Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 51195/51196 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Plaintiff-Respondent, ) Boise, April 2026 Term ) v. ) Opinion filed: September 22, 2026 ) SALWAN YOUSIF AL-MAFRACHI, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Ada County. Lynn Norton, District Judge, and Nancy Baskin, District Judge. The district court’s order denying Appellant’s motion to suppress is affirmed. Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant. Andrea W. Reynolds argued. Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent. Kacey L. Jones argued. _____________________________________________ BEVAN, Chief Justice. This appeal concerns the district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that he claims was illegally seized during an unconstitutional search of his backpack. Salwan Yousif Al-Mafrachi was riding as a passenger in a car when law enforcement stopped the car for a traffic infraction. During the stop, law enforcement discovered a large quantity of illegal narcotics in a backpack at Al-Mafrachi’s feet. Al-Mafrachi claimed the backpack belonged to his girlfriend, but law enforcement did not believe him and arrested him on possession charges. The officers later learned that Al-Mafrachi, based on the terms of his felony probation, was subject to a waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Al-Mafrachi was originally charged with crimes in two separate cases, which the district court later consolidated for trial. Prior to trial, Al-Mafrachi brought a motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the backpack, arguing that the search of his backpack and the vehicle lacked probable cause and were unconstitutional. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Al-Mafrachi lacked 1 standing to challenge the search because he waived his Fourth Amendment rights when he entered into a probation agreement with the State in an earlier case. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, an Ada County jury found Al-Mafrachi guilty on multiple drug-related counts. The district court sentenced him to a unified term of fifteen years in prison with the first five years fixed. Al-Mafrachi now appeals, claiming that the district court erred by ruling he did not have standing to challenge the search of his backpack based on the Fourth Amendment waiver. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district court’s decision, overruling this Court’s holding in State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 454 P.3d 543 (2019). I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Around 1:00 a.m. on February 6, 2023, Officer Wilson Moss of the Boise Police Department observed a Buick Rendezvous idling at a motel with its headlights on. Officer Moss ran the vehicle’s license plate and learned that the vehicle’s registration had been suspended for lack of insurance. He followed the vehicle once it began moving and observed that the driver failed to use a turn signal when making a right turn. Officer Moss then initiated a traffic stop based on the suspended registration and failure to use a turn signal. There were two individuals in the car: the driver, Bobby Frisbee, and Salwan Yousif Al- Mafrachi. Officer Moss was able to identify Al-Mafrachi when Al-Mafrachi produced an Idaho identification card from a wallet inside the backpack at his feet. Officer Moss then completed “radio and computer checks” of Frisbee and Al-Mafrachi and learned that Al-Mafrachi was on felony probation and had been previously charged with aggravated assault, multiple batteries, and drug charges. However, Officer Moss was unaware that Al-Mafrachi had agreed to waive his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation. Officer Moss then requested a K-9 officer to perform a dog sniff. While Officer Moss was in his patrol car, Al-Mafrachi exited the vehicle on his own accord. This prompted Officer Moss to approach the vehicle out of concern for the safety of the officer assisting him with the stop, who was talking to Frisbee. Al-Mafrachi reentered the vehicle and closed the door as Officer Moss approached the car. Officer Johnson arrived at the scene with his drug dog, Rico, and conducted an exterior sweep, which resulted in a positive alert for narcotics. Officer Johnson communicated Rico’s alert to Officer Moss with a “thumbs-up.” 2 Officer Moss testified that, based on the positive alert and the suspicious conduct of Al- Mafrachi during the traffic stop—i.e., exiting the vehicle without instruction—Officer Moss believed he had probable cause to conduct a search of the vehicle. When asked, Al-Mafrachi denied ownership of the backpack and left it in Frisbee’s car before Officer Moss began the search. As part of the vehicle search, Officer Moss searched the backpack and found “approximately 95 dosages of 17 different types” of controlled and uncontrolled substances. The material in the backpack included: several types of fentanyl, suboxone strips, Xanax, methamphetamine, marijuana, THC vape cartridges, “moon rocks,” 1 LSD, a digital scale, and small plastic baggies. In addition, Officer Moss found a pay stub in the backpack belonging to “Lindsay Cooper.” Al- Mafrachi stated that Cooper was his girlfriend. In case number CR01-23-3590, the State charged Al-Mafrachi with three counts of possession of a controlled substance, a felony under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c); two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a misdemeanor under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c); and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor under Idaho Code section 37- 2734A. The magistrate court dismissed two of the felony possession counts upon determining there was not probable cause to believe Al-Mafrachi committed the crimes. In case number CR01-23-9618, the State charged Al-Mafrachi with two counts of possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver, a felony under Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(A); one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, a felony under Idaho Code section 37-2732(a)(1)(B); and two counts of possession of a controlled substance, a felony under Idaho Code section 37-2732(c). The State then added a persistent violator enhancement based on Al-Mafrachi’s prior felony convictions, pursuant to Idaho Code section 19-2514. The two cases were later consolidated by the district court. Al-Mafrachi filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the search of his backpack based on alleged violations of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 17 of the Idaho Constitution. The State objected to the motion and argued that Al-Mafrachi lacked standing to challenge the search of the backpack based on the waiver in his probation agreement. 1 Officer Moss explained that a “moon rock” is a “brownish organic-looking substance that is a highly concentrated form of marijuana . . . .” 3 The district court denied the motion to suppress at a hearing on August 4, 2023. 2 The court acknowledged that it read the preliminary hearing transcript and the briefs and watched the video recording of the traffic stop. Relying on State v. Dorff, 171 Idaho 818, 526 P.3d 988 (2023), the court explained that standing for Fourth Amendment purposes requires a defendant to have “either a privacy interest or a proprietary interest in the place searched.” The court found that Al-Mafrachi did not have a basis to claim any interest in the vehicle and lacked standing under Dorff to challenge the search of the vehicle. It then analyzed Al-Mafrachi’s privacy interest in the backpack and whether he had abandoned it under the factors in State v. Porter, 170 Idaho 391, 398, 511 P.3d 273, 280 (Ct. App. 2022). Based on the Porter factors (ownership, possession, control, ability to regulate access to the evidence, historical use of the items seized, and the totality of the surrounding circumstances) and “conflicting” evidence, the district court concluded that abandonment did not apply. The court proceeded to address the Fourth Amendment waiver contained in Al-Mafrachi’s probation agreement, and whether that waiver eliminated that Al-Mafrachi’s standing to “contest the search of the vehicle or its contents.” That condition of Al-Mafrachi’s probation agreement states: Defendant agrees to waive his Fourth Amendment rights applying to search and seizure as provided by the United States Constitution, and to submit to a search by his probation officer or any law enforcement officer of his person, residence, vehicle or other property upon request. Defendant shall not reside with any person who does not consent to such a search. The court reasoned that, under Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), Al-Mafrachi did not have a subjective expectation of privacy, and that society would not be willing to “recognize the expectation as reasonable given someone’s [Fourth] Amendment waiver.” After the cases were consolidated and assigned to Judge Baskin, Al-Mafrachi filed a “Motion to Exclude Evidence, Reconsider Motion to Suppress, and Dismiss Case,” in which he again argued that the search of the backpack was unconstitutional and unreasonable. The district court denied that motion as well. Following a trial, the jury found Al-Mafrachi guilty of four counts of possession of a controlled substance; two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The jury also found that Al-Mafrachi was a 2 Judge Lynn Norton was the original district judge on this case, and she made the initial ruling denying Al-Mafrachi’s motion to suppress. Judge Nancy Baskin presided over the remainder of the case, including the jury trial and sentencing. 4 persistent violator. Based thereon, the district court sentenced Al-Mafrachi to a unified term of fifteen years with five years fixed. II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW “When this Court reviews a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we employ a bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Grewell, 175 Idaho 256, ___, 564 P.3d 1189, 1191 (2025) (citing State v. Ramos, 172 Idaho 764, 770, 536 P.3d 876, 882 (2023)). “This Court accepts ‘the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous’ but freely reviews ‘the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found.’” Id. (quoting Ramos, 172 Idaho at 770, 536 P.3d at 882). III. ANALYSIS A. Al-Mafrachi lacked standing to challenge the search of his backpack under the Fourth Amendment. The district court concluded that Al-Mafrachi lacked standing to challenge the search of his backpack under the Fourth Amendment because of his probation waiver. At the pretrial hearing on the suppression motion, the court explained: Since [Al-Mafrachi] had a [Fourth] Amendment waiver, this [c]ourt finds that he cannot assert his privacy interest as a basis for the law enforcement officer not to search the backpack . . . . And so because of that, I find that Mr. Al-Mafrachi actually does not have standing to contest the search of the vehicle or its contents. .... . . . I do not find that given the [Fourth] Amendment waiver, Mr. Al- Mafrachi actually had a subjective expectation of privacy in the backpack that he is challenging the search for. And I do not find that society is willing to recognize the expectation as reasonable given someone’s [Fourth] Amendment waiver, so I do not find that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the backpack. On appeal, Al-Mafrachi argues that the district court erred by treating the probation waiver as a categorical preclusion to standing. He claims that the court “should have analyzed whether the search of Mr. Al-Mafrachi’s backpack was reasonable based on the Fourth Amendment waiver he agreed to as a term of probation.” He correctly notes that the police were not aware of his waiver condition before they executed the search; thus, using the waiver as a post hoc justification of an unreasonable search is improper under State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 908, 454 P.3d 543, 550 (2019). The State concedes that, under Maxim, the district court erred when it concluded Al- Mafrachi lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge based on his waiver alone. 5 Nevertheless, the State argues that Maxim should be overruled because it conflates consent and waiver as interchangeable concepts. The State distinguishes these terms by suggesting that consent is relevant to the reasonableness of a search, while waiver is relevant to standing. The State argues that a defendant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy when he waives his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation. As a result, such a defendant does not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge. We agree. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]” U.S. Const. amend IV. “Under the Fourth Amendment, a search conducted without a warrant is ‘presumptively unreasonable.’” State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 220, 443 P.3d 231, 234 (2019) (quoting State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 346, 256 P.3d 750, 754 (2011)). “To show a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches, the defendant must come forward with evidence” that: (1) “there was a Fourth Amendment search,” (2) the defendant has “standing to challenge the search,” and (3) “the search was illegal.” Id. at 220–21, 443 P.3d at 234–35 (citation modified). In this context, “standing” is simply “shorthand for the question of whether the moving party had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area that was searched.” Id. at 221, 443 P.3d at 235 (citation modified); see also Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410–11 (2018) (explaining that this kind of Fourth Amendment standing should not be confused with Article III standing). Probationers have a unique relationship with the Fourth Amendment because “they do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (citation modified). Rather, they only have claim upon a “conditional liberty,” which is “properly dependent on observances of special probation restrictions.” Id. (citation modified). These restrictions, memorialized in the probation agreement 3 that probationers sign as a condition of probation, determine the scope of the probation. See State v. Jaskowski, 163 Idaho 257, 260, 409 P.3d 837, 840 (2018) (explaining that resolution of probationer search cases depends on the specific language of the waiver at issue). In State v. Gawron, for example, the police performed a warrantless search of a probationer’s residence after learning that he may have been involved in several burglaries. 112 3 This Court and others have unartfully referred to these agreements as Fourth Amendment “waivers” even when these agreements do not include a waiver of a probationer’s Fourth Amendment rights. These “consent” agreements are not properly referred to as “waivers,” as we will explain below. Accordingly, this opinion will refer to “probation agreements” in the general sense as such, unless the agreement itself explicitly includes a waiver provision. 6 Idaho, 841, 842, 736 P.2d 1295, 1296 (1987). Upon searching the home, the police found additional evidence tying the probationer to the burglaries, which led to the probationer’s arrest and subsequent conviction. Id. In justifying the warrantless search, the State turned to the probation agreement, which read: That probationer does hereby agree and consent to the search of his person, automobile, real property, and any other property at any time and at any place by any law enforcement officer, peace officer, or probation officer, and does waive his constitutional right to be free from such searches. Id. (emphasis added). On appeal, Gawron argued this probation condition was an unreasonable invasion of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297. This Court disagreed and held the reasonableness of the search need not be addressed because Gawron had expressly waived his constitutional right to be free from warrantless searches. Id. Conversely, in Jaskowski, an officer pulled Jaskowski over for an outstanding arrest warrant. 163 Idaho at 258, 409 P.3d at 838. During the stop, the officer learned that Jaskowski was on probation and asked for Jaskowski’s probation officer to come assist with the stop. Id. Once there, the probation officer searched Jaskowski’s vehicle without asking for Jaskowski’s permission. Id. The probation officer then found drugs and drug paraphernalia in Jaskowski’s car, which led to the State charging Jaskowski with felony possession and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at 258–59, 409 P.3d at 838–39. Jaskowski moved to suppress the evidence gathered by the probation officer, challenging the validity of the probation officer’s search. Id. at 259, 409 P.3d at 839. The district court granted Jaskowski’s motion, and the State appealed to this Court. Id. On appeal, the State argued that a probationer only needed to be informed of an officer’s intent to search for the search to be valid. Id. As part of its argument, the State quoted Purdum, asserting that “a probationer’s consent to searches constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights.” Id. (quoting State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009)). Essentially, the State was arguing that all probation agreements “should be treated in the same way, without regard for the language used in the condition of probation.” Id. at 260, 409 P.3d at 840. This Court disagreed. In reaching its conclusion, this Court tailored its review to the language of Jaskowski’s probation agreement. The terms of that agreement were: I shall submit and I agree to . . . warrantless searches of my person, personal property, electronic devices, automobiles, residence, and outbuildings at the request 7 of my Probation Officer, by the Probation Officer, Peace Officer, and/or his designee; with or without Probable Cause; any time day or night. Id. at 261, 409 P.3d at 841. This Court held the warrantless search of Jaskowski’s vehicle exceeded the scope of his probation agreement because his consent to search “was conditioned upon the probation officer requesting to conduct a search,” and the probation officer made no such request. Id. at 260–61, 409 P.3d at 840–41. Because the search did not conform to the limitations of Jaskowski’s agreement, it was unreasonable. See id. at 259–60, 409 P.3d at 839–40 (“It is well settled that when the basis for a search is consent, the state must conform its search to the limitations placed upon the right granted by the consent.” (citation modified)). These and other cases demonstrate that courts must look to the language of the probation agreement to determine the probationer’s rights under that agreement. In interpreting these agreements, courts treat them like contracts. See id. at 261, 409 P.3d at 841. “Under this approach, the court will give force and effect to the words of the contract.” Id. (citation modified). “[T]he law presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the intention which its terms manifest.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006)). And yet, this Court in State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 454 P.3d 543 (2019), seems to have come to the opposite conclusion. In Maxim, police entered an apartment after knocking on the door caused the door to open. Id. at 903, 454 P.3d at 545. Inside, officers found Andrew Maxim and conducted a pat down, discovering a container of heroin in his pocket. Id. After arresting Maxim, the police learned that he was on probation and had signed a probation agreement. Id. The State then charged him with felony possession. Id. Maxim moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the State had violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. The State responded by asserting that Maxim lacked standing because he had waived his Fourth Amendment rights in his probation agreement. Id. at 903–04, 454 P.3d at 545–46. The district court denied Maxim’s motion, and Maxim appealed. Id. at 904, 454 P.3d at 546. This Court reversed the district court’s denial of Maxim’s motion in a split, 3-2 decision. See id. at 910, 454 P.3d at 552. The State raised its standing argument again on appeal, asserting that Maxim lacked standing to assert his Fourth Amendment rights because he had expressly waived them in his probation agreement. Id. at 905, 454 P.3d at 547. Maxim’s probation agreement included an express waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights: 8 Search: I consent to the search of my person, residence, vehicle, personal property, and other real property or structures owned or leased by me, or for which I am the controlling authority conducted by any agent of [the Idaho Department of Correction] or a law enforcement officer. I hereby waive my rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning searches. Id. at 907, 454 P.3d at 549 (alteration in original) (emphasis added). This Court rejected the State’s standing argument. See id. at 906–07, 454 P.3d at 548–49. The Court determined that probation agreements must be “viewed . . . under the rubric of consent to searches”—regardless of whether agreement included an express waiver of the probationer’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 907, 454 P.3d at 549. Accordingly, this Court focused its analysis on whether Maxim’s “consent” could transform an otherwise unreasonable search into a reasonable one. Id. at 907–08, 454 P.3d at 549–50. This Court concluded that it could not. Id. at 908, 454 P.3d at 550. This Court noted that the reasonableness of a search is determined by what the officer knew at the moment the search began. Id. Because the officers were unaware of Maxim’s “consent” at the time of the search, the Maxim court concluded that it could not provide an objectively reasonable basis for conducting the search. Id. From that premise, this Court held that a probationer may challenge a warrantless search under the Fourth Amendment notwithstanding an express waiver of Fourth Amendment rights in a probation agreement if the officers conducting the search were unaware of the waiver when the search occurred. Id. Under Maxim, we would be constrained to hold that the district court erred in concluding that Al-Mafrachi’s express waiver vitiated his Fourth Amendment standing to contest the search. However, the State asks us to overrule Maxim and affirm the district court. After reconsidering Maxim and the precedent on which it relied, we conclude that Maxim was wrongly decided and overrule it to the extent explained below. Overruling precedent is no small task, and deviating from stare decisis is a decision that cannot be made lightly. “Stare decisis provides that today’s Court should stand by yesterday’s decisions.” State v. Ortiz, 175 Idaho 94, ___, 562 P.3d 450, 454–55 (2025) (citation modified). And, as a rule, this Court adheres to controlling precedent unless it is “manifestly wrong,” has been “proven over time to be unjust or unwise,” or must be overruled “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Easterling v. Clark (Easterling II), 176 Idaho 121, ___, 574 P.3d 349, 360 (2025) (quoting State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 920, 436 P.3d 1252, 1269 (2019)). Notwithstanding the heavy burden of overruling precedent, we do so today because we are of the opinion that Maxim is manifestly wrong. 9 To begin, waiver and consent are distinct legal concepts. A “waiver” is “[t]he voluntary relinquishment or abandonment—express or implied—of a legal right or advantage.” Waiver, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Consent, by contrast, is “[a] voluntary yielding to what another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose . . . .” Consent, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Simply put, a probationer who waives their Fourth Amendment rights relinquishes those rights, while a probationer who consents to warrantless searches authorizes such searches only within the scope of that consent. Although the practical result may sometimes be the same—either may permit a search that would otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment—they carry different legal requirements and implications. For example, a waiver of constitutional rights must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily—but the giving of consent need not be. See Schenckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 241–46 (1973) (holding that consent searches are not subject to the same requirements as knowing waivers). Moreover, waivers of constitutional rights are binding and will generally be upheld so long as the waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See State v. Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 496, 129 P.3d 1241, 1245 (2006) (quoting State v. Murphy, 125 Idaho 456, 457, 872 P.2d 719, 720 (1994)). Consent need only be voluntary and can generally be revoked. State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646, 339 P.3d 368, 371 (2014) (“Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the right of the person to withdraw that consent.”). Thus, while the practical effect of waiver and consent might be similar, “there is nothing in the purposes or application of the waiver requirements . . . that justifies . . . the easy equation of a knowing waiver with a consent search.” Schenckloth, 412 U.S. at 246. And “[t]o make such an equation is to generalize from the broad rhetoric of some of our decisions, and to ignore the substance of the differing constitutional guarantees.” Id. To be fair, some grace is owed to the Maxim Court. This Court and others have frequently referred to probation agreements as “Fourth Amendment waivers,” even in cases where there was no explicit waiver contained in the agreement. See, e.g., Jaskowski, 163 Idaho at 261, 409 P.3d at 841; see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (“‘Waiver’ is a vague term used for a great variety of purposes, good and bad, in the law.”). Other cases have referred to both consent and waiver when discussing the probation agreements at issue because those agreements included both consent and waiver language. See State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297 (1987). This muddling of two similar terms has led to confusion in our precedent and 10 the belief that we must always analyze Fourth Amendment waivers under the “rubric of consent.” See Maxim, 165 Idaho at 907, 454 P.3d at 549. But that is simply not the case. The Maxim court relied on Jaskowski to conclude that all probation agreements must be analyzed under the “rubric of consent.” See id. That reliance is misplaced, however, given the material differences between the probation agreements in Jaskowski and Maxim. The Jaskowski court analyzed that probation agreement under the “rubric of consent” because the probation agreement in that case only used consent language. See Jaskowski, 163 Idaho at 261, 409 P.3d at 841. There was no express waiver provision included in that probation agreement. See id. The Gawron Court, meanwhile, analyzed the probation agreement in that case under both a waiver and consent standard because the probation agreement included references to both the probationer’s consent and an express waiver provision. See Gawron, 112 Idaho at 842, 736 P.2d at 1296. This is also true of the probation agreement in Purdum. See State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208, 207 P.3d 182, 184 (2009) (analyzing a probation provision that stated the probationer would consent to searches and waive his constitutional right to be free from those searches). These two cases commingled the term “waiver” with “consent” simply because the agreements in both cases included consent and waiver provisions, and the courts were using both terms as unartful shorthand for the probation agreement itself and the effect of that agreement. See Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297; Purdum, 147 Idaho at 210, 207 P.3d at 186. This precedent hardly evidences that this Court must always analyze express waivers under a “rubric of consent.” And by so concluding, the Maxim court effectively read the express waiver provision in Maxim’s probation as a nullity—surplusage with no independent meaning—which flies in the face of how this Court has always interpreted probation agreements. See Jaskowsi, 163 Idaho at 261, 409 P.3d at 841 (holding that the court will “give force and effect to the words” of the agreement, and “[t]he law presumes that the parties understood the import of their contract and that they had the intention which its terms manifest.” (quoting J.R. Simplot Co. v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611, 614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006))). The proper analysis for probation agreements is tailored to the language of such agreements. See id. If the probation agreement is grounded in consent, then the proper analysis is whether that consent can convert an otherwise illegal search into a legal one. See Maxim, 165 Idaho at 908, 454 P.3d at 550. However, if the probation agreement is grounded in a complete, express waiver, then the proper analysis is whether the waiver was valid. If it was, then the probationer has 11 no Fourth Amendment right to challenge the search. In other words, the probationer has no legitimate expectation of privacy because they expressly waived any legitimate expectation of privacy. See State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221, 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019) (holding that Fourth Amendment standing is merely “shorthand for the question of whether the moving party had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area that was searched” (citation modified)). Probationers who have waived their rights under the Fourth Amendment cannot then stand upon a legitimate expectation of privacy to challenge a search because they have no such legitimate expectations. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001) (“Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” (citation modified)). Accordingly, we overrule Maxim to the extent that it held otherwise. Our decision does not, however, disturb cases whose holdings do not depend on the portion of Maxim that we overrule today. Here, Al-Mafrachi’s probation agreement expressly waives his rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment and Idaho Constitution. It also expresses that he will submit (i.e. consent) to searches by law enforcement. Al-Mafrachi has not argued that this waiver was made unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily. Accordingly, we conclude that he has no legitimate expectations of privacy, and no Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures to assert here. Thus, we affirm the district court’s decision denying Al-Mafrachi’s motion to suppress for the same reason. The concurrence would have this Court hold that Al-Mafrachi abandoned his backpack and thus no search occurred. Infra at 17-20. We decline to do so because neither party on appeal argued that Al-Mafrachi had abandoned his backpack. The concurrence nevertheless justifies its approach under the right-result-wrong-theory standard articulated in State v. Campbell, 177 Idaho 209, ___, 587 P.3d 211, 222 (2026). We do not embrace this approach here because, as explained above, the district court reached the right result with the correct theory. VI. CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the district court’s denial of Al-Mafrachi’s motion to suppress. Justices BRODY, ZAHN, and MEYER CONCUR. MOELLER, Justice, concurring in the result. 12 While I concur in the result reached by the majority, which affirms the district court’s denial of Al-Mafrachi’s motion to suppress, I do not agree with its analysis or its decision to overrule State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 454 P.3d 543 (2019), unnecessarily. Even accepting, arguendo, the majority’s justification for departing from the doctrine of stare decisis, explained in a scant four sentences, Al-Mafrachi’s appeal is not an appropriate vehicle for overturning Maxim. Instead, because Al-Mafrachi abandoned any protected interest in the backpack before it was searched, no Fourth Amendment “search” occurred as to his effects. Therefore, I would affirm on that ground. I. There are stark differences between the lawful police conduct in this case and the misconduct present in Maxim. We must begin by acknowledging that Maxim addressed a uniquely bad set of facts. It asked this Court to determine “what happens when police unconstitutionally enter a home [i.e., without a warrant], frisk an individual, arrest him, and, only after all that, discover that the individual has signed a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of probation.” Maxim, 165 Idaho at 905, 454 P.3d at 547. More pointedly, the dispositive issue in Maxim was framed: “whether the existence of a Fourth Amendment waiver can transform the officer’s otherwise illegal actions into reasonable ones despite being unaware of the waiver at the time he acted.” Id. at 908, 454 P.3d at 550 (emphasis added). I am not prepared to concede that this Court somehow got it “manifestly wrong” when it answered that question in the negative. The facts of this case are so dramatically different from those in Maxim that Maxim is easily distinguished. Here, the interaction between Al-Mafrachi and the Boise Police Department began with a lawful vehicle stop on a public road at 1:00 a.m. and a positive alert from a trained drug dog. The search of Al-Mafrachi’s backpack was pursuant to a lawful vehicle search, in which Al- Mafrachi was the passenger, not the owner. Al-Mafrachi repeatedly disavowed ownership of the backpack to police before the officer searched the backpack. Finally, unlike in Maxim, the officer was aware that Al-Mafrachi was on felony probation before the search, although he was not aware of the precise terms of the probation waiver. The police in this case acted with professionalism and respected the boundaries of Al-Mafrachi’s individual rights protected under the Fourth Amendment, unlike the brazen conduct we disapproved of in Maxim. Further, this appeal presents an unusual situation where the defendant expressly disavowed ownership of his effects and voluntarily left them in the vehicle, subjecting the backpack to a lawful search based on abandonment. None of these factors were present in Maxim. Thus, Al-Mafrachi’s constitutional 13 interest and expectation of privacy in the backpack—one that he repeatedly asserted he did not own and left in the vehicle—is profoundly less than the interest in being safe and secure within the walls of one’s own home at stake in Maxim. The district court ultimately concluded that Al-Mafrachi lacked standing to challenge the search of his backpack under the Fourth Amendment because of his probation waiver. The State concedes that under Maxim, the district court erred when it concluded Al-Mafrachi lacked standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge based on his waiver alone. Nevertheless, the State argues that Maxim should be overruled because it conflates consent and waiver as interchangeable concepts. The State distinguishes these terms by suggesting that consent is relevant to the reasonableness of a search, while waiver is relevant to standing. The State argues that a defendant essentially jettisons any reasonable expectation of privacy when he waives his Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation. Accepting that argument, the majority concludes that a defendant on probation who signs a search waiver does not have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge. However, regardless of whether that conclusion is correct, it is unnecessary for us to reach that issue because this case should never have been decided on standing principles untethered to substantive Fourth Amendment law. Importantly, the district court found that abandonment did not apply to Al-Mafrachi’s backpack before it found that he lacked standing. Al-Mafrachi’s counsel acknowledged that during oral argument on the motion to suppress, “[the State] did [argue abandonment] to a limited degree[.]” The record confirms that the trial court expressly addressed and rejected abandonment. It did so despite undisputed evidence that Al-Mafrachi (1) repeatedly disavowed ownership, (2) left the backpack in the car when he exited the vehicle, and (3) did not own the car. After applying the factors from State v. Porter, 170 Idaho 391, 398, 511 P.3d 273, 280 (Ct. App. 2022), and the “subjective expectation” from State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 181 P.3d 1231 (2008), the district court stated, “I don’t find that the Porter case of abandonment necessarily applies to the backpack. There is a reasonable expectation of privacy under those factors related to the backpack.” This rejection, when viewed through the holding in State v. Campbell, 177 Idaho 209, 587 P.3d 211 (2026), permits our free review of constitutional abandonment. In Campbell, we explained that a trial court’s adverse ruling on an issue, even if it is challenged for the first time on appeal, is nonetheless preserved for appeal. Id. at ___, 587 P.3d 211, 222–23 (2026) (“a party preserves an issue for appeal by properly presenting the issue with argument and authority to the 14 trial court below and noticing it for hearing or a party preserves an issue for appeal if the trial court issues an adverse ruling . . . [b]oth are not required.”) (quoting State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 924–25, 517 P.3d 849, 853–54 (2022)). This