People v. Tate

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 250222-U NOTICE Decision filed 11/03/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0222 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Wayne County ) v. ) No. 21-CF-236 ) RAY E. TATE, ) Honorable ) Denton W. Aud, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hackett and Clarke concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶1 Held: Where there is no arguable merit to this direct appeal, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), appellate counsel is granted leave to withdraw, and the judgment of conviction is affirmed. ¶2 The defendant, Ray E. Tate, appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Wayne County, denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate sentence. The Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) was appointed to represent the defendant in this appeal. OSAD has concluded this appeal lacks arguable merit, and, on that basis, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), filed a motion for leave to withdraw as counsel, along with a supporting memorandum of law. OSAD properly served the defendant with notice, and this court gave the defendant the opportunity to file a response. The defendant has chosen not to file a response to OSAD’s motion. Having considered OSAD’s Anders motion and memorandum, and the entire 1 record on appeal, this court agrees with OSAD’s assessment that this appeal is without arguable merit. We therefore grant OSAD’s motion to withdraw, and we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 The following facts and procedural history are necessary to our disposition of this appeal. On December 29, 2021, the defendant was arrested and charged by information with one count of first degree murder for knowingly shooting Wayne County Sheriff’s Deputy Sean Riley with a handgun with intent to kill. On the following day, the defendant was appointed a public defender. ¶5 On January 21, 2022, in a 38-count indictment, the grand jury charged the defendant with 36 counts of first degree murder, one count of aggravated vehicular hijacking, and one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon. Relevant to this appeal, count IX charged the defendant with intentional first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)) while personally discharging a firearm that proximately caused Deputy Riley’s death (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)(iii) (West 2020)). Additionally, count IX explicitly charged that, if at the time of the commission of the offense, the adult defendant was found guilty of murdering a peace officer, killed while “performing his official duties,” and the defendant “knew or should have known” that the victim was a peace officer, “the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment.” (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) (West 2020). ¶6 A. Guilty Plea ¶7 On March 17, 2022, the parties announced that the defendant wished to enter a “negotiated 2 plea.” 1 The State indicated that pursuant to the plea agreement, it was prepared to nol-pros all the counts except for count IX. The State made no sentencing concessions and instead clarified that because count IX explicitly charged the defendant with the murder of a peace officer killed in the line of duty, the sentence was natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The State confirmed that the agreement was that the defendant would enter a guilty plea and the matter would be set for a sentencing hearing at a later date. ¶8 Before accepting the defendant’s guilty plea, the trial court proceeded to thoroughly question the defendant regarding his understanding of the plea agreement and his ability to enter into it freely and voluntarily. First, the trial judge inquired whether the defendant had taken any medication, food, or beverage that might affect his ability to understand, to which the defendant responded, “Unfortunately not.” Next, the judge asked the defendant whether he had spoken with his defense attorney and reviewed his discovery with her prior to coming to court, and whether he was “satisfied with the time spent and the conversation had,” and the defendant responded in the affirmative. ¶9 After reading count IX out loud and ascertaining that the defendant understood the charge, the court further admonished the defendant regarding the potential sentence. The court explained that a first degree murder charge carried a sentence of 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment but that two sentencing enhancements in count IX increased that sentence to natural life in prison. Specifically, because the defendant personally discharged the firearm that caused the victim’s death, an additional 25 years to natural life had to be added to his murder sentence. Moreover, because count 1 As OSAD correctly notes, this was an incorrect characterization and the record unequivocally establishes that this was an open, rather than a negotiated, guilty plea. See People v. Gooch, 2014 IL App (5th) 120161, ¶ 15 (defining an open plea, in contrast to a negotiated plea, as one in which the sentence is not a material element of the plea agreement and instead the State and the defendant are free to argue for any sentence permitted by the statute, which the trial court ultimately imposes). 3 IX charged the defendant with knowingly killing a peace officer while that officer was performing his duties, the court had no choice but to impose a sentence of natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The defendant acknowledged that he understood the penalties. When the court later advised the defendant that the conviction in the instant case could also result in a sentencing enhancement in future criminal prosecutions, including in other counties or states, the defendant responded, “I mean, natural life is natural life,” but acknowledged that the conviction “might be something that would come up” in later cases. ¶ 10 The court also admonished the defendant that he was under no obligation to plead guilty. The court explained that by pleading guilty, the defendant was relinquishing his right to remain silent and his right to a trial, at which the State would be required to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and at which the defendant would be entitled to confront the witnesses against him and compel witnesses to appear on his behalf. The court explained the difference between a bench and a jury trial and informed the defendant that in a jury trial, 12 citizens would have to render a unanimous verdict of guilty. The defendant indicated that he understood all this, acknowledged his signature on the written jury waiver, and affirmed that he had read the waiver and discussed it with his attorney. The defendant also confirmed that no threats or promises (beyond those discussed in the courtroom) were made to him, and that he had not been coerced into entering a plea. He then stated that his plea was both free and voluntary. ¶ 11 After this discussion, the trial court found that the defendant understood “the nature of the charges pending against him, the possible penalties, his legal rights, [and] the possible future impact of his plea of guilty” and that he was entering into the plea agreement “voluntarily.” ¶ 12 The State next recited, and defense counsel conceded to, the following factual basis for the plea. According to the State, in the early morning hours of December 29, 2021, Deputy Riley was 4 acting as a peace officer in the course of performing his official duties. At approximately 4:31 a.m., Deputy Riley was in uniform and operating a marked squad car while responding to a motorist-assist call on eastbound I-64 near milepost 115 in Wayne County. The vehicle in question was a silver gray 2014 Nissan Altima, and the defendant was in the driver’s seat. Deputy Riley pulled up and approached the driver’s side of the Nissan with his body-worn camera activated. Deputy Riley questioned the defendant for a few minutes, during which time the defendant failed to produce any form of identification. After taking out his notepad, Deputy Riley asked the defendant for his name, and the defendant identified himself as “Raymond Scott.” As Deputy Riley began to write down the name, the defendant reached for a firearm and shot the deputy in the face. ¶ 13 Deputy Riley fell to the ground, and the defendant exited the vehicle and moved toward its rear. Deputy Riley reached for his firearm and attempted to crawl toward the defendant, but the defendant fired additional shots at him. Deputy Riley was struck multiple times but was able to radio for help before the defendant walked directly up to him, placed a gun to his head, and fired a final shot, killing him. The defendant then dragged Deputy Riley’s body from the roadway into a ditch and absconded in the deputy’s patrol car. ¶ 14 After Fairfield police officers Caleb Koker and Austin Russel responded to Deputy Riley’s call for help, they could not locate the deputy’s patrol vehicle at the scene. Instead, they only found the unoccupied Nissan and Deputy Riley’s motionless body lying in a nearby ditch. Wayne County Sheriff Christopher Otey arrived shortly thereafter and attempted CPR without success. ¶ 15 A subsequent autopsy revealed that Deputy Riley sustained five gunshot wounds: to the head, right eye, right ear, right back, and left thigh. The head wound was a contact-range shot and two of the other wounds (to the right eye and ear) were intermediate-range shots. The cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. 5 ¶ 16 The police search of the interior of the Nissan produced a wallet containing multiple forms of identification belonging to the defendant. Inside the trunk, officers also found court documents dated December 17, 2021, showing that the defendant was wanted in Indiana on an armed robbery charge. ¶ 17 Deputy Riley’s unoccupied patrol vehicle was soon discovered on I-64 eastbound near milepost 120. A multistate manhunt ensued, leading the police into Missouri and then back into Illinois. Later that same afternoon, police located the defendant at a residence at 20240 Beaver Creek Road in Carlyle, Illinois, where he was holding hostages. One of the hostages, whom the defendant had carjacked earlier that morning, was able to escape from the residence. After hearing gunshots, the Illinois State Police SWAT team entered the home and successfully placed the defendant into custody. A search warrant was later executed at the residence, and the police recovered a black .380-caliber semiautomatic pistol from a chair in the basement. ¶ 18 Subsequent ballistic testing of that semiautomatic pistol revealed that it matched the cartridge casings found at the crime scene and the bullets extracted from Deputy Riley’s body during the autopsy. In addition, DNA testing of the weapon revealed the defendant’s DNA on the grip and trigger, and Deputy Riley’s DNA on the muzzle. ¶ 19 After the State’s recitation of these facts, the trial court found there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. The court then accepted the defendant’s guilty plea, ordered a presentence investigation report (PSI), and set the matter for a sentencing hearing. ¶ 20 B. Sentencing Hearing ¶ 21 At the subsequent sentencing hearing, held on April 22, 2022, defense counsel initially requested that the State be prohibited from presenting any evidence in aggravation. Defense counsel argued that because the court was obligated to impose a natural life sentence, any 6 aggravating evidence was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible. The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion, explaining that, despite the court’s lack of sentencing discretion, because this was an open, rather than a negotiated, plea the State was permitted to present aggravating evidence. ¶ 22 The State then began by offering two victim impact statements, from Deputy Riley’s widow (and the mother of his three children) and from his sister. Next, the State called several officers to testify regarding the circumstances of the instant crime. Sheriff Otey and Officer Koker described their observations of the crime scene and their discovery of Deputy Riley’s body. In addition, Illinois State Police Trooper Cheyenne Thompson testified that she recovered Deputy Riley’s body-worn camera from the crime scene and watched the footage together with Sheriff Otey. After Sheriff Otey identified that footage, over defense counsel’s objection, the footage was admitted into evidence and played for the court with Sheriff Otey narrating portions of it. ¶ 23 The footage, which this court has independently reviewed, depicts the following from the vantage point of the deputy. At 4:32 a.m., Deputy Riley exits his patrol car and walks to the driver’s side of the Nissan, which is parked off the side of the road, with the defendant in the driver’s seat. For the first 2:54 seconds of the video, Deputy Riley and the defendant engage in what appears to be a friendly conversation during which the defendant claims his vehicle “ran out of gas” and cannot provide the deputy with his driver’s license. Throughout this conversation, the defendant is rummaging through numerous articles of clothing strewn over the passenger seat of his vehicle. When Deputy Riley asks the defendant his name, the defendant provides a false one. As Deputy Riley takes out his notepad to write down the name, the defendant pulls down a hoodie over his head, reaches to his right, and with no warning, grabs a handgun, aims it at Deputy Riley’s face with both hands, and fires. Bits of tissue fly into the air and are visible in the beam of the deputy’s flashlight. Deputy Riley falls to the ground on his left side and rolls toward the Nissan. The 7 defendant exits the car and points the pistol at the deputy before running to the back of the vehicle. Deputy Riley pulls himself up and is seen on his knees, bleeding over the roadway, slowly attempting to crawl toward the back of the Nissan with a pistol visible in his right hand. He is heard moaning as he is shot again. As the deputy makes his way to the back of the vehicle, an arm and hand holding a pistol enter the frame from the right and the deputy is seen trying to wrestle it away. The deputy is heard making a call for help before he falls on his right side into the grass. He is then seen being dragged off the roadway, after which the defendant’s face enters the frame, and the defendant rifles through items on the deputy’s body. The remainder of the video shows the police, EMS, and Illinois State Police Crime Scene Investigator’s response from the vantage point of the body worn camera. ¶ 24 After the footage was played, in aggravation, the State presented evidence of the defendant’s actions following his flight from the crime scene. Brian Reuss testified that approximately three hours after Deputy Riley had been shot, the defendant approached him in a gas station in St. Peters, Missouri, coaxed him out of his vehicle by pretending to need help, pulled out a gun, shot Reuss in the shoulder, and stole Reuss’s vehicle. ¶ 25 Joesph Reagan testified that later that morning when he arrived at the CitiBank in O’Fallon, Missouri, where he worked, the defendant walked up to him with a gun and told him that he had already shot a police officer and another person and would shoot Reagan, too, unless Reagan drove him out of town. Reagan obliged and for the next several hours drove the defendant around in his truck looking for a place where the defendant could “lay low.” During this time, the defendant disposed of several cell phones through the window and then used Reagan’s cell phone to make calls to various people. After learning from one of those calls that the police were searching for Reagan’s truck, the defendant ordered Reagan to drive to a car dealership in Pierron, 8 Illinois. There, he secured a car by pretending he was buying it for his daughter and ordered Reagan, at gunpoint, into the passenger seat. ¶ 26 The defendant then drove both of them to what looked like an abandoned house. When an elderly woman appeared at the door, the defendant pretended that his vehicle was overheating and needed water. After the woman began taking pictures of the vehicle with her cell phone, the defendant sped off. About a mile and a half away, amidst fields, the defendant pulled into a solitary farm that had a garage door open, forced himself into the house, and took the owner hostage. After hiding the car in the garage, the defendant ordered Reagan and the owner inside the house and held them there at gunpoint. After the police arrived, the defendant moved the men into the basement and called his sister to help “rescue him” and get him out of town. The defendant told Reagan that he intended to go out with “guns blazing” and “didn’t mind taking out another officer.” Reagan was able to escape while the defendant was distracted, and the defendant was eventually taken into custody. ¶ 27 In aggravation, the State also presented evidence regarding the defendant’s conduct in jail after his arrest. Trooper Thompson testified that she monitored all of the defendant’s communications while he was housed in Jefferson County jail, including, among other things, his “chirps,” or text messages made via a secure jail-provided device. According to Trooper Thompson, between February 11 and March 1, 2022, the defendant made numerous inculpatory statements via “chirps.” For purposes of brevity, we relate only the most incriminating ones. For example, on February 11, 2022, defendant wrote: “I shot him in the face, and back of his head, and drug him in a ditch. Crazy.” On that same day, he wrote: “The f*** up thing, brother, I didn’t feel anything.” On February 13, 2022, the defendant wrote: “How does it make you feel if it does at all? That I shot a cop in his face and the back of his head?” Two days later, the defendant also 9 “chirped”: “Is it f*** up that I wanted to kill cops and [racial slur]?” On March 1, 2022, the defendant also wrote: “Because I hate cops and didn’t want to go back to the system.” ¶ 28 After Trooper Thompson’s testimony, the State also called Jefferson County sheriff’s correctional officer Gilbert Haynes who testified that about two weeks after the plea hearing, on the evening of April 9, 2022, the defendant nearly broke out of jail. According to Officer Haynes, the defendant escaped his jail cell, broke into the kitchen, and reached the final door to the outside before officers captured him. The defendant had put a bundle of clothes under his bed sheets to make it look like he was in bed and had somehow pried apart the shower in his jail cell and escaped into the hallway behind it. Inside a broom closet by the kitchen door, officers also discovered two duffel bags containing an electric Sawzall, metal files, screwdrivers, pliers, a carpenter’s knife, and dark clothes. ¶ 29 After the witnesses’ testimony, in aggravation, lastly the State offered the defendant’s PSI into evidence. The PSI reflected that the defendant was 41 years old and had an extensive prior criminal history, comprised of a 1995 juvenile adjudication for a Class A battery, and four adult felony convictions in Illinois, including: residential burglary and theft in 1999, a Class 3 burglary in 2000, a Class 4 theft in 2002, and a Class 3 aggravated battery in 2003. The defendant also had convictions in Louisiana, for simple escape in 2008, and false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon in 2018, and in Kentucky for wanton endangerment, methamphetamine possession, fleeing/evading, prescription in an improper container, possession of drug paraphernalia, operating under the influence, and marijuana possession in 2013, and promoting contraband in 2018. In addition, at the time of his arrest, the defendant had pending charges in Indiana for armed robbery, resisting law enforcement, burglary, criminal confinement, and theft, and in Missouri for 10 kidnapping, vehicular hijacking, armed criminal action, robbery, assault, and unlawful possession of a firearm. ¶ 30 After the State presented its evidence, defense counsel informed the court that she had met with the defendant on several occasions and discussed the PSI with him but that he did not wish to present any evidence in mitigation. Counsel nonetheless noted that the PSI reflected that the defendant had reported that, as a child, he was sexually abused by his father. We note that the PSI also reflects that the defendant dropped out of high school in tenth grade, obtained his GED in 2016, and heavily used intravenous methamphetamine from April 2021 until his arrest in the instant case. ¶ 31 After the parties’ arguments, the trial court sentenced the defendant to natural life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court admonished the defendant of his appeal rights. ¶ 32 C. Postplea Proceedings ¶ 33 On May 17, 2022, the defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate sentence. Therein, he made three contentions. First, the defendant argued that his “plea was the result of coercion (force or threats).” The defendant explained that he was “not allowed phone, mail, [or] visits” and that he was “threatened” that unless he “took the plea” he “would not be allowed these rights while in held facility.” Second, the defendant asserted that he was not mentally competent to enter the plea because he had “seen and heard things in [the] factual basis that made [him] question” his competence but “was never given [a] mental evaluation.” Third, the defendant argued that defense counsel had provided him with “inadequate representation” because there was a “lack of time and understanding with [the] attorney regarding [the] plea” and he was not allowed to “call, write, or visit adequately with [her].” 11 ¶ 34 At the next status hearing, on June 28, 2022, the trial court noted that it appeared that the defendant was “not alleging ineffective assistance of counsel” but rather that “he didn’t have enough time to confer” with his attorney. The court, therefore, stated that it would decide at a later date whether a separate hearing on the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was necessary. In the meantime, it would give defense counsel an opportunity to review the defendant’s claims and prepare a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). ¶ 35 On July 10, 2023, defense counsel filed an amended motion to withdraw the defendant’s guilty plea and vacate his sentence, as well as her Rule 604(d) certificate. In the amended motion to withdraw the guilty plea, counsel first argued that the defendant was “under duress and entered into the guilty plea by coercion.” Counsel alleged that, while in jail, the defendant was in isolation the entire time and was cut off from all non-legal communications. Moreover, a jail guard told the defendant that if he did not plead guilty, he would be prosecuted in federal court where he would be subject to the death penalty. The defendant was also beaten by another inmate who was allowed into the defendant’s cell by a jail guard. The defendant’s family was harassed and threatened by the deputy’s family, and the defendant did not want his family to have to watch the body-worn camera footage alongside the victim’s family. Under these circumstances, counsel argued, the defendant had no choice but to plead guilty to protect himself and his family from ongoing threats of violence and to restore some access to communication. ¶ 36 Counsel did not attach an affidavit from the defendant in support of these allegations but explained its absence was “due to circumstances beyond [the defendant’s] and [counsel’s] control, attributable to conditions at Menard [Correctional Center] including lockdowns and mail interruptions.” 12 ¶ 37 The amended petition also challenged the constitutionality of the defendant’s mandatory life sentence. Therein, counsel argued that under the Illinois proportionate penalties clause (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) the statute mandating natural life imprisonment for the instant crime (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(iii) (West 2020)) was per se unconstitutional. Counsel also asserted that the defendant’s particular rights were violated because the trial court was foreclosed from considering the defendant’s rehabilitative potential. ¶ 38 On July 13, 2023, the defendant informed the court that he wished to raise additional allegations and to proceed pro se. Upon the State’s request, the court thoroughly questioned the defendant regarding this decision. The court informed the defendant that if he were to proceed pro se, he would be held to the same legal standards as any attorney, that the judge could not help him with his pleadings or legal arguments, and that he was putting himself “at a great disadvantage” considering opposing counsel’s expertise. The defendant acknowledged that he had no prior experience representing himself but stated that because of the numerous previous charges brought against him in various states he “basically kn[ew] the law.” The defendant said that he had experience in doing legal research and understood “the gist” of the rules of evidence. He also confirmed that he was 42 years old, had a GED, was “fairly intelligent,” and would have no issues with reading, comprehension, or communication. ¶ 39 The court reiterated that the defendant had the right to be represented by counsel and informed him that he could change his mind in the future and decide to be represented again but could not choose which counsel would be appointed. In addition, the court told the defendant that, if he wished, it could appoint standby counsel to assist him. The defendant stated that he understood and believed that he could “move forward [in his own] best interests.” 13 ¶ 40 The trial court found that the defendant had made a knowing, intelligent, informed, and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel, permitted defense counsel to withdraw, and granted the defendant’s request to represent himself. The court then granted the defendant leave to file a second amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea or a supplement to the existing motion. ¶ 41 On September 15, 2023, the defendant filed a motion for the appointment of standby counsel, which the court granted on March 26, 2024. ¶ 42 On March 29, 2024, the State filed a response to the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therein, among other things, the State argued that the defendant’s plea had not been coerced because he had unfettered access to defense counsel while in jail, and his non-legal communications had been restricted for only about a week prior to his guilty plea. The State explained that despite being classified as a high-security inmate, for the first two months in jail, the defendant was allowed unrestricted communication with family and friends, during which he made and received nearly 10,000 “chirps.” According to the State, the defendant’s ability to communicate was curtailed on March 9, 2022, only after jail officials discovered that three days earlier, during a video visit, the defendant had discussed obtaining a gun and cutting tools for an escape attempt. After a review of 185 “chirps” confirmed an escape plan involving outside accomplices, weapons, and a getaway driver, jail authorities notified the Illinois State Police, who ordered that all of the defendant’s non-legal communication be stopped on March 10, 2022. Nevertheless, later that same day, the defendant attempted to communicate with his accomplices through another inmate, and jail authorities intercepted additional escape-related messages, including a plan to have someone shoot out the defendant’s cell window. ¶ 43 At a subsequent status hearing on May 31, 2024, the defendant waived attorney-client privilege with defense counsel so that the State could subpoena her notes and address his 14 allegations regarding her representation. The defendant then informed the court that he intended for his original pro se motion to withdraw his plea, defense counsel’s amended motion, and any supplemental motions he intended to file to complement, rather than supersede, each other. ¶ 44 On June 3, 2024, the defendant filed a supplemental pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therein, he attributed additional faults to defense counsel, including counsel’s failure to: request a change of venue, “raise issues regarding coercion,” and use their “limited time” to review discovery and the State’s evidence. The defendant also asserted that counsel coerced him with “death penalty threats if he didn’t reach [a] plea agreement,” and led him to believe that “all other charges would be dismissed upon pleading,” and would “stop coercion, violence.” In addition, the defendant claimed that defense counsel instructed him to “remain silent and keep [his] mouth shut,” “get through the hearing,” and agree that his plea was “free and voluntary.” According to the defendant, contrary to defense counsel’s promises, and in violation of the terms of the plea agreement, the State did not drop the remaining charges. ¶ 45 On August 28, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant’s various motions to withdraw his guilty plea. For purposes of clarity, henceforth, we will refer to all of these motions as one, i.e., the defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea. ¶ 46 At the hearing, defense counsel testified that after she was appointed to represent the defendant on December 30, 2021, she met with him three times (once in jail and twice before court hearings) and spoke with him on the phone seven times. In that time, the defendant never denied committing the offense and from the start informed her that he intended to plead guilty. ¶ 47 Defense counsel testified that the very first time she spoke with the defendant on January 14, 2022, he told her that he wanted to plead guilty but would wait and see if any other options unfolded after discovery. During this conversation, defense counsel informed the defendant that 15 the penalty for the first degree murder charge in the information was natural life imprisonment. On January 20, 2022, defense counsel and the defendant discussed his prior criminal history, background, and any mental health treatment he might have had in the past. According to defense counsel, the defendant had been in prison continuously since he was 24 years old and had been released only about six months prior to the instant offense. ¶ 48 During their next conversation, on January 24, 2022, defense counsel informed the defendant that the grand jury had issued a 38-count indictment against him and discussed those charges with him. She explained the sentencing enhancements in the charges and the defendant understood that he was subject to mandatory life imprisonment. After defense counsel described the arraignment process, the defendant told her that he wished to appear in person, have the charges formally read to him, and plead not guilty with the understanding that “there was a high likelihood” that he would subsequently change his plea to guilty but wished to “size up the situation” first. Defense counsel testified that it was the defendant who, once again, brought up the possibility of a guilty plea because the crime was “on video” and “there [wa]s no way around it.” ¶ 49 On February 1, 2022, defense counsel had a telephone conversation with the defendant in which they discussed his physical and mental condition at the time of the murder. The defendant told defense counsel that he had been awake a long time because he was on the run, that he had run out of gas on the side of the road, and that he was worried that Deputy Riley would arrest him once he learned there was an arrest warrant out for him in Indiana. For the first time, the defendant also told defense counsel that he had been taking drugs—“possibly *** bath salts.” Defense counsel advised the defendant that he would need to undergo a psychological examination if he was going to raise any issues regarding his state of mind at the time of the murder, but the defendant refused. 16 ¶ 50 During their next phone conversation on March 11, 2022, the defendant instructed defense counsel to request an earlier court date so that he could plead guilty. The defendant told defense counsel that his communications with family and friends had been terminated and he was “stressed with having no contact.” The defendant believed that the jail had cut off his outside communications the previous day in order to coerce him to plead guilty but acknowledged that he had also been disciplined for bad behavior, i.e., his foiled escape plan. According to counsel, the defendant told her that he wanted to “plead guilty to go to a different facility where [he] would be able to have communications,” and because he did not want his family to go through trial and see the deputy’s body-worn camera footage. ¶ 51 During this conversation, the defendant also told defense counsel for the first time that when he killed Deputy Riley, he had been awake for five days and was on his way to kill his father in Indiana and asked her whether that would justify an insanity plea. The defendant told counsel that he had been sexually abused by his father, which had “messed him up for real,” and that his father had been reaching out to him recently, which “weighed on his mind.” After defense counsel advised the defendant that a psychological evaluation would be necessary for such a defense, the defendant, again, refused to undertake such an exam ¶ 52 On March 15, 2022, defense counsel met with the defendant in jail in order to go over all the State’s evidence with him before he entered his guilty plea. Together they watched the body- worn camera footage “at least twice” and reviewed four binders containing the State’s entire discovery. Afterwards, the defendant reiterated that he wanted to plead guilty and instructed defense counsel not to pursue any type of mental status defense. ¶ 53 According to defense counsel, at the subsequent March 17, 2022, plea hearing, the defendant did not seem nervous or confused and appeared to understand the plea proceedings. 17 Based on the plea colloquy, which she witnessed, defense counsel believed that the defendant’s guilty plea was both knowing and voluntary. ¶ 54 Defense counsel repeatedly testified that throughout her representation, she had no qualms that the defendant understood the nature of the charges against him, the potential penalties, and the judicial process; and was able to assist her in his defense. ¶ 55 Defense counsel denied: that she told the defendant that he would permanently lose communication privileges unless he pleaded guilty; that as part of the plea agreement, charges would be dropped in other jurisdictions; that he and his family would not have to watch Deputy Riley’s body-worn camera footage during sentencing; and that he should “keep his mouth shut” and acquiesce during the plea colloquy. Defense counsel also denied that she told the defendant that unless he pleaded guilty, he would face the federal death penalty. Instead, counsel explained that she merely informed the defendant that although Illinois law no longer had a death penalty, she could not know whether federal prosecutors would charge him and seek the death sentence. ¶ 56 Defense counsel acknowledged that she and the defendant discussed potential bias, pretrial publicity, and change of venue but explained that she never got a chance to file a motion for a change of venue because the defendant chose to plead guilty. ¶ 57 The defendant’s sister, Virginia Tate, next testified that it was her understanding that the defendant’s plea agreement included the following provisions: that Deputy Riley’s body-worn camera footage would not be played in the courtroom; that the defendant was going to be taken directly from the courtroom to the Illinois Department of Corrections, and that “maybe” all of the other charges against him, except for one, would be dropped. The defendant’s girlfriend, Amanda Brown, testified that the defendant pleaded guilty to “get his phone and mail privileges back.” 18 ¶ 58 The defendant next testified on his own behalf. He stated that he pleaded guilty to avoid the federal death penalty, to get out of Jefferson County, and to prevent the body-worn camera footage from being shown. The defendant claimed that it was defense counsel, and not a jail guard, who told him that if he did not plead guilty “the feds were going to seek the death penalty and run all of these other charges together.” He also asserted that defense counsel refused to pursue a change of venue and told him that all charges would be dropped against him. The defendant further testified that on the day of the plea hearing and sentencing, he told defense counsel that he c