People v. Chambers

2026 IL App (4th) 250934 FILED NO. 4-25-0934 September 16, 2026 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County WILLIE CHAMBERS, ) No. 14CF791 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William A. Yoder, ) Judge Presiding. JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Knecht and Vancil concurred in the judgment and opinion. OPINION ¶1 In the circuit court of McLean County, defendant, Willie Chambers, filed a pro se petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). Afterward, through appointed counsel, he filed an amended petition. (We note that the presentence investigation report refers to defendant as Willie Chambers Jr. and that he is quoted in the report as referring to himself by that name. Also, the report states that his deceased father was named Willie Chambers. Nevertheless, because the record otherwise refers to defendant as Willie Chambers and previous appeals referred to him by that name (People v. Chambers, 2021 IL App (4th) 190151; People v. Chambers, 2018 IL App (4th) 160232-U), we refer to him, for the sake of consistency, as Willie Chambers.). The State moved to dismiss the amended petition on the ground that the amended petition was legally insufficient. The court granted the motion, and defendant appeals. ¶2 He contends that the circuit court should have denied the State’s motion for a dismissal and granted him an evidentiary hearing because his amended petition, supported by an evaluation by a clinical psychologist, made a substantial showing that the 42-year term of imprisonment imposed upon defendant for the first degree murder of Ronald Smith (see 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2014))—a murder he committed hardly more than a month after his eighteenth birthday—violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11) as applied to him. Specifically, he claims, on appeal, that the sentence of 42 years’ imprisonment is cruel and degrading and so wholly disproportionate to the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. ¶3 In our de novo review, we are unconvinced that imprisonment for first degree murder is cruel or degrading or that, given the circumstances of the offense and defendant’s previous history of offending, the community of Bloomington-Normal, Illinois, would regard 42 years’ imprisonment as shocking to the conscience. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 On June 10, 2014, a grand jury returned an indictment against defendant. Count II charged him with the first degree murder of Smith in that on June 2, 2014, without lawful justification, he struck Smith on or about his body, knowing that, by doing so, he created a strong probability of great bodily harm to Smith and that he thereby caused Smith’s death. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2014). ¶6 At a hearing on August 7, 2015, defendant, through defense counsel, proposed entering a guilty plea to count II in return for consideration from the State. Under the “partially -2- negotiated plea agreement,” as the circuit court called it, defendant would plead guilty to count II; pay fines, fees, costs, and restitution in all the criminal cases pending against him; and testify truthfully against his two codefendants, Anthony Davis-Dickson and Tory Washington. The State, for its part, would dismiss the charges pending against defendant in other cases: charges of aggravated battery and mob action in McLean County case No. 14-CF-782; charges of robbery, aggravated battery, and mob action in McLean County case No. 14-CF-646; and charges of robbery, aggravated battery, and mob action in McLean County case No. 14-CF-638. Also, the State would dismiss the first and second petitions for revocation of probation that were pending against defendant in a residential burglary case, McLean County case No. 13-CF-1054, although he “would be unsuccessfully discharged from probation as part of the agreement for that case” (meaning he would be successfully discharged from probation while being found to have been unsuccessful in complying with its conditions). In the present case, the State would dismiss counts I, III, and IV of the indictment, which charged defendant with the first degree murder of Smith on other theories besides knowledge of a strong probability of great bodily harm (see id. § 9-1(a)(1)- (2)). Defendant’s guilty plea to the remaining count of the indictment, count II, would be—as the court also characterized it to defendant—“an open plea to that count whereby the minimum sentence that would be imposed would not be less than 20 years[’] [imprisonment and] the maximum sentence would not be more than 60 years[’] [imprisonment].” Defendant acknowledged he understood those terms of the plea agreement. ¶7 The circuit court then reviewed with defendant the allegations in count II and confirmed that, given those allegations, he wished to plead guilty to that count: “Q. *** The charge alleges that you, on or about the 2nd day of June, 2014, in the County of McLean, State of Illinois, committed the offense of Murder in that -3-  you, without lawful justification, struck *** Smith on and about the body knowing that such acts created a strong probability of great bodily harm to *** Smith, thereby causing the death of *** Smith. Do you understand that charge? A. Yes, sir. Q. Is that the offense that you wish to plead guilty to at this time? A. Yes.” ¶8 That offense, the circuit court informed defendant, was a Class M felony, which, in the absence of the plea agreement, would be punishable as follows: “a sentence of not less than 20 years[’] [imprisonment] with a maximum of 60 years[’] [imprisonment] unless it would be determined that you were eligible for an extended-term sentence, in which case, then the maximum could be up to 100 years[’] [imprisonment] or unless you were eligible for a sentence of natural life. Under each of the latter categories, extended term or natural life, in essence, the State would be required to establish that the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense were exceptionally brutal or heinous, indicative of wanton cruelty.” If defendant were found guilty of first degree murder, there would be no possibility of probation or conditional discharge, the court cautioned him, nor could he earn any good-time credit: he would have to serve 100% of the actual term of imprisonment the court imposed. After serving his prison sentence, he additionally would have to serve up to three years of mandatory supervised release, the court said, and there would be a fine. ¶9 Those were the punishments that defendant would face if he were found guilty at trial. The circuit court pointed out that, under the plea agreement, by contrast, “the State would not -4- be seeking either for the Court to consider an extended-term sentence or a life sentence, in that[ ] they would be foregoing *** the finding that this act was exceptionally brutal or heinous indicative of wanton cruelty.” ¶ 10 Defendant confirmed he understood the plea agreement as the circuit court had explained it to him. The court reiterated: “So between the terms of not less than 20, nor more than 60 years, there is no agreement other than that as far as the actual term in the Department of Corrections as to what sentence would be imposed upon you for this particular offense at the time of the sentencing hearing. Each side would be afforded the opportunity to present any evidence; there would be evidence in aggravation by the State, evidence in mitigation by your attorney. To the extent that you have been deemed by the State to have been fully cooperative and of aid to the State in them on prosecuting your co-defendants, that could be construed as a factor in mitigation by the State, that being your level of cooperation; but, nonetheless, the parties, that being either your attorney and/or the State’s Attorney are not bound by any term in the Department of Corrections to recommend to the Court so long as it’s not less than 20 nor more than 60 years.” The court asked defendant if he understood. He said he did. The court asked him, “Knowing that, is that still your desire to plead guilty on this charge?” He answered, “Yes, sir.” ¶ 11 The circuit court then admonished defendant on the rights he would give up by pleading guilty to count II, including the right to have the State prove to a jury—or, if he waived a jury, have the State prove to a judge—that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 12 The circuit court asked defendant if the signature on the plea agreement purporting -5- to be his signature was in fact his signature. He answered, “Yes.” The court asked him if he had reviewed the plea agreement with defense counsel. He answered, “Yes.” The court asked him if he understood the plea agreement. He answered, “Yes.” The court asked him if anyone had forced him to enter into the plea agreement or had used threats to make him enter into it. He answered, “No.” The court asked him if, in return for his guilty plea, any promises had been made to him other than the promises in the plea agreement. He answered, “No.” ¶ 13 The circuit court then requested that the State provide a factual basis to support the proposed guilty plea to count II. ¶ 14 The prosecutor said he would begin the factual basis by asking defendant to take the stand and testify pursuant to his promise of cooperation. Defendant took the stand and, after being sworn, testified substantially as follows. ¶ 15 The night of June 2, 2014, defendant was at O’Neil Park in Bloomington with Washington and Davis-Dickson, skateboarding, drinking hard liquor, and taking Xanax pills. They saw Kyle Fairchild at the park and decided to beat him up. All three of them punched Fairchild. Defendant punched him in the face or the back of the head. ¶ 16 After receiving this beating, Fairchild left the park. The three of them went over to a jungle gym and drank more alcohol and took more pills. Then they saw “the homeless guy,” Smith, who was by a tree next to a fence. He “just started layin’ down.” Davis-Dickson “was lookin’ over there sayin’, ‘Let’s go beat him up.’ ” The three of them went over to the tree, and defendant struck Smith first, hitting him in the face. Defendant continued in his testimony, “Then [Washington] hit him and then he started yellin’ and then *** me and *** Washington seen *** Davis-Dickson jump all the way in the air and crushed him in his ribs. And after he was yellin’, he stopped yellin’ after that and we ran away.” Smith was lying on the ground “the whole time this -6- was going on.” When Davis-Dickson jumped on his ribs, Smith went “completely silen[t].” Then the three of them went to the pavilion and did some more drinking. When they saw Smith get up off the ground and start walking away, they went “back and beat him up some more,” “punch[ing] him *** a couple of times more.” After the three of them inflicted this second beating on Smith, Davis-Dickson and Washington “ran off,” but defendant stayed behind for a moment. He testified, “I told [Smith], ‘Sorry,’ and I picked up some [G]oldfish [crackers] that he dropped, and then after I told him I was sorry and picked up the [G]oldfish [crackers], I ran away also.” The prosecutor asked defendant, “And you’re talking about [G]oldfish [crackers] that belonged to the homeless man?” He answered, “Yes.” ¶ 17 After running out of O’Neil Park, defendant met up again with Davis-Dickson and Washington. Two other individuals, Jamaude Tutwiler and Isaiah Dorch, joined them, and they all began walking toward Normal. They went into Kroger’s, where Davis-Dickson was caught stealing liquor. “[T]hey just kicked us out [of] the store,” defendant testified, “and we kept on drinkin’ some more.” ¶ 18 Near Carle BroMenn Medical Center in Normal, they saw “another guy.” Defendant testified that Davis-Dickson and Washington “just beat [this man] up till he was bleedin[g]” and “on the ground,” and they “all ran off afterwards.” ¶ 19 They walked farther and saw “another guy.” “They said” to defendant, “ ‘It’s your turn,’ ” and defendant punched this individual four or five times. ¶ 20 They walked “deeper into Normal[,] right next to the library,” when they saw “another guy,” who had headphones on. Davis-Dickson “punched him, [and] he fell to the ground[,] and then they jumped him and *** took his headphones.” ¶ 21 The police stopped them “because *** Washington had the blue headphones in his -7- pockets in there[ ] and the guy [had] called the police talkin’ ’bout [‘]they stole from me.[’] ” The police arrested defendant and his companions. ¶ 22 Having no more questions for defendant, the prosecutor supplemented the factual basis with his own statement, by way of proffer. According to the prosecutor, Smith went to the hospital on June 2, 2014, after defendant, Davis-Dickson, and Washington beat him up. Smith remained in the hospital until July 3, 2014, when he “ended up dying as a result of those injuries.” An autopsy revealed that “the cause of death was internal injuries caused by the attack that occurred.” ¶ 23 The police seized some items of clothing that defendant and his codefendants were wearing the night of June 2, 2014, the prosecutor continued in his proffer, and these items appeared to be bloodstained. Forensic testing by a laboratory in Morton, Illinois, revealed that defendant’s shoes had the blood of Smith on them and that his shirt had the DNA and blood of another victim on it. ¶ 24 After the prosecutor concluded his proffer, the circuit court asked defense counsel if he would stipulate that the name of the decedent was Ronald Smith. Defense counsel so stipulated and added that, according to his review of the discovery materials, Smith “died from an infection that was secondary to the internal injuries he received.” Defense counsel further conceded that DNA testing “conclusively proved that [defendant] was involved in this incident.” The court inquired: “THE COURT: *** Even though [defendant] may not have been the sole proximate cause, his actions were a proximate cause of the death of Mr. Smith[?] [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge. We concede that and stipulate to that.” -8- ¶ 25 After finding a sufficient factual basis for the guilty plea to count II and further finding that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, the circuit court accepted the guilty plea and entered a judgment upon it. The court then ordered the preparation of a presentence investigation report. ¶ 26 According to the presentence investigation report, which was filed on October 19, 2019, defendant was born on April 29, 1996, making him 18 years and 1 month old when he committed the first degree murder of Smith. ¶ 27 For some four years before the murder, defendant, as a minor, had been falling afoul of the law. He repeatedly was put on probation, which he repeatedly violated. On July 1, 2010, when he was 14, petitions for adjudication of wardship charging him with one count of retail theft and two counts of theft were found to have been proven. Nineteen days later, a petition for revocation of probation—alleging he had been absent from his residence from July 2 to 7, 2010— was found to have been proven, and he was placed on a new term of probation for 12 months, with 13 days of detention. Further petitions for adjudication of wardship and revocation of probation followed. On October 12, 2010, a petition for revocation—alleging that he had been absent from his residence from September 17 to 20, 2010, and that he had been “unsuccessful[ly] discharge[d] from [an] Extended Day Program”—was found to have been proven. On January 4, 2011, a petition for adjudication of wardship, charging him with residential burglary, was found to have been proven. On April 9, 2012, two more petitions for adjudication of wardship, which charged him with two counts of domestic battery and two counts of “resisting,” were found to have been proven. He was to remain on probation and was given 30 days’ detention. ¶ 28 Defendant had one prior “adult” conviction: residential burglary, an offense he committed on August 6, 2013, when he was 17. For that offense—his second offense of residential -9- burglary—he was sentenced to probation. Afterward, two petitions for revocation of probation were filed in that case. On August 7, 2015, there was “an unsuccessful discharge from probation,” and the two petitions were dismissed. ¶ 29 Defendant had been receiving services since he was three years old and had been hospitalized at least seven times for behavioral or mental health problems, including suicide attempts or suicidal ideation. The presentence investigation report summed up: “[Defendant] has been on juvenile probation in 09 JD 88 since March 2010. Over the four (4) years [preceding] his current incarceration, every service/resource available has been provided to the defendant. The defendant exhausted all resources, and continued to engage in inappropriate, unproductive[,] and criminal behavior. While on juvenile probation in 09 JD 88, the defendant committed the offense of Residential Burglary in McLean County Cause [No.] 13 CF 1054. On February 3, 2014, he was granted [Treatment Alternatives to Street Crimes (TASC)] probation in this cause. Four (4) months later he was in custody for Murder, Robbery, Aggravated Battery, and Mob Action.” The TASC probation was supposed to be for 30 months, and defendant committed the first degree murder of Smith while on that probation. ¶ 30 Before committing that offense as an adult, defendant had a troubled childhood. His father was deceased, having been fatally shot in 1997. In September 1998, defendant was removed from his home and placed in foster care because his mother had a drug problem. By defendant’s account, he was physically abused while in foster care and was locked in closets for long periods of time. In April 2001, after his mother completed rehabilitative services, he was returned to her custody. - 10 - ¶ 31 On October 23, 2015, the circuit court held a sentencing hearing, at which the court admitted the presentence investigation report, having ascertained from the attorneys and Shelley L. Kosky, the probation officer who had signed the report, that no additions, corrections, or changes needed to be made to the report. ¶ 32 The prosecutor then provided the circuit court a “statement of restitution addendum,” in which the parties had agreed on the amount of restitution that defendant should be ordered to pay. ¶ 33 Also, the circuit court admitted two victim impact statements: one by Smith’s son, Andrew Smith, and the other by Smith’s brother, Clifton Smith. In his statement, Andrew described Smith as a “happy freewheeling man that would give his shirt off his back if needed.” It saddened him that Smith would never get to see his grandchildren grow up and would never again be at family get-togethers. He dreaded answering Smith’s mother, who had Alzheimer’s disease, when she asked him if he had seen his father lately. Clifton wrote, “My brother might have been [a] homeless drunk. But he never hurt no one [or] did anyone wrong in any way.” ¶ 34 Finally, the attorneys agreed that, when it came to evidence in aggravation, there would be no live testimony. They agreed that, instead, the circuit court could rely on its notes and memory of Davis-Dickson’s trials in McLean County case Nos. 14-CF-649, 14-CF-650, and 14- CF-792. Specifically, the agreed-upon procedure was that, after the defense presented mitigating evidence, the prosecutor could make an argument summarizing the relevant testimony from Davis- Dickson’s trials. If the prosecutor’s summary conflicted with the court’s notes and recollection, the court’s notes and recollection should prevail. After the attorneys described that suggested procedure, the court responded, “I’m sorry. I misunderstood. I thought there was going to be some - 11 - type of an offer of proof, but you’re just incorporating it within the State’s argument.” “Correct, Your Honor,” the prosecutor replied. ¶ 35 “So that concludes[,] then[,] the State’s evidence in aggravation,” the circuit court announced. The court then asked defense counsel if he had any evidence in mitigation. Without objection by the State, the court admitted defense exhibit Nos. 1 to 6. ¶ 36 Defendant’s exhibit No. 1 was a conference summary report by the Mackinaw Valley Special Education Association, dated December 11, 2002, concluding that, although defendant had “average intelligence,” “a significant discrepancy exist[ed] between this student’s ability and achievement,” specifically in written expression, reading comprehension, basic reading skills, and mathematical reasoning and calculation. The determination was made that defendant was eligible for special education services. ¶ 37 Defendant’s exhibit No. 2 was a social developmental study, dated May 18, 2004, by the Special Services Department of McLean County Unit District No. 5. According to this study, defendant had been diagnosed with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). He had been “display[ing] severe behavior concerns,” such as “wandering out of the room, destroying his own and other people’s property, defiance, yelling and threatening other students, and aggressive behaviors toward staff.” It was determined that he had “a behavioral/emotional disorder [and] learning disability” and that he was “eligible for *** speech and language services as a related service.” ¶ 38 Defendant’s exhibit No. 3 was a comprehensive mental health assessment, dated January 27, 2005, by the McLean County Center for Human Services. In answer to the question, “Main problems you would like your child to address in therapy?” someone, apparently defendant’s mother, had written, “[B]ehavior & Anger[.] Talk about what is make him act out at - 12 - school.” In a comprehensive mental health assessment, a therapist, Cheryl Goldberg, diagnosed defendant with ADHD, not otherwise specified, and ODD. Goldberg wrote that defendant, who was then eight, had “been acting-out aggressively at school” and hitting his teachers, although his mother “report[ed] no aggressive behaviors at home.” At school, defendant “recently bit a teacher and was suspended.” His mother was “frequently called away from work to take [defendant] home” and was “concerned about losing her job.” Defendant subsequently received treatment for these aggressive behavioral tendencies. A document from the McLean County Center for Human Services, titled “Closing/Transfer” and dated July 8, 2005, noted that he had undergone nine sessions, described as “Individual therapy, Family therapy, Play therapy, Reality therapy, Anger and Stress management training, [and] Training in parenting and problem solving skills.” The “Reason for discontinuation” was that “Client completed treatment.” The “Continuity Arrangements” were to “Continue with recommended services.” ¶ 39 Defendant’s exhibit No. 4 was a psychoeducational evaluation of defendant, when he was 11, by Dean R. Brown, a school psychologist at the Mackinaw Valley Special Education Association. Brown noted: “At the time of the current referral, [defendant’s] teachers reported that [defendant] ha[d] made noticeable progress, especially in his ability to remain on task and to remain in his assigned area. His social skills [were] good, and he [was] often sought out by his peers. He present[ed] no aggressive behavior.” Nevertheless, defendant “continue[d] to require support in his response to work, teacher directives[,] and problem solving.” After administering to defendant a battery of tests, Brown concluded that “[t]he best estimate of [defendant’s] true intellectual ability place[d] him at the low end of the low average range, suggesting that he [was] likely to experience difficulties keeping up - 13 - with same-aged peers” and that he was “likely to require more repetition, extended time, and increased adult support to have reasonable access to the general curriculum.” ¶ 40 Defendant’s exhibit No. 5 was an Illinois Standards Achievement Test from the spring of 2009. According to this test, defendant’s performance in reading, mathematics, and science was “Below Standards.” Specifically, in reading, he did as well as or better than only 5% of students nationally; in mathematics, as well as or better than 26%; and in science, as well as or better than 22%. ¶ 41 Defendant’s exhibit No. 6 consisted of two letters. One letter, dated October 23, 2015, was from Cheryl Fletcher, a member of the church defendant’s family attended, who noted that she had always found defendant “to be a young man who was easily swayed by his peers” and that he had owned up to what he had done. Although she did not deny that defendant should pay for his crime, she argued that “[t]he bacterial peritonitis that was the cause of *** Smith’s death due to the blunt force trauma of his abdomen had nothing to do with [defendant],” who “was not the young man who jumped on *** Smith[,] causing the peritonitis to kill him.” She urged the circuit court, therefore, to “[p]lease be merciful.” ¶ 42 The other letter in defendant’s exhibit No. 6 was from Deborah R. Simmons, the minister at the church defendant’s family attended, who remarked that defendant had been subjected to “unfortunate situations and circumstances in his life.” Simmons believed that defendant was “very sorry for what he ha[d] allowed himself to be caught up in.” Although she was “aware that [defendant] ha[d] to spend time for the crime committed,” she requested that the circuit court “extend leniency toward him.” ¶ 43 In addition to presenting those exhibits, the defense called five witnesses to testify at the sentencing hearing: defendant’s brother, Rayvon Shorter; defendant’s stepfather, Demetrius - 14 - LeFlore; defendant’s grandmother, Lilly Mae Davis; defendant’s aunt, Cathy King; and defendant’s mother, Tammy LeFlore. Some of these witnesses testified to defendant’s ambitions for the future. According to Shorter, defendant had intended to enlist in the military. According to Demetrius, defendant was “a pretty good chef” and had intended to go to culinary school. King believed that the murder was out of character for defendant, whom she had always found to be courteous, kind, and respectful. Tammy testified that defendant had been diagnosed with ADHD, bipolar disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that he was receiving disability benefits from the Social Security Administration for those conditions. “[E]xcept for a brief period of time when he was very young,” she had “been involved in his life on a daily basis.” Because he had struggled with reading, she had sought assistance for him. She was very close to him. Before he was jailed, he lived with her, and she saw him every day. These witnesses expressed a willingness to “be there for [defendant] in the future.” ¶ 44 After defendant’s witnesses testified, the attorneys made their arguments. Toward the beginning of his argument, the prosecutor raised the question of why defendant had caused such suffering and regret. The reason, the prosecutor said, was that, on June 2, 2014, defendant played a game of “ Point them out, knock them out.’ ” In other words, what defendant did to Smith “was his idea of fun”; he “made a game out of hurting and robbing random people.” He had “blood on his clothing at the time of his arrest *** that matched the DNA profile of Patrick Reed” (one of the robbery and assault victims) “in addition to that of *** Smith.” The prosecutor recounted, “Further, Your Honor, when the defendant relived that night on the witness stand in the co- defendant’s trial, in between yawns there was no visible compassion or remorse. I saw no apathy [sic]. And that is scary, and that is dangerous, Your Honor.” - 15 - ¶ 45 After making those initial observations, the prosecutor discussed the factors in aggravation, as he saw them. The first such factor, in his view, was defendant’s prior history of criminality. From 2010 to 2012, defendant was adjudicated a delinquent minor for criminal damage to property, retail theft, theft, residential burglary, domestic battery, and “resisting” a peace officer. Less than a year before the murder, he committed a second offense of residential burglary, this time as an adult (or he was prosecuted as an adult). On February 3, 2014, he was placed on 30 months’ probation for the residential burglary. About four months later, while he was on probation, he attacked and robbed Smith and others. ¶ 46 The second factor in aggravation, according to the prosecutor, was the need to deter others. He argued: “ ‘Point them out, knock them out’ is not a game residents of this community should have to endure or be fearful of. The Constitution Trail can be a wonderful recreational resource to the citizens of Bloomington-Normal, but not if they read the paper and learn about senseless attacks like these and are too afraid to use it.” ¶ 47 After raising those two factors in aggravation, the prosecutor addressed the subject of mitigation. He argued: “[Defendant] has received mitigation by taking responsibility *** for what happened to *** Smith. And because of that, as he’s sitting here, this defendant doesn’t have a finding of wanton cruelty hanging over his head, and he doesn’t have the possibility of a sentence that would be consecutive to a robbery sentence, either. So this defendant as he sits here has had some mitigation because of his plea in this case.” - 16 - ¶ 48 With respect to the defense exhibits that had been presented in mitigation, the prosecutor made two points. First, although it was clear that, when growing up, defendant had “behavioral problems” and academic difficulties, he also “had numerous resources at his disposal.” When he availed himself of those resources, “his prognosis was always optimistic.” Even defendant’s mother had testified that, “yes, he’s had a lot of services,” and “when he used those services, he did well.” Second, the prosecutor cautioned against assuming there was a connection between cognitive limitations and violence: “What I think also is important is what’s not in those records. Not in those records is any correlation between his cognitive abilities and his thirst for violence. I saw no explanation of how his difficulties in the classroom are responsible for him using his fists and using his feet to splatter unsuspecting victims’ blood all over them.” “Again and again this happened that night,” as Dorch, Tutwiler, Washington, and defendant had testified. The violence that night was repeated and persistent. ¶ 49 For all those reasons, the prosecutor requested that the circuit court sentence defendant to imprisonment for 60 years for the first degree murder of Smith. ¶ 50 While conceding the senselessness of Smith’s murder and acknowledging defendant’s prior juvenile and adult record, defense counsel argued, first, that the events of June 2, 2014, “were precipitated by [defendant’s] alcohol and drug use” and that, according to the testimony of defendant’s family members, such violence was “out of character for [defendant].” Second, defense counsel argued that the events of June 2, 2014, “were preceded and shaped by serious mental illness that the defendant suffer[ed] from,” specifically, bipolar disorder, ADHD, “and at other times [PTSD].” “[B]ecoming a young adult [was] difficult under the best of - 17 - circumstances,” defense counsel observed, but these “debilitating *** mental illnesses,” along with “borderline intellectual functioning,” made the transition “doubly difficult for” defendant. To compound his difficulties, defendant lost his father at a very young age and was in foster care “during a very formative time in his life,” which, defense counsel suggested, went “a long way towards explaining the antisocial behavior that [he was] engaged in.” Also, defendant suffered from depression. The presentence investigation report revealed that he had “thoughts of harming himself, suicidal ideation, faulty attempts at self-harm, and numerous hospitalizations to deal with mental illnesses.” In a word, defendant was “truly a lost soul.” ¶ 51 Nevertheless, defense counsel maintained that defendant had “demonstrated a capacity and willingness to change” and to become “a better man.” Defendant had so demonstrated by taking responsibility in the only way he could: by pleading guilty in the present case and by testifying truthfully and in detail at the trial of one of his codefendants, Davis-Dickson. ¶ 52 Finally, defense counsel cautioned against drawing conclusions from the demeanor or facial expressions that defendant appeared to display while testifying at Davis-Dickson’s trial: “Human beings are capable of displaying various emotions, but to know what’s in his heart based on the fact that perhaps out of nervousness he yawned a couple of times, I think that is a dangerous road to go down. I think a better indication is what he said in the presentence [investigation] report, about how he truly feels about what he did, how he is begging the family of *** Smith for forgiveness.” ¶ 53 Defense counsel suggested that because defendant could “be salvaged as a human being,” imprisonment for 30 years would balance the needs of punishment, protection of society, and deterrence with the possibility of rehabilitation. - 18 - ¶ 54 The circuit court then asked defendant if he wished to make a statement in allocution. Defendant did so, explaining that he had not meant to kill Smith and remarking that he could not live with himself for what he had done. He said, “I be telling myself[,] ‘You are not that kind of person,’ but much of the time I be helping a lot of people. I [was] drinking that night.” He disavowed any intention, however, to lay the blame on liquor. He said he was sorry for what had happened to Smith. He acknowledged, “A man is dead because of me.” He requested that Smith’s family forgive him, and he hoped that someday he would “get[ ] the chance to go back in the world and at least try to make up for what [he had done].” ¶ 55 After defendant made his statement in allocution, the circuit court listed the sources of information it had considered in determining the sentence it would impose: (1) the factual basis that had been provided in support of defendant’s guilty plea; (2) the testimony and DNA evidence from Davis-Dickson’s trial; (3) the presentence investigation report; (4) the history, character, and attitude of defendant; (5) the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing—namely, People’s exhibit Nos. 1 and 2, defendant’s exhibit Nos. 1 to 6, and the testimony of defendant’s witnesses; (6) arguments by counsel; (7) defendant’s statement in allocution; and (8) the factors in mitigation and aggravation. ¶ 56 The circuit court found four factors in mitigation. First, the codefendants had induced or facilitated defendant’s conduct. Second, when committing the offense, defendant was under the influence of alcohol and drugs—although, the court noted, consumption of the pills was illegal as was the consumption of alcohol at his age. Third, there did not appear to be any indication in the presentence investigation report that defendant was intoxicated when committing his previous offenses, which, except for domestic battery and resisting a peace officer, were nonviolent. Thus, there was “some evidence” that “the specific *** acts” that had brought - 19 - defendant before the court were “unlikely to re-occur.” Fourth, the court found that defendant was intellectually disabled. ¶ 57 On the other hand, the circuit court found three factors in aggravation. First, defendant had “a history of prior delinquency or crimin