Full Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (4th) 251301-U FILED This Order was filed under November 18, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-25-1301 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Schuyler County MASON T. DOWSON, ) No. 23CF63 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Mark Vincent, ) Judge Presiding. JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Harris concurred in the judgment. ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding (1) the evidence was sufficient for a jury to reasonably conclude defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of possessing at least 15 grams of methamphetamine, (2) the trial court did not err when denying his motion to suppress evidence, (3) defendant has forfeited his claim that the lab report contained irrelevant seized items, and (4) defendant could not raise his Illinois Supreme Court Rule 404(e) (eff. Sept. 1, 2023) claim for the first time on appeal. The appellate court also remanded the matter for defendant to file a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024) to correct his claimed sentencing error. ¶2 Defendant, Mason T. Dowson, was convicted by a jury of possessing 15 or more grams of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a), (b)(3) (West 2022)). He was subsequently sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. On appeal, he argues (1) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred when denying his motion to suppress evidence, (3) the court abused its discretion when admitting a lab report into evidence, and (4) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 404(e) (eff. Sept. 1, 2023) for a waiver of court assessments. We disagree and affirm. Additionally, we remand the matter for defendant to file a motion pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 472(a) (eff. Feb. 1, 2024) to correct his claimed sentencing error. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 In October 2023, defendant was charged by information with possession of methamphetamine for knowingly possessing 15 or more grams of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a), (b)(3) (West 2022)). In October 2024, he filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence, contending there had been no probable cause to issue a search warrant of his residence. A hearing on defendant’s motion was held in December 2024. ¶5 At the hearing, special agent Matthew Harris of the Illinois State Police testified he secured a search warrant of defendant’s residence in September 2023 related to a drug investigation. A confidential informant (CI) performed a controlled purchase from Daylon Cooper on August 14, 2023. Defendant was not involved in the controlled purchase. Harris recalled another controlled purchase involving the CI on August 30, 2023, at Cooper’s residence. Harris, again, said defendant was not involved with this purchase. A third controlled purchase occurred on September 20, 2023. Harris stated he “had been getting information that Mr. Cooper was getting his methamphetamine from [defendant].” The CI contacted Cooper, who said, “he didn’t have [the methamphetamine] at that time.” Harris said they observed Cooper travel to defendant’s residence and leave. Cooper then “messaged” the CI and “said he was good and he could come by.” Harris stated they observed Cooper “the entire time traveling from his residence to [defendant’s].” He estimated Cooper lived two or three blocks from defendant. When asked if he was certain someone had surveilled Cooper the entire time from him receiving the methamphetamine until delivering it to the CI, Harris said, “I can’t honestly answer that.” -2- Counsel for defendant summarized the complaint for the search warrant as the officers observing “one time when Mr. Cooper went into [defendant’s] residence during a time period in which 30 minutes after [the CI] had asked to purchase methamphetamine.” Harris agreed. He further agreed the only contact between Cooper and defendant was when Cooper had gone to defendant’s residence. ¶6 On cross-examination, Harris recalled, prior to filing the complaint for a search warrant, he observed defendant leaving his residence and going to Cooper’s residence. Harris did not recall defendant “make any other stops” before returning home. On redirect examination, Harris said, on the day of the controlled purchase, Cooper had traveled to defendant’s residence, but agents had observed on “other days where [defendant] and Cooper had traveled to each other’s places.” ¶7 The trial court then asked Harris to clarify that, on September 20, 2023, the CI had contacted Cooper to purchase methamphetamine, to which he agreed. Cooper said, “he did not have that much methamphetamine.” Cooper then discontinued communication with the CI. Harris confirmed he had been surveilling defendant’s residence, not Cooper. Harris confirmed he observed Cooper get out of a vehicle and enter defendant’s residence, where he remained for “approximately 15 minutes.” Cooper then left “carrying a black handbag.” Harris said the CI stated Cooper “pulled the meth from a black handbag that resembled the one that was seen on September 20.” The court confirmed this information was not included in the complaint for a search warrant. Harris could not recall if Cooper was under surveillance when he left defendant’s residence because he was with the CI. Harris said it was “approximately five to 10 minutes after [he] left [defendant] that [Cooper] text[ed] the [CI].” Harris said he discussed the black bag under oath when seeking the search warrant. -3- ¶8 In January 2025, the trial court entered a written order denying defendant’s motion to suppress. The court found as follows: the CI had purchased methamphetamine from Cooper in the past and had attempted to purchase methamphetamine from Cooper on September 2023. Cooper could not provide that much and was observed 30 minutes later entering defendant’s residence and, 15 minutes thereafter, leaving the residence with a black handbag. Cooper then contacted the CI to inform him he could sell the methamphetamine. The CI subsequently purchased the methamphetamine. The court additionally found the following information was not provided in the complaint for a search warrant: a phone call to the CI took place 5 to 10 minutes after Cooper left defendant’s residence and the black handbag Cooper was observed holding was the same or similar handbag Cooper used to provide the CI the methamphetamine. ¶9 The trial court concluded the complaint for a search warrant, coupled with Harris’s testimony, was sufficient to support probable cause. The court further noted it found the execution of the search warrant was covered by the good faith exception in the absence of probable cause. The court stated defendant had not shown any of the four exceptions to the good faith exception had applied. The matter proceeded to a jury trial in February 2025. ¶ 10 Prior to jury selection, the parties and the trial court discussed preliminary matters in chambers. Defendant asked the court to note he had invoked his speedy trial rights a year earlier. The court noted many of the prior continuances were made on his behalf and denied finding any violation of his speedy trial rights. The court informed defendant it would instruct the jury it could not hold it against him if he chose not to testify, to which defendant replied, “I think that’s important, Judge.” The parties discussed previous plea negotiations before proceeding to jury selection. -4- ¶ 11 The record indicates defendant was present for the beginning of jury selection and introduced himself to the venire. During questioning of potential jurors, trial counsel interrupted and said defendant needed to use the restroom; “otherwise he’d have an accident here in the courtroom.” The trial court stated “We didn’t want to announce it unless we had to. [Defendant] has had the flu, and I was—the Court was advised he may need to leave, and we’ll just pause for a moment.” The record indicates defendant exited and then reentered the courtroom wherein voir dire resumed. Later, the record indicates defendant exited the courtroom again. Trial counsel for defendant stated: “Your Honor, as we discussed the possibility of having [defendant] in another room on Zoom observing this on mute, and then he and I can confer with our notes in between going into chambers for selecting jurors. I’ve expressed to him he has a right to be in here. He’s willing to waive that right as long as he can observe the jurors, be able to take notes and listen to this from another room on Zoom.” ¶ 12 The trial court had defendant reenter the courtroom and inquired with him about participating in jury selection remotely. The court explained to defendant he had the right to be present during jury selection. Defendant replied, “As long as I can watch it and take notes, and— that’s fine.” The court also assured defendant he would have time to discuss potential jurors with his attorney before they were selected. Defendant said, “That’s fine. I don’t want to give nobody the flu.” The court allowed defendant to observe the remainder of voir dire remotely. ¶ 13 At trial, Harris testified he was a member of the West Central Illinois Drug Task Force, which was comprised of officers from different counties and agencies who assisted each -5- other in drug investigations. He stated, on September 20, 2023, he was conducting a controlled drug purchase with a CI. He learned from the Rushville Police Department that Cooper had been getting his methamphetamine from defendant or another individual, Kelsie Ashcraft. Harris said they conducted surveillance on defendant’s residence. He stated an agent observed Cooper go to defendant’s residence, “go inside the trailer, and then le[ave] carrying a handbag.” Harris said, shortly thereafter, the CI received a message from Cooper to come over. The CI purchased drugs from Cooper. Harris recalled Cooper telling the CI “he didn’t have the amount [of drugs] that the [CI] had requested at that time.” This was prior to Cooper going to defendant’s residence. Harris stated he secured a search warrant of defendant’s residence on September 25, 2023. Prior to executing the search warrant, Harris said defendant and Ashcraft were detained during a traffic stop at a gas station. Harris recalled interviewing Ashcraft, which led him to serve the search warrant on defendant’s residence. Ashcraft permitted officers to enter the residence. Inside the residence, officers seized “two bags containing methamphetamine, a glass smoking device which contained liquid, other smoking devices with residue, [and] a glass vial with residue.” Harris said the liquid inside the glass smoking device was transferred into vials and sent for laboratory testing. He said the actual weight of one of the vials was 39.4 grams. The trial court admitted into evidence, over defendant’s objection, an exhibit of the lab-tested vial. Harris also recalled field testing a small “baggy containing a crystalized substance.” He said the bag field tested positive for methamphetamine and weighed 14.8 grams. The bag was admitted into evidence over defendant’s objection. ¶ 14 Harris stated defendant agreed to be interviewed, so long as it was not recorded. Harris said defendant asked him “if [he] found his medicine.” Harris asked defendant if by medicine he was referring to methamphetamine, to which defendant said, “[Y]es, that’s what I -6- call it, is my medicine.” Harris also said defendant said the methamphetamine did not belong to Ashcraft. ¶ 15 On cross-examination, Harris agreed defendant had told him there were “probably five to six grams” of methamphetamine in his residence. Harris testified defendant stated he would not “snitch on his friends and family” when asked where he had gotten the methamphetamine. Harris conceded defendant’s friend, Terry Baker, and his girlfriend, Ashcraft, had been at defendant’s residence prior to the search warrant being executed. Harris confirmed all of the controlled purchases involved Cooper, not defendant. Harris conceded there was an unaccounted for 30 minutes between when Cooper spoke with the CI and when he went to defendant’s residence. He admitted it was possible Cooper had gone to someone else’s residence to secure the methamphetamine for the controlled purchase. ¶ 16 On re-direct-examination, Harris stated none of the evidence taken from Cooper’s residence was mixed with evidence taken from defendant’s residence. Regarding defendant’s statement to him about having only five to six grams of methamphetamine, Harris said, in his experience, suspects lie about the amount to “lower the criminality of *** their pending charges.” ¶ 17 Agent Lance Ormond testified he also was part of the task force. He recalled participating in a search of defendant’s residence on September 25, 2023. He recounted the same evidence seized from defendant’s residence as agent Harris. ¶ 18 Joshua Stern, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, testified he tested evidence seized from defendant’s residence. He said lab testing works “better with a solid sample than a liquid one.” He confirmed he authored a lab report, which listed numerous items seized by the task force during their investigation of Cooper. The trial court admitted the lab -7- report into evidence without objection subject to defendant’s cross-examination. Stern testified the crystalline substance weighed 13.8 grams, and the liquid weighed 39.4 grams. He said he did not analyze a second liquid container because the evidence tested had already “reached the maximum penalty for the evidence.” He stated both the crystalline substance and the liquid contained methamphetamine. ¶ 19 On cross-examination, Stern identified the numerous items listed on the lab report. Defendant objected to the lab report based on relevance, arguing the suspect name on the report was Cooper and it “contain[ed] a number of items that seemingly have nothing to do with [defendant’s] case.” The trial court overruled the objection, finding Stern had testified the “names and descriptions are up to the submitting agencies.” ¶ 20 Sergeant Robert Cody Cook of the Illinois State Police testified he was part of the drug task force and participated in the search of defendant’s residence. He identified photographs of the various items seized from defendant’s residence. These photographs were admitted into evidence and were consistent with the physical evidence taken from defendant’s residence. Much of the physical evidence field tested positive for methamphetamine. ¶ 21 The State rested. Defendant moved for a directed verdict, contending, inter alia, the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The trial court denied defendant’s motion. ¶ 22 Defendant called Ashcraft to testify on his behalf. She said she was living at defendant’s residence on September 25, 2023. She remembered telling agent Harris that he would find methamphetamine in the residence. When shown photographs of the evidence seized from the residence, Ashcraft denied the evidence depicted in two of the State’s photographs was consistent with what she had told Harris he would find. ¶ 23 Defendant rested. -8- ¶ 24 During closing arguments, the State contended two of the items seized, including the crystalline substance weighing 13.8 grams and the liquid weighing 39.4 grams, had tested positive for methamphetamine. The State argued the weight exceeded 15 grams. Defendant argued he admitted to only possessing 5 to 6 grams, which was less than the 15 grams he was minimally charged with possessing. ¶ 25 The jury found defendant guilty of possessing methamphetamine (greater than 15 grams but less than 100 grams). ¶ 26 In March 2025, defendant filed a posttrial motion, arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The matter proceeded to a combined hearing on defendant’s posttrial motion and sentencing in April 2025. ¶ 27 At the hearing, defendant stood on the posttrial motion. The trial court denied the motion. Following the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced defendant to seven years’ imprisonment. ¶ 28 On May 23, 2025, trial counsel filed a motion to reconsider sentence. A few days later, new counsel entered his appearance for defendant and filed a new motion to reconsider sentence. New counsel also filed a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, stating trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to continue the matter on the first day of trial because defendant was too ill to participate. A hearing on defendant’s motions occurred in November 2025. ¶ 29 At the hearing, defendant testified he was in a separate room viewing the trial proceedings, “laying fetal position, just listening on the floor because [he] was very sick that day.” He believed he had food poisoning. He recalled discussing the jury selection process “[s]omewhat” with his trial counsel. He said he had told trial counsel about two potential jurors -9- he did not want to be impaneled. He denied having the opportunity to “fully discuss all the jurors” with trial counsel. ¶ 30 The trial court recalled defendant was ill on the first day of trial. The court stated trial counsel moved to continue, but the court denied the request “because [it] didn’t think it was enough of a reason, and we had a workaround, and that’s what we did.” The court said numerous recesses were taken to permit trial counsel to discuss potential jurors with defendant. The court denied defendant’s motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court also denied defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence. ¶ 31 This appeal followed. ¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 33 On appeal, defendant argues (1) the State failed to prove him guilty of possessing more than 15 grams of methamphetamine beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred when denying his motion to suppress evidence, (3) the court abused its discretion when admitting Stern’s lab report, and (4) counsel was ineffective for failing to file a Rule 404 certification for waiver of court assessments. We address each claim in turn. ¶ 34 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence Claim ¶ 35 When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). The trier of fact has the responsibility to assess the witnesses’ credibility, weigh their testimony, resolve inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). We will not reverse a criminal - 10 - conviction based on insufficient evidence unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Murray, 2019 IL 123289, ¶ 19. ¶ 36 For possession of methamphetamine, the State had to prove defendant knowingly possessed methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine. 720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2022). Generally, to prove possession of a controlled substance, such as methamphetamine, the State is required to prove a defendant knew “ ‘of the presence of the narcotics and [had] immediate and exclusive control over them.’ ” People v. Scott, 2012 IL App (4th) 100304, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Morrison, 178 Ill. App. 3d 76, 90 (1988)). ¶ 37 Defendant argues the evidence at trial established the crystalized methamphetamine weighed 13.8 grams, and the liquid containing methamphetamine weighed 39.4 grams. However, he argues the entire weight of the water containing an unknown specified quantity of methamphetamine should not count toward the total gross weight. Defendant concedes the statute criminalizes the possession of methamphetamine or “a substance containing methamphetamine.” 720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2022). He also notes our supreme court, in People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 109 (2006), addressed the definition of “substance” and “substance containing methamphetamine” in the manufacturing, delivery, or intent to deliver methamphetamine statute (720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2000)). The McCarty court concluded, in the absence of a statutory definition, that a “by-product that contains traces of methamphetamine qualifies as a ‘substance containing methamphetamine,’ ” “despite the State’s inability to prove that any of the methamphetamine was usable.” McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d at 125. The court noted the legislature could have expressly limited the methamphetamine to that which is “usable or consumable or marketable.” Id. - 11 - ¶ 38 Defendant contends that, because this case involves merely possession and not manufacturing, delivery, or intent to deliver methamphetamine, the liquid associated with the methamphetamine is not a material from which the methamphetamine was made or owes its characteristics or qualities. He argues the liquid is more akin to drug paraphernalia that is used in the consumption of methamphetamine. He argues McCarty is, therefore, not applicable. He also cites People v. Mayberry, 63 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1976), for the proposition that dangerous drugs are often diluted for the purpose of distribution to greater numbers of people, thereby making the criminalization of mixtures and compounds reasonable. From here, defendant argues the liquid containing methamphetamine was not a mixture or compound for the purpose of distribution. Lastly, he cites People v. Kucharski, 346 Ill. App. 3d 655 (2004). ¶ 39 In Kucharski, the defendant was convicted of possessing more than 200 grams of ecstasy. Id. at 657-58. On appeal, he argued the ecstasy removed from his stomach had been adulterated by his bodily fluids, which should have been excluded from the gross weight. Id. at 664-65. The appellate court found guidance from Mayberry and noted controlled substances in a mixed state are more harmful for the purposes of distribution to greater numbers of people. Id. at 666. The court said the defendant had not mixed the ecstasy with his bodily fluids for the purpose of marketing or distribution, but, rather, unintentionally adulterated the ecstasy. Id. at 667. The court reasoned “the unintentional adulteration of the ecstasy caused no enhanced danger that is apparent to us. Without some enhanced danger, the rational of Mayberry falls away.” Id. The Kucharski court held that “where a controlled substance is unintentionally adulterated, the weight of the adulterating agent must be discounted” and modified the offense to a lesser included offense of possessing between 50 and 200 grams. Id. at 668. ¶ 40 Kucharski also cited People v. Butler, 304 Ill. App. 3d 750 (1999), as - 12 - distinguishable. In Butler, the defendant was convicted of possessing, with the intent to deliver, cocaine. Id. at 752. The defendant was transporting liquid in bottles that field tested positive for cocaine. Id. A forensic chemist testified each bottle containing cocaine “weighed 693.5 grams for a total weight of 1,387 grams.” Id. at 754-55. Further testing showed the liquid was only comprised of 29% cocaine, though “the record [was] unclear whether the percentage refer[ed] to volume or weight.” Id. at 755. On appeal, the defendant argued it was error to include the weight of the liquid in which the cocaine was diluted. Id. at 757. The appellate court construed the plain meaning of the statutory language from the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(D) (West 1996)) and noted the statute’s language was clear regarding “ ‘any substance containing cocaine.’ ” Butler, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 758. The court explained the “cocaine-containing liquid in this case certainly falls within the ordinary meaning of the term ‘mixture,’ which is encompassed within the definition of ‘substance.’ ” Id. The court further noted it was not authorized to depart from the plain language of the statute nor read into it “exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 759. The court said the statute was “silent on the issue of what additional hearings or evidence may be required in order for the court to make a determination as to weight.” Id. ¶ 41 “The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.” People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891, ¶ 18. “The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. ¶ 20. “Issues requiring statutory interpretation are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Evans v. Cook County State’s Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 27. ¶ 42 In the case at bar, the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act - 13 - clearly states it is unlawful to knowingly “possess methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine.” 720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2022). The statute then provides a gradation of penalties based on the amount, in weight, of methamphetamine or substance containing methamphetamine one is convicted of possessing. In this case, 15 or more grams but less than 100 grams is a Class 1 felony. Id. § 60(b)(3). Much like the analysis in McCarty or Butler, we find no reason to depart from the ordinary, plain meaning of the term “substance containing methamphetamine” to mean anything other than that which it clearly states. “Where the language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply the statute without resort to further aids of statutory construction.” Cothron v. White Castle System, Inc., 2023 IL 128004, ¶ 20. “Only if the statutory language is ambiguous may we look to other sources to ascertain the legislature’s intent.” Id. Accordingly, we read the statute to mean exactly what it states: a defendant may be convicted of knowingly possessing methamphetamine or “a substance containing methamphetamine.” 720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2022). ¶ 43 Defendant asks this court to construe the statute’s plain language to read into it conditions, exceptions, or limitations because some of the methamphetamine he was convicted of possessing was diluted in water and for personal consumption, as opposed to manufacturing or delivering. “We may not depart from the plain language of a statute by reading into it ‘exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.’ ” People v. Witherspoon, 2019 IL 123092, ¶ 24 (quoting People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, ¶ 17). ¶ 44 Defendant notes his trial counsel argued an extreme example during closing arguments when he said someone could combine a small bag of methamphetamine in a “10,000- gallon pool of water, suddenly [they are] the biggest meth kingpin north of the border.” We agree reviewing courts must construe statutes “to avoid absurd results.” Dawkins v. Fitness - 14 - International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 27 (“When a proffered reading of a statute leads to absurd results or results that the legislature could not have intended, courts are not bound to that construction, and the reading leading to absurdity should be rejected.”). It is entirely unclear from the facts of this record what amount of the liquid containing methamphetamine was diluted. The evidence at trial that is not in dispute showed defendant possessed a crystalized methamphetamine weighing 13.8 grams. Thus, the additional methamphetamine-containing liquid needed to only weigh an additional 1.2 grams to meet the statutory threshold for which defendant had been charged. 720 ILCS 646/60(b)(3) (West 2022). The liquid containing methamphetamine weighed 39.4 grams. Unlike Butler, there was no evidence suggesting what amount of this liquid, by weight or volume, was methamphetamine. However, only 3% of the liquid by weight would need to have been methamphetamine under the analysis proposed by defendant. We find no reason to think this case offers an absurd result necessitating a rejection of the statute as written. Ultimately, if the legislature had desired this court undertake the analysis defendant proposes, it could have easily expressed so when it proscribed the unlawful possession of any “substance containing methamphetamine.” Id. § 60(a). Because the legislature did not, we will not do so. Therefore, we find the evidence at trial was not so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. ¶ 45 B. Motion to Suppress Evidence Claim ¶ 46 Next, defendant argues the trial court erred when denying his motion to suppress evidence. He argues the evidence showed Cooper had visited defendant’s residence one time for 15 minutes while communicating with the CI. The court concluded this was enough to establish a nexus between Cooper’s methamphetamine dealing and defendant’s residence to support probable cause to issue a search warrant. He contends law enforcement did not have complete - 15 - surveillance on Cooper’s activity to rule out anywhere else Cooper may have gone for 30 minutes between the last communication with the CI and visiting defendant’s residence or the 5 to 10 minutes after he left the residence. He argues there are endless possible locations where Cooper could have obtained the methamphetamine from prior to entering or leaving his residence. In support, he cites People v. Manzo, 2018 IL 122761, to argue the court erred when finding probable cause of illegal contraband at his residence. ¶ 47 A trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress evidence presents both factual and legal questions. Id. ¶ 25. Findings of fact are afforded deference and will be reversed only when such findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Where a reviewing court accepts the trial court’s factual findings, the suppression order itself is reviewed de novo. Id. ¶ 48 Whether probable cause exists is determined case-by-case based on the “totality of the circumstances and facts known to the officers and court when the warrant is applied for.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 29. The “facts and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge at the time the warrant is applied for” must be “sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the law was violated and evidence of it is on the premises to be searched.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “Whether the necessary probability exists is governed by commonsense considerations that are factual and practical, rather than by technical rules.” Id. ¶ 30. ¶ 49 In Manzo, the complaint for a search warrant noted multiple undercover cocaine purchases from an individual named Casillas, who was the cousin of the defendant’s then girlfriend. Id. ¶ 4. Two of the undercover purchases occurred “in the vicinity” of the defendant’s residence. Id. ¶ 5. During one of the purchases, Casillas drove a vehicle registered to the defendant’s girlfriend to the defendant’s residence. Id. ¶ 6. During another purchase, officers - 16 - observed Casillas leave the defendant’s residence on foot and meet an undercover officer at a nearby grocery store. Id. ¶ 8. Officers identified Casillas as “an associate” of the defendant’s girlfriend but did not explain what that meant. Id. ¶ 9. Based on those facts, officers sought a search warrant, and the appellate court found there was probable cause. Id. ¶ 21. ¶ 50 Our supreme court noted “the fact that a dealer leaves his home to complete a drug sale makes it more likely that he possessed drugs at his home.” Id. ¶ 52. However, the court found the fact that Casillas had been seen leaving the defendant’s residence before one undercover purchase and using the defendant’s girlfriend’s registered vehicle for another purchase failed to establish a sufficient nexus between Casillas’s criminal conduct and the defendant’s residence. Id. ¶ 38-39. The court explained, “There [was] no evidence indicating where Casillas was before arriving at the drug deal in [the] vehicle. In particular, there was no evidence that Casillas drove [the] vehicle directly from [the] defendant’s home to meet [the undercover officer].” Id. ¶ 40. The court noted the fact that Casillas left the defendant’s residence to complete a drug sale established he had drugs on his person when he left the residence, but “it [did] not follow that Casillas obtained those drugs from [the] defendant’s home as opposed to any other place.” Id. ¶ 48. The court explained, “Without more information connecting [the] defendant’s home to the drug sale, it is equally possible to infer that Casillas had the drugs on his person when he arrived at [the] defendant’s home.” Id. Moreover, the court stated the complaint only established Casillas was an acquaintance of the occupants of the defendant’s residence and did not establish a nexus of illegal contraband to be found there. Id. ¶ 51. ¶ 51 We find this case distinguishable from Manzo. Here, the evidence showed law enforcement had been investigating Cooper for selling methamphetamine. In fact, two of the controlled purchases were focused solely on Cooper and did not involve defendant. However, - 17 - Agent Harris had learned from the Rushville Police Department that Cooper was procuring methamphetamine from either defendant or Ashcraft at his residence. Cooper had been observed carrying a black handbag during one of the transactions. On September 20, 2023, a controlled purchase was performed. The CI reached out to Cooper to purchase methamphetamine. Cooper informed the CI he did not have the amount of methamphetamine requested. Cooper went to defendant’s residence 30 minutes later and left 15 minutes later with the black handbag. Cooper then contacted the CI to complete the controlled purchase. Defendant himself had a lengthy criminal history, which included prior convictions for possession and delivery of methamphetamine. ¶ 52 While we understand defendant’s assertion of the possibilities regarding Cooper’s conduct in procuring methamphetamine, we note that probable cause “is not a high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014). “The standard for determining whether probable cause exists is the probability of criminal activity, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v. Barnes, 2025 IL App (4th) 250014, ¶ 16. Accordingly, the complaint for a search warrant was not required to show proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Cooper had obtained methamphetamine from defendant’s residence. The evidence before the trial court was sufficient to create a nexus between Cooper’s activity and defendant’s residence. The CI contacted Cooper to make a controlled purchase. Cooper said he did not have the quantity of methamphetamine requested and proceeded to defendant’s residence with a handbag that had been used in previous drug transactions. After leaving defendant’s residence, Cooper then completed the controlled purchase. Agent Harris, along with several other officers, had been observing the parties involved, and based on many years of experience, he believed Cooper had obtained the methamphetamine from defendant’s residence. Defendant notes Harris could not confirm with - 18 - certainty whether other officers had consistently surveilled Cooper. However, Harris’s uncertainty does not mean the other task force agents involved had not been surveilling Cooper when he left his residence or defendant’s. Harris provided the names of the other agents involved, but none of them were ever called to testify at the motion to suppress hearing. We conclude the complaint for a search warrant established probable cause. Because we find there was probable cause, we need not address defendant’s arguments for whether any good faith exceptions to the exclusionary rule apply. ¶ 53 C. Trial Court Erred When Admitting Lab Report Claim ¶ 54 Next, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted a lab report listing several items having nothing to do with his case and the report’s limited probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He notes the lab report authored by Stern listed Cooper as the suspect and contained relevant evidence, such as the 13.8 grams of crystallized methamphetamine, along with the 39.4 grams of liquid containing methamphetamine. However, he argues the report also had several additional items, including other items of suspected methamphetamine and hydrocodone pills, for example, that had no relevance to his case. He cites People v. McBride, 2020 IL App (2d) 170873, in support. ¶ 55 In McBride, the defendant was tried and convicted separately for mu