People v. Doolin

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250232 Decision filed 09/17/26. The text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0232 changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-20 ) HOWARD DOOLIN, ) Honorable ) Robert B. Haida, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Bollinger concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice McHaney concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant, Howard Doolin, was convicted of first degree murder for the deaths of James Shafer (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)) and Curtisha Warner and Marcelene Braggs (id. § 9-1(a)(3)); armed robbery of Roneka Fair (id. § 18-2(a)(4)); and aggravated battery with a firearm against both Fair and Warner (id. § 12-3.05(e)(1)). At sentencing, the trial court merged the aggravated-battery conviction involving Fair into the armed- robbery conviction and merged the aggravated-battery conviction involving Warner into both felony-murder convictions. The trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of natural life imprisonment for the murder convictions, consecutive to a 43-year term of imprisonment for armed robbery, followed by 3 years of mandatory supervised release. Defendant 1 raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the aggravated battery with a firearm lacked an independent felonious purpose sufficient to support his felony-murder convictions, (2) whether he was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) during voir dire in a closely balanced case, and (3) whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by permitting inadmissible and prejudicial evidence to be presented to the jury. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 A. The Investigation ¶4 The record demonstrated that Officers Sharp and Boyd were on duty together in the early hours of December 23, 2019. A little before 4 a.m., they received a report of a vehicle accident at 18th Street and St. Clair Avenue in East St. Louis, Illinois. When they arrived, they saw a burning SUV crashed against a telephone pole. There were two women at the scene, one hanging out of the car and one lying right next to the car. While removing the women from the vehicle, the officers discovered that the driver, Curtisha Warner, had sustained gunshot wounds. The passenger was identified as Marcelene Braggs. About five minutes later, they heard gunshots coming from the direction of 25th Street and State Street. Officers Sharp and Boyd proceeded to 25th Street and State Street, where Fair was lying in the eastbound lanes of State Street. Fair told Officer Sharp that she had been shot, and he observed a gunshot wound to her stomach. Fair kept saying, “Why did they shoot me? I gave them—I gave my money.” ¶5 Within five minutes of arriving at 25th Street and State Street, the officers heard gunshots coming from the area of 25th Street and Louisiana Boulevard. Officer Boyd headed to the area and saw a White man, later identified as Shafer, on the ground in a pool of blood at a Citgo gas station. The man appeared to have been shot. A gas station security guard gave a description of a Black 2 man wearing a lime green hat running from the alley beside the gas station toward a vehicle that traveled west on Louisiana Boulevard and then north on 25th Street. Fair survived her injuries, but Shafer did not. ¶6 A 911 call, later published to the jury, was placed at approximately 3:53 a.m. During the call, the caller reported that her niece had been shot in the leg and that they were being chased. Approximately one minute into the call, the sound of a collision could be heard. Raven Williams testified that, while driving to work that morning, she came upon a gray-blue SUV that had crashed into a utility pole and was beginning to catch fire. She and another motorist removed two women from the vehicle before it became engulfed in flames. ¶7 Illinois State Police sergeant Travis Irwin was assigned to investigate the incident at 18th Street and St. Clair Avenue. When he arrived a little after 5 a.m., he saw a silver Dodge Durango had struck a pole. Through the course of his investigation, Sergeant Irwin obtained information that the shooting of Warner and Braggs had occurred near a shuttered bar on the corner of 11th Street and Lake Avenue. Sergeant Irwin went to that location on December 27 and found a red blood-like substance on the roadway, later determined to be blood from Warner, and three spent 9-millimeter shell casings. A person who lived in a residence on the corner advised that he heard gunshots on December 23 but did not report it. Sergeant Irwin obtained surveillance video from two locations along 15th Street, which showed a silver Dodge Durango pass by at approximately 3:53 a.m., followed 11 seconds later by a silver car. The surveillance videos were later published to the jury. ¶8 Warner had three gunshot wounds to the left and right thighs, but they did not cause her death. Rather, Warner died from blunt trauma to her abdomen resulting from the car crash. 3 Braggs’s death was determined to have occurred as a result of thoracoabdominal blunt trauma consistent with an automobile accident. ¶9 Police obtained surveillance videos of the shooting at 25th Street and State Street, which depicted Fair walking down the street toward the intersection, then turning toward a vehicle parked there. The subjects in the video are difficult to make out. After a short time, a vehicle left the intersection, and Fair appears not to be moving as much as before. ¶ 10 Paramedic Heather Kloeppel responded to the scene of the shooting at 25th Street and State Street just after 4 a.m. on December 23, 2019. Fair, who had been shot in the abdomen, was on the ground in the eastbound lane near the curb, complaining of pain. A single 9-millimeter shell casing was recovered from the scene. Fair survived her injuries but later died in an unrelated homicide, rendering her unavailable for trial. ¶ 11 Police also obtained surveillance video from the Citgo gas station, which showed Shafer arriving at the gas station in a black Mercedes at approximately 3:54 a.m., then hanging out at the gas station for about 25 minutes. Portions of the surveillance footage were later published to the jury. In the videos, Shafer can be seen standing near the gas pumps and talking to two other men. At one point, Shafer walks out of the camera view, toward the back side of the gas station. A dark blue medium-sized SUV can be seen in the parking lot. Later, the blue SUV starts pulling out of the gas station, and people in the area of the gas pumps react as if they hear a noise. Shafer walks back into view and stumbles to the ground. A vehicle turns from the direction of the shooting onto 25th Street and follows the blue SUV. ¶ 12 Illinois State Police investigator Michael Hentze responded to the scene of the shooting at 25th Street and Louisiana Boulevard in the early morning hours of December 23, 2019. Hentze prepared a crime-scene sketch depicting seven discharged cartridge casings found along the side 4 of the convenience store, a cell phone, three areas of a blood-like substance, and a towel. Hentze collected the cartridge cases and submitted them to the lab for testing. ¶ 13 Andre Williams, a deputy with the St. Clair County Sheriff’s Department, assisted in the investigation of the Shafer shooting and found a silver Nissan Sentra automobile associated with the offense about six blocks away from the gas station. Inside the car was a spent shell casing sitting on the driver’s seat. The Nissan was towed and processed. No fingerprints were found inside or outside the car. Shafer died from gunshot wounds to his legs that damaged major arteries. ¶ 14 Timothy Johnson was a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, specializing in firearms identification. Johnson received the seven fired cartridge cases obtained from 25th Street and Louisiana Boulevard, the one fired cartridge case located in the Nissan, the three fired cartridge cases obtained from 11th Street and Lake Avenue, and the one fired cartridge case obtained from 25th Street and State Street. After comparing the microscopic patterns of the cartridge cases, Johnson opined that they were all fired from the same unknown firearm. ¶ 15 Shortly after the shootings, police located the Nissan abandoned several blocks from the Shafer shooting. Investigators determined that the vehicle had been rented by Jolanda Davis (Jolanda), who was dating defendant. After Jolanda provided investigators with inconsistent accounts of the events, they interviewed her son, Damorion Davis (Damorion). Based upon information developed during the investigation, police ultimately identified defendant as the suspect in the shootings. ¶ 16 The State charged defendant with eight counts: (1) first degree murder of Shafer, (2) being an armed habitual criminal, (3) armed robbery of Fair, (4) aggravated battery with a firearm of Fair, (5) aggravated battery with a firearm of Warner, (6) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, 5 (7) first degree felony murder of Warner, and (8) first degree felony murder of Braggs. 1 Counts VII and VIII charged felony murder, alleging that the predicate forcible felony was the aggravated battery with a firearm committed against Warner. ¶ 17 B. Fitness Proceeding ¶ 18 During trial preparations, defense counsel raised the issue of defendant’s fitness for trial based upon his review of records from the Social Security Administration, which indicated that defendant had vision impairments as well as mental and psychological disabilities. On May 26, 2022, the trial court found that defense counsel had raised a bona fide doubt as to defendant’s fitness and entered an order appointing Dr. Daniel J. Cuneo, a clinical psychologist, to evaluate defendant’s fitness to stand trial. On August 16, 2022, Dr. Cuneo issued his report, concluding that, despite defendant’s impairments and limitations, he was fit to stand trial. ¶ 19 On August 19, 2022, the trial court addressed Dr. Cuneo’s report, stating: “THE COURT: All right. Based upon counsel’s stipulation as to Dan Cuneo’s qualifications and also to his findings that [defendant] is fit to stand trial, and also [defendant’s] stipulation that—to the findings of Dan Cuneo, I will find that [defendant] is fit to stand trial, and we will schedule the matter for a jury trial the week of November 14th, that’s a Monday commencing at 8:30 in the morning.” ¶ 20 C. Pretrial Rulings ¶ 21 Before trial, the State moved to use three of defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes: (1) a 2015 Missouri conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, (2) a 2014 Illinois conviction for possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver, and (3) a 2012 Missouri 1 Before trial, the trial court severed the armed habitual criminal and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon counts to be tried separately. The State ultimately nol-prossed those charges. 6 conviction for second degree robbery. Over defense objection, the court ruled that the robbery and controlled-substances offenses were admissible but excluded the 2015 firearm conviction. ¶ 22 D. Voir Dire ¶ 23 At the start of voir dire, the trial court advised the potential jurors in groups about the principles outlined in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). As to each of the four principles, the trial court first asked each group if there was anyone “that does not understand the concept.” Then, as to each principle, the trial court asked: “can you apply that principle *** as it relates to the charges?” At no point did the court ask the prospective jurors if they accepted any of the four Rule 431(b) principles. ¶ 24 E. Jury Trial ¶ 25 1. Master Sergeant Jarran Riley’s Testimony ¶ 26 Master Sergeant Jarran Riley testified that he served as the lead investigator assigned to investigate the multiple shootings that occurred in East St. Louis on December 23, 2019. During the investigation, Sergeant Riley learned that the Nissan found near 25th Street and Louisiana Boulevard was leased to Jolanda. When Sergeant Riley interviewed Jolanda, she initially reported that her vehicle had been stolen and identified another individual as a possible suspect. After investigating that individual, Sergeant Riley determined he was not involved. Sergeant Riley further testified that Jolanda provided investigators with different accounts of the events during multiple interviews. ¶ 27 Following his interviews with Jolanda, Sergeant Riley interviewed her son, Damorion, who provided investigators with information concerning the shootings. The State then questioned Sergeant Riley concerning his interview with Damorion as follows: 7  “Q. And after speaking with him and meeting with him, did he—did you have any reason to feel that he was the one behind all this? A. No, I did not. Q. And why is that? A. So, based on my training and experience, it’s been approximately thirteen years of doing this job, and then prior to this, I was also an investigator in a different entity with the Offices of the Inspector General, part of my ability to interview people is to elicit true answers in addition to evaluate deceptive behavior and non-deceptive behavior. And while in interviewing him and talking to him, I—I listened to his story, I had him repeat his story, and then I also observed his behavior and mannerisms throughout the time he was telling the story, and there was nothing based off of my experience or my gut that gave any inclination that he was being deceptive with the story that he provided.” Defense counsel did not object to this testimony. On cross-examination, Sergeant Riley testified that Damorion had never been a suspect in the investigation. Sergeant Riley explained that he interviewed Damorion because he continued to follow and explore all leads in the case and because Damorion lived at the residence. ¶ 28 After interviewing Damorion, Sergeant Riley identified defendant as a suspect. Sergeant Riley testified that investigators obtained surveillance footage, interviewed additional witnesses, and reviewed cellular telephone records during the course of the investigation. Surveillance footage showed a silver vehicle leaving the Citgo station immediately after the Shafer shooting, consistent with the observations of the security guard. Cellular telephone records reflected communications between Jolanda and Damorion during the relevant time period. Although investigators never recovered the firearm used in the shootings, Sergeant Riley testified that 8 Jolanda later admitted disposing of it. Damorion later testified for the State and identified defendant as the shooter in each of the offenses. ¶ 29 On cross-examination, Sergeant Riley acknowledged that Jolanda provided investigators with multiple inconsistent accounts before eventually implicating defendant. He further acknowledged that investigators recovered no forensic evidence directly linking defendant to the shootings. Instead, the investigation relied largely upon the statements of Damorion and Jolanda, together with surveillance footage, cellular telephone records, and other evidence obtained during the investigation. ¶ 30 2. Jolanda’s Testimony ¶ 31 Jolanda testified that defendant was living with her in December 2019. After he returned home for winter break, Damorion’s black Camry was stolen. Jolanda rented the Nissan for him, and she continued driving her blue Ford Edge. She testified that both defendant and her son, Damorion, had access to the Nissan. After an argument between Jolanda and defendant, Damorion accompanied defendant as they left in the Nissan. Approximately 20 minutes later, Jolanda received a call directing her to meet them in East St. Louis. ¶ 32 When she got there, she saw defendant and Damorion sitting in the Nissan at a Citgo gas station. Jolanda parked near the gas pumps and sat in the car for a few minutes. Then, she said, she saw defendant get out of the driver’s side of the car, holding a black gun. He walked into an area that she could not see, then she heard three to four gunshots. Jolanda saw defendant run back to the passenger side of the Nissan, with the gun in his hand. She pulled out of the gas station, and the Nissan followed behind her. She did not know where to go, but she got a call from defendant on Damorion’s phone, and he told her where to go. Jolanda parked at a house, and then Damorion 9 and defendant parked the Nissan and got into her car. Jolanda drove them home, and as they drove, defendant was crying and saying, “[I]t was either me or them.” ¶ 33 On December 23, defendant borrowed Jolanda’s Ford Edge. When he did not return it as he promised, Jolanda reported it stolen. When defendant eventually returned, Jolanda drove defendant and her children toward Cahokia while looking for a place for defendant to stay so that she could notify police of his whereabouts. As they were driving home, they encountered police officers. Although defendant told her to keep driving, Jolanda stopped the vehicle, and officers arrested defendant. Jolanda later testified that, after defendant was arrested, he repeatedly called her from jail asking her to retrieve “Derek’s wallet” from beneath the passenger seat of her Ford Edge. Instead of a wallet, she found a black handgun, which she discarded. She acknowledged that she initially concealed this fact from investigators before later admitting it after receiving immunity. ¶ 34 3. Damorion’s Testimony ¶ 35 Damorion testified that, in December 2019, he was a student at the University of Illinois Springfield but returned home to live with his mother, Jolanda, during the holiday break. When he arrived home, he learned that Jolanda was dating defendant. On the evening of December 23, 2019, Damorion witnessed an argument between defendant and Jolanda. According to Damorion, defendant became upset and asked Jolanda to accompany him when he left the residence. When Jolanda refused, Damorion offered to accompany defendant instead, and the two left together in the Nissan. ¶ 36 Damorion testified that he sat in the front passenger’s seat while defendant drove them to East St. Louis, which took about 10 minutes. Defendant stopped the car in what looked like a residential area. There, on the opposite side of the street, was a black SUV with a woman standing 10 outside it. Damorion testified that defendant motioned the woman to come over and, as she neared, defendant pulled out a gun and shot her three times through the open car window. After she was shot, she got back into the SUV and drove off. Defendant and Damorion chased the SUV for a “little bit.” Damorion testified that, once they saw flashing lights, they stopped their chase. ¶ 37 Next, defendant and Damorion drove to another part of East St. Louis and stopped at a stoplight, where there was a woman begging for change. According to Damorion, defendant said “[H]ey, I have some fire-ass girl in here.” The woman approached the driver’s side and spoke with defendant. According to Damorion, defendant told the woman, “give me everything you got” and “this is not a game.” Defendant fired a shot into the air, and the woman gave him a dollar. Defendant drove forward a little bit, then stopped, leaned out the window, and shot the woman. Damorion testified defendant stated, “[O]nce you start killing, you have to keep killing, you got to paint this entire city red if I have to.” ¶ 38 Defendant and Damorion drove to a brick house with a driveway and sat there for a little while. Defendant did not have a phone, so he asked Damorion to use his phone to call his mother. Damorion called Jolanda, but defendant took the phone out of his hand. Defendant told Jolanda to come and get them, and then he hung up. Then, he called back and told her to meet them at a gas station. According to Damorion, defendant said, “I know where this guy’s at,” and they drove to a gas station. Jolanda pulled up in her blue Ford Edge right after them. ¶ 39 Within five minutes after they arrived, Damorion saw a light-skinned man walk from inside the gas station and behind the building, and defendant said, “[T]hat’s him right there.” Defendant told Damorion to give him a green bandana that Damorion was wearing at the time; defendant put the bandana over his face. Defendant then got out and told Damorion to get into the driver’s seat and not to get out no matter how many gunshots he heard. Damorion climbed into the driver’s seat. 11 Defendant went back behind the building, and Damorion heard gunshots. Damorion could not see the area where the shooting took place. After the gunshots, defendant ran back to the car, and Damorion did not see where the other man went. When defendant returned, he told Damorion to unlock the doors, but Damorion fumbled with the locks. Once Damorion got the doors unlocked, defendant got into the back seat and told him where to drive. According to Damorion, Jolanda left the gas station after them and followed. Damorion followed defendant’s directions and stopped on a street across from some houses. Damorion and defendant got out of the Nissan and got into Jolanda’s Ford Edge, with Damorion sitting behind the driver’s seat and defendant sitting in the front passenger seat. Jolanda then drove them back home. Damorion testified that, as they drove home, they passed one of the victims and defendant said, “[Y]eah, I did that, you see that, I did that.” ¶ 40 When they arrived home, Damorion and his mother sat downstairs on the couch and talked, while defendant went upstairs and went to sleep. Damorion testified that he and Jolanda did not call the police after the incident because he was afraid of defendant. Damorion agreed that he did speak to the police after defendant was arrested. ¶ 41 On cross-examination, Damorion testified that he saw defendant with a handgun one night before the incident. Defendant had the gun wrapped in a cloth. Defendant put the gun in Damorion’s hand, then told him not to touch it and took it back. Damorion denied ever taking the gun to his mother’s car. Damorion also testified that, after the incident, he saw defendant lift up his mother’s bed and saw that there was a box of ammunition under the bed. Damorion acknowledged he gave a statement to the police on January 2, but he did not recall telling the investigator that he wore the green bandana because he thought something might go down and did not want anyone to see his face. 12 ¶ 42 4. Rodney Wilson’s Testimony ¶ 43 Rodney Wilson testified that he is assigned to intelligence at the St. Clair County jail. Part of his job is to monitor jail calls. The State introduced recorded jail calls, which were published to the jury, in which defendant directed others to retrieve what he referred to as his brother’s “wallet” from beneath the passenger seat of Jolanda’s Ford Edge. ¶ 44 5. Motion for Directed Verdict ¶ 45 At the close of the State’s case in chief, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict on the felony-murder counts. Counsel argued that the State could not prove felony murder because there was “not an independent felonious intent.” Counsel asserted that the aggravated battery with a firearm was complete once Warner was shot and that the subsequent pursuit constituted “a separate incident from the aggravated battery.” Counsel further argued that Warner died from blunt-force trauma sustained when her vehicle struck a utility pole, rather than from the gunshot wound, and maintained that the aggravated battery had concluded before the fatal collision. Counsel contrasted those facts with a traditional felony-murder scenario in which a killing occurs during the continuous commission of a predicate felony, such as an armed robbery. ¶ 46 The State responded that the felony-murder theory remained applicable because the victims were killed while attempting to escape from the aggravated battery. The State argued that the pursuit and resulting crash remained part of a continuous course of conduct flowing from the forcible felony. The trial court agreed, finding that the issue presented “a course of conduct determination” and concluding that a reasonable jury could find the shooting and subsequent crash were contemporaneous and occurred during the course of the aggravated battery. The court denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. 13 ¶ 47 6. Defendant’s Testimony ¶ 48 Defendant testified that he had been dating Jolanda since August 2019 and was living with her in December 2019. He and Jolanda argued on the evening of December 23, 2019, but he denied leaving the residence with Damorion or participating in any of the shootings. Instead, he testified that he spent the night with family and friends before returning to Jolanda’s residence the following morning. He further testified that he later drove to the Citgo gas station where Shafer had been shot and observed police investigating the scene. ¶ 49 Defendant stated that, on December 24, Jolanda gave him a gun wrapped in a towel and asked him to dispose of it, although she did not explain why. He denied possessing or using a firearm during the shootings. Defendant acknowledged that, while in jail, he made recorded telephone calls directing others to retrieve what he described as a “wallet” from beneath the passenger seat of Jolanda’s vehicle, and he admitted the item was actually a firearm. He explained that he wanted the gun removed because, as a convicted felon, he feared being prosecuted for possessing a firearm. ¶ 50 During direct examination, defense counsel questioned defendant concerning his prior convictions. Defendant acknowledged prior convictions for robbery and possession of a controlled substance. Defense counsel then asked whether defendant had ever been convicted of a firearm- related offense, and defendant responded, “No.” Outside the presence of the jury, the State argued that defendant had opened the door to impeachment with his 2015 Missouri conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm. The trial court agreed. ¶ 51 On cross-examination, the State impeached defendant with the certified copy of his 2015 Missouri conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm, which was admitted as State’s exhibit 105. Also, during cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that, during a recorded jail call with 14 Jolanda, he told her, “I put Derek [sic] wallet up under the front seat of your car,” and that he similarly told his sister that he had left the “wallet” in Jolanda’s vehicle. Defendant maintained that Damorion had actually placed the firearm under the seat and explained that he used the coded language in the calls because he wanted the firearm removed to avoid being charged as a felon in possession of a firearm. ¶ 52 F. Jury Instruction Conference ¶ 53 During the jury instruction conference, the trial court noted that defense counsel’s directed- verdict argument applied to the proposed felony-murder instructions. Counsel objected to the instructions, arguing that the aggravated battery and the subsequent pursuit were separate events and that the victims died from blunt-force trauma sustained in the collision rather than from the gunshot wound. The State responded that the predicate aggravated battery set in motion the chain of events culminating in the fatal crash. The trial court modified one instruction to specify that the predicate aggravated battery with a firearm was committed against Warner but otherwise overruled defendant’s objections. The jury was instructed that it could convict defendant of felony murder if it found that the deaths resulted “as a direct and foreseeable consequence of a chain of events set into motion” by the aggravated battery with a firearm. ¶ 54 G. Jury Deliberations and Verdict ¶ 55 Prior to deliberations, the trial court advised the parties that State’s exhibit 105, the certified copy of defendant’s 2015 Missouri firearm conviction, would accompany the jury into deliberation. Defense counsel stated that he preferred the exhibit not be sent to the jury but raised no objection. The jury retired to deliberate and later returned guilty verdicts on all counts. 15 ¶ 56 H. Posttrial Motions and Sentencing ¶ 57 Following the jury’s verdicts, defense counsel filed a posttrial motion asserting, inter alia, that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court erred in barring the defense’s proposed witnesses, and that the felony-murder charges were based on an improper predicate offense. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court thereafter proceeded with sentencing. ¶ 58 Following merger of the remaining counts, the trial court sentenced defendant to three consecutive terms of natural life imprisonment for the murders of Shafer, Warner, and Braggs. The court also imposed a consecutive 43-year sentence for the armed robbery of Fair, to be followed by a 3-year term of mandatory supervised release. ¶ 59 On January 26, 2023, defendant filed a pro se pleading titled “Motion to Reconsider,” asserting that the trial court had allowed members of the state’s attorney’s office, victim’s family members, and law enforcement witnesses to remain in the courtroom while the jury was deliberating and viewing a DVD entered into evidence. Simultaneously with his motion, he filed a pro se notice of appeal. Defense counsel subsequently filed a notice of appeal on February 3, 2023, asserting there was insufficient evidence for a conviction. ¶ 60 I. First Direct Appeal ¶ 61 The Office of the State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent defendant on March 18, 2023. Through counsel, defendant raised four arguments: (1) the trial court erred by finding defendant fit to stand trial based solely on defendant’s and his counsel’s stipulations as to his fitness, (2) defendant was denied a fair trial because the trial court incorrectly questioned prospective jurors about the principles outlined in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012) in a closely balanced case, (3) defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, where 16 his trial counsel failed to prevent the admission of inadmissible and prejudicial evidence, and (4) remand for a preliminary Krankel inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)) was required because the trial court did not inquire into defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Doolin, 2024 IL App (5th) 230053-U, ¶ 2. On June 25, 2024, this court held that the trial court erred by finding defendant fit to stand trial based solely on the stipulation of the parties and, accordingly, remanded for a retrospective fitness hearing. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. ¶ 62 J. Retrospective Fitness Hearing ¶ 63 On remand for a retrospective fitness hearing, the parties agreed it was not necessary to obtain a new fitness evaluation or call Dr. Cuneo to testify. Neither side submitted new evidence. The trial court summarized the procedural history of the case, making particular note of its observations of defendant during the pretrial proceedings. The trial court ruled that, based on its own observations and findings, as well as its review of the record and Dr. Cuneo’s report, defendant had been fit to stand trial at the time of the trial in November 2022. Defendant filed a second notice of appeal. ¶ 64 K. Second Direct Appeal ¶ 65 Following the trial court’s determination on remand that defendant was fit to stand trial, defendant pursued this appeal, raising three issues. He argues that (1) the aggravated battery with a firearm lacked an independent felonious purpose sufficient to support his felony-murder convictions, (2) he was denied a fair trial because the trial court failed to comply with Rule 431(b) during voir dire in a closely balanced case, and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by permitting inadmissible and prejudicial evidence to be presented to the jury. 17 ¶ 66 Before briefing on the merits, the State moved to strike defendant’s first issue, arguing that it exceeded the scope of the limited remand because it had not been raised during the original appeal and was therefore barred under the law-of-the-case doctrine. After the limited remand, but before this appeal was resolved, our supreme court decided People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747, which clarified the application of the merger doctrine to assaultive predicate felonies. Because the question presented is governed by the law in effect at the time of our decision and defendant’s first claim turns upon the principles clarified in Bush, we denied the State’s motion to strike and proceed to consider the merits of that claim. ¶ 67 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 68 Defendant argues that the aggravated battery with a firearm committed against Warner could not serve as the predicate felony supporting the felony-murder convictions arising from the deaths of Warner and Braggs because it lacked an independent felonious purpose. He contends the aggravated battery constituted the completed act of violence directed at Warner, while the subsequent pursuit and fatal collision were separate events. Accordingly, because Warner and Braggs ultimately died from blunt-force injuries rather than the gunshot wounds, defendant maintains the aggravated battery could not serve as the predicate felony under the merger doctrine as reaffirmed in Bush. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions. ¶ 69 A. Felony Murder ¶ 70 1. Curtisha Warner ¶ 71 Defendant argues that the aggravated battery with a firearm committed against Warner could not serve as the predicate felony supporting his felony-murder conviction because it lacked an independent felonious purpose. We agree. 18 ¶ 72 Whether a charged offense may serve as the predicate felony supporting a conviction for felony murder presents a question of law, which we review de novo. Id. ¶ 39. Under section 9- 1(a)(3) of the Criminal Code of 2012, a person commits first degree murder when, “in performing the acts which cause the death,” he or she is committing or attempting to commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2020). Although aggravated battery with a firearm is statutorily classified as a forcible felony, our supreme court has long recognized that not every forcible felony may serve as the predicate felony for felony murder. See People v. Davison, 236 Ill. 2d 232, 239-40 (2010); People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 447 (2001). ¶ 73 As the supreme court recently reaffirmed in Bush, the merger doctrine excludes predicate felonies that “ ‘arise from and are inherent in the act of murder itself.’ ” Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 44 (quoting Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d at 447). In determining whether a predicate felony merges with the homicide, the inquiry focuses upon defendant’s conduct and whether the predicate felony was inherent in and arose out of the killing. Id. ¶ 43. The court explained that the doctrine applies where “the predicate felony’s sole purpose is to effectuate an act of physical violence contemplating death.” Id. ¶ 44. Conversely, the merger doctrine does not apply where the predicate felony has a felonious purpose independent of such violence. Id. ¶ 74 In explaining the doctrine, the Bush court reaffirmed both Morgan and People v. Pelt, 207 Ill. 2d 434 (2003), observing that each involved “singular acts of assaultive conduct that directly caused the victims’ deaths.” Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 44. The court further explained that courts generally examine the “gravamen” or “essential characteristic” of the predicate felony to determine whether it has an independent felonious purpose. Id. ¶ 45. Where, as here, aggravated battery is alleged as the predicate felony, the relevant inquiry is whether “the conduct charged contemplates 19 death.” Id. If it does, the aggravated battery cannot serve as the predicate felony; if it does not, the offense may properly serve as the predicate. Id. ¶ 75 Applying those principles here, the sole predicate felony alleged in support of the felony- murder charge was the aggravated battery with a firearm committed against Warner. The State relied upon that same aggravated battery as the predicate felony for the felony-murder counts involving both Warner and Braggs. The evidence established that defendant motioned Warner