People v. Perry
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket1-24-1397
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL App (1st) 241397-U
SECOND DIVISION
November 17, 2026
No. 1-24-1397
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 05CR11283
)
CORDELL PERRY, ) Honorable
) Charles P. Burns,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice D.B. Walker and Justice Van Tine concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Because postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance, we affirm the
denial of defendant’s petition following an evidentiary hearing.
¶2 Defendant Cordell Perry appeals from the trial court’s denial of postconviction relief
following a third stage evidentiary hearing and argues that his postconviction counsel provided
unreasonable assistance. Specifically, he contends that his postconviction counsel failed to
adequately present defendant’s claim of actual innocence based on the recantation of an
eyewitness and to develop a claim that the eyewitness’s identification was coerced by police.
No. 1-24-1397
¶3 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first degree murder in the April 2005
shooting death of Denzel Calhoun at Magnum Motors, located near Cicero and Wabansia
Avenues in Chicago. He was subsequently sentenced to 65 years in prison. We recount the
evidence presented at defendant’s jury trial only as necessary for our resolution of the issues
raised on appeal. A full discussion of the evidence presented at defendant’s trial is set forth in his
direct appeal. See People v. Perry, No. 1-07-2761 (2009) (unpublished order pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶4 Latavia Hayden, Calhoun’s girlfriend, testified that she accompanied Calhoun to
Magnum Motors where he purchased an automobile. While Calhoun was completing paperwork,
Hayden stepped out of the office to smoke a cigarette and noticed defendant standing on a nearby
corner. Hayden and Calhoun later left the office together to transfer Calhoun’s belongings from
his old car to his new one. While Calhoun was walking between two SUVs, Hayden heard shots
being fired and saw Calhoun fall to the ground. Hayden saw defendant fire one shot at Calhoun’s
head and an additional three or four shots at his body.
¶5 During a police interview that day, Hayden identified defendant as the shooter by his
nickname, Bushwick. She subsequently identified defendant in a photo array, a lineup, and in
court. Hayden admitted she told a friend that she did not see the shooter’s face because she
thought that friend would discuss their conversation with other people.
¶6 Boykin Gradford was driving on Cicero Avenue when he heard gunshots. He noticed a
short, stocky Black man wearing a black hoodie and a white “do-rag” standing behind an SUV
on the car lot, with his arm outstretched and a gun in his hand. Gradford saw the victim standing
between two parked cars, approximately three or four feet away from the shooter. He then saw
the victim fall to the ground but he did not recall whether any more shots were fired. Gradford
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No. 1-24-1397
viewed a lineup, thought defendant looked like the shooter, but he was not certain.
¶7 Vernon Holman admitted selling drugs often near Magnum Motors. He testified that he
knew both the defendant and Hayden. On the day of the shooting, Holman was cutting through
the car lot when he saw Hayden talking to a man who looked like Calhoun. At that time, Holman
saw defendant, who was wearing a coat and a black hoodie, standing between two vans in the car
lot. Holman then heard three or four shots, at which point he ran home.
¶8 Detective Michael Barz interviewed defendant after his arrest. Defendant admitted he
was at the scene of the shooting but denied seeing who fired the shots. Defendant told the
detective he recognized Calhoun as the man who killed his friend Anderson Thomas, also known
as “Shug.” Defendant had a tattoo on his arm that read “RIP Shug.” A certified copy of
Calhoun’s 1993 murder conviction was entered into evidence.
¶9 The jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder, and the court sentenced him to 65
years in prison. Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Perry, No.
1-07-2761.
¶ 10 Defendant filed his initial pro se postconviction petition in July 2010, alleging several
claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s
petition, which this court affirmed on appeal. People v. Perry, 2012 IL App (1st) 103225-U.
¶ 11 In April 2013, defendant filed his pro se successive postconviction petition asserting a
claim of actual innocence. In support, defendant attached an affidavit purportedly from Hayden,
dated July 11, 2012. She stated that she did not see who shot Calhoun because she was “not in a
position to see who killed” him. She gave a statement identifying defendant as the shooter “after
pressure” from the police and the assistant State’s Attorney (ASA). She was given defendant’s
name from the detectives. Prior to defendant’s trial, Hayden went over her testimony with an
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No. 1-24-1397
ASA, and he “provided” her with the details of her testimony, including that she was not forced
to identify defendant.
¶ 12 Continuing on, the affidavit provided that Hayden did not see defendant shoot Calhoun,
nor did she see who killed Calhoun. She “falsely testified and identified” defendant at trial
because she “had already lied” in her statement and she “feared prosecution.” Hayden stated that
she was not forced or induced to give the affidavit, which was signed and notarized with a
photocopy of Hayden’s state identification card.
¶ 13 The trial court docketed defendant’s successive petition and appointed the public
defender to represent defendant. The case proceeded to a third stage postconviction review with
the agreement of the State. Prior to an evidentiary hearing, defendant’s postconviction counsel
sought to withdraw Hayden’s affidavit following an investigation. Counsel stated that based on
her own investigation, as well as the State’s investigation, she could not “proceed with the
affidavit.” Counsel also asked to incorporate an affidavit from defendant. Defendant’s affidavit
simply stated his date of birth, current address in the penitentiary, and that he was “innocent of
all charges and [he] still maintain[ed his] innocence.”
¶ 14 The State orally moved to dismiss defendant’s petition. Postconviction counsel waived
“any sort of notice” and stated that she had “no argument.” At a subsequent status hearing, that
attorney indicated that defendant “does not agree” with her, but “as an officer of the Court, I
stand by my decision.” The trial court dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition finding the
petition with defendant’s “self-serving affidavit” was “frivolous and completely without merit.”
¶ 15 On appeal, this court found that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance
by withdrawing Hayden’s 2012 affidavit over defendant’s objection. People v. Perry, 2017 IL
App (1st) 150587, ¶ 39. Counsel’s “actions amounted to an affirmative action that damaged
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No. 1-24-1397
defendant’s claims” and defendant’s actual innocence claim “could not stand absent Hayden’s
affidavit.” Id. After acknowledging that “the record establishes serious questions regarding the
reliability of the Hayden affidavit,” we held that counsel should have either stood on the petition
or sought to withdraw as counsel. Id. We remanded for new second stage proceedings on
defendant’s original petition with new counsel to be appointed. Id.
¶ 16 Defendant retained private counsel on remand. His new postconviction counsel filed an
amended petition again raising a claim of actual innocence and reattached Hayden’s 2012
affidavit. However, in January 2021, a new attorney filed his appearance, filed a certificate in
compliance with Supreme Court Rule 651(c), and stated that defendant’s pro se petition
adequately presented defendant’s contentions. (Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017)). See
People v. Urzua, 2023 IL 127789, ¶ 54 (Rule 651(c) sets forth the duties postconviction counsel
must undertake at the second stage of proceedings).
¶ 17 Counsel also filed a new affidavit from Hayden, dated September 15, 2022, stating her
trial testimony that she saw defendant shoot Calhoun “was not true.” She said her identification
of defendant “was mistaken” and she thought defendant shot Calhoun “but it was not him” and
she “made a mistake.” Hayden also stated that she did not “ever remember signing an affidavit”
for defendant before. Her identity was stolen in 2014, including her driver’s license and social
security card. Counsel included a black and white photocopy of Hayden’s identification card.
¶ 18 The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing in March 2024. Postconviction counsel
presented Hayden’s 2022 affidavit but did not call her as a witness. Counsel stated that he
discussed “the potential” of Hayden’s testimony with defendant and they agreed “to rest on her
affidavit and not proceed with her live testimony.” Counsel asked defendant if this was correct
and defendant stated it was. Counsel also submitted this court’s 2017 decision in this case as an
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No. 1-24-1397
exhibit because it explained the history of the case and a summary of the factual evidence.
Counsel then rested.
¶ 19 The prosecutor presented a copy of Hayden’s 2012 affidavit as his first exhibit. He then
submitted Hayden’s handwritten statement from the original investigation, signed by Hayden,
Detective Barz, and the ASA. The prosecutor also presented a stipulation as the foundation for
his next exhibit. The parties stipulated that if called to testify Kathleen DeWald would testify she
is an ASA and was an ASA on June 24, 2014. On that date, she met with Hayden in an interview
room at 26th and California in Chicago. DeWald would identify the next exhibit as a video
recording of that conversation.
¶ 20 The prosecutor then presented the video recording, which was played for the court. In
the video, DeWald questioned Hayden about this case. Hayden confirmed she testified at
defendant’s trial and that she saw defendant shoot and kill Calhoun. Hayden stated that her trial
testimony was the truth. DeWald presented the 2012 affidavit to Hayden. Hayden stated that she
did not recognize this document and denied that the signature on the affidavit was her signature.
She did not sign this affidavit in 2012 and had not seen this affidavit until she spoke with
DeWald. Hayden denied ever signing an affidavit for defendant. Hayden stated that her
identification card was stolen from her in 2012. Hayden also said the statement in the affidavit
that she identified defendant after being pressured by police and the ASA was not true. She
further denied that the ASA told her what her trial testimony would be. Hayden continued to
deny each statement made in the 2012 affidavit, including that she testified falsely because she
feared prosecution.
¶ 21 DeWald also had Hayden identify her 2005 handwritten statement. Hayden confirmed it
was her statement and that her signature was on each page of the document. Hayden said her
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No. 1-24-1397
statement that she saw defendant shoot and kill Calhoun was the truth. Hayden stated that prior
to being approached by DeWald, no one had approached her to provide an affidavit or say that
defendant was not the shooter. Hayden confirmed that DeWald did not threaten or promise her
anything to give the videotape statement. Hayden said she gave the statement of her own free
will and everything she said was the truth.
¶ 22 Postconviction counsel then argued that “to some extent other than Ms. Hayden’s
statements regarding the actual incident itself, the tape and the previous affidavit are a red
herring.” He stated that he “made sure” Hayden provided her identification for the 2022
affidavit. When asked by the court if counsel was sure it was the same woman from the
videotaped interview, counsel responded in the affirmative. The court said, “There’s something
seriously wrong with this case. Seriously wrong. But go ahead.” Counsel maintained that he was
“convinced” it was Hayden because he met with her when the affidavit was given and he knew
she was the same person.
¶ 23 After counsel concluded his argument, the court voiced that it had “serious concerns.”
Counsel responded that he talked to Hayden about the facts of the case and she provided an
affidavit with her identification so he “was certain of who she was.” The court stated, “Well,
obviously, you’re the attorney, you’re not a witness, at least you’re not a witness right now. I
have no reason whatsoever to ever doubt your credibility.”
¶ 24 The trial court subsequently denied defendant’s petition both on the record and in a
written order. After reviewing Hayden’s various statements, the court found her 2022 affidavit
was not credible because her “new statements do not provide meaningful explanations or specific
details.” The court further found Hayden’s affidavits recanting “a coerced false identification and
testimony are unequivocally incredible.” Hayden’s videotaped statement in June 2014 affirming
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No. 1-24-1397
the truthfulness of her initial statements and testimony was “compelling and consistent.” The
court concluded that Hayden’s statements were not likely to change the result of the trial and
defendant “failed to present evidence of such a character as to undermine confidence in his
conviction.”
¶ 25 Defendant argues on appeal that his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable
assistance during the third-stage proceedings by failing to: (1) properly authenticate Hayden’s
2022 affidavit, (2) present a cogent and supported claim based on Hayden’s recantation, and (3)
develop a due process claim that Hayden’s identification of defendant was coerced by police.
The State responds that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance in presenting
defendant’s actual innocence claim.
¶ 26 The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) allows a defendant to challenge a conviction
based on a violation of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois
Constitution or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2022); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-
79 (1998). Defendant has not challenged the denial of his postconviction petition on the merits
and, thus, he has forfeited any argument regarding his claim of actual innocence. People v. Cotto,
2016 IL 119006, ¶ 49; Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited
and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing”).
¶ 27 Defendant focuses his argument on his attorney’s performance during the third-stage
proceedings. The right to counsel in proceedings under the Act is not a constitutional right, but
strictly a matter of legislative grace derived from the Act. People v. Huff, 2024 IL 128492, ¶ 21
(citing People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30). A postconviction defendant is entitled to only a
reasonable level of assistance, which is a standard lower than that provided by the federal or state
constitutions. People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006).
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No. 1-24-1397
¶ 28 The reasonable level of assistance required under the Act is not coextensive with the level
of assistance required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). People v.
Hotwagner, 2015 IL App (5th) 130525, ¶ 37 (citing People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364-65
(1990)). Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was
deficient and that such deficient performance substantially prejudiced defendant. Strickland, 466
U.S. at 687. To demonstrate performance deficiency, a defendant must establish that counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d
142, 163 (2001). In evaluating sufficient prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
¶ 29 Although Strickland “is not the relevant standard” for addressing such claims, “the
Strickland test is an essential standard for comparison.” Hotwagner, 2015 IL App (5th) 130525,
¶ 37; see People v. Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867, ¶ 36 (following Hotwagner). “It stands to
reason that, if postconviction counsel’s assistance cannot be deemed ineffective under
Strickland, it cannot be deemed unreasonable under the Act.” Pabello, 2019 IL App (2d) 170867,
¶ 36 (citing Hotwagner, 2015 IL App (5th) 130525, ¶ 37); see People v. Addison, 2023 IL
127119, ¶ 38 (“this court has not prescribed by rule specific duties that counsel must perform at
the third stage”).
¶ 30 Because defendant’s postconviction relief was denied following a third stage evidentiary
hearing, we review postconviction counsel’s representation under this general reasonable
assistance standard. See Hotwagner, 2015 IL App (5th) 130525, ¶ 37. Even if we were to
evaluate defendant’s claims alleged against postconviction counsel under the elevated Strickland
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No. 1-24-1397
standard, his claim that he was denied the right to reasonable assistance still fails for the reasons
that follow.
¶ 31 Defendant first contends that his postconviction counsel was unreasonable for failing to
present independent evidence to authenticate either of Hayden’s affidavits. According to
defendant, counsel could have either provided a clear color copy of Hayden’s identification card
or subpoena the notary to testify that Hayden’s identification matched the person signing the
affidavit. Instead, he argues that counsel violated Rule 3.7 of the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct by acting as a witness to affirm Hayden was the person who signed the affidavit. Ill. R.
Prof’l Conduct R. 3.7 (eff. Jan. 1, 2010) (“A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which
the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness”).
¶ 32 The State responds that counsel sufficiently established the authenticity of the notarized
2022 affidavit and further proof was unnecessary because the State did not challenge its
authenticity. The State also maintains that counsel did not violate the advocate-witness rule by
answering the court’s questions about the 2022 affidavit.
¶ 33 We agree with the State. Postconviction counsel did not act as a witness by responding to
the trial court’s questions. The following colloquy took place during counsel’s argument.
“THE COURT: Are you sure that’s the same woman as I see on the
videotape?
POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL: Yes.
THE COURT: There’s something seriously wrong with this case.
Seriously wrong. But go ahead.
POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL: I’m convinced based on the date of
birth and on the -- because I met with the lady when the affidavit was taken, so I
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No. 1-24-1397
know that that is the same person. Though this isn’t evidence, it’s my lawyer talk,
that that person is the same person I met with in my office who provided me that
identification, otherwise, I wouldn’t be here if I had any doubt in my mind.”
¶ 34 The court discussed the circumstances of Hayden’s testimony, noting she testified both
before the grand jury and then at trial. Hayden later provided the 2014 videotaped statement
identifying defendant as the shooter and disavowing the 2012 affidavit. The court expressed that
it had “serious concerns” about this case, including “the travesty of having fabricated recants to
overturn convictions here.” Counsel then stated he talked to Hayden about the facts of the case
and provided the affidavit with identification so counsel “was certain of who she was.” The court
noted that counsel was the attorney and “not a witness,” and it had “no reason whatsoever to ever
doubt [his] credibility.” We conclude postconviction counsel was not acting as a witness when
he answered the court’s questions about the 2022 affidavit and Hayden’s identity. Further, we
find counsel did not violate the advocate-witness rule and he did not act unreasonably.
¶ 35 Even if counsel was unreasonable for failing to authenticate the affidavit, which we do
not find, defendant cannot establish any prejudice from counsel’s actions. Contrary to
defendant’s assertion, the postconviction court did not rule that the 2022 affidavit was “a fraud
on the court.” Significantly, the court accepted the authenticity of Hayden’s 2022 affidavit but
rejected her recantation on the merits. The court found Hayden’s affidavits to be “unequivocally
incredible” while Hayden’s 2014 videotaped statement was “compelling and consistent.” The
court observed that the videotaped statement “exposes the fraud submitted to this court” because
Hayden denied being involved in the preparation of an affidavit. While the court did not specify
which affidavit it was referring to, it can be logically inferred that the court meant the 2012
affidavit because the videotaped statement predated the 2022 affidavit by several years.
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No. 1-24-1397
¶ 36 Additionally, the court did not find the 2022 affidavit lacked authenticity. When
discussing the 2022 affidavit, the court found that Hayden provided “no explanation for why her
identification was mistaken or any specific details to undermine the verdict.” The court
concluded that Hayden’s statements were “not likely to change the result of the trial.” Since the
trial court accepted the authenticity of the 2022 affidavit and rejected the claim on the merits,
defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s actions regarding authentication.
¶ 37 Defendant next asserts that postconviction counsel failed to make any good faith
arguments to support Hayden’s 2022 affidavit. According to defendant, it was unreasonable for
counsel to stand on the 2022 affidavit recanting her identification. Defendant contends that
counsel should have attempted to distinguish case law regarding recantations. While defendant
asserts that “there are good-faith arguments to distinguish [his] case and modify or reverse
existing law,” defendant does not explain what arguments counsel could have made. Conclusory
allegations are not sufficient to sustain a claim of ineffective, or unreasonable, assistance under
the Act. People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247, 258 (2008).
¶ 38 It is unclear what counsel could have done under these circumstances. At the time
postconviction counsel first appeared in 2021, this court had already remanded for further
proceedings, and a prior counsel filed an amended petition reasserting actual innocence based on
Hayden’s 2012 affidavit. However, that affidavit had been disavowed by Hayden’s 2014
videotaped statement. Postconviction counsel was placed in an untenable position: either stand
on the disavowed 2012 affidavit or seek new evidence. Counsel chose the latter and stood on
defendant’s pro se petition supplemented by Hayden’s 2022 affidavit.
¶ 39 Nevertheless, defendant contends that counsel made defendant’s petition worse by
supplementing it with the 2022 affidavit and arguing against the validity of the 2012 affidavit.
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Defendant cites People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶¶ 24-25, as support. There, the defendant
raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel in his pro se
petition. Postconviction counsel amended the petition, focusing on some of the defendant’s
claims but failed to shape these claims into their proper form. Id. ¶ 26. Crucially, counsel
eliminated the necessary allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, leaving the
claims subject to forfeiture. Id. ¶¶ 23-26.
¶ 40 Addison is readily distinguishable from the circumstances of this case. As thoroughly
discussed above, Hayden’s 2012 affidavit was repeatedly disavowed by Hayden. In the 2014
videotaped statement, Hayden denied having seen the affidavit before and denied her signature
was on the document. She also reaffirmed her identification of defendant as the shooter and
stated that her trial testimony was truthful. Hayden also denied providing the 2012 affidavit in
the 2022 affidavit. It is unclear how counsel could have argued that the 2012 affidavit was valid.
Unlike in Addison, counsel did not remove a necessary claim making the petition worse. Rather,
counsel sought to remedy the significant problems of the 2012 affidavit by obtaining the 2022
affidavit. Counsel acted reasonably to minimize the effects of the dubious affidavit and proceed
with a new one.
¶ 41 Defendant also cannot show how he was prejudiced by counsel’s actions. During the
evidentiary hearing, the trial court repeatedly expressed its concerns with the 2012 affidavit. In
its written order, the court explicitly found the 2012 affidavit was fraudulent and the 2014
videotaped statement was “compelling and consistent.” While defendant asserts that he was
prejudiced by counsel’s actions, he fails to offer any basis on which counsel could have
supported the discredited 2012 affidavit. There was no reasonable probability that the trial court
would have granted defendant’s petition based on the 2012 affidavit.
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No. 1-24-1397
¶ 42 Defendant next argues postconviction counsel was unreasonable for failing to develop his
due process claim based on Hayden’s 2012 affidavit that her identification of defendant was
coerced by police and prosecutors. According to defendant, counsel should have presented
evidence showing a pattern of misconduct by Detective Barz and that the State knowingly used
false testimony in violation of Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (holding that a
defendant’s right to due process is violated when a conviction is obtained through the use of false
evidence “known to be such by representatives of the State”).
¶ 43 The State responds that counsel has no obligation to raise this claim because it was not
raised in defendant’s pro se petition. In his reply, defendant asserts that the Napue claim arose
from Hayden’s allegations of coercion in the 2012 affidavit. He maintains it was counsel’s role
to support this claim at the evidentiary hearing.
¶ 44 Postconviction counsel is only required to investigate and properly present defendant’s
claims. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 472. “Postconviction counsel is not required to comb the record
for issues not raised in the defendant’s pro se post-conviction petition.” People v. Helton, 321 Ill.
App. 3d 420, 424-25 (2001). A postconviction petitioner is “not entitled to the advocacy of
counsel for purposes of exploration, investigation and formulation of potential claims.” People v.
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 163 (1993).
¶ 45 Defendant’s pro se petition set forth a single claim of actual innocence based on
Hayden’s 2012 affidavit. Significantly, a separate due process claim based on this affidavit was
not alleged in the petition and counsel had no obligation to assert this new claim at the third
stage.
¶ 46 Moreover, even if counsel was unreasonable for failing to present this claim, defendant
cannot show prejudice. Defendant’s argument relies again on the discredited 2012 affidavit.
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No. 1-24-1397
These claims of coercion were denied by Hayden in the 2014 videotaped statement. Hayden
specifically said the statement regarding coercion by Detective Barz and prosecutors was not
true. She stated that both her handwritten statement and trial testimony were truthful. Notably,
Hayden’s 2022 affidavit does not allege any coercion, rather she stated that her identification
was a mistake. Given this evidence, defendant has not shown a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different.
¶ 47 We note that defendant is not without a remedy to pursue a potential due process claim.
When appellate counsel discovers an error not argued during postconviction proceedings, the
proper course of action is to seek leave to file a new successive petition alleging this claim.
People v. Jones, 213 Ill. 2d 498, 509 (2004). Defendant can raise this claim in a new successive
petition, but he will have to overcome the cause-and-prejudice test. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)
(West 2024).
¶ 48 For all of the reasons listed above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 49 Affirmed.
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