People v. Vilchis

2026 IL App (2d) 240457 No. 2-24-0457 Opinion filed November 6, 2026 IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO A. VILCHIS, Defendant-Appellant. Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. Honorable David P. Kliment, Judge, Presiding. No. 22-CF-1459 JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice Birkett concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 After a bench trial, defendant, Pedro A. Vilchis, was convicted of one count of attempt (first degree murder) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)), two counts of criminal damage to government-supported property (id. § 21-1.01(a)(1)), two counts of aggravated assault (id. § 12- 2(c)(7)), and one count of aggravated fleeing and eluding a peace officer (625 ILCS 5/11- 204.1(a)(4) (West 2020)). Defendant was then sentenced to a term of imprisonment of nine years on the attempt (first degree murder) conviction and concurrent two-year terms on each of the other convictions. In addition, he was ordered to pay $13,245 in restitution to Kane County. Defendant now appeals from his convictions of criminal damage to government-supported property and attempt (first degree murder) and one conviction of aggravated assault. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and reverse in part. ¶2 I. BACKGROUND ¶3 We first note that the State requests this court to strike portions of defendant’s brief pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), contending that the statement of facts is “selective and misleading” and fails to “accurately and objectively reflect the full factual record.” However, our review of the record and defendant’s brief do not reveal such omissions as would require the striking of any portion of defendant’s brief. We deny the State’s request. ¶4 The charges against defendant arose out of an almost 15-minute high-speed car chase that wended its way through Kane County starting at about 1:30 a.m. on August 12, 2022. Defendant committed numerous traffic violations as he raced down rural roads and through residential neighborhoods at speeds reaching 104 miles per hour (mph). Multiple law enforcement officers were involved; a total of five officers from two jurisdictions were called to testify at trial. The chase ended only when a Kane County deputy slammed his squad car into the driver’s side of defendant’s car. ¶5 Sergeant Ryan Rojkowski of the Kane County Sheriff’s Office testified that, on August 12, 2022, he was a patrol deputy. At about 1:30 a.m., while traveling northbound on Orchard Road just north of Prairie Street in Aurora, he saw a dark-colored sedan traveling 95 mph southbound on Orchard Road, in a 45 mph zone. Rojkowski performed a U-turn to follow the vehicle. He saw the car “weave in out of lanes between cars.” The car also turned off its lights. When the car disobeyed a red light, Rojkowski activated his emergency lights and siren. He was “a distance behind” the car, and the car accelerated when Rojkowski activated his lights. He never saw the car slow down “in an attempt to yield to” his emergency lights. He was able to “pace” the vehicle (maintaining an equal distance from the vehicle while observing his own speed) at the intersection of Gordon -2- and Baseline Roads, which had a posted speed limit of 55 mph. At that time, defendant’s car was traveling 100 mph and still without lights. ¶6 The car continued driving at high rates of speed, going 70 mph in a 35 mph zone and 55 mph in a 30 mph zone. Rojkowski radioed in to dispatch that he had a “vehicle that was taking off from me.” He testified as to the route that the car followed, including many turns and even U- turns. He also testified to a multitude of traffic infractions, including further speeding, disobeying traffic control devices, and driving in the wrong lane of traffic. Eventually, other deputies, including Detective Patrick Knudtson and Deputy Alfred Vidrio, along with officers from the Montgomery Police Department, responded to his radio message and were seen in the area. ¶7 At one point, while following defendant eastbound on Baseline Road, which is a two-lane road divided by yellow lane markings, he paced defendant driving at 100 mph in a 55 mph zone. He saw Knudtson’s squad car, with emergency oscillating lights on, traveling westbound. Defendant’s car, still traveling eastbound, fully entered the westbound lane. Defendant continued in the westbound lane without swerving. Knudtson drove off the road “into the ditch to avoid him.” Rojkowski described the ditch as “a short gravel shoulder, and then it turns into grass.” When asked how much of Knudtson’s squad car had to go into the ditch to avoid defendant, he stated that he was “pretty sure he at least was all the way into the gravel.” Defendant appeared to come within “a couple feet” of striking Knudtson’s squad car. There was nothing in the roadway that would have caused defendant to leave the eastbound lane, and defendant had previously driven over that same stretch of roadway earlier in the chase. ¶8 Traveling further on Baseline Road, Rojkowski saw Vidrio’s squad car stationery in the westbound lane with its emergency lights activated. The squad car was parked in the lane at a slight angle, with the front of the car pointing toward the center of the road. Defendant, still driving 100 -3- mph, crossed the yellow lines separating the two lanes of traffic, with “[a]t least the left side of his tires” in the westbound lane. Defendant came “[w]ithin a foot or two” of striking Vidrio’s squad car, moving back into his own lane “[a]t the last second.” As he passed the squad car, Rojkowski noticed that the driver’s side front door was open and Vidrio was not in the squad car; he was standing “[s]omewhere near the front left driver’s door area.” (On cross-examination, Rojkowski testified that he did not see Vidrio and did not know if he was inside or outside of the car.) A Montgomery squad car with lights activated was slowly approaching Vidrio’s squad car in the westbound lane; defendant’s “whole car” went back into the westbound lane before returning to the eastbound lane. ¶9 Rojkowski radioed Sergeant Hoffmann, requesting permission “to take [defendant’s] vehicle out based on his deadly force actions to our other deputies.” Permission was granted. ¶ 10 After viewing continued traffic infractions, Rojkowski attempted a “precision immobilization technique” (PIT) to disable defendant’s vehicle. As described by Rojkowski, “You either go up on the left or the right rear quarter panel of the suspect’s vehicle using your squad to turn it 180 degrees.” He agreed that it was “fair to say that you were trying to use your squad vehicle to hit into or bump into the suspect’s vehicle.” Rojkowski explained: “With newer vehicles, there is a fuel shut-off that’s in them, and when they spin out, normally it sensors it to turn off the fuel pump, thus making the engine not running any longer.” The PIT attempt was unsuccessful; defendant “was able to turn through it” and continue driving. Rojkowski’s squad car sustained damage “on the front right side of the bumper and then the push bar,” which is “a big piece of metal that’s on the front of a squad car, police car, that you can use to push vehicles out of the way, or protects the front end.” -4- ¶ 11 After following defendant into residential areas and observing numerous traffic violations, Rojkowski attempted another PIT maneuver. He did so because officers could not “get any squads in front to put out any spike strips, and due to [defendant’s] actions, I didn’t want anyone outside of their squad cars, and that was our only option left.” The PIT maneuver was again unsuccessful, and his squad car sustained damage on the left front side of the bumper. ¶ 12 The chase continued through residential areas, with three or four other deputies and officers from the Aurora Police Department assisting. As he followed defendant on Wilder Street in Aurora, Rojkowski saw Detective Lionel Arredondo’s squad car at the Cedar Street intersection ; the squad car was fully marked, and its emergency lights were activated. Defendant failed to yield at the posted “Yield” sign at the intersection, and he and Arredondo collided, with Arredondo striking the driver’s side of defendant’s car. Defendant and a front seat passenger were removed from the car and taken into custody. A small, clear plastic bag of marijuana was subsequently found in the car. ¶ 13 Rojkowski testified that both his and Arredondo’s squad cars were owned by the Kane County Sheriff’s Office and both cars had been damaged during the chase. Photos of front-end damage on Arredondo’s squad car and alleged damage (“scratching and damage on the push bar”) to Rojkowski’s squad car were admitted into evidence. Rojkowski testified that he had replaced a push bar on his squad car before, and the value of the bar was “over $1,000.” His in-squad camera recording of the entire chase was then entered into evidence. ¶ 14 According to Rojkowski, there were multiple instances during the chase through residential areas in which police officers attempted to block the direction in which defendant was driving; each time, defendant sought to find another way around. It appeared to Rojkowski that defendant was going to strike both Knudtson’s and Vidrio’s cars. He saw defendant go “head on” only at -5- police vehicles; defendant did not exit his lane of traffic to do that to anything other than a police car. ¶ 15 Detective Knudtson of the Kane County Sherrif’s Office testified that he was working as a patrol deputy at about 1:30 a.m. on August 12, 2022. He heard on his squad radio that Rojkowski was attempting to make a traffic stop but that the driver was not stopping and was attempting to flee. Knudtson drove to the area of the chase and attempted to place spike strips on Baseline Road to stop the fleeing vehicle. He pulled his squad car, fully marked with all of his emergency lights activated, onto the shoulder. Rojkowski told him on the radio that the fleeing vehicle was too close to Knudtson’s location and that he did not have time to set up the spike strips. Knudtson put his squad car into drive, pulled back onto the road, and proceeded 20 to 30 feet westbound. He saw headlights coming toward him, and it appeared the vehicle was coming into his lane. The car was originally in the eastbound lane, but it moved through the turn lane and the center median and fully into his lane a couple of hundred yards ahead of him. Knudtson saw nothing in the eastbound lane that would have caused the car to swerve into the westbound lane. As the car continued toward him, he swerved off the road, driving over the two-foot-wide pavement and gravel shoulder and fully into the grass off the roadway. The oncoming car did not swerve and continued eastbound in the westbound lane passing within two feet of Knudtson’s squad car. Knudtson believed that he was going to be hit by the car and feared for his life. A one-minute video from Knudtson’s squad car camera was introduced into evidence. ¶ 16 Deputy Vidrio testified that he was on patrol when he heard Rojkowski’s radio message regarding a fleeing vehicle. He activated the emergency lights on his marked police pickup truck and drove to westbound Baseline Road near Orchard Road. He was aware that Rojkowski and the fleeing vehicle were headed eastbound on Baseline Road and that Detective Knudtson was ahead -6- of him on westbound Baseline Road. Vidrio parked in the westbound lane at a slight angle to try to cover the entire lane. He got out of his truck to deploy spike strips across the road; as he stood in the open doorway of his truck, he heard sirens and the exhaust of “a vehicle which sounded like it was traveling extremely fast.” He could not recall if he saw anything, but he specifically testified that he did not see any headlights coming at him; he later clarified that he was not able to see the vehicle. He “got scared and *** ran away” to the back of his truck toward the embankment, fearing that he was going to get hit “[b]ecause the sound was getting extremely loud and heading towards” him. He then saw a Honda Civic without headlights and squad cars drive by. Based on his training and experience, he estimated that the car was going in excess of 80 mph, passing “inches” from his truck and “[a] couple feet” from where he stood. At about that time, he heard “some radio traffic talking about using deadly force;” However, that did not authorize him to use deadly force in stopping the vehicle, only “others.” Videos from his squad car camera and his body camera were entered into evidence. ¶ 17 Vidrio testified that he was scared and fearful for his life when the Honda Civic was coming in his direction “[b]ecause he was coming straight at me, or felt like he was.” He thought that he was going to be struck and killed. When asked why he looked “incredibly calm” in the videos, Vidrio stated that he had served in the military and deployed to a combat zone, “so I feel like I’m trained and better equipped to handle adrenaline than the average police officer.” ¶ 18 Detective Arredondo of the Kane County Sheriff’s Office testified that he was a patrol officer on August 12, 2022. At about 1:30 a.m., he heard over his squad car radio about a traffic stop that turned into a pursuit. He was not assigned to a particular location; he chose to proceed to the intersection of Baseline Road and Gordon Road to set up spike strips. However, by the time that he arrived, the chase had moved elsewhere. His next attempt to anticipate the route of the -7- chase and lay spike strips ended as the first had. He then heard a directive from Sergeant Hoffman over the radio “[t]o stop the vehicle any way possible.” ¶ 19 Arredondo then proceeded to the intersection of Wilder Street and Cedar Street to lay spike strips. As he approached the intersection on Cedar Street, he “saw the vehicle with squad cars with lights and sirens behind it.” He did not have time to deploy the spike strips; instead, as the vehicle went through the intersection on Wilder, Arredondo “hit the rear quarter panel of the suspect vehicle” and the driver’s side door with the “front push bar/bumper” of his vehicle, stopping it. Defendant and a front seat passenger were taken into custody. ¶ 20 Arredondo’s squad car was damaged in the collision. Arredondo related that “[t]he push bar was kind of hanging low, and there was damage to the bumper as well.” He identified the damage in two photos already in evidence, stating that the damage shown did not exist prior to the collision with defendant’s car and was caused by the collision. Arredondo agreed that, “based on the directions you got from your sergeant that you could use deadly force, you were the one that drove your vehicle into that vehicle.” The vehicle never veered toward him; it veered away just before the collision. He admitted that, after the collision, he left his squad car in gear when he quickly got out and went to the passenger side of defendant’s car. He agreed that his squad car “moved at some point and ended up against a telephone pole or something.” ¶ 21 The parties stipulated that, if called to testify, Christine Davis, assistant director for human resources of Kane County (County), would testify that she reviews claims related to damage to County property and assists the County in filing cases with the County’s third-party insurance administrator. She reviewed the claim for damages to Arredondo’s squad car, which was valued at $13,425. The damage to the squad car was determined to be $9,757.77, and the squad car “was determined by the insurance adjustor to be a total loss and was totaled.” -8- ¶ 22 Officer Kelli Smith of the Montgomery Police Department testified that she was on patrol in a marked police car at about 1:30 a.m. on August 12, 2022, when she received a radio dispatch about a Kane County Sheriff’s Office pursuit heading into a Montgomery neighborhood. As she was heading westbound on Baseline Road approaching the Lakewood Creek subdivision, she saw squad cars and the suspect vehicle coming toward her and one squad car about 500 yards ahead of her parked in the intersection. The motion of the oncoming car activated her in-squad radar, which read the car’s speed as 92 mph in a posted 55 mph zone. Smith described the road at that location as “Two lanes of traffic, and then a painted, striped median that’s about a length, the width of a lane, so about three lanes.” ¶ 23 As the fleeing car proceeded eastbound, it “[s]tarted driving towards my squad car, entering the striped, painted median.” There were no cars or other obstruction in the eastbound lane of travel to force the fleeing car to leave its lane. It appeared to her that she was going to be hit, and she had only a “few seconds” to react. She stopped her car; because of a ditch on the right-hand side of the road, she could not pull to the right to escape the oncoming vehicle. The car passed her “a couple inches” from striking her driver’s side mirror, and her entire car shook. She then joined the pursuit until she was ordered to terminate her pursuit, as the chase had left her jurisdiction. ¶ 24 Smith’s in-squad dash cam recorded the events that she testified to, and a video from that camera was entered into evidence. She explained that, as shown in the video, a large “hump or dome” on the hood of the squad car was the in-car radar. As the dash cam was located on the passenger side window, it did not capture the immediate front left area of the squad car, and the video did not “do justice” as to how close defendant’s vehicle came to her squad car. ¶ 25 On cross-examination, Smith explained that, where she stopped her squad car on Baseline Road, there was an approximately three-foot-wide shoulder on the right side, beyond which was a -9- ditch. Almost half of her squad car could fit on the shoulder; however, as her squad car was a Ford Taurus, she could not pull further right of the shoulder because she would have gotten stuck in the ditch. ¶ 26 Smith agreed that, at her location on Baseline Road, the road was about three lanes wide, including the striped median section between the eastbound and westbound lanes. Watching the video again, she also agreed that, as defendant passed her, his tires never went across the double yellow lines of the median and “never actually [got] into the westbound lane.” ¶ 27 The State rested, and defendant moved for a directed finding of not guilty but only made argument as to counts I and II, which charged him with the attempted murder of Knudtson (count I) and Vidrio (count II). The trial court denied the motion as to counts III through XIV. The court granted the motion as to count II, explaining that attempted murder is a specific intent crime and that such intent “must be inferred from the circumstantial evidence.” Vidrio was outside of his vehicle when defendant drove toward it; however, “we don’t know that [defendant] could even see that the deputy was outside the car.” “If [defendant] had wanted to kill Deputy Vidrio, he could have hit the squad car. The squad car didn’t move. He could have hit the passenger or driver’s side door that was sticking out. It didn’t move. So I think that the State has failed to show that [defendant] had the intent to kill Deputy Vidrio with respect to Count Two.” The court denied the motion as to count I, finding that: “[B]ut for evasive action taken by Knudtson, it appears likely that [defendant] would have struck that vehicle. It continued straight through where the vehicle had been, Knudtson’s squad had been. It didn’t veer back into the proper lane of travel, which would have been the eastbound lane. It continued through where Knudtson’s vehicle had been in the - 10 -  westbound lane. So I think the State has established for the purpose of this motion that [defendant] had the requisite mental state ***.” Defendant then rested without presenting any evidence. ¶ 28 The trial court found defendant guilty of all remaining counts, which included one count of attempt (first degree murder), two counts of criminal damage to government-supported property, two (lesser-included) counts of criminal damage to property, three counts of aggravated assault, and five counts of aggravated fleeing and eluding a peace officer. The trial court merged some of these counts before imposing a sentence. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. After sentencing, this appeal followed. ¶ 29 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 30 Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly caused damage to government-supported property; therefore, his convictions of that offense should be reversed and the order of restitution should be vacated. In general, the question is whether, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the witnesses’ credibility and the weight given to their testimony, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on these matters. Id. However, where the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence against him does not question the credibility of the witnesses, but instead questions whether the uncontested facts were sufficient to prove the elements of the charge, our review is de novo. In re Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d 226, 231 (2004). In this case, defendant does not - 11 - dispute the facts but “instead argues that the State’s facts do not meet the statutory definition of criminal damage to property.” ¶ 31 In reviewing a bench trial, we presume that the trial court knows the law and applies it properly. People v. Hernandez, 2012 IL App (1st) 092841, ¶ 41. However, when the record affirmatively shows that the trial court incorrectly applied the law, that presumption is rebutted. Id. ¶ 32 To prove defendant guilty of criminal damage to government-supported property as charged, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly damaged any government-supported property without the consent of the State. 720 ILCS 5/21-1.01(a)(1) (West 2020); People v. Little, 2018 IL App (1st) 151954, ¶ 53. ¶ 33 “When construing a statute, this court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, keeping in mind that the best and most reliable indicator of that intent is the statutory language itself, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” People v. Rodriguez, 2014 IL App (2d) 130148, ¶ 44. “To discern the plain meaning of statutory terms, it is appropriate for the reviewing court to consider the statute in its entirety, the subject it addresses, and the apparent intent of the legislature in enacting it.” Id. This court should not resort to further aids of statutory construction unless the language of the statute is ambiguous, and it must apply the language as written. Id. “In the absence of a statutory definition indicating legislative intent, an undefined word must be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning.” Ryan B., 212 Ill. 2d at 232. ¶ 34 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove that he damaged any property. According to defendant, the two damaged squad cars were driven into his car by the deputies, who caused the damage themselves. - 12 - ¶ 35 The statute does not define the verb “damage.” We must give the language of a statute its plain and ordinary meaning and consider the statute as a whole. People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 27. “Damage,” as a verb, is defined as, “to do or cause damage to: HURT, INJURE, IMPAIR.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 571 (1993). Clearly, defendant did not “do or cause damage to” the squad cars of Rojkowski and Arredondo. Both deputies testified that they initiated the contact with defendant’s car; Rojkowski agreed that it was “fair to say that you were trying to use your squad vehicle to hit into or bump into the suspect’s vehicle,” while Arredondo agreed that, “based on the directions you got from your sergeant that you could use deadly force, you were the one that drove your vehicle into that [defendant’s] vehicle.” (Emphases added.) Regarding Arredondo, he even testified that defendant veered away from him just before the collision. The damage to the squad cars was caused, not by defendant, but by the deputies. Further, this contact with defendant’s car was authorized by Sergeant Hoffman, the deputies’ superior at the Kane County Sheriff’s Office. The statute requires that the damage be done “without the consent of the State.” 720 ILCS 5/21-1.01(a)(1) (West 2020). Where state actors initiated damaging contact with defendant’s vehicle pursuant to specific departmental authorization to “take [defendant’s] vehicle out” and “stop the vehicle any way possible,” we cannot conclude that defendant damaged the property. ¶ 36 The State contends that the damage to the squad cars “was a direct result of defendant’s unlawful conduct.” According to the State, “criminal liability can attach when a defendant sets in motion a chain of events that foreseeably results in the prohibited harm.” ¶ 37 The State first argues that Illinois case law has “long recognized that causation in criminal cases encompasses both direct and proximate cause.” It cites three supreme court cases (People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462 (1997), People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247 (1998), and People v. Hudson, - 13 - 222 Ill. 2d 392 (2006)) for support. However, each of those cases involved murder convictions based on the theory of “felony murder.” ¶ 38 In codifying the offense of first degree murder, the legislature has provided: “A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death: (1) he or she either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or (2) he or she knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or (3) he or she, acting alone or with one or more participants, commits or attempts to commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or flight therefrom, he or she or another participant causes the death of a person.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2020). ¶ 39 In enacting subsection (a)(3) of the charge (“felony murder”), the legislature specifically authorized the concept of proximate cause in criminal liability for acts of another. Illinois’s “continued adherence to a proximate cause approach is further exemplary of how broadly we seek to extend the reaches of criminal liability in the case of felony murder.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 (1998). The cases relied upon by the State clearly speak to the limited reach of the “proximate cause approach” in criminal cases and cannot be read to apply this approach to criminal acts in general. See, e.g., Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 467 (“It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a felon’s attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost - 14 - inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.” (Emphasis added.)); Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d at 401 (“In general, Illinois law provides that a defendant may be charged with murder pursuant to the ‘proximate cause’ theory of felony murder.”). ¶ 40 Such liability is not the norm. “The law, after all, does not typically criminally punish one person for the actions of another.” People v. Barnes, 2017 IL App (1st) 142886, ¶ 42. Indeed, subsection (a)(3) of the first degree murder statute would be superfluous if such liability could be found without specific authorization in the statute. A statute is to be viewed as a whole, and we must construe words and phrases in connection with other relevant statutory provisions rather than in isolation, while giving each word, clause, and sentence of a statute a reasonable meaning, if possible, and not rendering any term superfluous. People v. Fair, 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 61. The fact that the legislature has provided a specific statutory basis for criminal liability for the acts of another in the felony murder provisions of the Criminal Code demonstrates that such liability does not apply in general. The State’s reliance on those cases is misplaced, as such liability does not apply here, where no such provision exists. ¶ 41 Along the same lines, the State also cites this court’s recent decision in People v. Barr, 2025 IL App (2d) 240323-U, for the proposition that defendant’s actions created a dangerous situation that made the officers’ response foreseeable. Barr involved a defendant who was convicted of resisting or obstructing a peace officer causing injury, which required proof that the defendant, (1) knowing that one is a peace officer, (2) knowingly resists or obstructs, (3) the officer’s performance of an authorized act, (4) and proximately causes an injury to the officer. 725 ILCS 5/31-1(a), (a-7) (West 2022). On appeal, the defendant argued that the State failed to establish that she, as opposed to her children—who kicked the officer as he struggled with and attempted to handcuff the defendant—was the proximate cause of the officer’s injury. Barr, 2025 - 15 - IL App (2d) 240323-U, ¶ 22. This court held that the evidence from videos and the officer’s testimony “permitted a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant proximately caused the injuries.” Id. ¶ 27. “The video evidence shows that defendant was forcibly removed from the vehicle after her repeated refusals to exit on her own, thrown to the ground, and physically resisted Katsuleas’ attempts to handcuff her. It took Katsuleas one minute and seventeen seconds on the ground to handcuff defendant. It was foreseeable that an officer may be injured as a result of her refusal to exit the vehicle and subsequent physical resistance to being handcuffed while on the ground. Though the children may have also contributed to the injuries, it is clear from the video evidence that defendant’s actions were a contributing cause of Katsuleas’ injuries. Simply put, Katsuleas would not have been injured but for defendant’s actions.” Id. ¶ 42 However, as in the felony murder cases upon which the State relies, the statutory language at issue in Barr specifically allowed for criminal liability via proximate cause and did not require the defendant to be the cause in fact of the officer’s injury. If criminal liability via proximate cause was possible under all criminal charges, the fourth element of the crime of resisting or obstructing a peace officer causing injury would be superfluous. The State’s reliance on Barr, as is its reliance on the cases involving felony murder convictions, is inapt and unavailing. ¶ 43 At oral argument, there was discussion of defendant’s accountability for the damage pursuant to section 5-2(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code), which provides that a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when, “having a mental state described by the statute defining the offense, he or she causes another to perform the conduct, and the other person in fact or by reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state.” 720 ILCS 5/5-2(a) (West 2020). We - 16 - note that accountability was never raised in the trial court. However, during defendant’s argument, the question was raised regarding defendant’s accountability for: “the actions of the police officers who were forced to use these maneuvers when the defendant knew, and, especially after the first PIT maneuver, he must have known that these maneuvers would be used again. *** Why would he not be accountable under section 5-2(a), which is what the judge found, Judge Kliment found that [defendant] was responsible, that he caused this to occur?” Later, the State was asked: “Judge Kliment, in finding the defendant guilty, clearly knew that the police gave the order to use any means necessary, but he still found the defendant guilty based upon the result, that the defendant caused this conduct, or caused this result. Correct?” ¶ 44 However, the issue of foreseeability and accountability has no application in a factual situation in a case such as this. People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419 (2000), involved a gang shootout. The defendants opened fire on members of the rival Black Disciples gang, wounding one; the rival gang returned fire, killing one of the defendants’ compatriots, Derrick Henderson. Id. at 422. The trial court found that both defendants had fired at the rival gang, “that it was ‘foreseeable’ that the Black Disciples would return fire, and that Henderson was killed as a result of the return fire by the Black Disciples.” Id. The trial court therefore found the defendants guilty of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. Id. The court later clarified that: “defendants were found guilty of first degree murder under accountability principles rather than felony-murder principles, because the State never charged felony murder in the indictment. The trial court further explained that it had found that defendants were the initial aggressors, that the Black Disciples had returned fire in self-defense, and that - 17 -  defendants were properly found guilty of the ‘knowing murder of Derrick Henderson because they knew and it was foreseeable that when they fired *** death or great bodily harm could result and it was foreseeable that in firing at rival gang members that rival gang members may have weapons to return fire.’ ” Id. at 422-23. ¶ 45 The appellate court held that the defendants’ first degree murder convictions could not be based upon a theory of accountability as set forth in section 5-2(c) of the Code. 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1994). 1 The court affirmed the convictions of aggravated battery with a firearm but reversed the first degree murder convictions. The court then remanded the cause to the trial court for (1) a determination of whether the defendants were prejudiced in their defense by the State’s failure to include a charge of felony murder and (2) potential further consideration of whether the State sufficiently proved the defendants guilty of felony murder. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d at 421. The defendants appealed. ¶ 46 Our supreme court agreed that accountability pursuant to section 5-2(c) could not be the basis for the defendants’ first degree murder convictions. However, the State argued that section 5-2(a) was applicable and should be employed to uphold the convictions. Id. at 424. ¶ 47 The supreme court described the section 5-2(a) basis of accountability as “the ‘innocent agent’ rule because it is most frequently encountered as liability based on inducing an ‘innocent agent,’ such as a child below the age of criminal capacity or an insane person, to commit an act.” 1 Section 5-2(c) provides that, with some exceptions, a person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when “[e]ither before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to promote or facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid, such other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West 1994). - 18 - Id. at 425. The principle set forth in section 5-2(a) “contemplates that the person to be held accountable procured, induced or intended the innocent agent’s action.” Id. at 426. The court was “unwilling to find that Illinois’ accountability statute should apply to situations like the present one where the person to be held accountable neither intended the actor to perform as his agent nor sought the ‘caused’ result.” Id. The court found the appellate court’s reasoning as to the inapplicability of section 5-2(c) “equally appropriate” in a section 5-2(a) context, quoting: “ ‘The trial judge’s comments indicate he believed Henderson’s death was a reasonably foreseeable result of defendants’ actions. Nevertheless, the concept of reasonable foreseeability (i.e. proximate cause), while essential to a felony murder inquiry, has no place in accountability analysis ***. *** Nos. 1-95-3211, 1-95-3212 cons. (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 426-27. The court concluded that holding the defendants criminally culpable for a death resulting from an act of self-defense that they provoked was “irreconcilable with our accountability statute” and rejected “the State’s contention that the trial court’s verdict may be upheld based on section 5- 2(a).” Id. at 427. ¶ 48 Further, under the “innocent agent” theory of accountability of section 5-2(a), the charge upon which the defendant is tried must allege some criminal action by the party for whom the defendant is allegedly accountable. For example, in People v. Scott, 271 Ill. App. 3d 307 (1994), the defendant dragged the victi