People v. Henry

2026 IL App (1st) 261242‑U No. 1‑26‑1242B Order filed October 22, 2026 Fourth Division NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL HENRY, Defendant-Appellant Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. Honorable Steven Jay Rosenblum, Judge Presiding. No. 26 CR 4469 JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment. Justice Ocasio dissented. ORDER ¶1 Held: In a revocation hearing, the State does not have to prove that the crime was committed, only that the defendant was charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor. The State proved by clear and convincing evidence that no release conditions would prevent future criminal charges. ¶2 Defendant Michael Henry challenges the circuit court’s order revoking his pretrial release. While on pretrial release, a new charge of violation of an order of protection was filed against him. Henry asserts that filing lawsuits does not legally constitute “contact,” and that no evidence indicates Henry directly or indirectly communicated with the protected individuals. For the following reasons, we affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On March 24, 2026, Michael Henry was arrested and charged with threatening a public official, a Class 2 felony, and intimidation, a Class 3 felony. The State filed a petition for a pretrial detention hearing, which was held on March 27, 2026. The trial court denied the State’s petition and granted Henry pretrial release. Henry was served with a stalking no contact order protecting the mayor of Tinley Park, Michael Glotz, and his wife, Kristie Glotz. As conditions of release, Henry was required to stay 2,500 feet away from the protected individuals and was prohibited from contacting them “by any means.” He was further ordered to be on GPS monitoring with an exclusion zone around the victims’ home and work. ¶5 On April 30, 2026, the trial court imposed additional restrictions after it was brought to the court’s attention that Henry had filed motions and exhibits on his own with the clerk’s office, had emailed the State’s Attorney’s Office, and had reached out to police officers and media outlets about the case. Henry was ordered not to file any documents in the criminal case and not to prepare or send communications regarding Michael Glotz while the criminal matter remained pending. These directives were intended to prevent any indirect harassment or unwanted communication. ¶6 On May 14, 2026, Henry emailed to a third party a draft of a lawsuit naming several people, including the victims in this case. On May 18, 2026, Henry filed a 210-page lawsuit in Sangamon County against the victims. ¶7 On May 21, 2026, new Class A misdemeanor charges were filed by the Tinley Park Police Department regarding the violation of the court’s order and the order of protection. On May 29, -2- 2026, Henry was arrested while attempting to file additional paperwork in the original criminal case pending against him for threatening a public official and intimidation. ¶8 At the revocation hearing, the State argued that there was nothing to prevent Henry from committing new felony offenses or Class A misdemeanors given that he was already on pretrial release and was admonished multiple times to have no contact, and to not harass the victims. The State argued that he continues to break the no-contact orders, not just through the charged offenses, but by serving paperwork with the victims’ names on it, and using the court system to harass public officials. ¶9 Defense counsel responded that filing a lawsuit against the victims was not a violation of an order of protection. ¶ 10 The circuit court found that based on the record, “it is very clear there’s nothing that’s going to stop Mr. Henry from filing these lawsuits.” It noted that keeping him outside of the system and on electronic monitoring or GPS would not prevent him from harassing the victims. The court stated that there was clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably prevent Henry from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. ¶ 11 Henry filed a motion for relief, which was denied. He now appeals. ¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 13 Henry argues that the trial court improperly revoked pretrial release because the alleged violations do not constitute “contact” under the statutory definition of the stalking no contact order. The parties proceeded by proffer, so our review is de novo. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 36. -3- ¶ 14 Where a defendant was previously granted pretrial release for a felony or Class A misdemeanor, that release “may be revoked only if the defendant is charged with a felony or Class A misdemeanor that is alleged to have occurred during the defendant’s pretrial release” on the court’s own motion or the State’s verified petition. 725 ILCS 5/110‑6(a) (West 2024). ¶ 15 At the revocation hearing, the State, per statute, bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance or prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. Id.; Stewart v. Rosenblum, 2025 IL 131365, ¶ 29. The State, however, does not have to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the new offense that prompted the revocation proceedings. Section 110‑6(a) contains no counterpart to Section 110‑6.1(e)(1)’s “proof is evident or presumption great” requirement (see 725 ILCS 5/110‑6.1(e)(1) (West 2024); being charged with a qualifying offense alleged to have occurred during release is itself sufficient to support revocation. People v. Hammerand, 2024 IL App (2d) 240500, ¶ 19. ¶ 16 At the revocation hearing, the defendant must be represented by counsel and afforded an opportunity to be heard regarding the alleged violation and to present evidence in mitigation. 725 ILCS 5/110‑6(a) (West 2024). The court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the nature and seriousness of the alleged violation or criminal act. Id. ¶ 17 Here, Henry was initially granted pretrial release. While on pretrial release, Henry was charged with Class A misdemeanors for violating the circuit court’s order and the order of protection. Accordingly, the State was permitted to seek revocation of Henry’s pretrial release under section 110‑6(a). See 725 ILCS 5/110‑6(a) (West 2024). While Henry contends that the filing of lawsuits does not violate the order of protection, and therefore he should not have been charged -4- with new Class A misdemeanors, that is an argument that can be made in the circuit court where the charges are pending. If Henry were to be acquitted of the new charges that form the basis of the revocation, he would be eligible for pretrial release. ¶ 18 We now turn to whether the revocation of pretrial release was proper. Revocation is proper if the State can prove by clear and convincing evidence “that no condition or combination of conditions of release would reasonably ensure the appearance of the defendant for later hearings or prevent the defendant from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor.” Id. ¶ 19 The circuit court reasonably concluded that no condition or combination of conditions would prevent Henry from being charged with a subsequent felony or Class A misdemeanor. On March 27, 2026, the court entered an order stating that Henry was to have no contact by any means with the protected parties. He then filed his own motions and exhibits in the case, and began contacting the State’s Attorney’s Office, police officers, and the media. On April 30, 2026, the court entered a subsequent order directing that Henry “shall not send or prepare out any communications regarding Mr. Glotz, to any person or agency during the pendency of this case. Mr. Henry shall not respond to any communication concerning the complaining witness, Michael Glotz.” ¶ 20 On May 14, 2026, Henry emailed a drafted lawsuit against the victims to a third party. He then filed a 201-page lawsuit against the victims in Sangamon County. On May 29, 2026, Henry was arrested while attempting to file additional paperwork in the criminal case pending against him for threatening a public official and intimidation. ¶ 21 These facts demonstrate Henry’s disregard of court-imposed conditions, and his likelihood of being charged with subsequent felonies or Class A misdemeanors. See People v. Taber, 2025 IL -5- App (2d) 240562, ¶ 15 (the defendant was charged with two new felonies and Class A misdemeanors after being placed on pretrial release after his repeated harassment of Geneva city employees, warranting revocation of pretrial release because the continued disregard for court- imposed conditions showed that no release conditions would stop him from being charged with subsequent felonies or Class A misdemeanors). Henry has demonstrated that he is unwilling or unable to comply with court orders. Henry ignored three separate orders of the circuit court by continuing to harass the victims through electronic means. It is apparent that GPS monitoring and no-contact orders have not and will not stop Henry from continuing to harass the victims. As such, the decision to revoke Henry’s pretrial release was not made in error. ¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION ¶ 23 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 24 Affirmed. ¶ 25 JUSTICE OCASIO, dissenting: ¶ 26 I respectfully disagree with the majority. ¶ 27 My argument is two-fold: First, a person cannot be expected to comply with a condition of release if they cannot understand the obligations imposed on them. Second, the act of filing a civil complaint does not constitute contact with a protected party. ¶ 28 The Pretrial Fairness Act is clear that pretrial release may be revoked only if the State proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of release would prevent the defendant from committing a felony or Class A misdemeanor while on release. I am having a very hard time connecting Henry’s obnoxious behavior to a likelihood that he will commit crimes on pretrial release. -6- ¶ 29 The majority argue that the court ordered Henry to have no contact, by any means, with the protected parties. The difficulty with that argument, however, is that a court order must clearly and precisely identify what a party must do or stop doing. A person cannot reasonably be expected to comply with an order if its meaning is unclear, and a court cannot fairly enforce an obligation that is open to competing interpretations. ¶ 30 Here, the circuit court’s order was ambiguous. Because the order did not state with sufficient clarity what conduct was prohibited, the parties could interpret its scope differently. That ambiguity undermines the order’s enforceability and can lead to disputes about whether a violation occurred. It also creates a problem for any revocation proceeding, because an obligation must be unmistakably stated before a party can be sanctioned for failing to comply. ¶ 31 The condition preventing Henry from “filing nothing in this case” applied reasonably to the current criminal proceeding, not to filing a separate civil lawsuit. Court orders, like written instruments, are enforced according to their plain terms and only an ambiguous one is read against the broader record. In re Marriage of Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 41, 57 (1999). Here, the trial court’s admonition that Henry cease filing materials was directed at his repeated motions and subpoenas in the criminal matter while represented by an attorney. The subsequent written condition likewise arose from concerns specific to those filings. The order did not explicitly prohibit Henry from filing a civil lawsuit, and the release condition does not apply to conduct outside its specific terms. ¶ 32 The governing limitation, in my view, is that prohibited “contact” must be directed to the protected person, not merely about them. In People v. Webster, 2026 IL App (2d) 250185, the court construed the Stalking No-Contact Order Act’s definition of “contact” and distinguished conduct addressed to the protected party, which may constitute contact, from conduct merely about the -7- person, which generally does not. A civil complaint is directed to the court rather than to the protected individual, which weighs against treating it as prohibited contact. ¶ 33 The only offense the State has charged since release began is a violation of a stalking no- contact order based solely on the act of filing a lawsuit involving the protected parties. Although I am not convinced that filing the lawsuit constituted a crime, bond revocation typically occurs when a defendant violates a condition of release, such as a no-contact order. Filing a lawsuit alone generally does not justify revocation unless it involves unlawful contact with the protected party. As an aside, nothing in the order of protection prohibited Henry from filing civil lawsuits. It was not at all obvious that filing a lawsuit would be deemed by the State to be a violation of the court’s order. Court orders must be clear and definite so that the parties involved understand exactly what is required of them. See People v. Wilcox, 5 Ill. 2d 222, 228 (1955). ¶ 34 Henry complied with the court’s directives and appeared to have deliberately avoided contacting the protected parties. The court could impose broader release conditions, including an explicit ban on civil filings, to help prevent violations and future criminal conduct. ¶ 35 For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the revocation and remand the matter for further proceedings concerning any additional conditions. -8-