on the defendant’s shocking abuse of her position of trust as the victim’s mother. Thus, redacting family relationships would threaten the courts’ core responsibilities in familial-victim cases: to publicly issue reasoned opinions justifying our decisions and to develop law that will guide future cases. It is unclear, however, whether the Legislature intended the statutes to govern documents produced by courts, such as orders, judgments, and appellate decisions. The statutes apply to “any document filed or submitted in a criminal action,” Ind. Code § 35-32-4-2; the chosen pair of verbs tends to suggest documents presented by parties to a court, not documents produced by a court. For this reason, and the reasons discussed above, we find the intended scope of the statutes ambiguous. And when a statute is ambiguous, we prefer to read it in a way that avoids unnecessarily creating doubt over its constitutionality. City of Vincennes v. Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155, 162 (Ind. 2006). Accordingly, to avoid constitutional separation-of-powers issues as far as reasonably possible, we read the new statutes as not requiring courts to redact defendants’ names or defendant–victim family relationships in cases where those relationships are critical to the result, at least until the Legislature clarifies its intent or the Supreme Court reaches a contrary conclusion. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 2 of 23 felonies and sentenced to 252 years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Sayger raises several challenges to her convictions and seeks revision of her sentence on appeal. We affirm her convictions. But finding her sentence to be an outlier in comparison with our Supreme Court’s precedents, we revise it to an aggregate 80 years. Facts [2] In 2021, Sayger was taking an EMT class when she met Mikel Fort, who supervised Indiana’s practical exam and was director of emergency medical services for Cass County. Fort promised Sayger a job and a place to live in Fulton, Indiana, so Sayger moved into a house there. But Cass County did not hire Sayger, and Fort instead began to pay her for sex and cleaning his home. Before long, Sayger told Child Victim that she, too, needed to do things for money and began sending photos to Fort of Child Victim in her underwear and topless. Sayger also directed Child Victim to send photos to Fort from her own cellphone. [3] The next year, Fort visited Sayger’s home to meet her children. Sayger gave Child Victim alcoholic beverages, and the adults and children played Twister together. When the adults and Child Victim were alone, Fort leaned against Child Victim from behind and fondled her genital area over her clothes as Sayger looked on. After that incident, Fort molested Child Victim on five more occasions. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 3 of 23 [4] Sometime before Christmas 2022, Sayger told Child Victim she needed to stay overnight at Fort’s home to watch his children. Fort picked Child Victim up and drove her to his home. That evening, Fort began touching Child Victim and then made her give him oral sex. Sayger later informed Child Victim that Fort had sent money afterwards. [5] After that Christmas, Sayger told Child Victim she needed to see Fort again. As Fort drove Child Victim to his home a second time, he slipped his fingers inside her underwear and into her vagina. Once home, Fort used a vibrator on Child Victim and performed oral sex on her. The next morning, Sayger asked Child Victim if she and Fort had engaged in sex. [6] Sometime later, Fort entered Child Victim’s bedroom one night while she was sleeping. He took off her clothes and performed oral sex on her. Another time, in the summer of 2023, Fort drove Child Victim to his home, where he used a vibrator on and had sexual intercourse with her. And on a final occasion, Sayger drove Child Victim and one of her friends to Fort’s house under the pretext of getting Child Victim’s nose pierced. Once there, Fort took Child Victim into his bedroom and had sexual intercourse with her again. Meanwhile, Sayger told Child Victim’s friend she could not go into the room. At some point during Child Victim’s abuse, Sayger threatened that she would be “sent somewhere” if she told anyone. Tr. Vol. III, p. 135. [7] Child Victim ultimately disclosed her abuse following an altercation with Sayger. During the ensuing police investigation, officers retrieved from Sayger’s Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 4 of 23 cellphone a deleted 2022 text message conversation between Sayger and Fort. In it, Fort requested “round 2” with Child Victim, and Sayger responded that Child Victim was willing. Exhs. Vol. V, pp. 68–70. Fort told Sayger she did a lot for him and was “1000% okay with it.” Id. at 80. Sayger thanked Fort for sending her $150. And when Fort wrote that Child Victim “wanted other . . . [p]ositions,” Sayger replied, “Oh lol.” Id. at 89. Police also discovered cellphone records of Fort sending Sayger a total of $2,690 across 30 transactions. [8] The State ultimately charged Sayger with 11 offenses: Count I, Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit child molesting; Count II, Level 3 felony promotion of child sex trafficking; Count III, Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent; Counts IV, V, and VII through X, Level 1 felony child molesting as an accomplice; Count VI, Level 4 felony child molesting as an accomplice; and Count XII, Class A misdemeanor contributing to the delinquency of a minor. [9] At trial, the court provided preliminary instructions defining the elements of the offenses charged using the term “Victim 1” as a label for Child Victim, to which Sayger did not object. Child Victim gave evidence and testified, over objection, that two members of Bikers Against Child Abuse were present in the courtroom to help her “feel safe” and that additional members were “upstairs.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 142. When the State asked whether “it would be more intimidating” if all the members came down and filled the courtroom, Child Victim answered, “Maybe.” Id. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 5 of 23 [10] The jury found Sayger guilty as charged. To avoid double jeopardy concerns, the court ultimately entered convictions only for: Count I, Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit child molesting; Count IV, lesser included Level 4 felony child molesting as an accomplice; and Counts V and VII through X, Level 1 felony child molesting as an accomplice. The court later sentenced Sayger to consecutive executed sentences on each conviction for an aggregate 252 years’ imprisonment. Discussion and Decision [11] Sayger appeals both her convictions and her sentences. As to her convictions, she argues: there was insufficient evidence to show she conspired with Fort or aided him to commit the Level 1 felony child molesting offenses; the trial court committed fundamental error in referring to Child Victim as “Victim 1”; admission of Child Victim’s testimony about Bikers Against Child Abuse was an abuse of discretion; and her multiple convictions for conspiracy and child molesting punish the same offense. Sayger also asks us to deem her 252-year sentence inappropriate and to revise it. We affirm Sayger’s convictions but revise her sentence to an aggregate 80 years executed. I. Sufficiency of the Evidence [12] Sayger contends there was insufficient evidence to support either her conviction for Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit child molesting or her five convictions for committing Level 1 felony child molesting as an accomplice. She does not Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 6 of 23 challenge her Level 4 felony child molesting conviction relating to the fondling incident after the Twister game. [13] When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility.” Farral v. State, 263 N.E.3d 794, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “The evidence need not ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’” Id. (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007)). And we will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable jury could find the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We conclude the evidence was sufficient to prove the challenged convictions here. A. Conspiracy to Commit Child Molesting [14] A conspiracy to commit a felony is formed when a person, “with intent to commit the felony, . . . agrees with another person to commit the felony.” Ind. Code § 35-41-5-2(a). To obtain a conviction, the State must additionally “prove that either the person or the person with whom he or she agreed performed an overt act in furtherance of the agreement.” Id. § -2(b). Here, the State alleged Sayger and Fort conspired for Fort, a person over twenty-one years of age, to perform sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Child Victim, a child under age fourteen. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1). “Other sexual conduct” is a defined term that includes an act involving one person’s “sex organ” and another person’s mouth and “the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 7 of 23 person by an object.” Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-221.5. An “object” includes a person’s finger. Seal v. State, 105 N.E.3d 201, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). [15] Sayger argues no evidence shows she agreed for Fort to engage specifically in sexual intercourse or oral sex with Child Victim. But the State was not required to prove “a formal express agreement,” only that Sayger’s and Fort’s minds met “understandingly to bring about an intelligent and deliberate agreement to commit the offense.” Porter v. State, 715 N.E.2d 868, 870 (Ind. 1999) (quoting Williams v. State, 409 N.E.2d 571, 573 (Ind. 1980)). And such an agreement can be proven by circumstantial evidence. See id. [16] The circumstantial evidence of Sayger and Fort’s agreement for Fort to engage in sexual intercourse or oral sex is ample and includes Sayger: providing Fort with photos of Child Victim in her underwear and topless; allowing Fort to fondle Child Victim in front of her; and directing Child Victim to stay overnight with Fort. Sayger also asked Child Victim whether she had sex with Fort, received over $2,000 from Fort, and texted, “Oh lol,” when Fort told her Child Victim wanted to try “other . . . [p]ositions.” Exhs. Vol. V, p. 89. What’s more, Fort engaged in sexual intercourse and oral sex, as well as digital penetration, with Child Victim, thus achieving the conspiracy’s aim. A reasonable jury could infer that Sayger and Fort agreed that Fort would commit these offenses in exchange for money. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 8 of 23 B. Aiding, Inducing, or Causing Fort to Commit Child Molesting [17] The State charged Sayger with multiple counts of child molesting on an accomplice liability theory. The statute on accomplice liability provides that a “person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. Thus, a person who aids another’s crime is equally guilty as the principal. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 557 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). And an accomplice “is criminally responsible for everything which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one of its natural and probable consequences, even though it was not intended as part of the original design or common plan.” Id. (quoting Griffin v. State, 16 N.E.3d 997, 1003 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)); see also McGee v. State, 699 N.E.2d 264, 265 (Ind. 1998). [18] As a general rule, mere presence at the scene of a crime does not imply participation. Madden, 162 N.E.3d at 557. But sufficient evidence may arise from the defendant’s: (1) presence at the scene; (2) companionship with the principal; (3) failure to oppose the crime; and (4) course of conduct before, during, and after the crime. Id. [19] Sayger argues no evidence shows she was present for, participated in, or planned any of Fort’s Level 1 felony sex acts with Child Victim. And she compares this case to Ward v. State, 567 N.E.2d 85, 86 (Ind. 1991), where our Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support a felony murder Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 9 of 23 conviction because the defendant merely drove three men to the vicinity of a store that those three men proceeded to rob. [20] Sayger, however, was present for at least one of Fort’s Level 1 felony child molesting offenses, when she told Child Victim’s friend not to enter the bedroom where Fort was having sexual intercourse with Child Victim. Sayger also demonstrated companionship with Fort by inviting him to meet her children, arranging for him to pick up Child Victim, bringing Child Victim to his home, and discussing his past and future crimes with him by text. [21] Additionally, Sayger failed to oppose Fort’s crimes, even answering, “Oh lol,” when he mentioned trying different positions. And she undertook a course of conduct promoting Fort’s crimes. For example, she provided Fort with photos of Child Victim both in her underwear and topless, let Fort fondle Child Victim, and told Child Victim to stay overnight with Fort. She also prevented Child Victim’s friend from entering the bedroom where Fort was having sexual intercourse with Child Victim and threatened Child Victim not to disclose the abuse. Granted, no direct evidence specifically shows Sayger helped Fort to enter Child Victim’s bedroom at night as she slept, but Sayger admitted nobody could get inside her home at night without her knowledge, so the jury could infer she let Fort in on that occasion. [22] Sayger also argues the evidence shows, at most, her “knowing participation in some form of sexual exploitation” short of sexual intercourse or oral sex. Reply Br., p. 12. But, as discussed above, an accomplice is liable for the natural and Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 10 of 23 probable consequences of a joint criminal design. Madden, 162 N.E.3d at 557; McGee, 699 N.E.2d at 265. So even if Sayger only knew Fort intended to fondle Child Victim, she would still be liable when his conduct foreseeably escalated to sexual intercourse and oral sex. [23] For these reasons, a reasonable jury could infer that Sayger aided Fort’s crimes as an accomplice. II. References to “Victim 1” [24] Sayger next contends the trial court committed fundamental error by labeling Child Victim as “Victim 1” in its preliminary instructions detailing the elements of the offenses charged. A claimed error in jury instructions is usually reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dunn v. State, 230 N.E.3d 910, 914 (Ind. 2024). But when a defendant fails to object, she waives appellate review. Id. In that case, we may review for fundamental error under a narrow exception to waiver. Id. An error is only fundamental if it made a fair trial impossible or constituted a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary principles of due process that presented an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id. [25] Sayger argues the “Victim 1” instructions assumed Child Victim was the victim of her alleged crimes, stripping Sayger of the presumption of innocence and crediting the State’s allegations. A panel of this Court recently addressed a similar argument in Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 11 of 23 [26] As occurred here, the trial court in Borroel “used the word ‘victim’ when referencing the charges and the statutory elements.” Id. at 13. The panel’s majority opinion explained that no fundamental error occurred for several reasons. The trial court only used the term “victim” when defining the elements of the crimes the State was required to prove and never referred to the victim personally as a “victim.” Id. at 14. And other instructions informed the jury that the charging information was not evidence of guilt, Borroel was presumed innocent until the State proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, it was up to the jury to determine the facts and its verdicts, and the court’s statements were not intended to suggest what facts or verdicts the jury should find. Id. at 14–15. Ultimately, the trial court’s wording intimated no “assessment of [the victim’s] credibility or any opinion on how the jury should decide the case.” Id. at 15.2 [27] We find the majority opinion in Borroel persuasive and applicable to the parallel circumstances of this case. Here, the trial court used the term “Victim 1” when defining the elements of Sayger’s alleged crimes, and it provided other instructions just like those the Borroel Court relied on in finding no fundamental error. The court thus made clear it was not intimating Sayger’s guilt. Sayger attempts to distinguish Borroel by pointing out that the defendant in that case did not dispute that a crime occurred, only the identity of the perpetrator, 2 Judge Crone concurred separately on this issue, stating that a trial court should use the phrase “alleged victim” in jury instructions. Id. at 19 (Crone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 12 of 23 whereas Sayger disputed whether her conduct and accompanying state of mind constituted the charged offenses. But this distinction does not change our conclusion that the trial court did not suggest any crimes had in fact occurred. [28] For these reasons, we do not find the trial court’s use of the term “Victim 1” amounted to fundamental error. III. Testimony about Bikers Against Child Abuse [29] Sayger also argues the trial court erred in permitting Child Victim to testify that two members of Bikers Against Child Abuse were present in the courtroom to help her “feel safe” and that members sitting “upstairs” might be “more intimidating” if they came down and filled the courtroom. Tr. Vol. III, p. 142. Sayger points additionally to Child Victim’s testimony that Sayger had driven past Child Victim’s home after her arrest. Sayger contends that Child Victim’s testimony was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial because it suggested Sayger was dangerous, but we find any error in admitting it was harmless. [30] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(A), no error is reversible on appeal “where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.” In applying this harmless error test, “we consider the likely impact of the improperly admitted or excluded evidence on a reasonable, average jury in light of all the evidence in the case.” Hayko v. State, 211 N.E.3d 483, 492 (Ind. 2023). Here, the record provides context for Child Victim’s testimony that indicates it likely had little impact. Child Victim stated the Bikers Against Child Abuse Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 13 of 23 members acted as the “emotional support animal equivalent of human beings” and were not in court to intimidate anyone. Tr. Vol. III, p. 142. In a sidebar discussion, the parties agreed that two individuals, who had on leather vests, were sitting quietly in the courtroom’s public seats with a “respectful . . . demeanor.” Id. at 147. And the jury heard that Sayger was in jail on the date when Child Victim believed she had driven by her home. All in all, it is improbable that Child Victim’s testimony led the jury to believe she needed Bikers Against Child Abuse members present to protect her from Sayger or that their presence affected the result of the trial. IV. Substantive Double Jeopardy [31] In Sayger’s final challenge to her convictions, she maintains she received multiple convictions for the same offense—an alleged substantive double jeopardy violation. Sayger argues only one conviction may stand out of her conspiracy conviction and five Level 1 felony convictions for child molesting as an accomplice. This issue presents two distinct questions: whether Sayger’s convictions for conspiring to commit and actually committing child molesting as an accomplice may stand under Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020); and whether Sayger was convicted five times for the same offense of child molesting as an accomplice under Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256 (Ind. 2020). We find no violation. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 14 of 23 A. Wadle Analysis [32] Sayger contends her conspiracy conviction and one of her convictions as an accomplice were based on the same offense under Wadle, which supplies the test for substantive double jeopardy when, as here, “a defendant’s single act or transaction implicates multiple criminal statutes.” Id. at 235. But while Wadle sets forth “a multi-step analysis,” Garth v. State, 182 N.E.3d 905, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), Sayger’s claim fails at step one. Wadle’s first step “is to determine whether the statutes, either explicitly or by unmistakable implication, allow for multiple punishments.” Id. This Court has held that the Criminal Code permits by unmistakable implication “convictions for both a crime and a conspiracy to commit the same crime.” Id. (citing Ind. Code § 35-41-5-3); Littlefield v. State, 215 N.E.3d 1081, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). Sayger therefore cannot establish substantive double jeopardy based on convictions for conspiracy to commit child molesting and actually committing child molesting as an accomplice. B. Powell Analysis [33] Sayger also argues the State failed to “identify separate and distinct acts that [she] committed to aid . . . Fort in committing each act” of Level 1 felony child molesting. Appellant’s Br., p. 37. We again find no violation because the evidence supports the verdict that Sayger knowingly aided Fort to commit five separate Level 1 felony child molesting acts. [34] The parties agree that Powell supplies the two-part test for substantive double jeopardy when, as here, “a defendant is convicted of a single statutory offense Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 15 of 23 multiple times.” Moyers v. State, 277 N.E.3d 33, 36 (Ind. 2026). At the first step, we determine whether the statute indicates expressly or by judicial construction a unit of prosecution. Id. at 43. If the unit of prosecution is not expressly defined, we instead ask whether the statute is conduct-based or result-based. Id. A conduct-based statute defines an offense by certain actions or behavior, and the crime is complete once the offender performs the prohibited conduct. Id. A result-based statute, by contrast, defines an offense by the defendant’s actions and their results, thus permitting multiple convictions when multiple consequences flow from a single act. Id. [35] “Once we identify a statute’s unit of prosecution, we turn to the facts to determine how many discrete offenses the evidence supports. But if the statute’s unit of prosecution remains ambiguous, we move on to the second step of the analysis.” Id. If step two is necessary, we “determine whether the facts—as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial—indicate a single offense or whether they indicate distinguishable offenses.” Id. (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264). And that step involves asking “whether the defendant’s actions are so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Id. (quoting Powell, 151 N.E.3d at 264). [36] The statutes underlying Sayger’s Level 1 felony convictions for child molesting as an accomplice are the accomplice liability statute and the child molesting statute. See Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4, -42-4-3(a)(1). The parties agree that these statutes make the offenses conduct-based. But both express statutory language Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 16 of 23 and the result-based nature of offenses based on accomplice liability lead us to a different conclusion. [37] As discussed above, under the accomplice liability statute a “person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. And our Legislature has instructed that singular terms in a statute “may be also applied to the plural of persons and things.” Ind. Code § 1-1-4-1(3). Hence, as an express textual matter, a person who knowingly aids another person to commit multiple offenses commits all those offenses. See, e.g., Specht v. State, 838 N.E.2d 1081, 1094–95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding sufficient evidence the defendant aided both a murder and an attempted murder based on the same conduct). As our Supreme Court has stated, the accomplice liability statute does not establish a separate offense; it merely provides a basis of liability for the offense charged. Hampton v. State, 719 N.E.2d 803, 807 (Ind. 1999). Thus, when an accomplice knowingly aids a principal to commit multiple child molesting offenses, the accomplice commits multiple offenses too. [38] The result-based nature of Sayger’s offenses leads us to the same conclusion. The offense of Level 1 felony child molesting as an accomplice requires not just an accomplice’s own act aiding the principal but the principal’s resulting engagement in prohibited sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct. Ind. Code §§ 35-41-2-4, -42-4-3(a)(1). Thus, each act of sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct that the accomplice knowingly aids is separately punishable. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 17 of 23 [39] Applying this understanding of the unit of prosecution, we find the evidence supports five separate offenses here. The evidence indicates Sayger promoted all five of Fort’s Level 1 felony offenses by providing him with photos of Child Victim both in her underwear and topless, letting Fort fondle Child Victim, and threatening Child Victim not to disclose the abuse. And beyond the evidence relevant to all five offenses collectively, the record further indicates Sayger aided Fort by rendering him aid specific to each of his offenses. Sayger told Child Victim to stay overnight with Fort to watch his children before Christmas 2022, when he made her give him oral sex. After that Christmas, Sayger told Child Victim to see Fort again, and he both digitally penetrated and performed oral sex on her. Sayger let Fort into her home one night when he performed oral sex on Child Victim—or so a reasonable jury could infer circumstantially. Sayger again told Child Victim to go see Fort when he first had intercourse with her at his home. And Sayger brought Child Victim to Fort’s home under the pretext of getting her nose pierced and prevented Child Victim’s friend from intruding on Fort having intercourse with Child Victim a second time. Thus, the trial court properly entered five Level 1 felony child molesting convictions. V. Appropriateness of Sentence [40] Finally, Sayger asks us to deem her 252-year aggregate sentence inappropriate and to revise it to 40 years by making each individual sentence concurrent with the others. We agree with Sayger that her sentence is an outlier in light of precedent from our Supreme Court and we revise her sentence to an aggregate 80 years. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 18 of 23 Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In applying this standard, we afford “considerable deference” to the trial court’s sentencing decision unless “compelling evidence” portrays the defendant’s offenses and character “in a positive light.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). Our principal role is to “leaven the outliers” rather than “to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. [41] Sayger points to two decisions of our Supreme Court which she suggests render her sentence an outlier: Monroe v. State, 886 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2008); and Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158 (Ind. 2019). [42] In Monroe, the defendant was found guilty on five counts of Class A felony child molesting of a child aged around seven through nine. 886 N.E.2d at 578–79. The trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 110 years with ten years suspended. Id. at 579. The Supreme Court found errors in the trial court’s sentencing procedure and elected to exercise its authority to review and revise the sentence. Id. at 579–80. As to the nature of the offenses, the Court noted the defendant’s repeated molestations of a young child over the course of two years and his violation of the position of trust he held “as a surrogate parent” to the victim. Id. at 580. However, the Court also noted that “the five counts of child molestation were identical and involved the same child.” Id. As to the defendant’s character, the Court gave little weight to his history of driving- Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 19 of 23 related misdemeanors. Id. All in all, the Court found that the case warranted enhanced sentences but not consecutive sentences, and it thus imposed concurrent 50-year sentences, with the trial court to determine whether to suspend any of that time to probation. Id. at 581; see also Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927 (Ind. 2008) (revising a 100-year sentence to 50 years). [43] Then, in Faith, our Supreme Court addressed the case of a teacher who groomed a 12-year-old student and ultimately engaged in sexual intercourse with her at least 20 times, as well as committing other sex acts on her. 131 N.E.3d at 160. The defendant pled guilty to three counts of Class A felony child molesting. Id. And the Supreme Court revised the sentence from an aggregate 90 years with 20 years suspended to an aggregate 90 years with 30 years suspended. Id. at 159–60. The decision did not indicate the defendant had any criminal history. [44] We also note Horton v. State, 949 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. 2011), a decision in which our Supreme Court revised a sentence but imposed a considerably greater punishment than in Monroe or Faith. In Horton, the defendant was convicted of nine counts of child molesting, six as Class A felonies and three as Class C felonies. Id. at 347. The “grisly facts” included: abuse of a position of trust by a man the seven-year-old victim called “Dad”; “daily sexual violation” of the victim’s “mouth, breasts, hands, vagina, and anus”; invasion of her bedroom; acts of non-sexual violence; injury to the victim’s bowels; and infection by oral and genital herpes. Id. at 347–48. The defendant had no criminal history, Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-3221 | September 25, 2026 Page 20 of 23 however. Id. at 348. The Supreme Court revised the aggregate sentence from 324 years to 110 years executed. Id. at 349. [45] Additionally, in Estes v. State, the Supreme Court characterized a 267-year sentence for molesting offenses against two victims as “well outside the typical range of sentences imposed for child molesting in reported Indiana decisions.” 827 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. 2005). [46] In light of the cases discussed, Sayger’s 252-year executed sentence is a clear outlier. See Knight v. State, 930 N.E.2d 20, 22 (Ind. 2010) (permitting the comparison of sentences among those convicted of similar crimes). We find that the nature of Sayger’s offenses and her character place this case between Monroe and Faith on one hand and Horton on the other for purposes of revising the sentence. There are numerous aggravating aspects of Sayger’s offenses: she violated her position