People v. Conerly

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250537-U NOTICE Decision filed 10/22/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0537 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Champaign County. ) v. ) No. 21-CF-1184 ) KIN CONERLY, ) Honorable ) Randall B. Rosenbaum, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McHaney and Clarke concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶1 Held: Defendant’s reckless discharge of a firearm conviction is affirmed where defendant failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. ¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Kin Conerly, was convicted of two counts of armed habitual criminal and one count of reckless discharge of a firearm in Champaign County circuit court case No. 21-CF-1184. On direct appeal, this court reversed the armed habitual criminal convictions, finding defense counsel was ineffective for stipulating to defendant’s previous aggravated battery conviction as a qualifying predicate offense. People v. Conerly, 2024 IL App (5th) 220779-U, ¶¶ 42-43. Regarding the other ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised on direct appeal, this court remanded the matter for the appointment of new counsel and full hearing 1 on defendant’s claims pursuant to People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). Conerly, 2024 IL App (5th) 220779-U, ¶ 51. ¶3 On remand, the trial court appointed counsel who filed a motion for a new trial based upon several claims that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. On July 1, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary Krankel hearing. After hearing testimony from trial counsel and arguments from the State and Krankel counsel, the court found that defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims did not satisfy the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and found that there was no reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different based upon defendant’s claims. Therefore, the trial court denied defendant’s ineffective assistance claims. ¶4 Back before us on appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant argues that (1) the court erred by finding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the substantive admission of the compilation video; (2) he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to a police officer’s identification of defendant in the compilation video; (3) he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to object to the State’s improper closing argument; and (4) he was prejudiced by trial counsel eliciting testimony that damaged the defense case. Finally, defendant argues he was prejudiced by the cumulative effect of these errors. For the following reasons, we affirm. ¶5 I. BACKGROUND ¶6 The details of the defendant’s conviction were set forth in Conerly, 2024 IL App (5th) 220779-U. For context, we repeat and summarize the facts and procedural history that are relevant to this appeal. 2 ¶7 A. Pretrial ¶8 On October 4, 2021, the State charged defendant by information with several offenses related to an incident that occurred on September 30, 2021. Counts I, II, and IV alleged that defendant committed the offenses of armed habitual criminal, Class X felonies in violation of section 24-1.7(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2020)); count III alleged the offense of reckless discharge of a firearm, a Class 4 felony, in violation of section 24-1.5(a) of the Code 1 (id. § 24-1.5(a)). ¶9 On January 21, 2022, appointed counsel filed a motion for forensic testing. According to the motion, because the Champaign Police Department informed the crime lab that defendant was seen discharging the weapon, the Illinois State Police Crime Lab declined to analyze gunshot residue (GSR) swabs taken from the defendant. On February 23, 2022, the public defender withdrew as counsel, and James Dedman entered his appearance as defense counsel. Because the motion for forensic testing filed by the public defender had yet to be heard, on April 27, 2022, the State filed a motion in limine regarding the GSR kit. The State argued that Dedman informed the State that he did not want the previously filed motion for forensic testing heard or withdrawn, because part of his trial strategy was to argue that the State’s failure to test the GSR kit “is a pillar of reasonable doubt.” As relief, the State asked that, should the defense mention the lack of GSR testing during the trial, (1) it be permitted to tell the jury that defendant sought the GSR testing and abandoned that request, and (2) the jury be instructed that defendant had the right to have the testing completed and that the testing would have been completed if the defendant so requested. The State relied on People v. Mudd, 2022 IL 126830, for this request. 1 The State dismissed count IV prior to the start of the trial. 3 ¶ 10 Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court offered to have an order entered directing the ISP Crime Lab to conduct the testing. After consultation with defendant, the defense declined to have the court enter an order for the testing. The court noted that it believed Mudd to be applicable, and that should this become an issue at trial, the State could mention that defendant had the ability to have the testing completed. ¶ 11 Prior to the start of the trial, the parties stipulated that defendant had previously been convicted of forcible felonies that served as predicate offenses for defendant’s armed habitual criminal charges. ¶ 12 B. Jury Trial ¶ 13 This matter proceeded to a jury trial on May 24, 2022. The State’s first witness was Gabriel Lafountain. Lafountain testified that on September 30, 2021, he parked outside his apartment at Gramercy Park and sat in his car with a friend. A man walked up and looked in the car. A woman walked up, and as they walked past, the man fired a gun into the air. Lafountain identified a video of the shooting and testified that the video “truly and fairly and accurately depict[ed] the events as [he] remember[ed] them on that evening.” ¶ 14 The video was admitted without objection from trial counsel and was published to the jury. 2 During playback, the State paused the video at various points and Lafountain described what was happening in the video. ¶ 15 Our review of the video reveals that a white Jeep pulled into the parking lot and parked five spaces away from Lafountain’s car. A man in a white shirt, later identified as defendant, exited 2 The video, which is part of the record on appeal, is a compilation video that appears to have been created using eight film clips captured by three different cameras at the apartment complex. Certain parts of the video are slowed down or sped up, depending upon what is occurring in the video. The time stamps from one segment to the next appear seamless, running from 22:48:38 to 22:59:10. The entire video played for the jury is 5:07 long (excluding the introduction and the conclusion), meaning that 10:22 of real time video was condensed into 5:07 for the jury. The video does not have audio. 4 the Jeep and walked behind the other parked cars until he stopped behind the car next to Lafountain’s car. He appeared to be carrying a drink. After pausing for a moment, the man in the white shirt walked alongside the driver’s side of Lafountain’s car and looked in the passenger compartment. Once he was toward the front of Lafountain’s car, the man in the white shirt set what appeared to be the drink on the hood of the car next to Lafountain’s car. The female passenger from the Jeep joined the man in the white shirt at the front of Lafountain’s car. 3 The man in the white shirt picked up the item that he had set on the hood of the other car, and both he and the woman walked in front of Lafountain’s car. As he walked in front of Lafountain’s car, the man in the white shirt appeared to look in Lafountain’s direction before he pointed his right arm into the sky. Two flashes of light appeared at the end of the right hand of the man in the white shirt, followed by a third flash of light a moment later. The man in the white shirt and the woman walked away from Lafountain’s car and entered an apartment building. Through a lit window, the pair appeared to enter an apartment. A short time later, the man in the white shirt and the woman exited the apartment and returned to the parking lot. The man in the white shirt briefly engaged in conversation with Lafountain. The police arrived shortly thereafter, and the man in the white shirt and the woman again walked toward the apartment building. Lafountain approached the police and pointed them to the man in the white shirt. The video ended with the police approaching the man in the white shirt outside his apartment building. ¶ 16 On cross-examination, Lafountain admitted that he could not identify defendant as the shooter. Lafountain explained that he was not paying attention to defendant until after the shots fired, and at that point the shooter walked away from him. He also explained that the person who fired the gun and the person that he pointed out to the police was wearing the same clothes and This woman was later identified as Skylar and was referred to as defendant’s girlfriend. Her last 3 name does not appear in the record. 5 was with the same woman. Lafountain also explained that, when asked to identify the defendant, he “didn’t want to get close.” Regarding the fact that the video he just watched appeared to speed up in portions, Lafountain said, “This is exactly what happened that night.” ¶ 17 Timothy Atteberry testified that he was a patrol officer for the City of Champaign, and that he responded to the call that night. After he arrived, he met with Lafountain. Lafountain pointed to the person who discharged the firearm. Atteberry testified that the person Lafountain pointed out was the defendant, who Atteberry identified in court. ¶ 18 Benjamin Newell testified that he was a patrol sergeant with the Champaign Police Department. After he arrived, Newell spoke with defendant. They spoke outside defendant’s apartment building, later identified as being in building 301 of the apartment complex. They also spoke in Newell’s squad car. Defendant initially stated that he heard gunshots, but that he had nothing to do with the shooting. Defendant later told Newell that it was Skylar who fired the gun. Back at the station, they spoke some more. On cross-examination, Newell testified that when the police told defendant that they were going to complete a gunshot residue test (GSR test), defendant did not want to comply. Once Newell explained that he had to complete the GSR test, defendant did not resist the efforts. Newell admitted that Skylar was not subjected to GSR testing. On redirect, Newell explained that they did not ask Skylar to take a GSR test because there was no evidence to corroborate defendant’s claim that Skylar was the person who fired the gun. ¶ 19 Blake Wheling testified that he was a patrol officer for the Champaign Police Department, and that he responded to the scene of the investigation. One of Wheling’s roles was to collect evidence. Wheling found three 9-millimeter shell casings on the ground near Lafountain’s car. Wheling also participated in the search of defendant’s apartment. During the search, he found a Smith & Wesson revolver in a laundry basket in a child’s room. He photographed the revolver and 6 waited for Sergeant Warren to swab the pistol for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence before removing the firearm from the basket. Wheling also recovered mail addressed to defendant at that address. ¶ 20 James Warren testified that he was a patrol sergeant for the Champaign Police Department. He was on scene the night of the incident and reviewed the video of the incident. Warren explained that the video security system at the apartment complex was provided by Watchtower Security (Watchtower). Using a computer in his squad car, he accessed a live feed from the cameras. He further explained that every 30 minutes, the videos are placed on a server, and that “historical data” can be accessed from his squad car computer for a period of four days. For any video more than four days old, the police have to request the footage from the company. Warren testified that the footage fairly and accurately depicted what the cameras were able to capture. Warren identified the video compilation previously played for the jury. Warren explained that by using software, he was able to create an “event” that is reviewed by Watchtower personnel. Warren provided Watchtower with a description of what he wanted, e.g., the cameras and the time frames, and Watchtower subsequently provided Warren with a link to download the requested footage. On cross-examination, Warren admitted that he did not know who at Watchtower was responsible for putting the video compilation together. ¶ 21 The video footage was again published to the jury, and this time Sergeant Warren narrated the video for the jury. Trial counsel did not object to Warren’s narration of the events that occurred on the video, and no limiting instruction was requested or given. Warren described the location of the cameras within the apartment complex and the direction in which they pointed. Warren explained that the video may speed up when nothing of significance occurs, and it may slow down at critical moments. Warren testified that when a firearm is discharged, there is generally a muzzle 7 flash. After a portion of the video played, Warren testified that he saw “two very distinct muzzle flashes, and a third that [was] mostly viewable, but not as clear as the first two.” The prosecutor asked Warren, “there were two individuals you could see [on the video], one wearing a white shirt and one wearing dark clothes. Who did you observe discharging the firearm?” Warren answered, “Mr. Conerly.” Warren also testified that part of the video showed shadows of two people who he believed to be defendant and Skylar walking toward building 301. Warren believed that one of the shadows appeared to be holding a handgun in the right hand, and that he believed this was defendant’s shadow. A screenshot of this shadow was introduced into evidence. Warren also participated in the search of defendant’s residence in building 301. During the search, he found a Beretta pistol hidden underneath the drawer of the stove. An aftermarket laser was attached to the pistol. Warren personally collected DNA swabs from the weapons before they were packaged as evidence. ¶ 22 Various police officers testified regarding chain of custody and the forensic testing of the evidence seized. Other testimony elicited at trial established: (1) that the GSR test was never analyzed by the crime lab, because the science does not allow the examiner to differentiate between someone who fired a gun and someone who was in close proximity to a firearm when it was discharged; (2) that the shell casings recovered from the ground near Lafountain’s car were fired from the Beretta pistol that was recovered from under the stove in defendant’s residence; (3) that the DNA swab taken from the grip of the Beretta revealed the presence of DNA from three individuals, and that the statistical support for this profile belonging to defendant and two unknown individuals as one in 23 quadrillion; (4) that the DNA swab taken from the grip of the Smith & Wesson likewise revealed the presence of DNA from three individuals and that the statistical support for this profile belonging to defendant and two unknown individuals as one in 73 septillion; 8 and (5) that no fingerprints suitable for comparison were found on either firearm, which is not unusual due to the curved, uneven, and textured surfaces of firearms. ¶ 23 Detective Lance Carpenter from the Champaign Police Department testified that he reviewed some of the phone calls that defendant made from the county jail shortly after his arrest. The State played for the jury two of the calls that defendant made the morning after his arrest. During one of the calls, defendant said, “How they going to try to accuse me of something that *** mother f*** told them. They didn’t even—they didn’t see me do nothing.” ¶ 24 The State rested. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. Defendant rested without presenting any evidence. ¶ 25 During closing argument, the prosecutor argued that “[t]he defendant’s only contention when he talks to the police is that he wasn’t the one shooting. And that’s not supported by any other evidence.” The State also argued that consciousness of guilt could be inferred from both statements and omissions made by defendant during the calls he made from the jail the morning after his arrest, relying specifically on defendant’s statement that “[t]hey didn’t see me do it. They are relying on the word of a witness” and defendant’s failure to ask Skylar why she did not “tell the police what you did” and “[w]hy didn’t you own up to your guns?” ¶ 26 During his closing argument, Dedman argued that defendant’s DNA being part of the mixed DNA on the firearms could have been transferred to the firearms by another person who had contact with defendant, thus suggesting that this other person could have been responsible for defendant’s DNA appearing on the firearms. ¶ 27 On rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that defendant had not questioned the DNA experts on whether transfer DNA was possible in this case. The prosecutor also noted that the State had the burden of proof, but that the defense had “the same ability [as the State] to subpoena witnesses, 9 call witnesses, [and] have the evidence tested.” The State also argued, on rebuttal, that defendant initially refused to be swabbed for GSR testing, and that this refusal indicated defendant’s consciousness of guilt. Dedman did not object to any of these statements. The jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. ¶ 28 C. Posttrial ¶ 29 On the date of the sentencing hearing, Dedman filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The motion noted that defendant expressed dissatisfaction with Dedman and believed that he was ineffective. The trial court noted that defendant expressed some dissatisfaction with Dedman in the presentence report and asked defendant about his complaints. Defendant echoed his complaints from the presentence report, telling the court that he had never seen the discovery in the case, including the video, that he had to have family members and friends tell Dedman to call him, and that they never sat down to “come up with a strategy for trial.” Defendant also told the court that he preferred to proceed with the sentencing and to put this behind him. The court did not make any further inquiries of defendant, and asked Dedman whether he believed that he could effectively represent defendant at sentencing. The court did not ask Dedman about defendant’s accusations. Dedman expressed concern about representing defendant at the sentencing. Characterizing the problems as a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the court granted the motion to withdraw as counsel. The public defender was reappointed to represent defendant. ¶ 30 It does not appear that defendant filed any pro se motions prior to the sentencing hearing. However, at the sentencing hearing, the public defender provided the court with letters written on defendant’s behalf, and noted that one of the letters, a letter from a Michael Woolf, contained a document entitled “Motion to Reconsider Sentence.” The letter stated that the document had not yet been filed, but that defendant wanted the court “to be apprised of this.” The unfiled motion 10 contained allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defense counsel and the trial court considered the motion to be premature since defendant had not yet been sentenced. In his allocution, defendant noted that his prior aggravated battery conviction should not count as a predicate offense for the armed habitual criminal charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections on the armed habitual criminal charges and 3 years in prison on the reckless discharge of a firearm offense. ¶ 31 After sentencing, defendant filed a motion to proceed pro se on his newly filed pro se motion to reconsider sentence. Although defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence claimed that his sentence was excessive, the motion primarily focused on defendant’s claim that Dedman was ineffective. Defendant again raised the use of defendant’s prior convictions as predicate offenses for the armed habitual criminal charges. In addition to claims regarding the use of the predicate offenses and the use of the stipulation, defendant alleged Dedman was ineffective for failing to file a motion to “quash arrest and suppress evidence” and for “accusing defendant of shooting a gun” during closing argument. At a hearing on defendant’s motion to proceed pro se, defendant told the court that he believed he was being forced to proceed pro se, because appointed counsel would not present his motion in its entirety. Appointed counsel explained that she told defendant that some of the issues he wanted to raise were not appropriate for a motion to reconsider the sentence. Since defendant told the trial court that he preferred representation on a motion to reconsider sentence, defendant’s motion to proceed pro se was denied. Thereafter, the public defender filed a motion to reconsider sentence. It did not raise defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court denied the motion to reconsider sentence. 11 ¶ 32 D. First Appeal ¶ 33 In his first appeal to this court, defendant argued that the State failed to prove him guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the two counts of armed habitual criminal. Conerly, 2024 IL App (5th) 220779-U, ¶ 28. Defendant’s argument centered on his contention that one of the two offenses used to prove armed habitual criminal did not qualify as a predicate offense for armed habitual criminal. Id. Because Dedman stipulated to the use of defendant’s prior convictions, this court found that defendant could not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. ¶ 35. This court then considered defendant’s alternative argument that Dedman was ineffective for stipulating to the predicate offenses where one of the offenses could not, by law, function as a predicate offense for armed habitual criminal. Id. ¶ 36. We found that Dedman was ineffective for making the stipulation, and that defendant was prejudiced as a result. Id. ¶ 53. Accordingly, defendant’s armed habitual criminal convictions were reversed. Id. ¶ 34 Defendant also made several other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. This court found that the trial court’s failure to address these issues left an insufficient record precluding appellate review. For this reason, the matter was remanded for the appointment of new counsel and an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Krankel. ¶ 35 E. Evidentiary Krankel Hearing on Remand ¶ 36 On remand, new counsel was appointed for defendant. She filed a motion for a new trial. Relevant to this appeal, she alleged that Dedman was ineffective for (1) failing to object to the admission of a compilation video, on foundational grounds, that showed defendant discharging a firearm; (2) failing to object to a police officer’s narration of the compilation video; (3) failing to investigate or call defendant’s then girlfriend, Skylar, as a witness at trial; (4) failing to object to improper closing argument by the State; (5) asking the State’s DNA expert about a defendant’s 12 costs to have DNA testing completed; and, (6) withdrawing a written motion for testing of gunshot residue (GSR) swabs taken at the time of defendant’s arrest. ¶ 37 On July 1, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. Defendant presented no evidence. The State called Dedman as its only witness. Regarding the foundation for the compilation video, Dedman testified that he believed Lafountain’s testimony that he watched the video and that it was an accurate representation of what occurred that night was a sufficient foundation. Dedman drew a distinction between a surveillance video made in the absence of a witness (silent witness video) and a surveillance video where a witness could testify that the video was an accurate description of what occurred. ¶ 38 Dedman testified that he did not object to Seargent Warren’s narration regarding the existence of the muzzle flashes. He explained that he feared that the objection would be overruled and that would serve to “imprint on the jury that maybe” the difficult-to-see flashes of light were indeed muzzle flashes. Dedman hoped that he could get the jury to focus on the video and conclude that the flashes were not gunshots. Dedman noted that muzzle flashes on television tend to be dramatic and that the flashes seen on the video were “not in any way dramatic.” Although Dedman was not asked any questions about Warren’s identification of the shooter as the defendant, he was asked about it on cross-examination. Dedman admitted that he had not requested a pretrial hearing to determine whether Warren’s identification of defendant on the video was admissible and further acknowledged that a police officer’s identification of a defendant on a video is “powerful evidence that a jury considers.” ¶ 39 Regarding defendant’s claim that he was ineffective for failing to interview and call Skylar as a witness, Dedman testified that defendant made it clear that he did not want Dedman to call or contact her. Dedman further testified that he did not think calling Skylar as a witness would have 13 been a good idea, explaining that defendant told the police that Skylar had fired the gun, but that “[t]he video didn’t give much wiggle room for that interpretation of events.” ¶ 40 The next claim addressed was defendant’s claim that Dedman was ineffective for failing to object to portions of the State’s closing argument wherein “the State argued that it was [defendant’s] responsibility to present forensic evidence disproving the State’s theory of the case, and that [defendant’s] failure to present exculpatory evidence should be held against him.” Dedman explained that the trial court had already ruled, with regard to the failure of the State to test the GSR swabs and pursuant to People v. Mudd, 2022 IL 126830, that the jury be instructed that defendant had the right to have the testing completed and that the testing would have been completed if the defendant so requested. Dedman noted that he objected to that instruction and further noted that the State repeatedly acknowledged that it had the burden of proof. ¶ 41 Dedman testified regarding defendant’s argument that he was ineffective for asking the State’s DNA analyst what it would cost him to have DNA testing done, and her answer that it would be “free.” Dedman stated that he knew it would not have cost him anything if he requested further analysis, and that he considered the question to be “theater.” Dedman explained, “[M]y comments were *** ironical, and intended to—like, oh, yeah, the government always takes care of you, you know? I want them to—I wanted to nurture any feelings they had about the government helping people, and knowing that they don’t.” On cross-examination, Dedman further explained that during closing argument, he “was talking about, yes, we could do that, but I didn’t have people to go out there and collect any DNA. It’s a—an exercise in nothing. It’s a right you don’t have because you don’t have the means to it—exercise it.” ¶ 42 With regard to the claim that he was ineffective for withdrawing the request for GSR testing, Dedman stated that he explained the limitations of GSR evidence to defendant and that it 14 would take about a year to get the testing done. Defendant did not want to wait a year but instead wanted to have his trial “right now.” For these reasons, “we decided to withdraw the motion.” ¶ 43 After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court took a recess before ruling from the bench. The court first noted that it found Dedman’s testimony credible, and that he was the only witness that testified. ¶ 44 The court first addressed Dedman’s failure to object to the admission of the compilation video. The court found that it was a “close call” and that not every foundational requirement was met, but that Dedman’s failure to object was not objectively unreasonable. With regard to Dedman’s failure to object to the narration of the video, the court also found that Dedman’s performance was not objectively unreasonable with regard to what he observed on the video with one exception: Warren’s identification of defendant as the shooter. The court found that an objectively reasonable attorney would have requested a pretrial hearing on this specific issue pursuant to People v. Thompson, 2016 IL 118667, or at least would have objected to the testimony. ¶ 45 The trial court next discussed the allegation that Dedman was ineffective for failing to investigate Skylar. The court noted that defendant had not testified, and that neither he nor Skylar provided an affidavit, and that it was speculative as to what she would have said had she spoken to Dedman or testified. The court further noted that Dedman credibly testified that defendant told him that he did not want Skylar involved. Accordingly, Dedman was not ineffective for this reason. ¶ 46 With regard to defendant’s allegation that Dedman was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s closing argument, the trial court characterized some of the State’s comments during closing argument as “improper” before noting that “they are somewhat taken out of context” and were made on rebuttal. The court noted that “probably at least half [of most defense attorneys], if not more, probably would have objected” and characterized this issue as “a very, very close call.” 15 ¶ 47 Turning to Dedman’s cross-examination of the State’s DNA analyst, while noting that attorneys often engage in theatrics, the trial court stated that it was concerned that the question “could potentially harm the Defendant” and “would be something that would not normally be done by counsel.” The court considered defendant’s argument that Dedman was ineffective for withdrawing the request to have the GSR swabs tested. The court noted Dedman’s testimony about the limited relevance of GSR test in determining who fired a gun, and also found, “more importantly,” that defendant indicated a desire to have his trial before the GSR test results would be available. ¶ 48 The trial court ultimately concluded that Dedman’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness with regard to three issues: (1) for not requesting a Thompson hearing before Sergeant Warren testified and for not objecting to Warren’s testimony identifying defendant from the video, (2) “arguably” for “not objecting to the State’s arguments in rebuttal about the defense having the same ability to call witnesses,” and (3) for “asking the question about the fee for the DNA results.” ¶ 49 The trial court then noted that “[e]ven if all three of those performances fell below the level of a reasonable attorney, I have to find prejudice. That there’s a likely outcome different [sic]. That there would have been some change in the verdicts by the jury.” After summarizing the evidence presented at trial, the court failed to find that “there was any reasonable likelihood that it would have changed the outcome.” Accordingly, the court ruled that Dedman had not committed ineffective assistance of counsel and denied defendant’s motion for a new trial. ¶ 50 A timely notice of appeal followed. 16 ¶ 51 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 52 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying Krankel counsel’s motion for a new trial. Specifically, defendant argues that the court erred by finding that Dedman’s failure to object to the admissibility of the compilation video did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant also argues the court erred by finding that defendant was not prejudiced by Dedman’s (1) failure to object to Sergeant Warren’s improper identification testimony, (2) failure to object to the State’s improper closing argument, and (3) eliciting testimony damaging to defendant’s case. Finally, defendant contends that the cumulative effect of these errors warrants reversal of defendant’s conviction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm and address each argument in turn. ¶ 53 A. Strickland ¶ 54 Initially, we note that our review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims is guided by the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and adopted by our supreme court in People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984). To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard, one must show both that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness (deficient performance prong) and ( 2 ) a reasonable probability exists that, but for the error, the result would have been different (prejudice prong). People v. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d 319, 326-27 (2011). A defendant must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Evans, 209 Ill. 2d 194, 220 (2004). Thus, defendant’s failure to establish either deficient performance or prejudice will be fatal to the claim. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 411 (2000). “ ‘[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result 17 of the alleged deficiencies. *** If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.’ ” Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d at 527 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). ¶ 55 To establish deficiency under the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that the complained-of action or inaction might have been the product of counsel’s sound trial strategy. Manning, 241 Ill. 2d at 327. The reviewing court must evaluate counsel’s performance from his perspective at the time rather than “through the lens of hindsight.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007). An evaluation of counsel’s actions cannot extend into matters involving the exercise of judgment, strategy, or trial tactics. People v. Penrod, 316 Ill. App. 3d 713, 722 (2000). “Reviewing courts should hesitate to second-guess counsel’s strategic decisions, even where those decisions seem questionable.” Manning, 241 Ill. 2d at 335. ¶ 56 To establish prejudice, “defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance rendered the result of the trial unreliable or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.” Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d at 411. If defendant’s claim can be disposed of on the basis that he suffered no prejudice, then a court should not decide whether counsel’s performance was deficient. People v. Villanueva, 382 Ill. App. 3d 301, 308 (2008). ¶ 57 B. Admissibility of the Compilation Video ¶ 58 Turning to the merits of defendant’s claims, we first consider the admissibility of the compilation video. Defendant argues that the video “did not accurately depict what Gabriel LaFountain saw, Seargeant Warren had no firsthand knowledge of what was depicted in the video, and neither witness could testify about what changes were made to the original recordings in producing the compilation video played in court, or the video’s chain of custody.” In support of his argument that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of the 18 compilation video, defendant invokes the “silent witness” rule. The State contends that a sufficient foundation was laid for the admission of the video. ¶ 59 A foundation for the admission of a video as demonstrative evidence is sufficient when “a witness with personal knowledge of the filmed object testifies that the film is an accurate portrayal of what it purports to show.” People v. Smith, 321 Ill. App. 3d 669, 675 (2001). A proper foundation requires that the testifying witness was present when the recording was made. Id. “ ‘Demonstrative evidence has no probative value in itself. It serves, rather, as a visual aid to the jury in comprehending the verbal testimony of a witness.’ ” People v. Flores, 406 Ill. App. 3d 566, 573 (2010) (quoting Cisarik v. Palos Community Hospital, 144 Ill. 2d 339, 341 (1991)). ¶ 60 Photograph