Full Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 260521-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is November 12, 2026 NO. 4-26-0521 Carla Bender not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT MARVIN KAYWOOD, ) Appeal from the Petitioner-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Warren County RYAN C. ARMSTRONG, ) No. 25OP58 Respondent-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) James Standard, ) Judge Presiding. PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s entry of a plenary stalking no contact order. ¶2 In September 2025, petitioner, Marvin Kaywood, filed a petition seeking a stalking no contact order against respondent, Ryan C. Armstrong, based on threats respondent made against petitioner. The trial court initially entered an emergency order in petitioner’s favor and later entered a plenary order. Respondent, appearing pro se, moved to vacate the order. The court denied the motion to vacate. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 A. The Emergency Order of Protection ¶5 In late September 2025, petitioner filed a petition seeking a stalking no contact order against respondent, alleging respondent threatened petitioner and his family. Petitioner alleged he had known respondent since high school and respondent had severe psychosis, delusions, and paranoia. The trial court entered an emergency stalking no contact order with a return date for hearing on a plenary order of October 20, 2025. ¶6 B. Respondent’s Evidence Documents and Related Filings ¶7 Respondent filed a letter addressed to “Court Representatives,” consisting of a rambling document alleging petitioner injured respondent when they were children and suggesting that a “mind control violator” was protecting petitioner. Respondent also filed motions seeking to disqualify multiple judges and other people who might be involved with the case and a request for a disability accommodation, consisting of a person to speak for him or a text-to-speech device. The record does not show respondent ever properly filed a notice of hearing or otherwise set the motions for hearing. ¶8 Respondent also filed a document consisting of over a thousand single-spaced pages of rambling accusations and conclusory allegations of fact. Respondent titled the document as his “Court Evidence/Complaint/Argument” (evidence document). In the evidence document, respondent detailed numerous injuries he suffered over the years by numerous people or entities and made numerous allegations of mind control causing him to behave in various ways. Included were allegations that petitioner harmed him as a child and that petitioner was one of respondent’s mind-control “violators.” Respondent also filed a notice stating the evidence document was his “testimony evidence” in the case. ¶9 We have reviewed respondent’s letter and evidence document and need not provide further details here, other than to note that the factual assertions and accusations in them are fanciful, bizarre, irrational, and incredible. We further note that we have found similar allegations in lawsuits filed by respondent against officials in Warren and Knox Counties fanciful, bizarre, -2- irrational, and incredible. See Armstrong v. Warren County Sheriff’s Office, 2026 IL App (4th) 260283-U, ¶ 31. In addition, respondent has made similar claims involving mind control that have been found “factually frivolous” on multiple occasions by the federal courts. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States Federal Government, No. 4:25-cv-04194-SLD-DJQ, 2025 WL 3229302, at *1 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 19, 2025). ¶ 10 C. Pretrial Proceedings ¶ 11 At the October 20, 2025, hearing, held before Judge Kenneth Hogan, the trial court told respondent the court did not have a text-to-speech device but was working on obtaining one. Respondent stated he could use Zoom chat to communicate, and the court stated it was working on getting a device. The matter was continued until December 18, 2025. ¶ 12 Respondent next filed a motion for separate appearances, alleging petitioner was a “violator,” and indicating his mind would go “blank” if petitioner was present when respondent appeared. He also filed motions seeking to disqualify another judge and requesting counsel. At a hearing on December 2, 2025, the trial court noted the motions were not properly noticed or served. The court told respondent he must appear at the December 18, 2025, hearing to decide the matters. Respondent said he would rather not attend, and the court told him a plenary order might be entered against him if he did not attend. ¶ 13 On December 18, 2025, another judge of the trial court granted a motion by respondent to substitute Judge Hogan as a matter of right, and the case was continued to January 16, 2026. Respondent then filed additional pleadings and refiled his evidence document. ¶ 14 On January 16, 2026, the parties appeared before Judge James Standard. Petitioner asked that a hearing for a plenary order be set. The trial court set the matter for trial on March 12, 2026. Respondent did not raise or address his previous motions, other than to note he -3- requested counsel. The court told him counsel could not be appointed in a civil action. Respondent also expressed concerns with being served with documents extending the order in the case, and the court explained why personal service was required. The court also denied a motion to consolidate the case with the one respondent had filed against Warren County officials. See Armstrong, 2026 IL App (4th) 260283-U. ¶ 15 The trial court stated the record had “been flooded with a bunch of documents and so on that should not have been filed with the clerk of court,” and it told respondent he could not file his evidence before trial. The court also noted that respondent’s filings contained matters unrelated to the petition before the court and respondent would be limited to presenting only relevant evidence. ¶ 16 Subsequently, respondent filed additional documents, alleging the trial court failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disabilities and violated due process. He also filed a “Notice of Non-Appearance, Declaration of Misconduct, and Request for Decision on the Merits” and a draft of an order dismissing the action with what appears to be a fabricated signature of Judge Standard. In the notice of nonappearance, respondent alleged the court had ignored his previous requests for separate appearances and stated he was not going to appear on March 12, 2026, as an act of self-defense to prevent further alleged victimization by petitioner. The record does not show respondent attempted to set hearings for the notices, motions, or other documents filed with the court. ¶ 17 D. The Plenary Order of Protection and Motion To Vacate ¶ 18 On March 12, 2026, the trial court conducted a hearing, at which respondent did not appear. Petitioner testified that respondent had sent e-mails to petitioner’s employer falsely stating petitioner was a criminal. Petitioner stated respondent had also sent social media -4- messages to family members threatening petitioner’s life. Petitioner testified that respondent believed petitioner had harmed him in high school and stolen ideas from him. Petitioner told the trial court that, in September 2025, respondent threatened him in person and provided details about the incident. Petitioner described the emotional distress respondent’s actions caused to him and his family. The court entered a plenary order of protection barring any contact by respondent with petitioner for two years. ¶ 19 Thereafter, respondent moved to vacate the plenary order, asserting due process violations, disregard of evidence, and organized misconduct based on the trial court’s failure to consider his evidence document when it entered the plenary order. He also alleged the court failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability. After a short hearing, the court denied the motion. ¶ 20 This appeal followed. ¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 22 On appeal, in a rambling and not entirely cogent pro se brief, respondent lists multiple contentions, which we construe as arguments that the trial court erred in various ways by (1) failing to investigate, consider, or give weight to his evidence document and the allegations in it, (2) failing to accommodate respondent’s disabilities, (3) failing to identify the presiding judge, (4) withholding timely processing of a notice of appeal, and (5) falsifying the report of proceedings. ¶ 23 A. The Lack of an Appellee’s Brief ¶ 24 We first note that petitioner did not file an appellee’s brief in this appeal. However, the record in this case is simple, and we are able to decide the issues on appeal without the aid of an appellee’s brief. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d -5- 128, 133 (1976). ¶ 25 B. The Trial Court’s Disregard of Respondent’s Evidence Document ¶ 26 Respondent presents multiple arguments that the trial court erred in denying his motion to vacate based on the court’s entry of the plenary order without giving consideration or weight to his evidence document. ¶ 27 1. The Applicable Law ¶ 28 “Under the Stalking No Contact Order Act ***, a victim of stalking may seek a civil remedy requiring the stalker to stay away from him or her.” Piester v. Escobar, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 11; 740 ILCS 21/5 (West 2024). “Stalking” means engaging in a course of conduct directed at a specific person and the stalker knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or suffer emotional distress. Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 11; 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2024). A “course of conduct” is two or more acts including but not limited to acts in which a respondent directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person and may include contact by electronic communications. 740 ILCS 21/10 (West 2024). “Contact” includes any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent or is in disregard of the victim’s expressed desire that the contact be avoided or discontinued, including being in the victim’s physical presence or sight, approaching or confronting the victim, or appearing at the victim’s workplace or residence.” Id. ¶ 29 To obtain a plenary stalking no contact order, the petitioner must prove stalking by a preponderance of the evidence. Piester, 2015 IL App (3d) 140457, ¶ 12. A stalking no contact order will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. A finding is -6- against the manifest weight of the evidence if it is clearly apparent the opposite conclusion should have been reached or the finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based upon the evidence presented. McNally v. Bredemann, 2015 IL App (1st) 134048, ¶ 12. ¶ 30 2. This Case ¶ 31 The trial court heard evidence that respondent engaged in a course of conduct directed at petitioner, which he knew or should have known would cause a reasonable person to fear for his safety, the safety of a third person, or suffer emotional distress. Accordingly, we conclude that the plenary order was supported by the evidence. ¶ 32 Respondent contends the trial court erred in various ways by failing to consider his evidence document. However, that document was never entered into evidence. Respondent had been warned he would need to wait until trial to present evidence and would be limited to relevant evidence. Because respondent failed to appear at the evidentiary hearing, the court properly disregarded the evidence document. ¶ 33 Further, the same document was at issue in lawsuits filed by respondent against officials in Warren and Knox Counties. Armstrong, 2026 IL App (4th) 260283-U, ¶ 31. There, we noted respondent made similar claims involving mind control that have been found “factually frivolous” on multiple occasions by the federal courts. Id. (citing Armstrong, No. 4:25-cv-04194- SLD-DJQ, 2025 WL 3229302). In the Warren and Knox County cases, we concluded the allegations were fanciful, bizarre, irrational, and incredible. Id. In the present case, we again conclude that the allegations are frivolous and it was entirely appropriate for the trial court to give no weight to them. Accordingly, the court’s entry of the plenary order was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 34 C. Reasonable Accommodations -7- ¶ 35 Respondent next makes various arguments that the trial court failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disabilities. However, the accommodations respondent sought, particularly in regard to his request for separate proceedings, were based on his fanciful and frivolous claims involving mind control. Beyond that, respondent did not raise the issue of obtaining a text-to-speech device or separate hearings when the court convened on January 16, 2026, to set the matter for trial. He also failed to notice his motions for a hearing. As a result, he forfeited the matters. See, e.g., Williams v. Bruscato, 2019 IL App (2d) 170779, ¶ 24 (“[A]n appellant who fails to raise an issue before the trial court forfeits the issue and may not raise it for the first time on appeal.”). Regardless, we also conclude that respondent’s arguments are frivolous because his requests for accommodation were based on fanciful, bizarre, irrational, and incredible allegations. ¶ 36 D. Remaining Issues ¶ 37 Respondent’s remaining issues were not raised in the trial court before he filed his appeal, and they are forfeited. Id. Forfeiture aside, we have reviewed the issues and find they are not well grounded in fact or law and are frivolous. ¶ 38 In respondent’s cases in Warren and Knox County, we cautioned him he may be subject to sanctions if he continues to file frivolous pleadings and appeals. Armstrong, 2026 IL App (4th) 260283-U, ¶ 76. That caution applies here, as well. ¶ 39 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 40 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. ¶ 41 Affirmed. -8-