People v. Post

2026 IL 132403 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 132403) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. JESSE POST, Appellant. Opinion filed October 29, 2026. JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Cunningham, O’Brien, and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion. Chief Justice Neville specially concurred, with opinion. Justice Overstreet specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Rochford.  OPINION ¶1 The circuit court of Fulton County denied defendant, Jesse Post, pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2024)), as amended by Public Acts 101-652, § 10-255, and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). Subsequently, defendant sought review of his pretrial detention. Following a hearing, the circuit court determined defendant’s continued detention was necessary to avoid the real and present threat he posed. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i- 5) (West 2024). Defendant appealed, and the Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed. 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 1. ¶2 Now on appeal, defendant asks this court to (1) define the proper standard of review applicable to orders appealed from continued detention hearings and (2) find the appellate court erred in affirming the circuit court’s order that he remain in pretrial detention. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 A. Initial Pretrial Detention Proceedings ¶5 In November 2023, the State charged defendant by information with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2020)). The charges alleged defendant, who was 17 years of age or older, committed an act of sexual contact with F.W., C.W., and E.W., all under the age of 13 when the acts were committed, in that he made contact with the private parts of the minors for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal. ¶6 After defendant’s arrest in May 2024, the State filed a verified petition to deny him pretrial release, alleging he was charged with an enumerated sex offense under the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 et seq. (West 2024)) and his pretrial release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case. See 725 ILCS 5/110- 6.1(a)(5) (West 2024). ¶7 At the initial detention hearing, the State proffered that the victims’ mother made a complaint in May 2020 to the police alleging defendant was having oral sex -2-  with the children. The children were interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center but did not make a disclosure. A few years later, the children’s mother reported that E.W. began talking about a sexual assault that took place in the 2020 timeframe. Further, F.W. and C.W., both of whom had undergone counseling, began disclosing they were sexually assaulted in 2020. Interviews with the children indicated defendant had lured them into the kitchen with candy and performed oral sex on them. The State also proffered that defendant lived close to the victims. In addition, in a prior criminal case, defendant failed to show up in court and make payments toward his fine. ¶8 Defendant testified he had four children but only one of them lived with him. At the time of the hearing, he was unemployed. When asked why he had missed court-ordered payments, he stated he started “to hold off on those payments” so he could pay it all off at once. If released, he stated he would come to court, wear an ankle monitor, and have no contact with the victims. ¶9 The circuit court found substantial articulable facts supported the charged offenses. Noting defendant’s willful disregard of his payment order and believing that constituted a significant concern regarding his ability to comply with court orders, along with the minor victims being “extraordinarily vulnerable,” the court denied pretrial release. ¶ 10 In July 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), asking the circuit court to reconsider its detention order because there were less restrictive means than detention to secure his continued appearance in court and conditions could be imposed to ensure he was not a danger to the community. The court denied the motion, finding no substantial change in defendant’s circumstances and that no less restrictive means were available. ¶ 11 Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. People v. Post, 2024 IL App (4th) 241002-U, ¶ 2. The Fourth District found the circuit court failed to make sufficient findings to allow meaningful review of its decision to deny pretrial release. Id. ¶ 27. The appellate court vacated the order denying defendant pretrial release and remanded with directions for the circuit court to conduct a new detention hearing, where the State could present evidence and the court could make express findings. Id. ¶ 29. -3- ¶ 12 On remand, the circuit court conducted a new detention hearing in November 2024. The State proffered that a complaint had been made in 2017 in regard to L.G., born in 2012, the daughter of defendant. L.G. told authorities about an incident where she and defendant went into the woods after defendant “had thrown a frisbee too far.” Defendant then “licked [her] butt.” Defendant denied the accusation. ¶ 13 The State also proffered that the charges in the present case were filed after criminal sexual assault allegations were made by E.W., born in 2016, who claimed defendant licked his penis on multiple occasions. E.W. described that defendant would put him on the kitchen counter next to a bowl of candy, pull down E.W.’s pants and underwear, lick his penis, give him a piece of candy, and tell him not to tell E.W.’s father. ¶ 14 F.W., born in 2013 and E.W.’s sibling, made a statement to investigators that defendant had previously been her father’s friend. F.W. indicated that on multiple occasions, while alone with defendant in the kitchen, defendant pulled down her pants and touched her vagina. C.W., born in 2014 and E.W.’s sibling, described an occasion where defendant took her into the kitchen, gave her candy, put her on the counter, and licked her vagina and buttocks. C.W. indicated defendant would unzip his pants and show his penis, “shaking it around” when doing so. ¶ 15 The victims’ father stated in an interview that he previously lived in an apartment with defendant. During that time, he would sometimes sleep on the couch or go to bed early and leave defendant to supervise the children. Upon being confronted with the allegations, defendant denied them but then “remained silent and did not speak.” ¶ 16 B.L., the mother of the three victims, testified defendant lived with the victims’ father in Canton in 2020. Defendant later moved to Peoria, and his current address was only half a mile from the home occupied by B.L. and her children. B.L. believed defendant moved to get closer to her, which she found “extremely terrifying.” ¶ 17 Over defense counsel’s objection, B.L. testified that other people had told her about being victimized by defendant. Specifically, B.L. stated S.R. told her that she rode the bus with defendant in the seventh grade and inappropriate acts occurred. B.H. reportedly said she was 16 years old when defendant was 20 and he forced -4-  himself on her, such that she felt “coerced, manipulated, and violated.” B.L. stated defendant was present at her home at the same time as 16-year-old M.M. and saw him being “extremely inappropriate with her.” B.L. also stated M.M. said defendant had exposed himself to her in person and in photographs. ¶ 18 Defendant testified he lived in Peoria and, if he was released from custody, he would live in St. David with his mother. Prior to his arrest, he had been a stay-at- home father but had applied at Walgreens. Defendant indicated he did not know where three of his children lived and had not seen them since 2020 because he did not “get along with their mothers.” He stated he would abide by any conditions of release, including restrictions on his movement, wearing an ankle monitor, and not contacting the victims or any minor. ¶ 19 The circuit court denied pretrial release. The court expressed concern for the victims and the community at large and found, at that time, no set of circumstances supported defendant’s pretrial release. ¶ 20 Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2), arguing that the determination by the court that means less restrictive than detention were insufficient to protect the victims and the community was against the manifest weight of the evidence and an abuse of discretion. The court denied the motion. Defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) allowing hearsay evidence, (2) considering evidence of a minor’s interview that did not result in any arrest or criminal charges, and (3) finding the State proved there existed no less restrictive means of protecting the community from the threat he might pose. People v. Post, 2025 IL App (4th) 241527-U, ¶ 37. The Fourth District affirmed the detention order, finding the circuit court’s decision to deny pretrial release was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶ 49. ¶ 21 B. Defendant’s Motion for Release Based on Change in Circumstances ¶ 22 In April 2025, defendant filed a motion for review of pretrial detention pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)), asking the circuit court to vacate the order for detention. Defendant alleged that, since the order finding no less restrictive means other than his continued detention, there had -5-  been “a change in circumstance.” Specifically, defendant alleged he secured appropriate housing and would reside with his parents, who would provide constant and direct supervision, he would agree to wear an ankle monitor, and he would abide by all terms and conditions the court wished to impose. Defendant contended he was no longer a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community and his continued detention was no longer necessary. ¶ 23 The circuit court conducted a hearing on the motion in May 2025. Defendant testified that, if released, he would reside with his mother in St. David. He stated he would submit to house arrest and wear an ankle monitor. His mother and father would provide constant supervision, and although his father worked, his mother did not. Defendant also stated release was necessary so he could assist in obtaining additional information for his defense. ¶ 24 On cross-examination, defendant testified he last lived with his parents from 2020 to 2022. On examination by the circuit court, defendant stated his father, age 67, was in good health but his mother, age 64, was not, due to her “heart condition” and “artery disease.” ¶ 25 The circuit court denied the motion, finding there had been no substantial changes in defendant’s circumstances and there were no less restrictive means available. The court believed GPS monitoring would not work in this case. Notable to the court, defendant’s testimony at the previous hearing was “of significant concern,” and his mother’s age and health were also relevant factors. Further, the court found defendant’s claim he needed to be released to obtain evidence to support his defense was not “at all credible.” ¶ 26 Defendant filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 604(h)(2), arguing he had provided information relating to a change in circumstance and showed there were less restrictive means than his continued detention. The circuit court denied the motion, finding no substantial changes in defendant’s circumstances and no less restrictive means were present. ¶ 27 Defendant appealed, arguing the circuit court’s continued detention order should be reversed because he established a change in circumstances showing there were less restrictive means of protecting the community from any threat he posed. 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 1. The appellate court affirmed. Id. -6- ¶ 28 On the merits, the appellate court first addressed whether a circuit court must find a change in circumstances has occurred before altering an existing detention order. Id. ¶ 26. The court stated showing new information or a change in circumstances is required for relief under section 110-6.1(i-5) because, “ ‘[i]f a court has found that a defendant qualifies for detention and no new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense to think that [the] court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29). ¶ 29 The appellate court next considered the appropriate standard of review of a circuit court’s decision at subsequent hearings regarding continued detention pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5) of the Code. Id. ¶ 27. The Fourth District noted this court had recently resolved the district conflict regarding the standard of review to be employed at a pretrial detention hearing. Id. (citing People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626). In Morgan, this court held “the standard of review to be employed when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer is de novo and, when live testimony is heard, the standard is manifest weight of the evidence.” Id. (citing Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54). ¶ 30 After noting another split in the appellate court had developed, the Fourth District distinguished between a circuit court’s initial pretrial detention decision from its continued detention decisions and concluded the appropriate standard of review in the latter circumstance is the abuse of discretion standard. Id. ¶¶ 27-29. ¶ 31 The Fourth District went on to find the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in concluding defendant’s continued detention was necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. Id. ¶ 30. The court found defendant failed to present any new information or demonstrate a change in circumstances to justify changing the detention order. Id. The only “ ‘new information’ ” was defendant’s willingness to be on house arrest with GPS monitoring and under the supervision of his elderly parents, which the appellate court stated were options and information available to the circuit court at the prior detention hearing and therefore insufficient to show a change in circumstances. Id. ¶ 31. The court further found the result would have been the same under the manifest weight of the evidence standard as well. Id. ¶ 32. -7- ¶ 32 This court granted defendant’s petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). ¶ 33 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 34 Under the Act, every person charged with an offense is presumed eligible for pretrial release. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 6.1(e) (West 2024); People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL 130693, ¶ 16. To detain a defendant, the State must file a verified petition requesting the denial of pretrial release, and the circuit court shall hold a hearing on the petition. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024). When seeking denial of pretrial release, the State bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that the defendant committed a detainable offense; (2) the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community, based on the specific, articulable facts of the case; and (3) “no condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection (b) of Section 110-10 of this Article can mitigate (i) the real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, for offenses listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of subsection (a), or (ii) the defendant’s willful flight for offenses listed in paragraph (8) of subsection (a).” Id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)-(3). In any order of detention, the circuit court is required to “make a written finding summarizing the court’s reasons for concluding that the defendant should be denied pretrial release, including why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community.” Id. § 110- 6.1(h)(1). If the court denies pretrial release, the defendant is entitled to appeal that order. Id. § 110-6.1(j). However, as a prerequisite to appeal, the defendant “shall first present to the trial court a written motion requesting the same relief to be sought on appeal and the grounds for such relief.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). ¶ 35 If the circuit court has entered a detention order, -8-  “[a]t each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). A defendant has a right to appeal a continued detention order, subject to the requirements of Rule 604(h)(2). ¶ 36 A. Standard of Review ¶ 37 On appeal from an initial order of detention, this court in Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54, articulated the appropriate standard of review. The court held that “(1) when live witness testimony is presented at a pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court’s ultimate detention decision under section 110-6.1, in addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” Id. ¶ 38 This case presents the question of the appropriate standard of review for appeals of continued detention orders under section 110-6.1(i-5). Determining the appropriate standard of review is a question of law that we review de novo. Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 52. ¶ 39 Initially, we note the State argues this court must first address what determination a circuit court is called upon to make at a continued detention hearing. The State contends the question before the circuit court was whether some new information or change in circumstances warranted altering its prior detention order. Defendant argues the plain language of section 110-6.1(i-5) does not require him to demonstrate a change in circumstances or to present new information before -9-  his detention can be revisited. Based on a reading of the Act as a whole, we find a showing of new information or a change in circumstances is required. ¶ 40 The Act provides three similar provisions with respect to a circuit court’s obligation to review detention or release status at subsequent hearings. The first provision of note requires that, when the court releases a defendant on conditions, it is required to review the continued necessity of those conditions as follows: “At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that the current conditions imposed are necessary to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant as required, the safety of any other person, and the compliance of the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release. The court is not required to be presented with new information or a change in circumstance to remove pretrial conditions.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/110-5(f-5) (West 2024). ¶ 41 The second provision deals with the circuit court’s review of detention status when a defendant is initially released but is later detained after that release has been revoked. “At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention under this Section is necessary to reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or to prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” Id. § 110-6(j). ¶ 42 The third provision is the one that applies in this case, where the court must review whether the continued detention of a defendant is necessary. “At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” Id. § 110-6.1(i-5). ¶ 43 “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.” People v. Whitehead, 2023 IL 128051, ¶ 18. “The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection - 10 -  with every other relevant section.” Nelson v. Kendall County, 2014 IL 116303, ¶ 23. “It is well settled that where the legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, courts will presume that the legislature acted intentionally in the exclusion or inclusion.” People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 30; see People v. Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 48 (stating that, where the legislature includes particular language in one section but omits it in another section of the same statute, courts will presume “that the legislature intended different results”). ¶ 44 In considering the three provisions of the Act quoted above, only section 110- 5(f-5) specifically excludes the requirement that new information or a change in circumstances be presented. Neither section 110-6(j) nor section 110-6.1(i-5) contains a similar exclusion. Thus, presuming the legislature acted intentionally by not inserting that exclusion in section 110-6.1(i-5), we find a showing of new information or a change in circumstances is required to alter a defendant’s continued detention. Although the circuit court still has the inherent power to reconsider and correct its own rulings (People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 171 (1990)), the conclusion that new information or a change in circumstances must be shown comes as no surprise because, “[i]f a court has found that a defendant qualifies for detention and no new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense to think that [the] court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason” (Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29). ¶ 45 With the requirement that new information or a change in circumstances be presented, we now turn to the appropriate standard of review of a circuit court’s continued detention order. Defendant argues Morgan’s standard is applicable to both initial and continued detention hearings. Specifically, in the factual scenario presented here where the circuit court heard live testimony, defendant argues the court’s ultimate determination that he remain detained should be reviewed under the manifest weight of the evidence standard. 1 In finding the abuse of discretion standard applied, the appellate court here focused on the fact that section 110-6.1(i- 5) does not set forth a standard of proof or impose a burden of proof. 2025 IL App (4th) 250598, ¶ 29. It found the lack of such a standard of proof suggested the 1 As the factual scenario of the parties proceeding solely by proffer is not present here, we need not address the standard of review appropriate in that instance. - 11 -  legislature intended to leave the continued detention decision to the circuit court’s discretion. Id. Likewise, the State argues the inquiry required by section 110-6.1(i- 5) calls on the circuit court to exercise its discretion rather than to determine whether any party has met its burden of proving any particular fact. We disagree with the appellate court and the State. ¶ 46 In Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 36, this court noted “determinations regarding the appropriate standard of review on appeal historically turn on the nature and substance of the question under review (fact, law, or discretion), not the importance of the question.” In the context of initial detention hearings, Morgan found “the individualized assessment of evidence in conjunction with any relevant statutory factors and conditions is a factual exercise.” Id. Thus, we found the State’s burden under section 110-6.1(e) “presents a unique factual question that the circuit court must resolve based on an individualized assessment of the evidence, the credibility of the live witnesses, and a careful analysis of the relevant statutory factors and conditions provided in sections 110-6.1(g) and 110-10(b).” Id. ¶ 38. ¶ 47 Although Morgan dealt with an initial petition for detention in which the State has the burden of proof, its reasoning applies equally to hearings with live testimony on continued detention. Section 110-6.1(i-5) states that, at each subsequent appearance by the defendant, the circuit court “must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i- 5) (West 2024). ¶ 48 Like Morgan, the circuit court’s assessment of whether a defendant is a real and present threat to the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent his willful flight from prosecution, offers its own unique factual exercise. The court must consider the question of continued detention based on the evidence; the credibility of the witnesses; and a careful analysis as to whether defendant represents a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community. “[W]hen confronted with such factual questions, the circuit court is in a superior position to resolve alleged inconsistencies and conflicts in the live witnesses’ testimony, as well as to weigh the testimony and determine the credibility of the witnesses in conjunction with the relevant statutory factors and - 12 -  conditions.” Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 38. Thus, whether a defendant’s detention should be continued is a question of fact, not one of discretion. Accordingly, similar to our holding in Morgan, when live witness testimony is presented at a continued detention hearing, a circuit court’s ultimate decision under section 110-6.1(i-5), in addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. To the extent the Fourth District’s decision holds the appropriate standard of review is abuse of discretion, that portion of the opinion is hereby overruled. ¶ 49 B. Manifest Weight of the Evidence Review ¶ 50 With the appropriate standard of review in mind, we now consider whether the circuit court’s decision to continue defendant’s detention was against the manifest weight of the evidence. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where ‘the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.’ ” People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008)). Whether continued detention is necessary requires courts to first look at the initial detention decision. See Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 37 (noting “the original detention order is always the context against which a subsequent review must be measured” and “[i]t is the baseline from which to assess the significance of any alleged change in circumstances or new information”). ¶ 51 At the initial detention hearing, the State proffered that defendant had allegedly performed oral sex on children and lived close to the victims. Defendant testified that, if released, he would come to court, wear an ankle monitor, and have no contact with the victims. In denying pretrial release, the circuit court found substantial articulable facts supported the charged offenses and questioned defendant’s ability to comply with court orders. ¶ 52 On remand for a new detention hearing, the circuit court heard the State’s proffer of further sexual assault allegations and defendant’s proximity to the victims. Defendant testified that, if released from custody, he would live in St. David with his mother. He stated he would abide by any conditions of release, including restrictions on his movement, wearing an ankle monitor, and not contacting the victims or any minor. The circuit court denied pretrial release, - 13 -  expressing concern for the victims and the community and finding no set of circumstances supported release. The Fourth District affirmed the detention order. ¶ 53 Thereafter, defendant filed his motion for review of pretrial detention pursuant to section 110-6.1(i-5), the subject of this appeal. In the motion, defendant alleged there had been “a change in circumstance.” He stated he had obtained appropriate housing and would reside with his parents, his parents would provide constant and direct supervision, he would agree to wear an ankle monitor, and he would abide by all terms and conditions imposed by the circuit court. He contended he was no longer a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the community and his continued detention was no longer necessary. ¶ 54 At the hearing on the motion, defendant testified that, if released, he would reside with his mother in St. David and would be willing to undergo house arrest and wear an ankle monitor. His parents would provide constant supervision, and while his father worked, his mother did not. Defendant also stated release was necessary so he could assist in obtaining additional information for his defense. On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged his mother was not in good health due to her “heart condition” and “artery disease.” ¶ 55 The circuit court denied the motion. The court believed GPS monitoring would not work in this case, defendant’s testimony at the previous hearing was “of significant concern,” and his mother’s age and health were relevant factors. Further, the court found defendant’s claim he needed to be released to obtain evidence to support his defense was not “at all credible.” ¶ 56 After considering the testimony presented at the hearing, we find the circuit court’s decision to continue defendant’s pretrial detention was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Defendant essentially presented the same or similar information he provided at the initial detention hearing. Living with his parents, a willingness to wear an ankle monitor, promises to comply with any terms and conditions, and having no contact with the victims were already available for consideration by the court. The only “new information” or “change in circumstances” defendant offered centered on being supervised by his ailing mother, being agreeable to house arrest, and the need to be released so he could obtain evidence in his defense. This evidence failed to show defendant was no longer a real and present threat to the community. Without more showing the - 14 -  danger defendant presented had been mitigated, the circuit court had nothing before it to conclude continued detention was no longer necessary. As such, its decision to deny pretrial release cannot be said to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented, and the opposite conclusion is not clearly evident. ¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 58 We hold that a showing of new information or a change in circumstances is required for relief under section 110-6.1(i-5). We also hold that, when live testimony is presented at a continued pretrial detention hearing, the circuit court’s decision under section 110-6.1(i-5), in addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the decision, will not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Applying the appropriate standard, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment continuing defendant’s pretrial detention. ¶ 59 Judgments affirmed. ¶ 60 CHIEF JUSTICE NEVILLE, specially concurring: ¶ 61 I agree with the majority’s analysis of the standard of review, and I agree with the result the majority reaches. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of section 6.1(i-5) of article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, as amended by what is commonly known as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024)). The Act provides: “At each subsequent appearance of the defendant before the court, the judge must find that continued detention is necessary to avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or to prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution.” Id. The majority holds that, under this section, “a showing of new information or a change in circumstances is required to alter a defendant’s continued detention.” Supra ¶ 44. - 15 - ¶ 62 I. Interlocutory Orders ¶ 63 The legislature explicitly classified pretrial detention orders as interlocutory orders. Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(1)(iii) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (“An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an interlocutory order of court entered under section[ ] *** 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 *** by the defendant from an order denying pretrial release[.]”); see People v. Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 19. Courts retain the inherent power to correct their erroneous interlocutory orders. People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 33 (“[A] court in a criminal case has the inherent power to reconsider and correct its *** interlocutory rulings.”); People v. Mink, 141 Ill. 2d 163, 171 (1990). Therefore the legislature cannot prevent the circuit court from reconsidering an interlocutory order for pretrial detention (People v. Davis, 93 Ill. 2d 155, 161 (1982)), even if the defendant has presented no new evidence. ¶ 64 The majority argues that the Act requires new evidence when a defendant seeks pretrial release after the circuit court has ordered pretrial detention. Supra ¶ 44; see 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(i-5) (West 2024). The majority adopts the appellate court’s reasoning: “ ‘[i]f a court has found that a defendant qualifies for detention and no new information or change in circumstances is presented, it makes little sense to think that [the] court would reverse its prior ruling for no particular reason.’ ” Supra ¶ 44 (quoting Walton, 2024 IL App (4th) 240541, ¶ 29). ¶ 65 I think that Illinois law permits the circuit court to exercise its inherent power to reverse its prior ruling, even with no new evidence, if it determines that it erred by granting the State’s motion to detain the defendant before trial. See Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 33. ¶ 66 “In furtherance of the authority of the judiciary to carry out its constitutional obligations, the legislature is prohibited from enacting laws that unduly infringe