People v. Finney
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket132703
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL 132703
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 132703)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
JOHN W. FINNEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed November 19, 2026.
JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Chief Justice Neville and Justices Overstreet, Holder White, Rochford,
O’Brien, and Tailor concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, John W. Finney, appeals from a detention order denying him
pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963
(725 ILCS 5/art. 110-1 (West 2024)), as amended by legislation commonly known
as the Pretrial Fairness Act (Pub. Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023)) . Before this court,
Finney challenges the appellate court’s affirmance of the trial court’s detention
order, arguing only that the appellate court applied the incorrect standard of review.
Since filing his opening brief, Finney has been convicted of the charges against him
and, accordingly, is no longer in pretrial custody pursuant to the trial court’s
detention order. For the following reasons, we find that this case is moot and no
mootness exception allows us to consider the appeal. We therefore dismiss this
appeal as moot and vacate the judgment of the appellate court.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 On September 2, 2025, Finney was charged with three counts of first degree
murder in the shooting death of his wife, Amy Finney. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West
2024). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release. On September 3,
2025, the Jefferson County circuit court conducted a hearing on the State’s petition,
in which it considered only proffered evidence. Following the hearing, the trial
court found that the State had met its burden for pretrial detention and granted the
State’s petition to deny pretrial release. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024).
¶4 On September 4, 2025, Finney filed a motion for relief and immediate pretrial
release pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). On
September 10, 2025, the trial court jointly heard Finney’s motion for relief and
conducted Finney’s preliminary hearing.
¶5 During the preliminary hearing portion of the joint hearing, Detective Justin
Titzer of the Jefferson County Sheriff’s Office testified to the details of Finney’s
offense, confession, and arrest. The trial court then found that the State had met its
burden of establishing probable cause that the felony of first degree murder had
been committed.
¶6 The trial court moved onto the motion for relief portion of the joint hearing,
stating: “for those of you who are present here, the Motion for Relief, basically, is
a Motion for The Court to Reconsider its decision to detain [Finney]. That’s what
that is. But they call it a Motion for Relief.” The parties then made their arguments
on Finney’s motion for relief, in which both the State and Finney referred to
Detective Titzer’s testimony from the preliminary hearing.
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¶7 Following arguments, the trial court stated: “And this is, in essence, a—a repeat
of the original hear—hearing on the [S]tate’s Petition to Deny Pretrial Release—
except that The Court has heard even more information, now from Detective Titzer,
concerning the case itself and the evidence itself.” In issuing its ruling, the trial
court confirmed that it considered the proffered evidence from the first hearing on
the State’s petition for pretrial detention, as well as the live testimonial evidence
from the preliminary hearing. The trial court denied Finney’s motion for relief
because it found that Finney posed a flight risk and was a danger to the public and
a possible danger to himself and to the person who reported the crime.
¶8 Finney appealed the trial court’s order denying pretrial release, entered on
September 3, 2025, and the trial court’s September 10, 2025, denial of his motion
for relief. On appeal, Finney argued that the trial court erred in deciding to detain
him and, in particular, that the court erred in finding that the State met its burden
of proving that Finney posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or
persons or the community and that the State met its burden of showing that Finney
was a flight risk. The appellate court noted that Finney waived the issues of whether
he was a flight risk and whether the proof was evident or presumption great that he
committed a qualifying offense and, therefore, only considered the issue of
Finney’s danger to a person or the community as a whole and whether any
conditions could mitigate the threat of danger. 2025 IL App (5th) 250741-U, ¶ 17.
¶9 Regarding the standard of review for its analysis, the appellate court stated:
“Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. Where
the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or
submission of documentary evidence, this court stands in the same position as
the trial court and may conduct its own independent review of the proffered
evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶ 54. However, where the trial court is asked to consider the testimony
of live witnesses, and make factual findings, such as the State’s burden of
presenting clear and convincing evidence that conditions of pretrial release
would not protect any person or the community, the defendant has a high
likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution, or the defendant failed to
comply with previously ordered conditions of pretrial release, our standard of
review is the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. *** In light of the live
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testimony of Detective Titzer, we review the evidence under the manifest
weight standard.
[Finney’s] memorandum asserts that no live testimony was taken in this
matter; however, that assertion is inaccurate. Detective Titzer provided live
testimony at the preliminary hearing, which was conducted concurrently with
the hearing on [Finney’s] motion for relief. Moreover, the trial court expressly
stated that it relied upon Detective Titzer’s testimony in determining that
[Finney’s] motion for relief should be denied.” Id. ¶¶ 19-20.
¶ 10 Noting that it had thoroughly reviewed the record on appeal, including the
initial detention hearing and the motion for relief hearing, the appellate court
concluded that the trial court’s decision to detain Finney was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Id. ¶¶ 21-22.
¶ 11 This court granted Finney’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Before this court, Finney contends the appellate court erred in affirming the trial
court’s detention order and, in support, maintains only that the appellate court
applied the incorrect standard of review to that order. However, after Finney
submitted his opening brief to this court, he was convicted of the charges against
him. Accordingly, he is no longer in pretrial custody, which was the basis for his
appeal of the trial court’s order.
¶ 14 “An appeal is moot if no controversy exists or if events have occurred which
foreclose the reviewing court from granting effectual relief to the complaining
party.” In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15. It is well established that reviewing
courts generally will not decide moot questions, render advisory opinions, or
consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how those issues
are decided. Bright v. Yenchko, 2026 IL 132015, ¶ 24; People v. Seymore, 2025 IL
131564, ¶ 32. Finney acknowledges that he can no longer receive relief no matter
how this court rules. Therefore, his appeal is moot as a matter of law. He
nevertheless asks this court to make an exception to the mootness doctrine. Finney
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specifically argues that we should address the underlying standard of review issue
under the public interest exception.
¶ 15 Whether a case falls within an established exception to the mootness doctrine
is determined on a case-by-case basis, and the party challenging a finding of
mootness bears the burden of proving that an exception to the finding applies.
Bright, 2026 IL 132015, ¶ 26. “The public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine permits review of an otherwise moot question when the magnitude or
immediacy of the interests involved warrants action by the court.” (Emphasis
added.) Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2016 IL
118129, ¶ 12. It has long been settled that the public interest in an issue must be
clearly established before an exception will be made to the general rule of
dismissing moot cases. People ex rel. Cairo Turf Club, Inc. v. Taylor, 2 Ill. 2d 160,
164 (1954). “Indeed, the public interest exception is invoked only on ‘rare
occasions’ when there is an extraordinary degree of public interest and concern.”
Commonwealth Edison Co., 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 13.
¶ 16 The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine is narrow and requires a
clear showing that (1) the question presented is of a substantial public nature, (2) an
authoritative determination of the question is desirable for the future guidance of
public officers, and (3) the question is likely to recur. Bright, 2026 IL 132015, ¶ 27;
Seymore, 2025 IL 131564, ¶ 33. All three criteria must be clearly established, or
the exception may not be invoked. Commonwealth Edison Co., 2016 IL 118129,
¶ 13.
¶ 17 This case fails to satisfy the first criterion of the public interest exception. To
satisfy the substantial public nature criterion, it must be clearly established that the
issue presented is of substantial breadth or has a significant effect on the public as
a whole, not simply on the parties. Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 393 (2007). In
other words, the public nature criterion cannot be met when the issue has a limited
application to a small group of people. In re Marriage of Eckersall, 2015 IL
117922, ¶ 15.
¶ 18 The underlying issue in this case—the proper standard of review when the
initial detention hearing involves only proffered evidence but a later motion for
relief hearing considers live testimony—is very narrow and applies only to a limited
class of people. Indeed, during oral argument before this court, when asked how
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often preliminary hearings are heard jointly with a motion for relief hearing,
defense counsel expressed uncertainty and named only four other cases in which
that fact pattern had occurred. Such a small number of decisions is an indication
that the issue presented is not the kind of broad public issue that is required for
review under the public interest exception. In re Rita P., 2014 IL 115798, ¶ 36.
¶ 19 Simply put, the degree of deference a reviewing court should give when
considering appeals from motions for relief where the trial court considered both
proffered evidence and subsequent live testimony in a detention order is not of
overarching public concern. That matter is not comparable to issues such as election
law or involuntary mental health treatment, both of which are inherently matters of
broad public concern. See Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners of Chicago,
2012 IL 111928; In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill. 2d 393, 402 (2002). We therefore
determine that this case does not present any questions of a public nature. Because
Finney cannot clearly establish that this matter encompasses a question of a
substantial public nature, it does not fall within the public interest exception to the
mootness doctrine.
¶ 20 In urging us to invoke the public interest exception, Finney points to a split
within the appellate court regarding the proper standard of review when the initial
detention hearing involves only proffered evidence but a later motion for relief
hearing considers new, live testimony. Specifically, the following two appellate
cases recently held that the standard of review is de novo: People v. Coleman, 2025
IL App (1st) 251472-U, and People v. Yarbrough, 2025 IL App (4th) 250915-U.
And the following three appellate cases, in addition to the appellate court decision
in this matter, recently held that the standard of review is manifest weight of the
evidence: People v. Nabors, 2025 IL App (5th) 250720-U, People v. Davis, 2025
IL App (5th) 250715-U, and People v. Ganaway, 2025 IL App (5th) 250706-U.
¶ 21 This split amongst appellate court decisions is certainly relevant to determining
whether the second criterion for the public interest exception has been satisfied,
which is a desire for an authoritative determination of the question for future
guidance. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 2016 IL 118129, ¶ 16 (“In deciding the
need for an authoritative determination, this court looks to whether the law is in
disarray or conflicting precedent exists.”). However, the fact that there is a split of
authority is insufficient on its own to warrant application of the public interest
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exception. It is well established that the additional criteria of the exception must
also be satisfied. Id. ¶ 13. And in this case, the additional criteria have not been met.
This court does not review cases merely to set precedent or guide future litigation;
to do so would virtually eliminate the notion of mootness. In re Alfred H.H., 233
Ill. 2d 345, 357 (2009) (citing Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill.
2d 1, 8 (1997)); see In re Adoption of Walgreen, 186 Ill. 2d 362, 365 (1999)
(“[W]hen an opinion on a question of law cannot affect the result as to the parties
or controversy in the case before it, a court should not resolve the question merely
for the sake of setting a precedent to govern potential future cases.”).
¶ 22 All three criteria of the public interest exception must be satisfied to invoke the
exception. See Felzak, 226 Ill. 2d at 393 (public interest exception requires a clear
showing of each criterion). In this case, the first criterion for the public interest
exception has not been established. Consequently, we find that Finney has failed to
make a clear showing of the necessary criteria to invoke the public interest
exception to the mootness doctrine. See Commonwealth Edison Co., 2016 IL
118129, ¶ 13 (“If any one of the criteria is not established, the [public interest]
exception may not be invoked.”).
¶ 23 Where an appeal is moot and no mootness exception applies, we vacate the
lower court’s judgment and dismiss the action. See Bright, 2026 IL 132015, ¶ 33
(citing In re Marriage of Donald B., 2014 IL 115463, ¶¶ 35, 38). The appellate
court’s judgment in this case is thus vacated, and the appeal is dismissed as moot.
We express no opinion on the merits of the appellate court judgment. 1
¶ 24 CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal as moot and vacate the
judgment of the appellate court. In entering this disposition, we express no opinion
on the merits of the parties’ other arguments.
1
After Finney submitted his opening brief and was convicted, he filed a motion in this
court to adjudicate the appeal pursuant to the public interest exception to the mootness
doctrine. We entered an order taking the motion with the case. That motion is now denied.
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¶ 26 Appeal dismissed.
¶ 27 Appellate court judgment vacated.
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