People v. Johnson

2026 IL 130932 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (Docket No. 130932) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. GREGORY A. JOHNSON JR., Appellant. Opinion filed November 12, 2026. JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Rochford and O’Brien concurred in the judgment and opinion. Chief Justice Neville specially concurred, with opinion. Justice Overstreet specially concurred, with opinion. Justice Holder White dissented, with opinion. Justice Tailor took no part in the decision.  OPINION ¶1 After he was charged with first degree murder in the circuit court of Vermilion County, the defendant, Gregory A. Johnson Jr., was found unfit to stand trial because of his mental condition. Johnson subsequently received treatment, and following a hearing, the trial court found he had been restored to fitness. Johnson then pled guilty to the murder charge. ¶2 Johnson thereafter filed an amended motion to reconsider his guilty plea. His motion was denied by the trial court on the merits. Johnson appealed. On appeal, Johnson argued for the first time that the trial court erred when it found he had been restored to fitness. According to Johnson, his condition of unfitness had therefore never been lifted, and his subsequent guilty plea was involuntary and had to be set aside. ¶3 Reviewing Johnson’s claim under the plain-error standard, the appellate court held that the trial court committed plain error when it found Johnson had been restored to fitness prior to the entry of his guilty plea. 2024 IL App (5th) 220608- U, ¶ 21. The appellate court therefore vacated the trial court’s order finding Johnson restored to fitness and remanded the cause to the trial court for the limited purpose of conducting a retrospective fitness hearing to determine whether Johnson had, in fact, been restored to fitness before entering his guilty plea. Id. ¶ 22. The appellate court did not vacate the guilty plea. Instead, the court left the issue of the validity of the guilty plea to be resolved following the outcome of the retrospective fitness hearing. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 On October 20, 2017, the State charged Johnson in a three-count information with the first degree murder of Timothy Ellis (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2016)). A preliminary hearing was held on November 2, 2017. During that hearing, the trial court heard police testimony stating that Johnson had admitted stabbing Ellis to death because Johnson had “discovered that in his mind” Ellis had molested the 16-year-old daughter of a friend. After finding probable cause for the murder offense, the trial court began formal arraignment. Johnson interrupted the -2-  proceedings, telling his appointed attorney that he did not “want to say not guilty” because “saying you’re guilty is saying you’re guilty” and that he wanted to “plead innocent” and “plead insanity.” The trial court eventually had Johnson removed from the courtroom, and a plea of not guilty was entered on his behalf. ¶6 On December 21, 2017, Johnson’s attorney filed a motion pursuant to section 104-11(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/104- 11(b) (West 2016)), requesting that the trial court order a fitness examination of Johnson. In the motion, Johnson’s attorney asserted a bona fide doubt existed as to Johnson’s mental fitness to stand trial based on counsel’s personal observations of Johnson’s behavior as well as Johnson’s own stated “belief that he had mental health issues of an unknown nature.” The motion requested that the fitness examination be conducted by Dr. David Coleman and additionally asked that Dr. Coleman prepare a report regarding his findings pursuant to section 104-15 of the Code (id. § 104-15). On January 5, 2018, the trial court, Judge Nancy Fahey presiding, granted the motion in a written order. ¶7 A fitness hearing was held on March 29, 2018, pursuant to section 104-16 of the Code (id. § 104-16). During that hearing, the following colloquy took place: “THE COURT: Purpose of the hearing? MR. MARA [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: This is a hearing on fitness, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is there a report? MR. ALIKHAN [(ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: Yes, Your Honor. MR. MARA: Yes. MR. ALIKHAN: I can tender— -3-  THE COURT: Somebody needs to tell Dr. Coleman that he needs to get copies of these reports to the clerk to get in the court file, because they are not getting in there.[1] MR. MARA: I will certainly do that, Your Honor. I apologize. THE COURT: It’s not your fault, but this is the third one today. And are you stipulating to the contents of the report? MR. MARA: Your Honor, I am. There is one correction on the first page, Dr. Coleman indicates that [Johnson] was referred for a fitness evaluation in November of 2014. I believe that’s just a misprint. The referral happened in January of this year, but otherwise, I would be stipulating to the contents. THE COURT: Mr. Alikhan? MR. ALIKHAN: Judge, we’ll stipulate to the opinions made by Dr. Coleman in the report. THE COURT: And do we have an order? MR. MARA: I do and Ms. Lacy [(Vermilion County State’s Attorney)] reviewed it and signed it as well, Your Honor. THE COURT: Based on the stipulation of the parties and the contents of the report, the order on fitness will enter this date. I’m going to set this for a status on—I did the last one on May 29th. Is that too far out or is that okay? MR. MARA: That should be fine, your Honor.” ¶8 No copy of Dr. Coleman’s report is contained in the record on appeal. Nor is there any written order in the record regarding the trial court’s determination as to whether Johnson was fit to stand trial. Thus, the trial court’s statement regarding the entry of an order “on fitness” was unclear and ambiguous at best. However, the 1 Section 104-19 of the Code states that “[a]ny report filed of record with the court concerning diagnosis, treatment or treatment plans made pursuant to this Article [(the fitness statute)] shall not be placed in the defendant’s court record but shall be maintained separately by the clerk of the court.” 725 ILCS 5/104-19 (West 2016). It is not clear if the trial court was referring to this separate file. -4-  parties do not dispute that Johnson was found unfit by the trial court with the expectation that he would be restored to fitness after receiving treatment (see id. § 104-16(d)), and the record indicates that on May 18, 2018, Johnson was admitted to the Chester Mental Health Center (Center), a secure mental health hospital operated by the Department of Human Services. 2 ¶9 On May 21, 2018, the Center completed a 10-page “Treatment Plan” for Johnson (see id. § 104-17(e)) that was file-stamped as received by the clerk of the circuit court on June 4, 2018. This form document indicated that Dr. Coleman found Johnson unfit to stand trial and quoted Dr. Coleman’s fitness report as stating: “ ‘Mr. Johnson presented with an animated and irritable affect. He made constant rants about the Public Defender being in collusion with the State’s Attorney, and frequent allusions to his trial needing to be by God and Jesus. His verbal IQ appeared to be in the borderline to low-average range, but his insight, judgment, and impulse control appeared to be limited. He does not appear to presently meet criteria for fitness, but he should be able to be made fit within one year.’ ” ¶ 10 The May 21, 2018, treatment plan also stated that, upon admission to the Center, Johnson received a primary diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia and a secondary diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. The treatment plan noted that Johnson had a “significant history of sexual and physical abuse, homicidal and suicidal thoughts, [and] numerous psychiatric hospitalizations” and further noted that he was receiving the medications olanzapine (for “psychosis”) and lorazepam (for “anxiety”). The treatment plan outlined various goals for Johnson to meet and was signed by Dr. Nagaswararao Vallabhaneni, as treating psychiatrist, and Carri Morris, as coordinating therapist. ¶ 11 On June 27, 2018, the parties appeared in court for a status hearing on Johnson’s fitness. At that hearing, both defense counsel and the State indicated they had 2 Section 104-17(b) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/104-17(b) (West Supp. 2025)) now states: “No defendant may be ordered to inpatient restoration unless at least one licensed physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist who has examined the defendant testifies in person at the hearing. The defendant may waive the requirement of the testimony subject to the approval of the court.” No question is raised in this appeal as to whether this provision was satisfied in this case. -5-  received a treatment plan from the Center and that the Center indicated it would take approximately five months to restore Johnson to fitness. The trial court continued the case and set a new status date. ¶ 12 On August 2, 2018, the Center prepared a “90 Day Fitness Evaluation/Progress Report” pursuant to section 104-18(a)(1) of the Code (id. § 104-18(a)(1)). This two- page, form progress report was signed by Dr. Vallabhaneni and, along with a transmittal letter from the Center’s interim administrator, was file-stamped as received by the clerk of the circuit court on September 7, 2018. The progress report stated that Johnson had “no rational understanding of court proceedings and [was] not capable of assisting his public defender” and that he remained on the medications olanzapine and lorazepam. The report concluded that Johnson remained unfit to stand trial with a “substantial probability” that he could be restored to fitness within a year of the original finding of unfitness to stand trial. ¶ 13 On September 7, 2018, the same date the trial court received the progress report, the parties appeared in court for a status hearing. At that hearing, the parties stipulated to the contents of the progress report, and a new status date was set for December 7, 2018. ¶ 14 On October 22, 2018, a 14-page “Treatment Plan Review” was prepared by the Center. This form document stated that, because Johnson was no longer displaying signs of psychosis, his primary mental health diagnosis had been changed by Dr. Vallabhaneni on September 26, 2018, to “Adult Oppositional Defiant Disorder,” with a secondary diagnosis of “Anti-Social Personality Disorder with Paranoia.” The document also indicated that Johnson was still prescribed olanzapine (although now for “aggression”) and lorazepam (now for “agitation”) and stated that “Mr. Johnson will be advised to continue medications currently prescribed while in custody to maintain clinical stability.” ¶ 15 The October 22, 2018, treatment plan review contained conflicting statements regarding Johnson’s fitness. On two different pages the treatment plan review stated Johnson was found fit to stand trial on September 24, 2018. However, in a section of the document setting forth Johnson’s treatment plan for attaining fitness, one of Johnson’s social workers listed his fitness to stand trial as an “active” goal and listed the “target date” for his attaining fitness as December 30, 2018. In addition, and significantly, on the last page of the treatment plan review, in a section labeled -6-  “Fitness Statement,” the following sentence appears: “The treatment team currently believes that [Johnson] is Unfit to Stand Trial.” (Emphasis in original.) ¶ 16 The October 22, 2018, treatment plan review was unsigned. There is also no file stamp on the document and no entry in the trial court’s docket sheet indicating when or whether the document was ever filed in the trial court. ¶ 17 On October 30, 2018, the trial court, Judge Karen Wall presiding, entered an “Immediate Transport Order,” directing that Johnson be released from the Center and remanded to the Vermilion County jail. The transport order noted that the court had received a progress report from the Center, pursuant to section 104-18(a)(2) of the Code (id. § 104-18(a)(2)), indicating that Johnson was fit to stand trial. The progress report cited in the transport order was not appended to the transport order and does not appear in the appellate record. There is also no entry in the trial court’s docket sheet indicating the progress report was filed in the trial court. ¶ 18 On November 1, 2018, the Center prepared a “Notice of Change in Status” (see 405 ILCS 5/3-902(c) (West 2018)). This single-page form was completed by the facility director of the Center and was file-stamped as received by the clerk of the circuit court on November 5, 2018. The document stated that, on November 1, 2018, Johnson was discharged to the Vermilion County sheriff and “recommended as fit to stand trial.” ¶ 19 Also on November 1, 2018, the Center prepared a “Discharge Summary/Transition Record.” This was an 11-page form, signed by both a social worker and Johnson, that set forth Johnson’s care plan following his discharge from the Center. The document did not discuss Johnson’s fitness to stand trial. The document stated that Johnson retained a primary diagnosis of adult oppositional defiant disorder, with a secondary diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder with paranoia, and that he was not prescribed any medications. The document was not file-stamped, and there is no entry in the trial court’s docket sheet indicating when or whether it was filed in the trial court. ¶ 20 A restoration to fitness hearing was subsequently held on November 14, 2018, pursuant to section 104-20 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/104-20 (West 2018)), with Judge Fahey presiding. At that hearing, the following colloquy took place regarding Johnson’s fitness: -7-  “MR. MARA [(DEFENSE ATTORNEY)]: Your Honor, Mr. Johnson has been returned from [the Center]. There is a report that I know the State has received. I don’t know if the Court has received the— THE COURT: A discharge—notice of change in status filed November 5th. MR. MARA: I have— THE COURT: I got that. Let me see what else is in the file. MR. MARA: A report dated 10-25-18, a 90-day fitness evaluation progress report. I would be happy to let the Court— THE COURT: Hang on. Let me just double check. There’s not one in the Court file. MR. MARA: I believe at this point it’s the intention of both parties to stipulate that if the doctor who wrote the report were to testify, he would testify consistently with his report. THE COURT: Which is restoring him to fitness. MR. MARA: To fitness, yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Ms. Weber [(assistant state’s attorney)], are you in agreement? MS. WEBER: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. The Court will accept the stipulation of the parties as to the contents of the report that if the doctor were testifying, that is what he would testify to, and Mr. Johnson will be restored to fitness based on that.” (Emphasis added.) ¶ 21 At a March 11, 2019, hearing, at which Judge Fahey also presided, the parties announced they had reached a fully negotiated plea agreement, wherein Johnson would plead guilty to one count of first degree murder with the intent to kill for which he would serve a prison sentence of 45 years followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. In exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss the two remaining counts of first degree murder along with the charges in -8-  two unrelated cases. The State provided a factual basis. During admonishments, Johnson disclosed that he had not been taking any medications for his mental health condition since November 1, 2018, but answered in the affirmative when asked by the trial court if he was thinking clearly and was able to make important decisions about his case. Ultimately, the trial court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and sentenced him pursuant to the plea agreement. ¶ 22 After accepting the plea, the trial court then admonished Johnson of his appeal rights, informing him that, prior to taking an appeal, he would first need to file a written motion seeking to withdraw his plea and that any issue or claim of error not raised in that motion would not be considered by the appellate court. When asked by the trial court if he understood his appeal rights, Johnson replied, “Yes.” ¶ 23 Johnson thereafter filed a pro se “Petition to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Vacate Sentence.” In this motion, Johnson alleged that his guilty plea should be set aside because, at the time he pled guilty, he was a mental patient under great mental and emotional stress and he was not receiving his prescribed medications, he was not adequately represented by plea counsel, and he was threatened by the assistant state’s attorney that his sentence would increase if he did not accept the plea agreement. Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied by the trial court as untimely. Johnson appealed, and the appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for consideration of Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate the sentence on the merits. People v. Johnson, No. 4-19-0412 (2020) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)). ¶ 24 On remand, Johnson, now assisted by appointed counsel, filed an “Amended Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Vacate Judgement.” In this amended motion, Johnson alleged that he was denied his prescribed medications from November 1, 2018, to the date of his plea on March 11, 2019, and that, because of this, at the time of his plea he was not thinking clearly and was unable to truly understand what was happening. Johnson argued that the trial court erred “in proceeding with the plea on March 11, 2019, having been advised by [Johnson] of his mental illness and his not receiving medication dating back to November 1, 2018,” and that the performance of Johnson’s attorney “during the plea process on March 11, 2019 was inadequate and ineffective and was so deficient that the attorney’s performance -9-  prejudiced [Johnson] in that he continued with a plea without first determining whether [Johnson] was competent to do so.” Of note, the amended motion did not allege that the trial court erred in restoring Johnson to fitness on November 14, 2018. ¶ 25 Attached to Johnson’s amended motion to withdraw his plea was (1) part of the transcript for the March 11, 2019, plea hearing, (2) the progress report from the Center dated August 2, 2018, (3) the treatment plan review from the Center dated October 22, 2018, (4) the notice of change in status form dated November 1, 2018, (5) the discharge summary for Johnson dated November 1, 2018, and (6) an affidavit from Johnson. Defense counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017), indicating he had consulted with Johnson and had made any amendments to Johnson’s previous motion to withdraw his plea that were necessary to address any defects in the guilty plea proceedings. The State filed a response to Johnson’s amended motion to withdraw his plea and provided the trial court with a full transcript of Johnson’s plea hearing. ¶ 26 On August 3, 2022, Judge Fahey 3 held a hearing on Johnson’s amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied the motion. Johnson then filed a pro se notice of appeal that listed the appealed judgment as “Aug 3, 2022 on motion to withdraw guilty plea and vacate sentence.” ¶ 27 On appeal, Johnson argued for the first time that the trial court erred in finding him restored to fitness on November 14, 2018, before accepting his guilty plea. Johnson maintained that “the trial court erred in finding him restored to fitness where the trial court adopted the conclusions of [Johnson’s] treatment providers based on a stipulation by the parties to the contents of a report that the trial court never received.” 2024 IL App (5th) 220608-U, ¶ 14. Johnson also asserted that, even if he were properly restored to fitness, the trial court erred by not addressing his requests to represent himself during postplea proceedings. The State, in 3 While the cover page for the transcript of the hearing on this date lists Judge Charles C. Hall as the trial judge, the docket entry for the hearing states that Judge Fahey presided. Additionally, it was noted several times during the proceedings that the judge presiding over the hearing was the same judge who found defendant unfit, found defendant restored to fitness, and accepted Johnson’s guilty plea. - 10 -  response, maintained Johnson had not raised either issue in the trial court and, therefore, had failed to preserve both issues for appeal. ¶ 28 As to whether the trial court properly found that Johnson had been restored to fitness, the appellate court reviewed the matter under the plain-error doctrine, noting that Johnson had “failed to raise the issue in a posttrial motion.” Id. ¶ 16. The appellate court then stated: “In the instant matter, it is unclear whether the trial court ever saw the expert’s report concluding that the defendant had been restored to fitness. The record reveals that the expert’s report was not in the court’s file, and it is unclear whether the trial court was provided with a copy of that report at the hearing. Instead, it appears that the trial court merely relied on the stipulation of the parties that the defendant had been restored to fitness and, thus, failed to exercise its judicial discretion. Because the record does not demonstrate that the trial court ensured that the defendant was able to understand the nature of the proceedings or to assist in his own defense before determining he had been restored to fitness, we find that plain error has been established.” Id. ¶ 21. ¶ 29 Having determined that plain error occurred, the appellate court then concluded that the appropriate remedy was to vacate the trial court’s order finding Johnson restored to fitness and to remand the “cause with directions that the trial court conduct a retrospective fitness hearing to determine whether the defendant was restored to fitness prior to his guilty plea.” Id. ¶ 25. The appellate court further noted that, if the trial court could fairly and accurately determine that Johnson had been restored to fitness, then the appellate court retained jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(2) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) to consider the merits of Johnson’s second claim regarding his requests to represent himself. 2024 IL App (5th) 220608-U, ¶ 22. If, on the other hand, the trial court concluded that Johnson’s fitness could not be accurately determined, then Johnson was entitled to a new trial. Id. ¶ 23. ¶ 30 Johnson filed a petition for rehearing in the appellate court arguing primarily that, having vacated the trial court’s order finding him restored to fitness, the appellate court should not have remanded the cause to the trial court to conduct a retrospective fitness hearing but, instead, should simply have vacated his guilty plea. The appellate court denied Johnson’s petition for rehearing. - 11 - ¶ 31 Johnson thereafter filed a petition for leave to appeal in this court, which we allowed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff. Dec. 7, 2023). The State has also sought cross-relief. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 343(b)(1) (eff. July 1, 2008). ¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 33 In his appeal to this court, Johnson asserts the appellate court correctly vacated the trial court’s November 14, 2018, order finding him restored to fitness but incorrectly failed to vacate his guilty plea. Johnson maintains it is not possible to conduct a retrospective fitness hearing in this case and that the appellate court erred in ordering the trial court to do so. Johnson further argues that the appellate court’s vacatur of the trial court’s restoration order meant that he was returned to the status of being mentally unfit to stand trial prior to pleading guilty. Thus, according to Johnson, he was necessarily unable to knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty, and the appellate court’s failure to vacate his subsequent guilty plea violated his right to due process. ¶ 34 In response, the State first contends we need not reach Johnson’s due process claim. In its request for cross-relief, the State argues the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s restoration order and, therefore, should not have vacated that order or remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. Because determining whether the appellate court lacked jurisdiction is a threshold issue, we first address that question. See People v. Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d 32, 36-37 (2009). ¶ 35 A. Whether the Appellate Court Lacked Jurisdiction to Review the Trial Court’s November 14, 2018, Order Finding Johnson Restored to Fitness ¶ 36 The State argues that Johnson’s notice of appeal failed to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the trial court’s November 14, 2018, restoration order. The State notes that Johnson’s pro se notice of appeal listed the judgment being appealed as “Aug 3, 2022 on motion to withdraw guilty plea and vacate sentence” but did not mention the trial court’s order finding him restored to fitness. Because Johnson’s notice of appeal referenced only the trial court’s denial of his amended - 12 -  motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the State maintains the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider the correctness of the trial court’s restoration order. We disagree. ¶ 37 In criminal cases in Illinois, “ ‘[a] notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on an appellate court to consider only the judgments or parts of judgments specified in the notice.’ ” (Emphases omitted.) People v. Bingham, 2018 IL 122008, ¶ 16 (quoting Lewis, 234 Ill. 2d at 37). However, when a defendant files a timely notice of appeal from a final judgment, that notice brings up for review any prior nonfinal orders that merged into, or were steps in the “procedural progression” leading to, the final judgment. People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 138 (2003) (citing Burtell v. First Charter Service Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 434-35 (1979)). In other words, under this “merger rule,” a notice of appeal that designates a final judgment encompasses not only that judgment but also all prior interlocutory orders that produced the judgment. Id. 4 ¶ 38 Both the Code and this court’s rules provide that an order finding a criminal defendant unfit to stand trial is a final order for purposes of appeal. See 725 ILCS 5/104-16(e) (West 2022); Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(e) (eff. July 1, 2017). By contrast, no statute or rule allows for the immediate appeal of an order finding a criminal defendant restored to fitness. Such an order is a nonfinal, interlocutory order. See 725 ILCS 5/104-20(b) (West 2018) (stating that, if the trial court finds a defendant has been restored to fitness, “the court shall set the matter for trial”). ¶ 39 Further, because the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV) bars the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is mentally unfit to stand trial (People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 470 (2006)), it follows that an order finding a defendant restored to fitness is necessarily a step in the procedural progression leading to the judgment of conviction. See People v. Elsholtz, 136 Ill. App. 3d 209, 211 (1985) (noting that the criminal prosecution of a defendant is “totally dependent on” the defendant’s fitness). Thus, an order finding a defendant 4 Of note, Illinois is not alone in following the merger rule. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, for example, also recognize the rule. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4) (“The notice of appeal encompasses all orders that, for purposes of appeal, merge into the designated judgment or appealable order. It is not necessary to designate those orders in the notice of appeal.”). - 13 -  has been restored to fitness merges into a final judgment of conviction for purposes of appeal. See, e.g., People v. Finlaw, 2023 IL App (4th) 220797, ¶¶ 46-70 (reviewing a trial court’s finding that the defendant was restored to fitness in an appeal after a jury trial). ¶ 40 To be sure, the present case concerns an appeal following a guilty plea rather than an appeal following a trial. And, as the United States Supreme Court has put it, the general rule is that a guilty plea “represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the criminal process” (Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)), such that the defendant is precluded from challenging on appeal “case- related government conduct that takes place before the plea is entered” (Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174, 182 (2018)). However, this rule—the doctrine of waiver by guilty plea—is not a jurisdictional rule. See United States v. Riojas, 139 F.4th 465, 469-73 (5th Cir. 2025) (discussing the difference between jurisdiction and the doctrine of waiver by guilty plea); United States v. De Vaughn, 694 F.3d 1141, 1154-58 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d 947, 951-57 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶ 18, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 (“Like the general rule of waiver, the guilty-plea-waiver rule is a rule of administration and does not involve the court’s power to address the issues raised.”). But see United States v. Combs, 657 F.3d 565, 571 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding that a federal circuit court of appeals lacks jurisdiction over preplea claims because those claims are no longer part of a live “ ‘case or controversy’ ” within the meaning of article III of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2) (quoting Jacobo Castillo, 496 F.3d at 957 (Callahan, J., dissenting))). ¶ 41 In Illinois, the appellate court’s jurisdiction in an appeal following the entry of a guilty plea is determined solely by the notice of appeal and the application of the merger rule. People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 20 (“timely filing of a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step for initiating appellate review”). Whether the defendant in that appeal is barred from challenging a trial court order entered prior to the plea under the doctrine of waiver by guilty plea is a separate question. ¶ 42 In arguing that Johnson’s notice of appeal was inadequate to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the trial court’s restoration order, the State also relies on People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356. In Ratliff, the defendant entered an open guilty plea to a charge of robbery and was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Id. - 14 -  ¶ 6. He thereafter timely filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea or, in the alternative, to reconsider his sentence. Id. ¶ 7. However, before the trial court ruled on that motion, the defendant requested an attorney, and one was appointed. At a subsequent status hearing, defense counsel informed the trial court that the defendant no longer wanted the court to vacate his guilty plea. Instead, the defendant only wanted the trial court to reconsider his sentence. Counsel subsequently filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the sentence that was denied by the trial court. Id. ¶ 43 The same day the motion to reconsider the sentence was denied, the defendant filed a notice of appeal. Id. ¶ 8. Consistent with the proceedings in the trial court, the notice of appeal stated that the defendant was appealing only the trial court’s order denying his motion to reconsider sentence. Id. ¶ 44 More than six months later, the defendant filed in the appellate court an unopposed motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal. Id. In that motion, the defendant stated that the original notice of appeal had erroneously stated he was appealing only the trial court’s order denying his motion to reconsider sentence. According to the motion, the defendant was not, in fact, appealing just his sentence but instead was appealing “his conviction and all rulings related thereto.” Id. The appellate court allowed the motion to file an amended notice of appeal. Id. The appellate court then considered and rejected the defendant’s arguments that his guilty plea should be set aside and affirmed his conviction. Id. ¶¶ 9-11. ¶ 45 On appeal, this court concluded that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion to amend his notice of appeal because that motion was untimely. Id. ¶ 16. And, because the motion to amend was untimely, this meant that the “appellate court only had jurisdiction as conferred by the defendant’s original notice of appeal.” Id. Citing the rule that a notice of appeal must specify the order or judgment being appealed, this court then concluded that the original notice of appeal did not confer jurisdiction on the appellate court to review the judgment entered on the defendant’s guilty plea because the notice of appeal stated that the defendant was appealing only the trial court’s order denying his motion to reconsider his sentence. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. After reaching that conclusion, this court then invoked its supervisory authority and went on to reject the merits of the defendant’s challenge to his guilty plea. Id. ¶ 19. - 15 - ¶ 46 Before this court, the State contends that Ratliff controls the outcome of this case. The State reads Ratliff as limiting the appellate court’s jurisdiction solely to the judgment or order specified in the notice of appeal (in Ratliff the order denying the motion to reconsider sentence) and barring the appellate court from reviewing other judgments or orders (such as the judgment entered on the guilty plea in Ratliff) that might otherwise be reviewable under the merger rule. In other words, the State essentially reads Ratliff as having eliminated the merger rule. That, however, is too broad a reading of Ratliff. ¶ 47 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017) provides, in part: “No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to reconsider the sentence, if only the sentence is being challenged, or, if the plea is being challenged, a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and vacate the judgment.” The postplea motion required under Rule 604(d) is a condition precedent to maintaining an appeal. Thus, when a defendant fails to file a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, the appellate court cannot reach the merits of a challenge to the plea but, instead, must dismiss the appeal. People ex rel. Alvarez v. Skryd, 241 Ill. 2d 34, 40 (2011) (citing People v. Flowers, 208 Ill. 2d 291, 301 (2003)). ¶ 48 In Ratliff, the defendant initially filed a postplea motion asking to withdraw his guilty plea. However, the defendant, with the assistance of counsel, subsequently abandoned that motion, which was never ruled on by the trial court. The defendant’s knowing abandonment of the motion to withdraw his plea meant that the motion to reconsider his sentence was the only postplea motion before the trial court. That being the case, the merger rule could not have been applied to allow the appellate court to review the merits of the guilty plea. If the merger rule had been applied to the appellate court’s decision in Ratliff, that would have permitted the defendant to proceed in the appellate court with a challenge to his plea without first complying