People v. Hammond
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket132067
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL 132067
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 132067)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
MELVIN HAMMOND, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 19, 2026.
JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Cunningham, O’Brien, and Tailor concurred
in the judgment and opinion.
Chief Justice Neville took no part in the case.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Melvin Hammond, appeals from the dismissal of his amended
petition at the second stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act
(Act). 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022). Defendant argues postconviction
counsel violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) by failing
to support defendant’s claims with evidence or to certify why supporting evidence
was not attached to the amended petition. Defendant concedes that counsel filed a
facially valid certificate of compliance under Rule 651(c), but he contends that
counsel’s failure to attach supporting evidence to the petition or to explain its
absence precluded the Cook County circuit court from presuming that counsel made
a reasonable, good-faith effort to locate evidence but failed. Defendant’s position
is that reasonable assistance may not be presumed from a Rule 651(c) certificate
where the record lacks any indication, one way or the other, about postconviction
counsel’s efforts to locate evidence that is missing but necessary for an adequate
presentation of the petitioner’s contentions. Defendant concludes the cause must be
remanded under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) for further
second-stage proceedings where counsel can amend the petition with evidence or
explain its unavailability. We disagree.
¶2 The appellate court correctly held that postconviction counsel’s certification
under Rule 651(c) created a rebuttable presumption that he rendered reasonable
assistance, including that counsel made a reasonable effort to obtain supporting
evidence and was unable to do so. 2025 IL App (1st) 230583-U, ¶¶ 97, 100 (citing
People v. Wallace, 2016 IL App (1st) 142758, ¶ 27). Furthermore, defendant failed
to rebut the presumption by pointing to affirmative evidence in the record to
establish that postconviction counsel did not seek out evidence necessary for an
adequate presentation of his contentions. Therefore, defendant failed to meet his
burden of proving that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable assistance
under Rule 651(c). We affirm the dismissal of his petition.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder for the beating death of
Diamond Shaw, the 13-month-old daughter of his girlfriend, Michele Tate, in
Burnham. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal, and he was ultimately
sentenced to 75 years’ imprisonment. Then defendant, over a 15-year period, filed
four pro se postconviction petitions, which consist of more than 100 pages of
handwritten factual allegations pertaining to claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel and appellate counsel. A summary of the trial evidence concerning
Diamond’s cause of death and the timing of her fatal injuries provides context for
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defendant’s postconviction claims and his assertion that postconviction counsel
provided unreasonable assistance in presenting them.
¶5 A. The Trial
¶6 In September 1995, defendant and Tate were jointly charged with the first
degree murder of Diamond. The defense’s theory was that, although there was some
evidence that defendant struck Diamond on the night of her death, defendant did
not intend to kill Diamond or to commit any act that created a strong probability of
death or great bodily harm. Defendant claimed Tate inflicted the fatal injuries and
that defendant was, at worst, guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
¶7 During jury selection, a venireperson informed the circuit court that she worked
as the manager of safety and security at a hospital and regularly employed off-duty
police officers. She knew Officer Richard Barber, who planned to testify, but she
affirmed that she could be fair and impartial. Trial counsel did not object or use a
peremptory challenge, and the venireperson served on the jury.
¶8 At trial, Burnham police chief J.D. Crull testified that, at about 9 a.m. on
September 20, 1995, he was dispatched to defendant’s apartment in response to a
baby who was not breathing. Diamond was transported to a hospital, where she died
less than a half-hour later. Officer Barber went to the hospital and photographed
Diamond’s injuries.
¶9 Chief Crull observed that Diamond had extensive bruises, with black and blue
marks from her waist to her knees and under her chest. She also had visible injuries
on her face and legs. Chief Crull noticed that Diamond’s vagina was swollen and
bloody.
¶ 10 At the police station, defendant told Officer Barber that he had been living with
Tate and Diamond in his apartment for about five months. Defendant was not
Diamond’s father. Defendant and Tate would occasionally discipline Diamond.
Defendant said that he would “whup” or “spank” Diamond and that Tate would hit
her with a belt. Defendant stated he would tie Diamond’s hands to the car seat where
she usually slept. Defendant was six feet, two inches tall and weighed 175 pounds.
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¶ 11 Defendant subsequently gave an assistant state’s attorney a more detailed
written statement, admitting that he struck Diamond hours before she died.
Defendant reported that, when Tate and Diamond moved in, they agreed that Tate
would be the one to “whup” Diamond by “hit[ting] Diamond on the legs, arms and
butt,” which they believed “was a good way to discipline the girl.” But after a month
and a half, they agreed they would both whup Diamond. Defendant admitted he
would whup Diamond about eight times a month by removing her diaper and
“hit[ting] her on the butt with [his] hands” for “about two or three minutes” as
discipline for crying, taking off her diaper, and jumping off the bed. About a month
later, Tate began using a belt to strike Diamond on the legs and bottom. The belt
left cuts that would reopen and bleed when defendant struck Diamond with his
hand.
¶ 12 According to his written statement, defendant arrived home about 1:30 a.m. on
the morning Diamond died. Diamond was sleeping in her car seat in the bedroom.
Defendant tried to sleep, but Diamond’s crying kept him awake, so he took her out
of the car seat, pulled off her diaper, and “whupped her.” He thought that, when he
returned Diamond to the car seat, she hit her head on the back of the seat. Defendant
went back to bed but could hear Diamond “talking and crying and mumbling.”
Defendant moved the car seat with Diamond to the living room and went back to
bed, but Diamond kept him awake.
¶ 13 Tate told defendant she was going to “whup” the baby, and Tate and defendant
went into the living room. When defendant took Diamond out of the car seat and
put her on the floor, she hit her head. He took off Diamond’s diaper and “whupped”
her again, then went back to bed and fell asleep. At some point overnight, defendant
tied Diamond’s wrists to the car seat so she would not scratch her face. When
defendant woke up at 8:15 a.m., he noticed something was wrong with Diamond,
and Tate called 911.
¶ 14 The prosecution presented evidence that Diamond died from blunt trauma. The
emergency room physician observed bruises and swelling on her forehead, scabs
and bruises on the back of her scalp, bruising and a deep abrasion on her left cheek,
and abrasions on her right cheek and ear. The doctor observed discoloration around
Diamond’s wrists that indicated they had been bound; substantial bruising to the
front of her pelvic area and lower abdomen; swelling and bruising on her left thigh;
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scabs and wounds on her buttocks and legs; and bruising, swelling, and a deep
abrasion to the external vaginal area and labia. The doctor testified that Diamond’s
injuries were consistent with being struck by a blunt instrument. The police
searched defendant’s apartment and found a white sock and a belt with blood
matching Diamond’s DNA, as well as shoestrings and a car seat cover with blood
matching DNA from both Diamond and defendant.
¶ 15 The State initially planned to call Dr. Young Kim, the forensic pathologist who
performed the autopsy, to testify to the cause of death. The parties represent that
Dr. Kim’s report—which does not appear in the record—stated his conclusion that
Diamond had sustained a skull fracture, among other injuries. To dispute Dr. Kim’s
skull-fracture finding, the defense considered presenting the expert testimony of
Kim L. Reilly, a Ph.D. candidate in forensic anthropology. Reilly would testify that
the lines on Diamond’s skull were not a fracture but normal suture lines commonly
found on all infants’ growing skulls.
¶ 16 Dr. Kim did not testify. Instead, the prosecutors presented the testimony of Dr.
Nancy Jones from the Cook County Medical Examiner’s Office. Dr. Jones opined
that the mark on Diamond’s skull was not a skull fracture. As the State’s expert did
not testify that Diamond suffered a skull fracture, defense counsel decided that
Reilly’s testimony on that point was unnecessary and did not call her.
¶ 17 Dr. Jones testified that Dr. Kim’s autopsy report showed multiple blunt trauma
injuries of varying ages and types that were distributed over “basically the entire
surface of [Diamond’s] body,” including her head. Diamond’s head exhibited two
recent bruises on the right side of her forehead and a laceration near her right ear.
¶ 18 Dr. Jones explained that, as Diamond’s brain swelled from the blunt trauma,
she lapsed into a coma and the compression of her brain stem eventually stopped
her breathing. The swelling also caused diastatic fractures, which differ from skull
fractures. Dr. Jones explained that the skulls of babies and children have sutures
where the bones grow together and Diamond’s swelling brain created intracranial
pressure that separated the sutures in her skull. Although Dr. Jones concluded that
Diamond had not suffered a skull fracture, she believed that Diamond’s injuries
were consistent with multiple blows to the head and inconsistent with an infant
banging her head against the back of a plastic car seat.
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¶ 19 Dr. Jones estimated that Diamond suffered her fatal injuries one to six hours
before her death because she suffered minimal “inflammatory reaction,” where
white blood cells appear in blood and tissue about six hours after an injury. Dr.
Jones explained, “Diamond didn’t survive long enough for her body to react” by
producing more white blood cells.
¶ 20 Defendant’s trial testimony differed from his oral and written statements.
Defendant accused Tate of abusing Diamond for several weeks before her death
and described Tate as an angry, neglectful mother. Defendant testified that, on the
day Diamond died, he arrived home at 3 a.m. When Diamond started fussing, he
only spanked her “on the butt a little bit” to “soothe and comfort” her. He placed
her back in the car seat and went back to bed, where he fell asleep. At some point,
he woke up to Tate returning from the bathroom; she said Diamond was still awake.
Tate woke defendant around 8 a.m. Defendant thought Diamond was awake
because her eyes were “kind of open,” but he told Tate to call 911 because
something seemed wrong. Defendant denied that he and Tate agreed that hitting
Diamond was a good way to discipline her, but he admitted he struck her a few
hours before she died and did not see Tate do so.
¶ 21 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder. The appellate court
affirmed his conviction but ordered a new sentencing hearing, where he received a
75-year prison term.
¶ 22 B. Postconviction Proceedings
¶ 23 Defendant filed four pro se postconviction petitions in 2007, 2010, 2013, and
2022 and was represented by a series of appointed attorneys. The petitions asserted
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel based on dozens of
alleged errors. The most recent pro se petition was advanced automatically to the
second stage because the circuit court failed to act on the petition within 90 days.
See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a), (b) (West 2022).
¶ 24 New postconviction counsel was appointed, and on June 2, 2022, counsel filed
the operative petition, which incorporated the four pro se petitions by reference and
distilled defendant’s allegations into 37 claims. Counsel did not attach supporting
materials, other than defendant’s notarized verification affidavits. However,
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counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate that affirmed he consulted with defendant
and examined the record. The certificate further states, “I have prepared an
amended petition for post-conviction relief, which, along with petitioner’s
previously filed pro se petitions for post-conviction relief, adequately set forth the
petitioner’s claims of deprivation of his constitutional rights.”
¶ 25 For purposes of this appeal, defendant argues postconviction counsel failed to
adequately present five claims from the amended petition. First, defendant claims
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to use Reilly or another expert to
challenge the State’s evidence of cause of death and the estimated time of the fatal
injuries and that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the issue on
appeal. Second, he claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and
interview Dr. Kim, who could have challenged Dr. Jones as to the cause of death
and the timing of the fatal injuries. Third, he claims trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a motion in limine to admit letters that Tate sent to defendant while
they were in pretrial custody, as well as Chief Crull’s police report. Fourth, he
claims trial counsel was ineffective for selecting the venireperson who admitted to
knowing Officer Barber. Fifth, he claims appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to argue on direct appeal that the trial court erred in not striking the juror.
¶ 26 The State moved to dismiss the amended petition, arguing that the claims were
unsupported by either the trial record or affidavit or that they were procedurally
barred. Postconviction counsel responded that he had filed an amended petition to
consolidate all of defendant’s claims into one document and to adopt any previous
claims defendant made in the four petitions. Counsel rested on the claims as
presented in the pro se and amended petitions, noting that defendant had cured any
forfeiture concerns by arguing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The
circuit court dismissed the petition.
¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that postconviction counsel’s
representation was inadequate because counsel failed to obtain and attach
affidavits, records, or other supporting evidence or to explain their unavailability.
Defendant also argued counsel did not shape his ineffectiveness claim into proper
legal form by arguing he was prejudiced by his attorneys’ performance at trial and
on appeal. The appellate court disagreed on both points. The court held that,
because counsel certified compliance with Rule 651(c), the court could reasonably
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presume that postconviction counsel made a good-faith effort to obtain evidence
supporting the claims but was unable to do so. 2025 IL App (1st) 230583-U, ¶ 100.
The court also held that, by incorporating the pro se petitions by reference,
postconviction counsel adequately alleged prejudice under Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The appellate court concluded that
postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance and affirmed the dismissal.
Defendant then filed a petition for leave to appeal, which we allowed pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 28 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 29 A. Standard of Review
¶ 30 Defendant appeals from the second-stage dismissal of his postconviction
petition, arguing that he is entitled to a remand for additional proceedings because
counsel provided unreasonable assistance under Rule 651(c). Specifically,
defendant contends counsel violated the rule by failing to support his claims with
evidence or to explain why evidence was not available. Defendant also claims
counsel failed to allege prejudice to shape his ineffective-assistance claims into
proper legal form. De novo review applies to a circuit court’s dismissal of a
postconviction petition at the second stage as well as to the interpretation of a
supreme court rule. People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 17.
¶ 31 B. Post-Conviction Hearing Act
¶ 32 Under the Act, any person imprisoned in the penitentiary may claim that “in the
proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial
of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of
Illinois or both.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2022). The Act provides a three-
stage mechanism for a defendant to pursue a collateral attack on the judgment by
advancing a postconviction claim. See People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 29.
¶ 33 At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review the petition and
shall dismiss it if it “is frivolous or is patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-
2.1(a)(2) (West 2022). The petition advances to the second stage if (1) the court
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fails to rule on the petition within 90 days, regardless of the petition’s merit, or
(2) the facts alleged in the petition state an arguable claim of constitutional
deprivation. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a), (b) (West 2022); People v. Urzua, 2023 IL
127789, ¶ 32. Because the circuit court did not rule on defendant’s most recent
pro se petition within 90 days, it advanced to the second stage, where counsel was
appointed. See 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2022); Urzua, 2023 IL 127789, ¶ 33.
¶ 34 At the second stage, the State may file a motion to dismiss or an answer to the
petition. Urzua, 2023 IL 127789, ¶ 34. When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the
circuit court must determine whether the petition and accompanying documents
make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. If the petition makes the
requisite showing, it is advanced to a third-stage evidentiary hearing; otherwise it
is dismissed. Id.
¶ 35 An evidentiary hearing will be held only where the petition’s allegations are
supported by “ ‘affidavits, records, or other evidence’ ” or where the petition
explains “ ‘why the same are not attached.’ ” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227,
239-40 (1993) (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, ¶ 122-2). The affidavits that
accompany a postconviction petition must identify with reasonable certainty the
sources, character, and availability of alleged evidence supporting the petitioner’s
allegations. Id. at 240. A petition that is not supported by affidavits or other
supporting documents is generally dismissed without an evidentiary hearing unless
the allegations stand uncontradicted and are clearly supported by the record. Id.
¶ 36 C. Reasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel
¶ 37 This appeal provides an opportunity to further delineate what constitutes
adequate representation in postconviction proceedings. There is no sixth
amendment right to counsel in proceedings under the Act (see U.S. Const., amend.
VI); rather, the right to counsel is “a matter of legislative grace.” Custer, 2019 IL
123339, ¶ 30. A petitioner is entitled to the level of assistance guaranteed by the
Act, which is “a standard that is significantly lower than the one mandated at trial
by our state and federal constitutions.” Id. A postconviction petitioner is entitled
merely to “reasonable assistance” due to the different roles counsel plays in
postconviction proceedings and at trial. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19.
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¶ 38 While a defendant is presumed innocent prior to trial, a postconviction
petitioner has already been stripped of the presumption of innocence. Id. Because
the petitioner, rather than the State, initiates the postconviction proceeding by
claiming that constitutional violations occurred at trial, counsel’s role is to “shape
their complaints into the proper legal form and to present those complaints to the
court” rather than to “protect postconviction petitioners from the prosecutorial
forces of the State.” Id.
¶ 39 To ensure that postconviction petitioners receive reasonable assistance, Rule
651(c) provides:
“The record filed in that court shall contain a showing, which may be made
by the certificate of petitioner’s attorney, that the attorney has consulted with
petitioner by phone, mail, electronic means or in person to ascertain his or her
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights, has examined the record of
the proceedings at the trial, and has made any amendments to the petitions filed
pro se that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s
contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017).
¶ 40 Compliance with Rule 651(c) is mandatory but may be shown by a certificate
filed by the petitioner’s attorney. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21. By filing a Rule
651(c) certificate, postconviction counsel creates a rebuttable presumption of
reasonable assistance. Id. The defendant bears the burden of overcoming that
presumption by showing that postconviction counsel did not substantially comply
with the rule. Id. The defendant may do so by, inter alia, demonstrating that
postconviction counsel did not make all necessary amendments to the pro se
petition. Id. Remand is required when postconviction counsel fails to comply with
Rule 651(c), regardless of whether the claims in the petition were meritorious. Id.
¶¶ 35, 44.
¶ 41 The parties agree that counsel owed a duty to amend defendant’s pro se
petitions to adequately present the claims and that counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate
created a rebuttable presumption that he provided reasonable assistance. However,
the parties dispute whether defendant rebutted the presumption of reasonable
assistance where counsel did not attach supporting evidence to the amended petition
and the record—including the certificate—does not indicate the extent to which
counsel made reasonable efforts to obtain and present necessary evidence.
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¶ 42 Defendant argues the record rebuts the presumption because (1) “[t]he petition
shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations or shall state why the same are not attached” (see 725 ILCS 5/122-2
(West 2022)) and (2) counsel must amend the pro se petition as necessary for an
adequate presentation of the petitioner’s contentions (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff.
July 1, 2017)). Defendant reasons that, because a petitioner must explain why
supporting evidence was not attached to the petition and postconviction counsel
must shape claims into their proper legal form, a record that lacks any indication,
one way or the other, about counsel’s efforts to locate missing evidence rebuts the
presumption of reasonable assistance. Defendant concludes the cause must be
remanded under Rule 615(b) for further second-stage proceedings so counsel can
amend the petition with necessary evidence or explain its unavailability. Ill. S. Ct.
R. 615(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) (the appellate court may remand a cause for a hearing).
¶ 43 The State responds that the Rule 651(c) certificate created a presumption that
counsel made a reasonable effort to make any necessary amendments to present
defendant’s claims—including undertaking a reasonable search for supporting
evidence—and defendant failed to rebut the presumption with anything from the
record to show that counsel’s assistance was unreasonable. We agree with the State
that counsel’s certification under Rule 651(c) supports the inference that counsel
undertook reasonable efforts to locate evidence necessary for an adequate
presentation of defendant’s contentions. We further agree that defendant failed to
cite anything in the record to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance.
¶ 44 The appellate court soundly relied on Wallace, 2016 IL App (1st) 142758,
which rejected defendant’s position. In Wallace, the defendant asserted
postconviction counsel failed to examine and attach certain mental health records,
and the State responded that counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate created a presumption
of reasonable assistance that defendant had failed to rebut. Id. ¶ 21. Counsel
certified that she had communicated with the defendant, examined the record of the
proceedings and other documents in the clerk’s file, examined the petition and its
attached documents, and concluded that amendment was not necessary. Id. ¶ 26.
As the certificate’s assertions were not contradicted by the record, the Appellate
Court, First District, determined there was a rebuttable presumption that
postconviction counsel acted reasonably and, to overcome this presumption, the
defendant had to demonstrate his attorney’s failure to substantially comply with the
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duties mandated by Rule 651(c). Id. (citing People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 52
(2007)). However, the defendant did not rebut the presumption because he pointed
to “no affirmative evidence in the record to establish that postconviction counsel
did not seek out and examine all available evidence relevant to his claim.” Id. ¶ 27.
¶ 45 The defendant asserted that, because counsel’s certificate did not say whether
she examined his mental health records, it should be presumed that she did not do
so. Id. The Wallace court rejected the assertion as “a reversal of the presumption
and corresponding burden in effect in this case. A court may reasonably presume
postconviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain evidence in support of
postconviction claims, but was unsuccessful.” Id. (citing Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at
241). Although the record indicated the mental health records existed, the defendant
failed to rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance because “nothing in the
record establishe[d] the substance of those medical records.” Id. “Without any
indication of whether those documents would have actually benefitted [the]
defendant’s claim that he was mentally unfit to plead guilty,” the Wallace court
would not assume that counsel was unreasonable in not attaching them to his
petition because the defendant bore the burden to overcome the presumption of
postconviction counsel’s reasonable performance. Id.
¶ 46 As in Wallace, postconviction counsel certified that he made all necessary
amendments to defendant’s amended petition, so the certificate supported the
presumption that counsel made a reasonable effort to obtain supporting evidence
but could not. Moreover, defendant has not rebutted the presumption. Even if
defendant had established the existence of the purportedly necessary evidence, he
has not pointed to anything in the record to suggest the evidence would have
benefited his claims. Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017) (record shall contain a
showing that the attorney “has made any amendments to the petitions filed pro se
that are necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions”).
Defendant does not cite anything in the record to indicate that (1) Reilly or another
expert would challenge the State’s evidence of cause of death and the estimated
time of the fatal injuries, (2) Dr. Kim would have disagreed with Dr. Jones that
Diamond suffered a blunt force trauma on the day she died, (3) the letters Tate
allegedly sent defendant or Chief Crull’s police report would undermine the
prosecution’s case, (4) the venireperson could not be fair and impartial, and (5) the
trial court erred in not striking the juror. Because the record does not indicate how
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the evidence cited by defendant would bolster his claims, the evidence was not
necessary for an adequate presentation of his contentions.
¶ 47 Wallace relied on Johnson, where this court also rejected defendant’s position.
In Johnson, postconviction counsel effectively admitted that he failed to comply
with Rule 651(c), where he “concede[d] that he made no effort to contact the
witnesses specifically identified in the pro se petition, or to amend the petition with
affidavits of such witnesses.” Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 243. However, the Johnson
court contrasted counsel’s concession with the “ordinary case,” where “a trial court
ruling upon a motion to dismiss a post-conviction petition which is not supported
by affidavits or other documents may reasonably presume that post-conviction
counsel made a concerted effort to obtain affidavits in support of the post-
conviction claims, but was unable to do so.” Id. at 241. This appeal is the type of
ordinary case that Johnson described, where the second-stage dismissal for lack of
evidence was proper because the record does not indicate that postconviction
counsel failed to make reasonable efforts to locate and present evidence necessary
for an adequate presentation of defendant’s contentions.
¶ 48 To the extent postconviction counsel does not attach evidence to a petition and
the record is silent on the reason for counsel’s decision, Rule 651(c) does not
require counsel to separately certify the steps taken to find and present evidence
that is necessary for an adequate presentation of a petitioner’s contentions. Unless
the record indicates that the evidence cited by the postconviction petitioner is
reasonably available to counsel and necessary for an adequate presentation of the
petitioner’s contentions, the absence of such evidence from the petition does not
rebut the presumption of reasonable assistance created by postconviction counsel’s
certification of compliance with Rule 651(c). To hold otherwise would reverse the
presumption and the corresponding burden that a petitioner bears in demonstrating
noncompliance with Rule 651(c).
¶ 49 Defendant asserts that reasonable efforts cannot be presumed from counsel’s
certification because the record will “very rarely, if ever” indicate why the
supporting evidence is unavailable. Defendant contends that, “[r]ather than relying
on any sort of off-record speculation of compliance, the test for Rule 651(c)
compliance has to be based on the record itself.” (Emphasis in original.) Defendant
misses the point of certification, as the other two components of Rule 651(c) (i.e.,
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the attorney has consulted with petitioner to ascertain claims of error and has
examined the record) also rely on so-called “off-record speculation of compliance,”
yet certification creates a rebuttable presumption that counsel fulfilled the
requirements. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 50.
¶ 50 A “certificate” is generally defined as “[a] written assurance, or official
representation, that some act has or has not been done, or some event occurred, or
some legal formality has been complied with.” Black’s Law Dictionary 225 (6th
ed. 1990). Therefore, when an attorney files a certificate under Rule 651(c), the
attorney is officially representing to the court that the duties listed in the certificate
have been fulfilled. Here, appointed counsel certified compliance with Rule 651(c),
assuring the court that he complied with each of the requirements of that rule,
including that the amended petition, along with defendant’s previously filed pro se
petitions for relief, adequately set forth defendant’s claims of deprivation of
constitutional rights. Although the certificate did not mention whether counsel
searched for or possessed supporting evidence, the circuit court could reasonably
infer from the certificate that counsel made any amendments and attached all
available evidence that was necessary for an adequate presentation of defendant’s
contentions. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 50; People v. Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 24 (when
counsel files a Rule 651(c) certificate, “[i]t is presumed from the lack of an
amendment that there were none to be made”). Defendant has not pointed to
anything in the record to overcome the presumption of reasonable assistance by
demonstrating his attorney’s failure to substantially comply with Rule 651(c). Thus,
defendant is not entitled to a remand for further second-stage proceedings.
¶ 51 Defendant cites People v. Jackson, 2021 IL App (1st) 190263, and People v.
Carson, 2024 IL App (1st) 221644, for the proposition that the presumption of
reasonable assistance created by a Rule 651(c) certificate is rebutted when counsel
fails to certify why supporting evidence was not attached to an amended petition.
In each case, postconviction counsel certified compliance with Rule 651(c), and the
petitions were dismissed at the second stage for lack of evidence. But in each case,
the appellate court improperly remanded the cause for further second-stage
proceedings without finding that counsel had rendered unreasonable assistance.
¶ 52 In Jackson, the pro se petition alleged trial counsel was ineffective for not
introducing the baggy clothing the defendant wore when he was arrested. On appeal
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from the second-stage dismissal, the defendant argued the record did not indicate
(1) whether there was an arrest photo of him wearing baggy clothes, (2) whether
the jail inventoried his clothing, (3) whether the clothing was in storage, or
(4) whether trial counsel had access to the clothing. Jackson, 2021 IL App (1st)
190263, ¶ 5. The defendant claimed that postconviction counsel rendered
unreasonable assistance because the record did not indicate whether she had
attempted to obtain the clothing, the jail inventory sheet, or arrest photos. Id.
¶ 53 The Appellate Court, First District, vacated the second-stage dismissal, holding
“we cannot find that postconviction counsel’s assistance was, in fact, unreasonable,
if we do not know whether she attempted to obtain these documents and clothes
and what facts she found. Defendant is correct that the record before us lacks any
indication, one way or the other, about her efforts.” Id. ¶ 44. Without
acknowledging the presumption of reasonable assistance created by counsel’s Rule
651(c) certificate or deciding whether counsel acted reasonably, the appellate court
invoked Rule 615(b) to remand the cause for further second-stage proceedings for
counsel to amend and support the petition. Id. ¶ 46.
¶ 54 The Jackson court cited Johnson for the principle that, once a defendant informs
postconviction counsel of specific witnesses who should have been called in his
defense, “counsel has an obligation to attempt to contact those witnesses.” Id. ¶ 44
(citing Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 247-48). Jackson’s reliance on Johnson was
misplaced. The Jackson court conflated counsel’s obligation to investigate with
Rule 651(c)’s certification requirements. While postconviction counsel must make
a reasonable, good-faith effort to seek out supporting evidence when directed by a
postconviction petitioner, that duty is separate from whether those efforts can be
presumed from the Rule 651(c) certificate.
¶ 55 Rather than acknowledge the rebuttable presumption of reasonable assistance,
the Jackson court effectively imposed a new certification requirement not found in
Rule 651(c). On remand, the appellate court ordered postconviction counsel to file
a new Rule 651(c) certificate and directed the circuit court and counsel to indicate
on the record what attempts counsel made to determine whether there was a photo
of defendant in the clothes he wore when arrested, whether his clothing was
inventoried by jail personnel, whether the clothing was in storage, and whether
postconviction counsel could determine whether trial counsel had access to the
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