People v. Kletz
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
Docket4-26-0175
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL App (4th) 260175-U
NOTICE FILED
This Order was filed under November 16, 2026
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
NO. 4-26-0175
Carla Bender
not precedent except in the
IN THE APPELLATE COURT 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
JUSTIN KLETZ, ) No. 23CF1194
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) William A. Yoder,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when sentencing defendant to 70 aggregate years’ imprisonment.
¶2 In September 2025, defendant, Justin Kletz, pleaded guilty to the first degree
murder of Jamere Bew (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2022)). He was subsequently sentenced to
55 years in prison for murder, plus an additional 15 years for a mandatory firearm enhancement,
for an aggregate 70 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues his sentence was excessive. We
disagree and affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In December 2023, defendant was charged by indictment with, inter alia, multiple
counts of first degree murder for shooting and killing Jamere Bew (id. § 9-1(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)).
In September 2025, he pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder (id. § 9-1(a)(1)).
Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State amended the charge to remove that the murder was
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty and
dismissed the remaining charges.
¶5 The factual basis revealed codefendant, Gabrielle Stine, stated she had been
asleep on the morning of November 25, 2023, when she awoke to Bew “engaging in sexual
intercourse with her.” Stine said another codefendant, Derek Siebring, and defendant “became
enraged” and beat Bew with a baseball bat. Siebring and defendant “tied [Bew] up with tape and
a blanket, put him in the trunk of Stine’s vehicle, and drove him out to the country.” Bew, at this
point, was still alive. Once at their destination, Siebring shot Bew “multiple times.” Stine said
the parties returned to defendant’s apartment, where they discussed “get[ting] the[ir] story
straight.” Defendant told police Stine had told him she had been raped by Bew. He admitted to
preventing Bew from leaving his apartment “until the situation was figured out.” He told police
he had “blacked out from that point forward and had no knowledge of what occurred.” Siebring
told police he had punched Bew while defendant beat him with a baseball bat. Siebring
recounted wrapping Bew in a blanket and tape and driving him out to the country, where Bew
was “placed in a ditch.” Siebring said defendant, Stine, and himself “all shot [Bew].” A passing
motorist reported Bew’s body. Police went to defendant’s residence, where a strong odor of
bleach was noted. Officers heard “someone inside [defendant’s] apartment saying, quote, we
gotta burn all of it.” Once officers entered the apartment, only defendant and Siebring were
present. An autopsy of Bew’s body revealed his cause of death “to be multiple gunshot wounds
that occurred in the setting of strangulation, multiple blunt-force injuries, and wrapped in taped
restraint.”
¶6 The trial court found defendant had knowingly and voluntarily pleaded guilty and
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ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI). The matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing in
November 2025.
¶7 The PSI was admitted into evidence. The PSI showed defendant had been
working full time as a union painter prior to his arrest. His criminal history included traffic
violations, the most serious being driving under the influence of drugs. He had also been
sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for possessing contraband in a penal institution in
McLean County case No. 24-CF-574, which occurred during the pendency of the instant case.
As for his education, the PSI stated he received an individualized education plan for a learning
disability while enrolled in high school. However, he dropped out of high school “due to
frequent absences.” His family history noted involvement of the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services, and both his parents struggled with substance abuse and addiction. He also
“reported suffering mental abuse from his mother as she struggle[d] with schizophrenia and
would have frequent episodes.” His health history showed he had a history of “attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, asthma, pancreatitis, stomach ulcers, and a tic disorder.” While
incarcerated, he had been prescribed numerous medications addressing depression, anxiety, and
psychosis. Defendant described overdosing on Xanax and Percocet on November 25, 2023,
following the incident and recounted the overdose as “ ‘a little bit intentional and accidental.’ ”
The PSI also noted suicidal ideations and diagnoses of bipolar, generalized anxiety, and
obsessive-compulsive disorders.
¶8 The PSI also showed defendant discussed a “shank” found in his cell that he said
was to harm himself. He reported having “ ‘a lot of remorse and guilt over the killing of who he
considered to be his friend.’ ” He said he was “ ‘upset that [t]his happened to his friend when his
friend had not committed the rape.’ ” He described everybody involved as “ ‘messed up’ ” and
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said the involved parties “were all using various drugs at the time.” He noted first trying
methamphetamine in 2020 and then using it daily starting in either 2021 or 2022. He attended
nine substance abuse classes in 2024 while incarcerated.
¶9 At the hearing, Dr. Scott Denton, who performed Bew’s autopsy, identified
numerous photographs of Bew’s body that were admitted into evidence. He stated Bew died
from “multiple gunshot wounds.” He reiterated his statement from the autopsy report that “[t]he
gunshot wounds occurred in the setting of strangulation, multiple blunt injuries and wrapped in
taped restraint.” He described the incident as “severe” and said, “There are cases that kind of
break through your professional shields, and I would say this is one of them.”
¶ 10 Detective Bryan Hanner recalled Stine saying she had observed Siebring
“grabbing a screwdriver and shoving it in [Bew’s anus].” He also recovered a security camera
video from inside defendant’s apartment. The video showed Siebring and defendant “armed with
handguns” as they interacted with Bew. Hanner reviewed Siebring’s interview and recalled
Siebring stated he, Stine, and defendant all shot Bew.
¶ 11 The trial court admitted four character letters written on defendant’s behalf from
his mother, father, and two sisters. The court also heard a victim impact statement from Bew’s
sister.
¶ 12 During argument, the State recommended the maximum 75 years in prison for the
offense. Defendant, through counsel, argued he ultimately took accountability for his role in
Bew’s death, and the evidence showed the plan was to leave Bew alive in rural McLean County
before Siebring shot him. He also noted his various mental health diagnoses and a volatile
household growing up as mitigating factors. He requested a 20-year sentence for murder, with
the mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement, for an aggregate sentence of 35 years’
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imprisonment.
¶ 13 Defendant gave a statement in allocution, wherein he said he was “sorry for [his]
actions.” He said he was “sorry for the way things happened” and requested “forgiveness” for
what he had done.
¶ 14 The trial court said it had reviewed the PSI, the evidence presented, the testimony
of witnesses, defendant’s statement in allocution, the victim impact statements, and the
arguments from the parties. The court said it had considered all of the statutory factors, both in
aggravation and mitigation. The court noted defendant was 28 years’ old and said he was “not
necessarily a youthful offender.” The court described defendant has having a “somewhat
diminished” mental capacity. The court also said it gave appropriate weight to defendant’s
childhood in a “household of extreme drug use and addiction.” The court made clear it gave no
weight to Dr. Denton’s opinion as to the severity of the offense during his testimony.
¶ 15 The trial court stated the facts of the case made the “brutality” of the offense
“obvious.” The court recounted Bew had been “beaten, tortured for a long period of time before
being driven out into the country and killed.” Therefore, the court said it would “consider the
extreme brutality of the surrounding conduct aside from the actual killing in formulating an
appropriate sentence.” The court noted defendant had “multiple rule violations, including both
major and minor violations,” while incarcerated. The sentence available was a minimum of 20
years to a maximum of 60 years in prison, along with a mandatory 15-year firearm enhancement.
The court said Bew’s murder was “carried out by *** defendant in this case on somebody that he
considered a friend.” Noting the PSI, the court recounted defendant rating his depression a 6 out
of 7, his anxiety a 7 out of 7, his anger a 5 out of 6, and his irritability a 4 out of 7, “[b]ut guilt he
rated as two out of seven, indicating to the Court at least that he feels very little guilt in this
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matter.” The court sentenced defendant to 55 years in prison for the offense of first degree
murder, with an additional 15-year sentence for the firearm enhancement, for an aggregate
sentence of 70 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 16 In December 2025, defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing his
aggregate 70-year sentence was excessive. A hearing on defendant’s motion occurred in
February 2026.
¶ 17 At the hearing, defendant argued significant evidence in mitigation was presented
related to his upbringing and addiction. The trial court stated it had considered the appropriate
and relevant evidence and “imposed an appropriate sentence.” The court denied the motion.
¶ 18 This appeal followed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when imposing
his 70-year aggregate sentence because he had a difficult childhood and suffered from addiction
and undiagnosed mental health issues while being gainfully employed at the time of the offense.
He argues these things indicated his conduct was out of character. He contends nothing in the
record required the court to impose a sentence higher than the minimum 35-year aggregate
sentence available. He notes he had accepted responsibility by pleading guilty, the PSI showed
he felt remorse for Bew’s death, and he sincerely apologized during his statement in allocution.
He reiterates the record shows he suffered from several serious mental health illnesses, nearly
overdosed on drugs after the incident, and remained suicidal during the pendency of the case. He
also points to his traumatic childhood and persistent drug use at the time of the offense. He cites
People v. Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d 899 (1985), in support. He requests this court exercise our
authority under Illinois Supreme Court rule 615(b)(4) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967) and reduce his sentence
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to the statutory minimum.
¶ 21 In Treadway, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder, armed violence
predicated on aggravated battery, two counts of aggravated battery, and aggravated assault.
Treadway, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 900. On appeal, the defendant argued his 60-year extended term
sentence was excessive. Id. at 904. The appellate court noted rehabilitation is not only a
consideration but an objective of sentencing. Id. It also stated a reviewing court may reduce a
sentence based on rehabilitative potential “where a defendant came from a poor social
environment [citation], where [a] defendant has expressed a desire to continue his education
[citation], and in certain cases where defendants were young.” Id. at 904-05. The court said it
looked beyond the sentencing court’s findings for the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and
noted the record showed he “was a 24-year-old high school dropout who had been physically
abused as a child and had suffered from a drug and alcohol problem since the age of 14.” Id. at
905. The court also noted the defendant’s “minor” criminal history and the offenses committed,
“though serious, were perpetrated in a fleeting moment of intoxicated rage upon a stranger.” Id.
The court said the defendant had expressed a desire to “improve himself,” and while awaiting
trial, sought alcoholism treatment, and earned his GED. Id. The court concluded the defendant
had “rehabilitative potential that would be poorly served by such a long sentence.” Id. The court
lowered the sentence to 30 years to permit the defendant to be “restored to a meaningful,
productive life, and at the same time will be adequate retribution for his offense, provide
protection for society and serve as a deterrent.” Id.
¶ 22 Defendant argues, analogously to Treadway, he is a young man with a serious
drug addiction that contributed to his actions on the night in question, had no violent criminal
record, and has rehabilitative potential. He notes his anticipated parole date is November 2095,
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when he would be 95 years old. He contends his sentence is a de facto life sentence that he will
not survive.
¶ 23 “The legislature sets forth by statute the range of permissible sentences for each
class of criminal offense.” People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53 (1999). “A sentence within statutory
limits will not be deemed excessive and an abuse of the court’s discretion unless it is ‘greatly at
variance with the spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense.’ ” People v. Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20 (quoting Fern, 189 Ill. 2d at 54). A
reviewing court affords great deference to a trial court’s sentencing judgment because, “having
observed the defendant and the proceedings, [it] is in a far better position to consider such factors
as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment,
and habits than a reviewing court, which must rely on a ‘cold’ record.” People v. Little, 2011 IL
App (4th) 090787, ¶ 24. A sentence that falls within the applicable statutory limits is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th) 100311, ¶ 36.
¶ 24 Here, defendant pleaded guilty to first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)
(West 2022)), a Class M felony (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2024)) subject to not less than 20
years and not more than 60 years in prison. Because the offense was committed while armed
with a firearm, a 15-year firearm enhancement was added to the potential term of imprisonment.
730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(d)(i) (West 2024). Thus, defendant faced an aggregate sentence of 35 to 75
years in prison. He was sentenced to 70 aggregate years in prison. Because his sentence was
within the permissible range, we begin with the presumption the sentence was proper. People v.
Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46.
¶ 25 The State contends the trial court appropriately considered all of the statutory
factors both in aggravation and mitigation when fashioning its sentence. The State argues
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defendant does not contend the court considered an improper factor or failed to consider an
appropriate factor. Rather, the State notes defendant argues the court simply failed to give
enough weight to his mitigating evidence.
¶ 26 The abuse of discretion standard is deferential to trial courts, and “[o]ur mere
disagreement with the [sentencing] court’s decision would not make the decision an abuse of
discretion.” People v. Fisher, 407 Ill. App. 3d 585, 589 (2011). Where mitigating evidence is
before the court, it is presumed the court considered it. People v. McDonald, 322 Ill. App. 3d
244, 251 (2001). Additionally, “that presumption will not be overcome without explicit evidence
from the record that the *** court did not consider mitigating factors.” People v. Flores, 404 Ill.
App. 3d 155, 158 (2010). As the State correctly notes, defendant does not argue the court failed
to consider the mitigating factors. Defendant argues the court did not afford the mitigating
factors due weight.
¶ 27 A trial court is not required to afford greater weight to mitigating factors than to
the severity of the offense. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 214 (2010). Nor does the
presence of mitigating factors require a minimum sentence. People v. Jones, 2014 IL App (1st)
120927, ¶ 55. In this case, the court explicitly referenced the very mitigating factors defendant
recites on appeal. However, the court also noted the brutality of the circumstances surrounding
the commission of the offense. We understand the gravity of defendant’s sentence, as it is nearly
the maximum afforded by law. However, we also recognize the seriousness of the offense—
indeed, perhaps the most serious offense—first degree murder. See People v. Quintana, 332 Ill.
App. 3d 96, 109 (2002) (noting the seriousness of the offense is the most important sentencing
factor).
¶ 28 We also find Treadway distinguishable. First, the victim in Treadway was a
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stranger to the defendant. Here, the victim was supposedly a friend of defendant’s but was still
brutally tortured prior to being shot and left in a ditch to be discovered by a random passing
motorist. While the record indicates defendant was a drug addict, the PSI suggests he overdosed
after killing Bew. Furthermore, the incident was not a fleeting moment of intoxicated rage like
Treadway; rather, Bew was tortured, bound, taken to a remote location, and, eventually, shot.
Afterwards, defendant was sober enough to work with Siebring to clean up his apartment and
discuss an alibi. Ultimately, the trial court was in a better position to observe defendant’s
conduct and weigh the need for a harsher sentence. While the sentence was harsh, we simply
cannot say it varied greatly with the spirit and purpose of the law or was manifestly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. See Pina, 2019 IL App (4th) 170614, ¶ 20.
Therefore, we find the court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing defendant to an
aggregate 70 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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