People v. Wallace

2026 IL App (4th) 250795 FILED June 5, 2026 NO. 4-25-0795 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Tazewell County JIMMIE L. WALLACE, ) No. 23CF357 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) ) Honorable ) Christopher R. Doscotch, ) Judge Presiding. JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices DeArmond and Grischow concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 Following a stipulated bench trial, defendant, Jimmie L. Wallace, was convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2022)) and sentenced to three years and two months in prison. He appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence against him and (2) the UPWF statute is unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to him. We affirm. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 On May 22, 2023, at approximately 2 a.m., officers with the Pekin Police Department conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. The stop resulted in a search of the vehicle, as well as a backpack that defendant had attempted to remove from the vehicle but was told to leave inside. An officer discovered a firearm in the backpack, and defendant acknowledged that he had purchased the firearm and knew it was in the backpack. In June 2023, defendant was charged by indictment with UPWF (id.). The charge was based on allegations that he possessed a gun after having previously been convicted of the felony offense of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance in Peoria County case No. 11-CF-42. ¶4 In March 2024, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him. He argued that the traffic stop, his detention, and his arrest were unlawful and that the police violated his constitutional rights by ordering him to exit the vehicle without his backpack. Defendant asked the trial court to suppress evidence obtained from the searches of the vehicle and his backpack, along with statements he made to the police. ¶5 In January 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress. Pekin police officer Tyler Bucco testified that at around 2 a.m. on May 22, 2023, he was on patrol in Pekin and observed a male, later identified as defendant, standing on a corner near a Circle K gas station. Defendant stared as Bucco drove by, and Bucco parked in a nearby parking lot to “wait for a call to come through from dispatch.” Bucco denied seeing defendant earlier the same morning. He also described the Circle K as being in “a high crime area.” He asserted that drug deals occurred at that location and he had made approximately five methamphetamine-related arrests at Circle K in the two and a half years he worked for the Pekin Police Department. ¶6 While parked, Bucco observed a female, who was driving a Nissan SUV, pull into a parking spot at the Circle K. The SUV remained “for less than two seconds” before immediately pulling out and leaving. Bucco did not see anyone enter or exit the vehicle. He testified he found the circumstances suspicious and decided to follow the vehicle. Bucco conducted a “registration check” and learned the vehicle was registered to a single female owner named Julie Pokorny, whose driver’s license had been suspended. Bucco initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, pulling it -2- over at “an industrial park type of area” that was also “a drug area.” Bucco approached the vehicle and identified Pokorny as its driver. He stated defendant was in the vehicle’s front passenger seat. ¶7 During the traffic stop, Bucco asked Pokorny for proof of insurance, which she was initially unable to provide. Around that time, another Pekin police officer, Cody Vicary, arrived at the scene. Bucco testified that Vicary was the officer who identified defendant. Vicary also spoke with defendant regarding the issue of Pokorny’s insurance. Defendant informed Vicary that he “was on the phone with State Farm” and, ultimately, Vicary “was able to collect [Pokorny’s] insurance information.” ¶8 Bucco testified he decided to write Pokorny a ticket for driving with a suspended license and “release her on a notice to appear.” At the time of the incident, he had discretion regarding whether to make an arrest for the offense at issue. However, the Pekin Police Department’s towing policy required that he have Pokorny’s vehicle towed. Bucco testified he was not permitted to allow someone else to drive her vehicle from the scene, even if that person had a valid license. ¶9 Bucco stated that Pokorny called for a ride from the scene and Vicary had defendant step out of the vehicle so that the officers could “conduct an inventory of the vehicle.” He testified that an inventory involved going through the vehicle and determining what was inside and that its purpose was “to protect the officer and the police department from any accusations of theft or any type of liability that could be associated with towing the vehicle.” Conducting an inventory also guarded against allegations of theft by the tow truck driver. ¶ 10 According to Bucco, Vicary began “the tow inventory” while Bucco worked on Pokorny’s notice to appear in his squad car. At that time, both defendant and Pokorny were outside of Bucco’s car, and defendant was standing at Bucco’s window, asking him questions about why -3- the vehicle had to be towed and why defendant could not drive it. Bucco acknowledged that defendant was free to walk about the scene of the traffic stop for some amount of time before he was ultimately detained. During that time, Bucco never “patted [defendant] down,” “frisked” defendant, or asked defendant to keep his hands out of his pockets. He identified the officer safety concerns he had during the stop as being based on “the time of night and where we were and the lack of lighting and essentially the secluded area.” ¶ 11 Finally, Bucco testified that he did not take part in the inventory search and did not remember looking at any of the contents of Pokorny’s car. He acknowledged that Pekin Police Department policy required “an itemized inventory log” of all the items in a vehicle. Bucco stated that he did not fill out an itemized list. He also had not seen an itemized list prepared by Vicary. ¶ 12 Vicary testified that he assisted Bucco with the underlying traffic stop. Upon his arrival at the scene, he approached the passenger side of the vehicle and identified defendant as the passenger. Vicary agreed that defendant was cooperative and that, at that moment, he had “[n]o concerns about [defendant] for officer safety.” Because the driver of the vehicle had a suspended license, the vehicle had to be towed, pursuant to the Pekin Police Department’s towing policy. ¶ 13 Once the officers determined the vehicle had to be towed, Vicary asked defendant to step out of the vehicle so that he could conduct an inventory search. He agreed that “a tow inventory” involved going through a vehicle and determining what property was inside before it was towed. The purpose of an inventory search was to protect the property, shield the police from liability, and shelter the tow company from liability “of anything going missing.” Vicary testified that as defendant was exiting the vehicle, he tried to remove from the vehicle “a bag” that had been held between his legs. However, Vicary told defendant to leave the “bag,” and defendant complied. Vicary testified he did not allow the “bag” to be removed “for [his] safety,” stating he did not -4- “know what could be in the bag.” He also testified that he was concerned for his safety, noting defendant’s “demeanor of *** being upset about the stop.” On examination by the State, Vicary further agreed that the stop occurred at 2 a.m., it was dark outside, there were only two officers at the scene, and the stop was not in a residential area with civilians who could call for help if needed. ¶ 14 Less than two minutes after defendant exited the vehicle, Vicary began the inventory search. “[A]lmost immediately,” he located “a small jar with white residue.” Vicary described the residue as a “crystal substance.” From his training and experience, he was familiar with what methamphetamine looked like, and he recognized the white residue as “an illegal substance.” Vicary stated that after locating the jar, he had probable cause to search the car, its occupants, and any containers in the car. He then searched the “bag” that had been between defendant’s feet and found a loaded “Glock 22.” ¶ 15 Vicary agreed that during the entirety of the traffic stop before the gun was found, defendant was never in handcuffs and no officer had conducted a “pat-down search” of defendant. Vicary stated that “he attempted to ask” defendant to submit to a search or “pat down” to check for weapons after defendant exited the vehicle. He also asked defendant “if he had any weapons on him.” According to Vicary, defendant ignored him and walked away. At that point in the stop, Vicary did not know if defendant had any weapons on him, and he characterized defendant as being uncooperative. ¶ 16 Vicary stated that multiple items were found during his search of Pokorny’s vehicle, and he agreed that based on the vehicle’s contents, “[i]t looked like somebody was moving houses.” He also acknowledged that when a vehicle was being towed for impound, the Pekin Police Department required “an itemized inventory log of all the items in the car.” Vicary testified that he did not complete a tow receipt that would have included a list of such items. Instead, he “stayed -5- with the gun” after it was found, and Bucco “ended up completing the tow receipt.” Vicary agreed that Bucco did not list the items in the car, explaining that he and Bucco “failed to communicate what was in the vehicle prior to [Bucco] completing the tow receipt.” ¶ 17 Defendant testified that he was upset during the traffic stop because Bucco had “followed [him] around” prior to the stop. He stated he saw Bucco several times as he walked from his house to the Circle K, which was several blocks away. During the traffic stop, Vicary ordered him out of the car. Defendant tried to take the backpack he had between his legs but was told to “leave it.” Defendant stated he complied because he did not want to make the officer mad. He also testified that before being ordered to exit the vehicle, he got out of the vehicle “a couple times.” He stated he exited once to take his cell phone to Bucco’s car to help verify that Pokorny’s vehicle was insured. He asserted he was also out of the vehicle another time, talking to the officers about why he was not being allowed to drive Pokorny’s car. ¶ 18 Following defendant’s testimony, the State recalled Bucco as a witness. He denied that prior to Vicary’s arrival at the scene, defendant exited Pokorny’s vehicle and approached him with his cell phone. ¶ 19 In addition to witness testimony, several exhibits were admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing. The exhibits included (1) recordings from both Bucco’s and Vicary’s body cameras; (2) transcripts of the officers’ body camera recordings; (3) a police report from Emilie Montoya, who also responded to the scene of the traffic stop; (4) written policies of the Pekin Police Department, including its vehicle towing and inventory search policies; (5) a City of Pekin ordinance regarding vehicle seizure and impoundment; and (6) a still image taken from the recording of Vicary’s body camera that depicted the items found in defendant’s backpack, including the gun. -6- ¶ 20 Consistent with the officers’ testimonies, the recordings from their body cameras showed Bucco stopped Pokorny’s vehicle and spoke with Pokorny during the stop. After obtaining Pokorny’s driver’s license, he returned to his squad car and confirmed that her license was suspended. When Vicary arrived at the scene, he spoke with Bucco before approaching Pokorny’s vehicle and obtaining defendant’s driver’s license. Vicary returned to Bucco’s squad car, noting that defendant appeared upset for “no reason.” He also noted the presence of a glass jar in the vehicle and the backpack between defendant’s legs. The officers discussed conducting an inventory search and removing Pokorny and defendant from the vehicle. ¶ 21 Initially, Bucco removed Pokorny from the vehicle, directing her to stand near the front of his car. They discussed Pokorny’s suspension and the necessity of having her vehicle impounded. Bucco then returned to his squad car as Pokorny stood with Vicary. Defendant, who was still in Pokorny’s vehicle, waved Vicary over, stating he was on the phone with State Farm. Vicary took defendant’s phone to Pokorny, who was able to obtain proof that her vehicle was insured. Vicary then returned to Pokorny’s vehicle and asked defendant to step out. As defendant exited, he attempted to remove a backpack that had been on the floorboard between his legs. However, Vicary stated, “[Y]ou can leave your stuff in there,” and defendant left the backpack. Vicary then explained to defendant that the vehicle had to be towed and that Pokorny had a suspended license. He also asked defendant if he had any weapons on him. Defendant did not answer and walked away from Vicary toward Bucco’s squad car, where Pokorny was standing. ¶ 22 The recordings showed that Pokorny and defendant stood near Bucco’s squad car, where they spoke to him through an open window. Vicary returned to Pokorny’s vehicle to conduct an inventory search. He began his search in the driver’s seat area of the vehicle. Vicary shined his flashlight in the area of the steering wheel and dashboard, lifted a cover on the driver’s seat, looked -7- under the driver’s seat, and opened a compartment in the center console. He lifted several items out of the center console and then quickly sifted through the numerous items inside. After closing the compartment, Vicary continued his search of the center console area. Approximately one minute into his search, he picked up a glass jar near the front of the center console area and audibly noted it had “white residue all in it.” ¶ 23 Vicary next moved to the driver’s side back seat area of Pokorny’s vehicle, where he noted the presence of some large speakers. He then opened the vehicle’s trunk and stated that it contained golf clubs, pool cues, and food items. Vicary continued his search by opening the rear passenger side door. He shined his flashlight inside the vehicle and moved what appeared to be an item of clothing on the seat. He did not audibly note the presence of any items. Finally, Vicary opened the front passenger side door and shined his flashlight on the floorboard and between the passenger’s seat and the center console. Vicary opened the backpack that was sitting on the passenger side floorboard and found the gun. Shortly thereafter, the officers detained and then arrested defendant as he stood near Bucco’s squad car. ¶ 24 Montoya’s police report showed that she responded to the scene of the traffic stop as defendant was being handcuffed and defendant was placed in the back of her squad car. She read defendant his Miranda rights (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)), and, thereafter, defendant made statements indicating the backpack in Pokorny’s vehicle was his, he knew the gun was in the backpack, and “he bought [the gun] from a guy named ‘John.’ ” ¶ 25 The evidence further showed that a City of Pekin ordinance provided for the seizure and impoundment of vehicles “used in connection with” a driving while license suspended violation. Pekin City Code § 5-10-2-1-4(a)(1) (adopted Jan. 24, 2023). Additionally, policies of the Pekin Police Department required that when a vehicle is towed, officers “complete a Tow -8- Form” that included “a description of property within the vehicle.” With respect to vehicle inventories, the department’s policies stated as follows: “All property in a stored vehicle shall be inventoried and listed on the Tow Report. This includes the trunk and any compartments or containers, even if closed and/or locked. Members conducting inventory searches should be as thorough and accurate as practical in preparing an itemized inventory. These inventory procedures are for the purpose of protecting an owner’s property while in police custody, to provide for the safety of officers, and to protect the Department against fraudulent claims of lost, stolen, or damaged property.” The department’s policies also addressed the removal of items from an impounded vehicle, stating as follows: “Unless it would cause an unreasonable delay in the completion of a vehicle impound/storage or create an issue of officer safety, officers should make reasonable accommodations to permit a driver/owner to retrieve small items of value or personal need (e.g. cash, jewelry, cell phone, prescriptions) which are not considered evidence or contraband.” ¶ 26 At the suppression hearing, defendant’s counsel argued that Vicary was not authorized to tell defendant to leave his backpack in the vehicle and that, at the time he did so, “there was no probable cause to search a passenger.” He also discounted Vicary’s assertion that he told defendant to leave his backpack for safety reasons, pointing out that defendant was never patted down for weapons upon exiting Pokorny’s vehicle. Counsel agreed that “if there’s probable cause to search, you search whatever is in the passenger compartment of the car.” However, he maintained that if defendant was already out of the vehicle with his backpack, it was not subject -9- to being searched. Additionally, counsel argued that the officers violated the Pekin Police Department policy for inventory searches by failing to keep a list of the items in the vehicle. Counsel asserted such inaction suggested the officers had some other motive for the search than simply taking an inventory of items. ¶ 27 In response, the State argued that officer safety was a valid basis for Vicary to direct defendant to leave the backpack in the vehicle when he exited. It also asserted that Vicary’s search of the vehicle began as a valid inventory search and that it became a search based on probable cause once Vicary found the jar with the white residue that he suspected was an illegal substance. It maintained that, during a search based on probable cause, Vicary could “search anything that’s in the car at that time as well as the occupants that were in the car.” Finally, the State asserted that even if Vicary could not lawfully have ordered defendant to leave the backpack in the car, “inevitable discovery would have led to finding of the gun.” It argued as follows: “[O]nce [the officers] had probable cause to search that car, they can search that bag. It had been in the car when the drugs were in the car during that traffic stop, so there is inevitable discovery.” ¶ 28 The trial court took the matter under advisement. In March 2025, it issued oral and written rulings, denying defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The court found Vicary conducted an inventory search consistent with Pekin Police Department policy up to the point that he located the glass jar with the white residue. It stated Vicary “abandoned” the inventory search upon finding the glass jar and, later, the weapon. The court concluded that, consistent with police department policy, Vicary’s search was initially “thorough”; however, it became less so after he found the glass jar and moved to the back seat and trunk. The court concluded that Vicary never completed the inventory search and pointed out that he did not “create a list to protect driver and department from claims of theft or lost property.” - 10 - ¶ 29 Nevertheless, consistent with the State’s argument, the trial court found Vicary had probable cause to search the vehicle for contraband upon finding the glass jar with the white substance. It determined that based upon Vicary’s training and experience, he “had a reasonable belief that the substance was an illegal drug,” i.e., methamphetamine. The court further found as follows: “The stop was lawful. It was 2 [a.m.] when the stop occurred. The gas station and industrial area are high crime areas. The suspect car pulled over for seconds before pulling away at the gas station. Based upon the officer’s training and experience, the appearance of the glass jar was consistent with illegal drugs. The decision to search the vehicle for other contraband was reasonable.” ¶ 30 The trial court emphasized that the glass jar was found in an open area of the center console and that it was accessible by both Pokorny and defendant. It also found that Vicary asked defendant to leave his backpack in the car due to safety concerns, and it found those concerns were objectively reasonable. In setting forth its oral ruling, the court noted that the evidence showed Vicary subsequently “gave up” on conducting “a pat-down” of defendant. While stating that decision was “probably not a best practice,” it also concluded such circumstances did not “undermine the objective nature of leaving the bag in there for safety purposes.” The court further concluded that “[t]he bag was proximal to the glass jar” and that it was reasonable for the officers to search the “bag” even if it was presumed to belong to defendant or if defendant had removed it when exiting the vehicle for the inventory search. The court reasoned as follows: “The bag was in the vehicle with the suspected drugs. Officers would have inevitably searched the bag even if defendant took it out of the car with him due to its proximity to contraband.” ¶ 31 On March 19, 2025, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing the - 11 - UPWF statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. He maintained that, under the test set forth in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), for evaluating gun laws, the UPWF statute violated the second amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. II). According to defendant, his conduct in possessing a firearm was presumptively protected under the second amendment, and the State could not show the UPWF statute was analogous to and consistent with historically accepted restrictions on firearm possession. In particular, defendant maintained that his prior felony convictions were drug-related and nonviolent and did not involve the “ ‘improper use of a weapon.’ ” He supported his motion with his own affidavit and exhibits that contained information about his criminal history. ¶ 32 In May 2025, the trial court heard and denied defendant’s motion to dismiss. The matter then proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. The stipulated evidence included “a copy of the docket” in Peoria County case No. 11-CF-42, showing defendant’s prior felony conviction for unlawful delivery of a controlled substance. The stipulated evidence further consisted of evidence presented at the suppression hearing, including the witness testimony from Bucco, Vicary, and defendant; the photograph of the firearm; recordings from the officers’ body cameras; and Montoya’s police report. Following argument by the parties, the court found defendant guilty of the charged offense. ¶ 33 In July 2025, defendant filed a posttrial motion for a new trial or a motion for a judgment of acquittal. He argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and his motion to dismiss the indictment. Defendant also argued the evidence in the case failed to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Following a hearing the same month, the court denied defendant’s posttrial motion and sentenced him to three years and two months in prison. ¶ 34 This appeal followed. - 12 - ¶ 35 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 36 A. Motion to Suppress Evidence ¶ 37 On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. He contends the warrantless search of his backpack circumvented fourth amendment protections (see U.S. Const., amend. IV) because (1) Vicary lacked the authority to order him to leave his backpack in Pokorny’s vehicle immediately prior to the inventory search and (2) the inventory search did not comply with police department policies and was invalid. According to defendant, both the gun evidence and his statements to the police should have been suppressed, and his UPWF conviction should be reversed. ¶ 38 “A circuit court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents questions of both fact and law.” People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, ¶ 25. When considering such rulings on appeal, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Molina, 2024 IL 129237, ¶ 17. Initially, the court’s factual findings will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 35. The court’s ultimate determination of whether suppression is warranted is subject to de novo review. Molina, 2024 IL 129237, ¶ 17. ¶ 39 Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. See U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6; see also People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9 (“The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states under the fourteenth amendment, and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). “[S]topping a vehicle - 13 - and detaining its occupants constitute a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the fourth amendment.” Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9. Such seizures are analyzed under the principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), which authorize a brief, investigatory stop of a person when a police officer has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9. “A police officer may stop a vehicle if he has a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle has committed a traffic violation.” Dunmire, 2019 IL App (4th) 190316, ¶ 72. ¶ 40 Additionally, “a search is per se unreasonable if conducted without a warrant supported by probable cause and approved by a judge or magistrate.” People v. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 20. However, there are exceptions to the warrant requirement, including one for automobiles “because their transient nature often renders it impracticable to secure a warrant before the automobile escapes the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id. ¶ 21. “Under the automobile exception, law enforcement officers may undertake a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of criminal activity that the officers are entitled to seize.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Molina, 2024 IL 129237, ¶ 20. ¶ 41 “Probable cause requires a showing that the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would justify a reasonable person in believing that the automobile contains contraband or evidence of criminal activity.” People v. Webb, 2023 IL 128957, ¶ 25. “Because probable cause deals with probabilities, not certainties, probable cause does not require an officer to rule out any innocent explanations for suspicious facts.” Id. Additionally, “[i]n determining whether probable cause exists, officers may rely on their law-enforcement training and experience to make inferences that might evade an untrained - 14 - civilian.” Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 23. ¶ 42 Another exception to the fourth amendment’s warrant requirement is “[a]n inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle.” People v. Gipson, 203 Ill. 2d 298, 304 (2003). The objectives of an inventory search are “(1) protection of the owner’s property; (2) protection of the police against claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger.” Id. To be valid, an inventory search must satisfy three requirements: “(1) the original impoundment of the vehicle must be lawful [citation]; (2) the purpose of the inventory search must be to protect the owner’s property and to protect the police from claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property and to guard the police from danger [citation]; and (3) the inventory search must be conducted in good faith pursuant to reasonable standardized police procedures and not as a pretext for an investigatory search.” People v. Hundley, 156 Ill. 2d 135, 138 (1993). ¶ 43 1. Vicary’s Request That Defendant Leave the Backpack in the Vehicle ¶ 44 As stated, defendant initially argues that his fourth amendment rights were violated because Vicary ordered him to leave his backpack in Pokorny’s vehicle immediately prior to the inventory search. He contends he exercised possession over the backpack and notes that it was positioned between his legs while he was in the vehicle. According to defendant, because of these circumstances, he should have been “afforded the same protections to the bag that would [have been] afforded to his person.” Defendant suggests that his backpack should have received heightened privacy protections, given its proximity to him in the vehicle and his effort to exercise control over it. ¶ 45 a. Relevant Case Authority - 15 - ¶ 46 Here, the trial court determined that the search of Pokorny’s vehicle began as a lawful inventory search that became a probable cause search after Vicary found the glass jar with suspected methamphetamine. Regarding vehicle searches, the United States Supreme Court has held that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). Although probable cause to search a vehicle does not justify a body search of a passenger (United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948)), a police officer with probable cause to search a vehicle “may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999). ¶ 47 The Supreme Court’s decision in Houghton is instructive to both the issue presented and the parties’ arguments. In Houghton, a police officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle with a male driver and two female passengers. Id. at 297-98. During the stop, the officer noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket, which the driver admitted was associated with drug use. Id. at 298. A probable cause search of the vehicle followed. During that search, the police also searched a purse that was on the back seat and claimed by one of the female passengers. Id. In the purse, the police found drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine, and they arrested the purse’s owner. Id. ¶ 48 On review, the Supreme Court upheld the search of the purse, stating “that police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that are capable of concealing the object of the search.” Id. at 307. The court reasoned that it had previously “read the historical evidence to show that the Framers would have regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless search of containers within an - 16 - automobile.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 300. It found that determination applied to all containers within a vehicle, “without qualification as to ownership.” Id. at 301. ¶ 49 The Supreme Court also found that “the balancing of the relative interests weigh[ed] decidedly in favor of allowing searches of a passenger’s belongings.” Id. at 303. It stated that “[p]assengers, no less than drivers, possess a reduced expectation of privacy with regard to the property that they transport in cars.” Id. In particular, the Court determined that the “package search” at issue “differ[ed] substantially” from the circumstances at issue in Di Re, where it had “held that probable cause to search a car did not justify a body search of a passenger.” Id. The Court stated as follows: “[Di Re] turned on the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s person. ‘Even a limited search of the outer clothing . . . constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.’ [Citation.] Such traumatic consequences are not to be expected when the police examine an item of personal property found in a car.” Id. The Court concluded that while a passenger’s privacy expectations to personal property are “considerably diminished, the governmental interests *** are substantial.” Id. at 304. Specifically, “[e]ffective law enforcement would be appreciably impaired without the ability to search a passenger’s personal belongings when there is reason to believe contraband or evidence of criminal wrongdoing is hidden in the car.” Id. ¶ 50 In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer emphasized that the rule announced by the Supreme Court applied only to containers found within automobiles and did not extend to the search of a person. Id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring). He also characterized purses as “special - 17 - containers,” which might, in his view, warrant a different result if “attached” to a person. Id. “[A]lso important, is the fact that the container here at issue, a woman’s purse, was found at a considerable distance from its owner, who did not claim ownership until the officer discovered her identification while looking through it. Purses are special containers. They are repositories of especially personal items that people generally like to keep with them at all times. So I am tempted to say that a search of a purse involves an intrusion so similar to a search of one’s person that the same rule should govern both. However, given this Court’s prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the Court has warned against trying to make that kind of distinction. [Citation.] But I can say that it would matter if a woman’s purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of ‘outer clothing,’ [citation], which under the Court’s cases would properly receive increased protection. [Citation.] In this case, the purse was separate from the person, and no one has claimed that, under those circumstances, the type of container makes a difference. For that reason, I join the Court’s opinion.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. ¶ 51 On appeal, defendant effectively relies on Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Houghton in arguing that his backpack in the present case should have been afforded the same protections as afforded to his person. He contends that no Illinois case addresses the precise questions at issue on appeal, which he characterizes as “whether an officer can order an individual to leave a personal bag in the vehicle during a search, or whether that would constitute a search of their person.” Accordingly, defendant cites cases from other jurisdictions. He relies most heavily on State v. Boyd, 64 P.3d 419, 427 (Kan. 2003), where the Kansas Supreme Court found that a - 18 - vehicle passenger’s purse was entitled to increased protections because it was in the passenger’s possession and under her control. See State v. Groshong, 135 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Kan. 2006) (wherein the Kansas Supreme Court noted that, in Boyd, it had relied on Justice’s Breyer’s concurring opinion in Houghton in “recogniz[ing] a heightened privacy interest in purses when they are attached to the owner”). ¶ 52 In Boyd, 64 P.3d at 421, the police conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Boyd was a passenger and the driver consented to a search of the vehicle. Boyd was asked to get out of the vehicle and, as she exited, she reached for her purse to take with her. Id. An officer told her to leave the purse in the vehicle, and she complied. Id. While outside of the vehicle, an officer asked