People v. Donald G.
CourtAppellate Court of Illinois
Date FiledNovember 2, 2026
Docket2-25-0377
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
2026 IL App (2d) 250377-U
No. 2-25-0377
Order filed November 2, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not
precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DONALD G., Defendant-Appellant
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County.
Honorable Stephen L. Krentz, Judge, Presiding.
No. 22-CF-305
JUSTICE BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McLaren and Mullen concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Defendant’s conviction of criminal sexual assault was affirmed where, (1) although
the trial court abused its discretion in barring defense counsel from cross-examining
the complaining witness about a prior inconsistent statement, the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the jury had already heard substantial
evidence of her prior recantations and had an adequate basis to assess her
credibility; and (2) defense counsel did not provide ineffective assistance of
counsel.
¶2 Following a jury trial, defendant, Donald G., was found guilty of one count of criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3) (West 2022)). The indictment alleged that defendant
committed an act of sexual penetration with V.G., a family member under the age of 18. On appeal,
defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by barring defense counsel from cross-examining the
complaining witness about a prior inconsistent statement; and (2) his counsel was ineffective for
failing to object when the State adduced testimony from an expert witness regarding recantation.
We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On August 16, 2022, defendant was charged by information with two counts of criminal
sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3), (a)(4) (West 2022)) and one count of aggravated criminal
sexual abuse (id. § 11-1.60(b)). The charges alleged that, between December 24 and December
29, 2021, defendant committed an act of sexual penetration with V.G., a family member under 18
years of age, in that he placed his finger inside her sex organ. On October 24, 2022, a grand jury
returned a superseding indictment that was substantively identical to the information. Defendant
was released from custody on bond, subject to the condition that he have no contact with V.G.
¶5 On March 4, 2024, defense counsel filed a disclosure pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 413(d) (eff. July 1, 1982), notifying the State of two witnesses: (1) D.G., the victim’s brother,
and (2) Nick Bruce, defendant’s friend. The disclosure included summaries of interviews that an
employee of the Kendall County Public Defender’s Office conducted with the witnesses on
January 18, 2024. According to the summary of D.G.’s interview, V.G. told D.G. that she lied
about the incident and that her father did not touch her as she originally reported. V.G. further
stated that she lied because she did not want to move and “leave her friends back in Iowa.” D.G.
also reported that, “[a]round Thanksgiving 2023 [V.G.] was still saying that [defendant] never
touched her and that it was all a lie.” According to the summary of Bruce’s interview, Bruce
reported that, as he was exiting a bathroom, he overheard V.G. tell D.G. that she had lied about the
incident and that her father had not touched her as she originally reported. Bruce further reported
that he overheard V.G. state that she did not want to move and leave her friends in Iowa.
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¶6 On May 1, 2024, the State filed petitions to sanction defendant and revoke his pretrial
release, alleging that he had been charged in Kendall County case No. 24-CM-127 with violating
the no-contact condition of his pretrial release by using fake profiles to contact V.G. through
Snapchat, a social media platform. The Snapchat messages referenced defendant’s GPS ankle
monitor, the ongoing court proceedings, defendant’s wish to see V.G. and her siblings, the
relationship between V.G.’s mother and defendant, and the family dynamics.
¶7 On May 7, 2024, following a hearing, the circuit court modified defendant’s pretrial release
to prohibit him from using social media and ordered him to provide the Kendall County pretrial
services department with the passwords to all his social media accounts. On September 11, 2024,
defendant entered an open plea of guilty to the misdemeanor charge in case No. 24-CM-127, and
the court granted a pretrial motion allowing the State to present evidence of the Snapchat messages,
as well as a telephone conversation between defendant and V.G. that defendant had requested. The
conversation occurred after defendant sent V.G. a message through a video game, Minecraft,
requesting that she call him.
¶8 Prior to trial, the State dismissed the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and the
case proceeded to trial on the two counts of criminal sexual assault.
¶9 V.G. testified at trial. She acknowledged that it was difficult to testify in court and that she
did not want to be there. She testified that in the fall and winter of 2021, her family lived in two
separate residences. V.G. lived with defendant at the home of defendant’s friend, Nick Bruce,
while V.G.’s mother, Jennifer, and five siblings lived at the home of Jennifer’s stepmother.
Although defendant was welcome to live with Jennifer and the children, he did not do so because
he did not get along well with Jennifer’s family. At the time, the family planned to move to South
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Carolina together, and defendant and V.G. made plans to travel there to explore the area and search
for suitable housing.
¶ 10 Around Christmastime in 2021, V.G. and defendant stayed at the Super 8 motel in Yorkville
for two nights because Bruce asked defendant to stay elsewhere during the holidays. V.G. could
not recall how many beds were in the motel room. On one of the nights, V.G. and defendant
simultaneously got into the same bed while the lights were off. She wore pants and underwear.
V.G. fell asleep but was awakened by defendant touching her vagina under her clothing. She was
in the fetal position and faced away from defendant, and defendant was spooned behind her.
Defendant’s hand reached over the top of the back of her leggings and went between her legs from
underneath. Defendant’s hand went inside her underwear, and he “inserted a finger or two” inside
her vagina. V.G. pretended to stay asleep while defendant touched her. After defendant ceased
touching V.G., she neither discussed what had just occurred nor immediately told anyone. V.G.
was afraid because she loved her father. At various points during V.G.’s testimony, including when
she testified about the sexual abuse and her love for her father, counsel asked whether she needed
a moment and directed her attention to nearby tissues. V.G. declined the offers to pause, at one
point telling counsel to “[k]eep going, please.”
¶ 11 V.G. further testified that, the next morning, she and defendant began their out-of-state
travels. They first stopped in Indiana for a few weeks and visited V.G.’s uncle. They then
proceeded to South Carolina, where they explored the area for several days. According to V.G.,
they possibly continued to Kansas to see one of defendant’s friends. After V.G. and defendant
returned to Illinois, they continued to live with Bruce for a couple weeks before she, but not
defendant, moved in with Jennifer.
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¶ 12 Around May of 2022, V.G. told a school counselor about the touching in the motel room,
and V.G. later told her mother, Jennifer. V.G. was interviewed at the Children’s Advocacy Center
(Advocacy Center) in Kendall County. 1 After the disclosure, the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) became involved with V.G.’s family, and defendant was prohibited from
having any contact with V.G.
¶ 13 Defendant thereafter contacted V.G. through Minecraft, an online world-building video
game. Defendant and V.G. were friends within the game, which allowed defendant to enter V.G.’s
Minecraft world, where he used the game’s chat feature to ask her to call him. V.G. called
defendant’s cell phone, and defendant asked about her disclosures. V.G. told defendant the details
of her disclosures and, according to V.G., defendant replied that he “didn’t do it, or that if he did it
in his sleep and [sic] he was sorry.” Defendant also asked V.G. if perhaps she was sleeping and
had dreamed the incident. The call made V.G. anxious about the events that would occur next and
she had a lot on her mind.
¶ 14 In August 2022, when she was 15 years old and had moved with her family to Iowa, V.G.
told Jennifer that she had made up the allegations because defendant was her father, and she “felt
really guilty and sorry” for putting him in that legal situation. She explained that, if she “wouldn’t
have said anything, none of this would have happened, and that’s what was going through [her]
mind at the time.” V.G. had attempted to contact the Yorkville police several times but did not
receive any response.
¶ 15 On March 2, 2023, V.G. went to the Yorkville Police Department and spoke with Detective
Jeffrey Johnson. She told him that she had made up the allegations, that she and her father had not
1
No recording of the victim-sensitive interview was offered into evidence at trial and therefore is
not part of the record on appeal.
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entered the same bed, and that there was no sexual contact between them in the motel room. V.G.
also told Detective Johnson that defendant wore cargo pants and a shirt to bed, which were details
that she was unable to recall “the first time around.”
¶ 16 On October 30, 2023, V.G. returned to the Yorkville Police Department and renewed her
allegations against defendant, stating that her original disclosure about defendant inserting his
fingers into her vagina was true. V.G. explained that she decided to come forward again after
seeing other survivors of sexual assault share their experiences on social media. It “kind of
motivated [her] to come forward and speak [her] truth,” and she did not want to betray herself or
any other sexual assault survivors. V.G. acknowledged that there was “so much back and forth”
regarding her allegations because she had mixed emotions about what had happened to her. She
explained that she felt “like something had to be said, but at the same time,” she “felt really bad”
for her father and did not want to see him in legal jeopardy because she still loved him. V.G.
maintained that she testified truthfully about what occurred in the motel room and had no reason
to fabricate the allegation at trial.
¶ 17 V.G. further testified that, in January 2024, she received messages on her phone through
Snapchat from two accounts with which she was unfamiliar, Nikki D. and Jessica G. She received
the messages while defendant was under court order to have no contact with her. V.G. suspected
defendant wrote the messages based on the word choices, the way the users typed, “a lot of self-
inflation” and egocentricity, and the users’ discussion of V.G.’s family and defendant’s pending
court case. She agreed that it was possible someone else could have sent the messages, but also
that they could have been sent by a third party at defendant’s request.
¶ 18 On cross-examination, V.G. acknowledged that, after renewing her allegations on October
30, 2023, she “maybe” went to Bruce’s house while defendant was there. Defendant asked V.G.
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whether, “at that time,” she told her brother, D.G., that she had fabricated her story to the police.
The State objected based on a lack of foundation, and the parties discussed the objection with the
court outside the jury’s hearing. Defense counsel explained that Bruce had been within ten feet of
V.G. and D.G. during the conversation and that, if necessary, Bruce could perfect the impeachment
by testifying that he overheard V.G. make the statement.
¶ 19 The State responded that if V.G. denied making the statement, defendant would need to
“prove it up” and perfect the impeachment, but would be unable to do so because D.G., “the person
that’s the party to the conversation,” was not included on defendant’s witness list. The State
conceded, however, that if V.G. admitted making the statement, then “it really doesn’t matter”
because the impeachment would be complete. The State also noted that defendant’s Rule 413
discovery disclosure, which summarized the interviews with D.G. and Bruce, failed to identify
when V.G. purportedly told D.G. that she had lied about the allegations.
¶ 20 In response, defense counsel emphasized that D.G. was a minor who lived out of state and
maintained that Bruce could perfect the impeachment because he was present and overheard the
conversation, as well as asserted that V.G.’s conversation with her brother occurred “after they left
the officers in Yorkville on October 30th.” The State retorted, “[t]hat’s not what this statement
says,” noting that it did not “know what [V.G.’s] going to say because this [Rule 413] disclosure
doesn’t have on this date, on this time, I went to this location, *** [s]o I can’t use this to impeach”
Bruce. The State also disagreed that Bruce could perfect the impeachment and asserted that
allowing defendant to ask the question without an ability to perfect the impeachment would place
the statement before the jury while leaving the State unable to “un-ring the bell.” The State
reiterated that, even if Bruce were called to testify, defendant’s disclosure concerning his
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anticipated testimony failed to identify the date or time of the alleged conversation, which it
maintained impaired the State’s ability to prepare for cross-examination.
¶ 21 The circuit court sustained the State’s objection and ruled that defense counsel could not
ask V.G. whether she told her brother that she had fabricated the allegations against their father.
The court agreed with the State that the question constituted improper impeachment because
defense counsel would be “ringing a bell that can’t be un-rung unless” the defense called D.G. to
perfect that impeachment, which counsel could not.
¶ 22 Jennifer testified that defendant was the father of her six children, including V.G. Their
family of eight lived together in Loves Park, Illinois, until October 2021, when they “were no
longer able to live where [they] were renting.” Jennifer and most of the children moved into her
stepmother’s home, but defendant opted to live elsewhere because of “some friction or tension”
between him and Jennifer’s stepmother. V.G. chose to live with defendant, and the two moved
into the home of defendant’s friend, Bruce, while Jennifer and the other children lived with
Jennifer’s stepmother. Jennifer and defendant discussed moving their family to South Carolina to
be closer to her siblings, who were moving to North Carolina.
¶ 23 Around the holidays in December 2021, Jennifer rented a hotel room for defendant and
V.G. to stay in because of “some issues with [defendant’s] housing arrangement.” Defendant
suggested that V.G. stay with her mother and siblings in Sugar Grove because it was the holidays,
but V.G. chose to remain with defendant. Although Jennifer paid for the reservation, only
defendant and V.G. stayed in the motel room, which had two beds in it. After the hotel stay,
defendant and V.G. traveled to South Carolina and made various stops along the way. Upon their
return to Illinois, V.G. continued to reside with defendant for a while. In 2022, V.G. moved back
in with her siblings and Jennifer, while defendant continued to reside with Bruce.
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¶ 24 In May of 2022, V.G. told Jennifer that defendant had touched her inappropriately the prior
December in the motel room. Upon learning this information, Jennifer was shocked and confused.
She described V.G. as “sad” and “very small” during the outcry. Because V.G. had also disclosed
the matter to a school counselor, the police had already been notified. At the direction of law
enforcement, Jennifer took V.G. to the Advocacy Center, where she participated in a victim-
sensitive interview. DCFS instituted a safety plan, which prohibited any contact between
defendant and V.G. Jennifer acknowledged that she continued to take V.G. to see defendant even
after V.G. reported that defendant had sexually abused her, explaining that it was a “confusing
time,” she was unable to assert herself in her relationship with defendant, and she was “nervous
about having to deal with [defendant’s] backlash.” Although Jennifer was concerned that the
contact could adversely affect V.G.’s emotional and mental well-being, V.G. indicated that “it
would be ok” if she saw defendant if her siblings were also present. Jennifer regretted having
allowed the contact, which occurred both over the phone and in person.
¶ 25 In August 2022, after criminal proceedings were initiated against defendant, V.G.
approached Jennifer and expressed feelings of guilt. Jennifer contacted Detective Johnson and
reported that V.G. stated she made up the allegations. Johnson “kind of brush[ed] [Jennifer] off.”
He seemed “a little bit” receptive but also hesitant to Jennifer bringing V.G. back to the police
station to speak with him. In March 2023, Jennifer brought V.G. back to the Yorkville Police
Department, and V.G. reported that she had made up the allegations and indicated that she “just
wanted this to be done, this never happened.” V.G. also told Jennifer that she still loved her father.
¶ 26 Later in 2023, V.G. again approached Jennifer and stated that her initial disclosure
concerning the events in the motel room was true. At that point, V.G. and defendant were having
no contact due to the no-contact order. V.G. also told Jennifer that she loved her father and missed
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him. On October 30, 2023, Jennifer transported V.G. back to the Yorkville Police Department,
where V.G. reported that defendant had, in fact, inappropriately touched her in the motel room.
Jennifer could not recall whether they stopped and saw defendant immediately after leaving the
police station, but she agreed that it was possible.
¶ 27 In January 2024, V.G. told Jennifer that individuals she did not know had contacted her
through Snapchat, and Jennifer described the messages as portraying defendant as a “hero.”
Jennifer feared that the messages might disappear, so she photographed the messages as they
appeared on V.G.’s phone using Jennifer’s own phone. The photographs were admitted into
evidence without objection.
¶ 28 Michelle Hawley, the mental health assistant director at the Kendall County Health
Department, testified as an expert in child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. She had
worked for the department for 20 years, providing substance abuse counseling and serving as a
forensic interviewer for the Advocacy Center. Hawley explained that the Advocacy Center
provides a safe place for children to talk about sexual or physical abuse. Following completion of
her training, Hawley conducted approximately 900 forensic interviews. She acknowledged that
children may or may not disclose abuse during a forensic interview.
¶ 29 Hawley explained that her testimony was neither to discuss any specific interview nor offer
an opinion as to whether any particular child who was interviewed at the Advocacy Center was
truthful. Rather, her testimony concerned the behaviors that children who have experienced sexual
abuse may exhibit in response to that trauma. Specifically, she testified that child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome was identified in 1983 by psychiatrist Roland Summit as a means to
understand how children react to sexual abuse, which may include delayed reporting,
inconsistencies in reporting, and recantation. A child’s age, experience, communication skills,
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understanding of what appropriate conduct is, and trauma response may contribute to a child
delaying the reporting of sexual abuse and inconsistencies in the child’s reporting. Hawley further
explained that no two children who have experienced sexual abuse will react the same way.
¶ 30 Hawley further testified that it is “very common” for children to delay reporting sexual
abuse, including in situations where the offender is a family member. She explained that a child
who has a close relationship with the offender may experience conflicting emotions and may be
reluctant to disclose the abuse out of concern for the repercussions the offender could face,
particularly if the child lives with the offender or if the offender otherwise remains involved in the
child’s life. The child may even be protective of the offender.
¶ 31 Hawley described recantation as occurring when the individual “actively den[ies] what
they already said had occurred.” Hawley explained that the “number one reason a child will recant
*** is when there’s family involvement in the situation” or “family influence,” particularly if “the
primary, non-offender caregiver does not believe what was going on or [is] not supportive of the
victim.” She further explained that continued interaction with the offender may contribute to a
child recanting an allegation of abuse. Hawley agreed that children who have been sexually abused
often recant because they “just want to get back to the way things were before the abuse or assault
occurred.” She further testified that disclosing abuse “takes a lot out of” a child and that speaking
with multiple entities involved in an abuse investigation can be overwhelming. As a result, it is
“very common” for a child to recant and “say nothing happened so they can stop all of that.”
¶ 32 On cross-examination, Hawley agreed that children undergo forensic interviews after
allegations of abuse have been made and that the interviewer is aware of the allegations prior to
the interview. She further agreed that inconsistencies in a child’s account or recantation could
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result from the child “just not being truthful” or having come “to a realization that they made a
mistake, [or] they lied and they want to own up to it.”
¶ 33 Following Hawley’s testimony, the parties stipulated that the Snapchat messages that V.G.
received in January 2024 from Nikki D. and Jessica G. were either sent by defendant or by a third
party at defendant’s direction. The State then rested its case-in-chief, and defendant’s oral motion
for a directed verdict was denied. After a jury instruction conference, the State dismissed one
count of criminal sexual assault, explaining that the remaining count of criminal sexual assault
alleged that defendant was a family member of the victim and that the proposed jury instruction
already included that element.
¶ 34 Donald G. testified in his own defense that he lived in Elburn with Bruce, as well as two
other individuals. V.G. was one of defendant’s six children that he had with Jennifer. In September
2021, defendant and his family vacated their home in Loves Park and moved into separate
residences, with defendant and V.G. moving in with defendant’s friend. Around that time,
defendant and his family contemplated moving to South Carolina, and he planned a trip to travel
there to explore housing options. Defendant invited the children, but only V.G. chose to
accompany him.
¶ 35 Defendant further testified that, late in November 2021, he and V.G. departed Bruce’s
residence and traveled to South Carolina. They made several stops along the way, including in
Indiana, where they stayed with defendant’s brother for approximately two weeks, as well as
Tennessee, where they stayed in a hotel. They spent “maybe three, four days” in South Carolina
before traveling to several states, including Mississippi, Arkansas, and Kansas, where they visited
one of defendant’s childhood friends. Defendant and V.G. primarily slept in the car because they
“didn’t have a lot and so [they] didn’t really stay at hotels much.”
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¶ 36 Defendant and V.G. returned to Illinois and stayed at a motel in Yorkville. Defendant
explained that they “were trying to make it *** out here so that we can have family come see each
other at the hotel for Christmas Eve.” That night, the entire family gathered in the motel room and
opened presents. Defendant suggested that V.G. leave with her mother so that she could wake up
with her siblings on Christmas morning, but V.G. insisted on remaining with defendant. According
to defendant, he “asked her like three times to go with her mom,” but “[s]he was persistent on
staying.” The room had two beds, and defendant denied ever getting into bed with V.G. or having
any sexual contact with her.
¶ 37 After the hotel stay, defendant and V.G. returned to his brother’s home in Indiana. They
stayed in Indiana until “maybe mid-January or so,” when V.G. asked to move in with her siblings.
They then returned to Illinois and stayed with Bruce. After “probably a couple of days,” V.G. left
Bruce’s home and moved in with her mother and the rest of the family. From mid-January until
May 2022, defendant had regular contact with V.G. and his other children, with no indication of
any problems.
¶ 38 In May 2022, defendant learned that V.G. had accused him of sexual abuse. Shortly after
the disclosure, while defendant was playing Minecraft, he saw that V.G. was also online. He joined
her Minecraft world and asked her to call him. At that time, defendant did not know the substance
of V.G.’s accusations, but he understood that it was “a sexual thing.” V.G. called defendant, and
they talked “a little bit” about the allegations. Defendant told her that they did not have any sexual
contact. At one point during the conversation, V.G. “said something about she could have been
dreaming, or [defendant] could have been sleeping,” and defendant replied, “if you think that’s
what I did, then I’m sorry.” Defendant denied saying, “if I did that, I’m sorry.”
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¶ 39 Defendant further testified that, from May 2022 until his arrest in August 2022, he
continued to visit and interact with his children, including V.G., although he described his contact
with V.G. as “occasional.” According to defendant, he ceased all contact with V.G. in August 2022,
after he was arrested and “court ordered not to” contact her. Defendant denied that DCFS ever
contacted him regarding a no-contact order. He could think of no reason why V.G. would make
up the allegations, but he noted that V.G. “was cutting herself and stuff the summer beforehand.”
¶ 40 Defendant additionally testified that, on October 30, 2023, V.G.’s siblings visited him at
Bruce’s house and stayed “pretty much the whole day.” Jennifer dropped V.G. off at Bruce’s house
toward the end of the day, but defendant had no contact with her. He remained in the backyard
with his other children while V.G. remained inside the house with her brother. Defendant believed
that it was the same day that V.G. gave another statement to the police, because he “came to court
a couple days afterwards.” He recalled the exact date because it was Jennifer’s birthday and the
day before Halloween.
¶ 41 Defendant conceded that the January 2024 Snapchat messages were sent from his cell
phone, but he denied personally sending them. According to defendant, he allowed his 25-year-
old cousin, Christina, to use his phone and do “whatever she wanted to do,” because she did not
have a phone of her own. He instructed her not to call V.G. Christina nevertheless contacted V.G.
and one of defendant’s other daughters through Snapchat. Defendant emphasized that it “wasn’t
[his] conversation,” and it was “between [his] cousin and them.” Defendant did not know why
Christina contacted his children, although he believed she wanted to visit them. He later learned
that Christina had created fake Snapchat profiles, which he characterized as “pretty dumb” and of
“her own doing.” Defendant denied authorizing her to create the profiles. He later deleted the
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Snapchat profiles from his phone and, as a result, he did not have access to the conversations.
Defendant further testified that Christina used drugs and had since died from an overdose.
¶ 42 After deliberation, the jury found defendant guilty of criminal sexual assault. The court
entered judgment on the verdict, revoked defendant’s bond, ordered defendant taken into custody,
and ordered a presentence investigation report.
¶ 43 On March 7, 2025, defendant filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or,
in the alternative, a new trial, which he supplemented on May 30, 2025. Defendant argued that
the circuit court erred in barring defense counsel from asking V.G. whether she recanted her
allegation to her brother, D.G., in an October 30, 2023, conversation shortly after renewing her
allegations to Detective Johnson. Defendant maintained that he should have been permitted to
inquire whether V.G. had “recanted on more than one occasion to other individuals besides the
police,” and to impeach her through Bruce, who overheard the conversation, could identify its
participants, and would be subject to cross-examination. Defendant further argued that the State
failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, emphasizing that V.G.’s recantation
demonstrated that she “lied at some point,” that her outcry “occurred significantly after the alleged
incident,” and asserting that Hawley’s expert testimony carried undue weight with the jury despite
offering only theories without a practical means of applying those theories to defendant’s case.
The court denied the motion following a hearing.
¶ 44 On August 22, 2025, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing and entered an agreed
sentencing order in Kendall County case No. 24-CM-127. As to the instant felony conviction, the
State requested a seven-year sentence, while defendant requested the statutory minimum of four
years. Following the parties’ arguments, the court sentenced defendant to 48 months’
imprisonment, followed by a mandatory supervised release period of three years to natural life.
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¶ 45 Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred by limiting his cross-examination
of V.G. regarding an alleged second recantation that occurred on October 30, 2023; and (2) his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Hawley’s testimony concerning recantation and its
causes among child victims of sexual abuse. We address each issue in turn.
¶ 48 A. Limitation of Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement
¶ 49 Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by improperly limiting his cross-
examination of V.G. when it sustained the State’s objection to defendant’s question concerning an
alleged second recantation, in which V.G. purportedly told her brother, D.G., that she fabricated
the allegation against defendant. As noted, the State argued at trial that, if V.G. denied making the
statement, defendant would be unable to perfect the impeachment because D.G. was not on his
witness list and thus unable to testify. Defendant acknowledges that he did not subpoena D.G. to
testify but maintains that Bruce, although not a participant in the conversation, overheard the
statement and could have testified to it for purposes of impeachment. According to defendant, the
court’s ruling denied him his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him through
meaningful cross-examination, because his counsel had a good-faith basis to question V.G. about
the second recantation as a prior inconsistent statement. In the alternative, defendant contends that
his counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena D.G. to testify at trial.
¶ 50 In response, the State appears to concede that Bruce’s status as a nonparty to the
conversation “may not have per se prohibited [Bruce] from perfecting impeachment,” but disputes
defendant’s characterization of the trial court’s ruling as resting entirely on that ground. The State
maintains that the court’s ruling is “more nuance[d] than defendant’s contention suggests” and
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asserts that the ruling was guided by several additional considerations that provide alternative
grounds for affirmance. See People v. Dunmore, 389 Ill. App. 3d 1095, 1109 (2009) (appellate
court may affirm the trial court’s exclusion of evidence on any basis supported by the record).
Specifically, the State argues that (1) defendant’s Rule 413(d) disclosure concerning Bruce’s
anticipated trial testimony lacked an adequate foundation because it did not indicate that V.G.’s
statement to her brother constituted a second, distinct recantation, as opposed to a statement made
near her August 2022 recantation; (2) defendant’s Rule 413(d) disclosures contained a “factual
anomaly” that did not conform to the evidence, thereby necessitating testimony from D.G.; and
(3) the disclosure did not establish that Bruce overheard the entire conversation and did not identify
who else was present, whereas D.G. could have supplied the full context of the conversation. In
the alternative, the State contends that even if the trial court erred by sustaining the State’s
objection, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 51 A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him, which
includes the right to cross-examine those witnesses. People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (2d)
210110,¶ 29. This right permits the defendant to inquire into a witness’s biases, interests, or motive
to testify untruthfully. People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 337 (1998). “The jury is entitled to the
details of the theory of defense so it can make an informed judgment, and thus the right to cross-
examine is satisfied when counsel is permitted to ‘expose to the jury the facts from which jurors,
as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the
reliability of the witness.’ ” People v. Averhart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (1999) (quoting Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974)). In general, cross-examination is limited to the subject matter
of the direct examination and to matters bearing on the credibility of the witness. People v.
Jefferson, 2021 IL App (2d) 190179, ¶ 43. “Cross-examination on any subject that ‘tends to
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explain, discredit, or destroy the witness’ direct testimony’ is generally permissible.” Id. (quoting
People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 498 (1998)). Nevertheless, the right to cross-examine is not
unlimited, as the right guarantees “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-
examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
(Emphasis in original.) People v. Butler, 2025 IL 130988, ¶ 70 (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer,
474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985)). “A trial court has broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination,
and we will not reverse the court’s restriction of cross-examination absent an abuse of discretion
resulting in manifest prejudice.” Johnson, 2023 IL App (2d) 210110, ¶ 29. A trial court abuses its
discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person
would adopt the court’s view. People v. McCullough, 2015 IL App (2d) 121364, ¶ 104. Moreover,
an abuse of discretion may be found where the trial court is found to have applied the wrong legal
standard. People v. Diggs, 2023 IL App (1st) 220955, ¶ 92.
¶ 52 Of particular significance to the instant appeal, when a witness testifies at trial in a manner
that is inconsistent with a statement he or she made on a previous occasion, a party may introduce
the witness’s prior statement for the limited purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility.
People v. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 44. To impeach a witness with a prior inconsistent
statement, the party must lay a proper foundation by (1) directing the witness to the time, place,
and circumstances of the statement, (2) confronting the witness with the prior statement through
pointed questioning, and (3) providing the witness an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. Id.
¶ 45. If, after a proper foundation is laid, the witness denies making the prior inconsistent
statement, the impeaching party must complete the impeachment by introducing admissible
extrinsic evidence of the statement. Id. When extrinsic evidence is admitted for the purpose of
impeaching the witness’s credibility, such evidence is “admitted not as proof of the truth of the
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facts stated out of court but as doubt cast on the testimony by showing the witness’s inconsistency.”
People v. Eggert, 324 Ill. App. 3d 79, 81 (2001). Conversely, if the witness admits making the
statement, the impeachment is complete, and no extrinsic evidence is necessary. Guerrero, 2021
IL App (2d) 190364, ¶ 44.
¶ 53 We agree with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding him from
questioning V.G. concerning her purported statement to D.G. During cross-examination,
defendant attempted to lay a proper foundation to impeach V.G. with a prior inconsistent statement
by directing her attention to the time, location, and circumstances under which she allegedly made
the statement. Specifically, the following colloquy occurred:
“[KURT GUSTAFSON (ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER)]: October 30th of
2023, you came back to Yorkville Police Department, told them that now you are
reinstating your original story, that it did in fact happen, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, after you had that meeting with the police in Yorkville that day, where did
you go?
A. I don’t remember.
***
Q. In fact, on that day after you met with the police, didn’t you go back to Nick
Bruce’s house in Elburn where your father was staying?
A. Umm, maybe.
Q. And, in fact, at that time didn’t you make a statement to your brothe