People v. Parks
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket1-23-1761
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
2026 IL App (1st) 231761
No. 1-23-1761
Order filed November 20, 2026
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT, SIXTH DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LIONEL PARKS, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County.
Honorable William G. Gamboney, Judge, Presiding.
No. 17 CR 17709
JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Pucinski and Evans concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: No error where the trial court allowed a police detective to testify that defendant
supplied his nickname during preliminary questioning; detective’s narration of surveillance
videos was not prejudicial; admission of “other crimes” evidence did not materially affect
the verdict given that overwhelming evidence of guilt was presented to the jury.
¶2 The State charged Lionel Parks with offenses arising from the shooting deaths of five
people in 2016. A jury found Parks guilty of five counts of first-degree murder, and the trial court
sentenced him to five natural concurrent nature-life sentences. On appeal, Parks challenges the
admission of his statement to police about his nickname, a detective’s testimony describing
surveillance recordings, and evidence of other crimes or wrongdoing. He also contends that the
cumulative effect of these alleged errors denied him a fair trial.
¶3 We affirm. Parks’ statement about his nickname fell within the routine booking exception
to Miranda. The testimony on the surveillance recordings does not require reversal as it did not
improperly invade the jury’s role as factfinder. Nor did the challenged evidence of other crimes or
wrongdoing serve solely to show Parks’ propensity to commit crimes. We also reject his
cumulative-error claim.
¶4 Background
¶5 On a December afternoon in 2016, five people were shot in a home: Scott Thompson,
Nateyah Hines, Shacora Jackson, Shakeyah Jackson, and Elijah Jackson. Shakeyah survived until
October 2017. Scott Thompson’s nephew, Kalieffe Thompson witnessed the shootings but was not
struck by the gunfire. He testified at Parks’ trial.
¶6 Pretrial Motion
¶7 Parks moved to suppress statements he made to police during custodial interrogation before
he received the warnings under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Parks argued that
detectives questioned him about his living arrangements, phone, car, financial support, and
nicknames. According to Parks, these questions went beyond routine booking information and
were designed to elicit incriminating statements before he received the Miranda warnings.
¶8 At the suppression hearing, Detective Keith Allen testified he investigated the homicides
and questioned Parks, a suspect. Before giving Parks the Miranda warnings, Allen asked questions
he routinely asked suspects in custody, including their name, nicknames, age, date of birth,
residence, household members, phone number, Social Security number, employment status,
weight, height, cars, and means of financial support. Parks identified his nickname as “Frog.” Allen
followed with “Frog or Froggy?” Parks repeated, “Frog.” Allen then asked, “Frog? Any other
names you go by?” Parks answered, “That’s it.” Asked whether “Dominic” was another nickname,
Parks said that Dominic was his middle name. Allen continued questioning Parks about other
personal information before administering Miranda warnings.
-2-
¶9 The trial court found that the questions about Parks’ name, nickname or alias, residence,
and employment status qualified as routine booking questions, an exception to Miranda. Excluded
were questions about Parks’ phone’s type and color, financial support, and car.
¶ 10 Parks moved to reconsider the denial of his motion to suppress his statement about his
nickname. He argued that the questions were investigative because police already knew that a
suspect was called “Froggy” and were trying to confirm Parks’ identity. The court denied
reconsideration.
¶ 11 State’s Evidence
¶ 12 Eyewitness testimony
¶ 13 On the day of the shootings, Kalieffe Thompson and his uncle, Scott Thompson, drove
from Detroit to Chicago to visit his uncle’s friend, Elijah Jackson.
¶ 14 That morning, a man Elijah introduced as “Froggy,” stopped by for 10 to 15 minutes.
Kalieffe identified Parks as that man.
¶ 15 Elijah smoked a joint with Scott and Kalieffe, and showed Parks two “nickel bags” of
marijuana, which Parks declined to buy. Before leaving, Parks said he would call Elijah and return
later.
¶ 16 Parks came back with another man who had long dreadlocks and a facial tattoo. The second
man bought marijuana from Elijah. During this visit, Parks displayed a gun and bragged about
having it. Elijah told Parks to put the gun away and leave because his family was present. Parks
stayed about 15 minutes.
¶ 17 Parks returned a third time, again with the other man. As Elijah opened the door, they
forced their way inside. Both carried guns. Parks approached Kalieffe and Scott and put a gun to
Kalieffe’s head. The other man stood over Elijah and Shakeyah. Elijah pleaded with Parks, saying,
“C’mon, Froggy, you know me…we go back.” Parks ordered everyone to be quiet, remove their
-3-
clothes, and lie face-down down on the floor. The two men searched for money, drugs, and guns,
but did not find what they wanted.
¶ 18 Kalieffe saw Parks for one or two seconds before Parks ordered him to lie face down.
¶ 19 The men made Kalieffe and Scott empty their pockets, took their belongings, including
their cell phones, and placed the items in a bag Elijah gave them. They then searched the other
rooms . Parks found 18-year-old Shacora Jackson in a bedroom and brought her into the living and
dining area with the others. The men were concerned that she had called 911.
¶ 20 The men asked Elijah how to open the back door and backyard fence. The men told a
toddler in the dining room to stand in a corner and look away. Parks stood over Kalieffe, who was
lying next to Scott, and the men began shooting. Kalieffe thought he heard four to five shots but
was uncertain because his ears began ringing after the first shot. He pretended to be dead.
¶ 21 After the men left, Kalieffe put on his shorts, closed the back door to prevent the men from
returning, and escaped through a bedroom window. He ran barefoot through the snow toward his
car but slipped and dropped his car keys. Unable to find them, he tried to stop a passing car for
help. He then approached a couple two doors away and asked them to call 911. Still panicked,
Kalieffe again looked for his keys. At that point, he saw Shacora on the front porch. She tried to
speak but collapsed. Eventually, he found his keys and drove to a Walmart, where he sought help
and called his parents. Another uncle, a retired public defender, brought clothes and took Kalieffe
to a nearby police station.
¶ 22 Kalieffe believed Parks had displayed his gun to learn whether Elijah had one. Kalieffe
acknowledged that he first told police he had not seen the gunman enter the home on the third visit,
although that statement was untrue. And he did not tell investigators about the gun or describe
-4-
Parks’ Carhartt hat and jeans until the day before trial. He explained that the shooting was
traumatic, and he recalled additional details as he repeatedly revisited what happened.
¶ 23 Kalieffe initially declined to identify anyone in a photographic array because he was not
certain. Later that day, he identified Parks from the same array during a recorded interview with
an assistant state’s attorney.
¶ 24 Police Investigation
¶ 25 Officer Carlos Ramos testified that he and his partner responded to a 911 call of shots fired.
When they arrived, a young child was alone on the front porch, and an unresponsive young woman
lay at the bottom of the porch stairs. After backup arrived, Ramos and other officers entered the
house through the back door and conducted a protective sweep. Officers found two men and two
women who appeared to be dead. Ramos requested medical assistance and secured the scene until
detectives and evidence technicians arrived. Shakeyah Jackson was taken to a hospital by
ambulance; she died in October 2017.
¶ 26 Chicago police lieutenant Melvin Branch, then a homicide detective, responded to the
shooting with his partner, Detective Pasquell Robinson. Officers had secured the area when they
arrived. At the base of the front steps, Branch saw Shacora Jackson, who had apparent gunshot
wounds and showed no signs of life.
¶ 27 Branch and Robinson entered through the back door. From the kitchen area, they saw
several people lying motionless in the dining and living rooms. Scott Thompson lay face down in
the dining room, wearing only underwear and socks, with a gunshot wound to the head. Nearby,
Elijah Jackson lay on his side, fully clothed, also with a gunshot wound to the head. A young
woman lay next to him, unclothed and apparently dead. The officers found blood throughout the
home, including spatter on the walls and a bloody hand smear leading toward the front door.
-5-
¶ 28 As part of the investigation, Branch interviewed Parks’ girlfriend at the time, Amber
Walker, who was living with her grandmother a few blocks from the shooting. Walker identified
Parks’ nickname as “Froggy.” Police obtained surveillance footage from the grandmother’s next-
door neighbor’s security camera. The footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
Over Parks’ objection, Branch described what appeared in the recordings.
¶ 29 Branch testified that at 9:11 a.m., the recording showed a man emerging from the rear of
Walker’s grandmother’s home. The man wore a hat or skull cap with an insignia, a black coat, and
blue jeans. At 10:35 a.m., the recording showed a similarly dressed man near the home. At 11:11
a.m., two men appeared—one with a hat, a dark coat, and blue jeans and the other dressed in black
with a hat. At 11:46 a.m., the recording showed both men, one carrying a book bag.
¶ 30 At 12:37 p.m., the recording showed two men in the alley behind the home. One carried a
bag and entered the rear of the house; the other continued through the alley toward the front of the
house. Branch described the second man as wearing a skull cap, black coat, and jeans with
something in his left hand.
¶ 31 The prosecutor asked Branch the significance of the bag. Branch began to answer that it
was possibly “used to transport” something before the court sustained Parks’ objection. The court
also sustained an objection when the prosecutor asked whether a black bag had been used at the
shooting scene.
¶ 32 Branch identified still photographs from the recordings. When asked about an object in one
man’s hand, Branch said it looked like firearm. Parks objected and the court sustained the
objection, instructing the jury to disregard that testimony. After the instruction, Branch said the
man appeared to have “something” in his hand.
-6-
¶ 33 Police also recovered surveillance recordings from homes near the shootings. Branch
explained that at 12:12 p.m., a teal Buick drove east on 105th Street and turned into an alley toward
104th Place. Branch testified to seeing “two heads” in the car and described the Buick as missing
a hubcap. At 12:14 p.m., another recording captured the Buick traveling west on 104th Place before
parking on a street behind Elijah’s home. Two men got out. At about 12:30 p.m., the recording
showed two men returning to the Buick and driving away.
¶ 34 Minutes later, another recording showed a man wearing a hat with an insignia, black jacket,
and blue jeans walking from the front to the rear of Walker’s grandmother’s residence. While
describing the recordings, Branch referred to the men as “offenders.” The court sustained Parks’
objection and directed Branch not to use the term “offender.” Branch also referred to a person
shown entering and leaving a vehicle as the “black male subject” and the “suspect.” Parks objected,
arguing that the State had not filed a motion under People v. Thompson, 2016 IL 118667, to permit
identification testimony from a non-eyewitness. The trial court sustained the objection.
¶ 35 Parks later moved for a mistrial on the grounds that Branch’s testimony had improperly
expressed an opinion about the identity of the person in the recording. The court denied the motion
but indicated it would consider a curative instruction if the Parks submitted one.
¶ 36 The parties stipulated to the admission of surveillance recordings from nearby residences.
¶ 37 Parks was on electronic monitoring at the time of the shootings. He was authorized to leave
his residence for work between 9 a.m. and 6 p.m., Monday through Friday. On the day of the
shooting, a Saturday, he left without authorization several times.
¶ 38 Walker testified that in late 2016, Parks lived with her and her family in her grandmother’s
basement. On the morning of the shootings, Walker awoke with Parks in the basement before going
-7-
upstairs to care for her grandmother and children. Parks tried to speak to her, but she was upset
and ignored him.
¶ 39 Walker acknowledged telling detectives and the grand jury that Parks had mentioned a
“lick,” a term she understood could refer to a robbery. At trial, she testified that detectives had
warned her that she could be charged as an accessory if she was untruthful and claimed they
pressured her to testify so she could return to her children and grandmother. Despite
inconsistencies in her statements, she affirmed during redirect that prosecutors had not threatened
nor promised her anything in exchange for her testimony.
¶ 40 Chicago police officer Tim Lammert testified that he encountered Parks at Roseland
Community Hospital shortly after midnight. Parks identified himself as “Sean Verner” and gave
an address of 10743 South LaSalle Street and a phone number. The next morning, police executed
a search warrant at that address.
¶ 41 Officers recovered a wallet containing a debit card in Parks’ name, mail addressed to him,
and several cell phones. They also found a black Carhartt hat hidden in an air duct, a pair of jeans
on the bed, and two boxes of live 9-mm Luger ammunition in a crawl space beneath the back door.
¶ 42 Lammert and his team documented the scene with photographs, recovered the evidence,
and transported it to the 5th District, where it was given to Evidence Technician Gerald Holden for
inventorying. The photographs depicted the residence and the recovered items, including the
wallet, jeans, Carhartt hat, narcotics packaging, and ammunition.
¶ 43 Forensic testing detected gunshot residue on the Carhartt hat and jeans recovered from
Parks’ residence and in the Buick’s front passenger area. DNA testing found a major male profile
on the hat consistent with Parks; the results from the jeans were inconclusive. Parks was also a
possible contributor to DNA recovered from a lime juice bottle at the shooting scene. Cell phone
-8-
records showed that phones associated with Parks and Elijah Jackson connected to towers serving
the area around the time of the shootings. The cell-site analysis could not establish who was using
the phones or pinpoint their locations.
¶ 44 After the State rested, Parks moved for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion, after
which the defense rested without presenting evidence. The jury convicted Parks of five counts of
first-degree murder.
¶ 45 Post-Trial Motion and Sentencing
¶ 46 Parks moved for a new trial, arguing (i) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt, (ii) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements, specifically
allowing his admission of his nickname during booking, and (iii) the trial court erred in denying a
mistrial after Branch referred to the person in the surveillance recording as “the offender.” Parks
also claimed the detective’s testimony about the person holding a weapon was prejudicial, lacked
prior disclosure, and invaded the jury’s role. Parks’ counsel explained that they did not request a
jury instruction to disregard the “firearm” reference because “[w]e decided as a defense posture to
not highlight that fact and request the Court to give an admonishment, which we think would have
highlighted it.”
¶ 47 Finally, he argued that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of a fair trial. The
court rejected all claims of error.
¶ 48 The trial court sentenced Parks to five concurrent natural life terms.
¶ 49 Analysis
¶ 50 Motion to Suppress Parks’ Statement to Police
-9-
¶ 51 Parks first argues that his admission to investigators that his nickname was “Frog” was
obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and should have been
suppressed. He contends the Miranda warnings should have been given before the questioning
began. The State counters that Parks’ statement about his nickname was not the product of a
custodial interrogation and thus did not require the warnings. We defer to the trial court’s factual
findings and review a ruling on a motion to suppress de novo. People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492,
505 (2004).
¶ 52 Before trial, Parks’ motion to suppress his statement was granted in part and denied in part.
The court ruled that Parks’ answers regarding his cell phone and car were inadmissible, but his
nickname was in response to routine booking questions and admissible.
¶ 53 Routine booking questions may be asked without Miranda warnings. Routine booking
questions include a defendant’s name, address, height, weight, birth date, and age. See
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589. 601 (1990). Officers also may ask if the defendant has
an alias. See People v. Dalton, 91 Ill.2d 22, 26 (1982) (“Miranda does not prohibit inquiry into
background data even though that information is later used to gather more evidence against a
defendant or is itself used as supporting evidence of defendant’s guilt.”); People v. Outlaw, 388
Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1081 (2009) (routine booking questions generally do not constitute
interrogation).
¶ 54 Parks argues that Allen’s question, “Frog or Froggy?” was investigative because police
already knew the suspect was called “Froggy.” But the question arose during a series of preliminary
inquiries about Parks’ identifying information, including his name and aliases. That an answer
might later prove incriminating does not, by itself, remove an otherwise routine identifying
question from the booking exception. Thus, under the facts here, no error occurred.
- 10 -
¶ 55 Surveillance Recordings Commentary
¶ 56 Parks next argues that the trial court erred by allowing Detective Branch to narrate the
surveillance recordings for the jury. According to Parks, Branch offered improper lay opinions
about the people and events seen in the recordings. The State responds that Branch’s descriptions
helped the jury follow the recordings from multiple cameras and did not constitute improper
identification testimony.
¶ 57 The admission of evidence ordinarily falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.
But whether it was proper for a prosecution witness to draw conclusions when the witness had no
personal knowledge of the events portrayed presents a legal question, reviewed de novo. People v.
Sykes, 2012 IL App (4th) 111110, ¶ 30.
¶ 58 Parks contends that Branch lacked firsthand knowledge of the events depicted in the
recordings and was in no better position to identify the shooter than the jurors, relying on People
v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142197, Sykes, 2012 IL App (4th) 111110, and People v. Hampton,
2021 IL App. (5th) 170341. The State distinguishes those decisions on the basis that Branch
described the recordings without identifying Parks as a person depicted in them.
¶ 59 In Brown, the officer identified the defendant as the individual in the surveillance footage.
Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 142197, ¶¶ 56, 64. The court found nothing in the record to indicate the
officer had familiarity with the defendant beyond the eyewitness descriptions of what the shooter
wore, eyewitness statements that the defendant was the shooter, and a photograph of the defendant
from police computer files. Id. ¶ 64. In sum, the officer’s identification was no more likely to
correctly identify the defendant and the victim than the jury. Id.
¶ 60 As the court observed in Brown, “[p]utting aside for the moment [the detective’s]
identification testimony,” the testimony otherwise was appropriate as “perceptions did not need to
- 11 -
be based on the live event [] because [the witness] was not providing an eyewitness account; rather,
his testimony was relevant to the scenes depicted in the recording. * * * [T]his testimony merely
laid an evidentiary foundation for admission of the surveillance recording.” Brown, 2017 IL App
(1st) 142197, ¶ 62.
¶ 61 Similarly, in Hampton, 2021 IL App. (5th) 170341, the court held that an officer improperly
testified that an object in surveillance footage did not look like a gun because the jury could
identify the object shown just as well as the officer. Id. ¶ 85-86.
¶ 62 The witness’s interpretation in Sykes constituted improper lay opinion testimony on
circumstances materially different from those here. Sykes, 2012 IL App (4th) 111110, ¶ 42. The
State’s witness, a loss-prevention officer for a store that was burglarized, testified that an original,
higher-quality surveillance camera recording he had viewed showed the defendant removing
money from a cash register, while the jury received an inferior version of the recording.
Id. ¶¶ 33, 37. The witness lacked firsthand knowledge of the event and was in no better position,
based on the evidence before the jury, to determine what occurred. Id. ¶ 42. Moreover, the
witness’s testimony offered the central evidence establishing the defendant’s conduct. Id. ¶ 6.
¶ 63 This case is similar to People v. Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B, ¶¶ 28, 77, where the
court found the narration admissible under Rule 701 because it aided the jury without offering
improper opinion testimony. In Mister, the court held that it was proper to allow a surveillance
manager to narrate footage despite having no personal knowledge of the events. Id. ¶ 77. The
footage spanned several hours, involved multiple cameras, and was difficult for a jury to follow
without context. Id. ¶¶ 28, 77. The witness explained movement and continuity based on clothing
and positioning but did not identify the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 28, 77-78.
- 12 -
¶ 64 A lay witness may identify a defendant in surveillance footage when the witness is more
likely than the jury to make a correct identification. People v. Thompson, 2016 IL 118667. But an
opinion is inadmissible when “the jury is as capable as the witness of drawing inferences or
conclusions from the recording.” See Hampton, 2021 IL App. (5th) 170341, ¶ 83. Branch’s
descriptions of the recordings assisted the jury in following the movements of people and vehicles
shown on several cameras and was based on his review of the footage alongside other investigative
information.
¶ 65 Although Detective Branch testified that the person in the still photo taken from a recording
was the offender, after a sidebar in which Parks’ motion for a mistrial was denied, the court told
the jury to disregard the previous inquiry. Parks’ counsel could have but declined to craft a
“limiting instruction,” believing it would highlight an aggravating error.
¶ 66 Branch’s descriptions of the recordings assisted the jury in following the movements of
people and cars shown on several cameras. Unlike the officer in Brown, 2017 IL App (1st)
142197, Branch did not identify Parks as a person in the recordings.
¶ 67 Neither was Branch’s testimony prejudicial as in Hampton where the officer’s testimony
that an object seen on the surveillance video did not “look like” a gun related to the defendant’s
claim of self-defense. Hampton, 2021 IL App. (5th) 170341, ¶ 86. Instead, Branch’s narration was
similar to that permitted in Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B. Narrating the videos to clarify
locations and times assisted the jurors’ factfinding task.
¶ 68 But Branch’s references to “suspect” and “offenders,” and his opinion that an object looked
like a firearm, went beyond describing what the recordings showed. The trial court properly
sustained Parks’ objection to these remarks, and after denying Parks’ motion for a mistrial,
- 13 -
instructed the jury to disregard them. Park’s counsel declined an additional instruction, believing
doing so would draw further attention to the testimony.
¶ 69 Thus, Branch’s narration didn’t constitute improper identification testimony. Nor do his
objectionable remarks require reversal, given that the trial court’s response adequately addressed
them.
¶ 70 Other Crimes Evidence
¶ 71 Evidence of other crimes or misconduct generally is inadmissible to show a defendant’s
propensity to commit crimes. It may be admitted for another relevant purpose, such as motive,
opportunity, intent, or identity, provided its relevance does not depend on an inference of criminal
propensity. Ill. R. Evid. 404(b).
¶ 72 Parks argues that the evidence that he lied to the police by giving a false name when first
interviewed, possessed drugs and drug paraphernalia, violated parole, and left his home
unauthorized several times on the day of the shootings “portrayed [him] as a man with no regard
for the law.” He contends that this evidence invited the jury to convict him for his character rather
than his conduct. Recognizing these alleged errors in the admission of these other crimes were not
preserved, Parks asserts this court may review the unpreserved other-crime issue under the second
prong of the plain-error rule. Under the second-prong, a reviewing court may consider an
unpreserved error when a clear or obvious error “affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People
v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d 551, 565 (2007).
¶ 73 The challenged evidence must be considered in light of its relevance to the charged offenses
and its potential for unfair prejudice. Evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts is generally
inadmissible to prove a general propensity to commit a crime, but evidence of prior bad acts may
- 14 -
be admissible, if relevant, to explain the investigatory steps connecting the defendant to the current
crime. People v. Lewis, 165 Ill.2d 305, 345-46 (1995). Other crimes evidence also may be used to
explain police conduct and the investigation leading up to the defendant's arrest, but only if it is
“relevant to specifically connect the defendant with the crime[ ] for which being tried.” Id. See
People v. Pikes, 2013 IL 115171, ¶ 20 (“[E]vidence of other crimes may be admitted if it is part of
the ‘continuing narrative’ of the charged crime.”).
¶ 74 Even assuming some of it was improperly admitted, reversal would not follow if the error
was harmless. See People v. Pinkett, 2023 IL 127223, ¶ 39 (evidentiary error held harmless where
no reasonable probability of acquittal absent error); People v. Nieves, 193 Ill. 2d 513, 530–31
(2000) (reference to “other incidents” was improper but error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt).
¶ 75 The evidence of Parks’ guilt was overwhelming. An eyewitness identified Parks as one of
the men involved in the shooting. DNA evidence, gunshot residue, and other circumstantial
evidence connected him to the crime. Given this evidence, the challenged testimony could not
reasonably have affected the jury’s verdict. Any error in admitting it was harmless. See In re
Rolandis G., 232 Ill. 2d 13, 43 (2008) (reviewing court may “focus on the error to determine
whether it might have contributed to the conviction [or] examine the other properly admitted
evidence to determine whether it overwhelmingly supports the conviction”).
¶ 76 Cumulative Error
¶ 77 Finally, Parks argues that the effect of the purported errors unfairly prejudiced him,
depriving a fair trial. See People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 127, 139 (2000) (“when an error arises at
trial that is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of the judicial process, the court must
act to correct the error, so that the fairness and the reputation of the process may be preserved and
- 15 -
protected.”); People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 350-51 (2000) (“Individual trial errors may have the
cumulative effect of denying a defendant a fair trial.”).
¶ 78 When looking at cumulative errors, a reviewing court assesses whether they threaten the
integrity of the judicial process and should reverse where the fairness and reputation of the judicial
process would not otherwise be preserved. Id. (citing People v. Green, 74 Ill. 2d 444, 455 (1979).
¶ 79 As discussed, we have found no error, and without individual errors, there can be no
cumulative error. People v. Quezada, 2024 IL 128805, ¶¶ 46.
¶ 80 Affirmed.
- 16 -