Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 52572 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: November 13, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED ) LANCE RAYMOND VANDERPOOL, OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Gem County. Hon. Brent L. Whiting, District Judge. Judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, affirmed. Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jacob L. Westerfield, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; T. Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ FLEMING, Judge Lance Raymond Vanderpool appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance. Vanderpool specifically challenges the district court’s order denying his motion to dismiss. Vanderpool acknowledges he waived his right to a probable cause determination in a preliminary hearing, but he argues the district court erred in determining that the information submitted by the State in opposition to his motion was “enough to raise a question of fact at least as to whether or not [Vanderpool] was in possession” of a controlled substance. Vanderpool also asserts that the district court’s finding that there was enough evidence to give “rise to a finding of probable cause that [Vanderpool] was in possession” of a controlled substance was also error. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Vanderpool was residing in a trailer located on a property situated in Gem County, Idaho. The property owner, who was on parole, complained 1 to his parole officer about Vanderpool and another individual residing in separate trailers on his property and told his parole officer that he “wanted them gone.” A judgment of eviction was ultimately obtained, evicting both Vanderpool and the other individual from the property. Law enforcement officers requested the assistance of probation and parole officers in serving the eviction notice, and, in turn, the probation and parole officers requested the law enforcement officers’ assistance in conducting a parole check on the property owner. Upon arrival at the property, the officers discovered Vanderpool was not present, but the property owner and other individuals were. Officers approached the trailer where Vanderpool was believed to be residing; the door was open and they heard voices coming from inside. The officers knocked on the trailer door and were told by the individuals in the trailer that Vanderpool was not there, and they did not know where he was. A probation officer later accompanied one of the individuals back into the trailer who wanted to use the bathroom. While inside the trailer, the officer observed drug paraphernalia in plain view. Officers were told by the individuals in the trailer that Vanderpool had lived there for about three months, and that Vanderpool had asked them to pack up his things. The officers obtained a search warrant for the trailer and, following a search, discovered methamphetamine, heroin, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia. Vanderpool was charged with two counts of felony possession of a controlled substance, heroin and methamphetamine; one count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana; and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. Vanderpool waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and the case was bound over to the district court for an arraignment. The Information was later amended, without objection, to amend the possession of heroin charge to trafficking in heroin. Thereafter, Vanderpool moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 48. Vanderpool argued that the State would not be able to prove he had possession of the contraband found in the trailer and that the State would therefore be “unable to prove an essential element in each of the counts charged.” Following a hearing, the district court denied the motion to dismiss. Vanderpool then entered a conditional Alford1 plea to felony possession of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1), reserving his right to challenge the district court’s denial of his 1 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 2 motion to dismiss. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed. Vanderpool appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ewing, 175 Idaho 940, 945, 572 P.3d 706, 711 (2025); State v. Roth, 166 Idaho 281, 283, 458 P.3d 150, 152 (2020). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). III. ANALYSIS On appeal, mindful of State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 234 P.3d 707 (2010), abrogated on grounds not relevant to this opinion by Sedillo v. State, ___ Idaho ___, 596 P.3d 351 (2026), Vanderpool argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to dismiss. We disagree. As the State correctly notes, because Vanderpool waived his right to a preliminary hearing, he also waived the right to a probable cause determination as to the charged felonies, and his waiver acted as an admission to the existence of sufficient evidence necessary to charge him with felony possession of a controlled substance. Stewart, 149 Idaho at 387-88, 234 P.3d at 711-12. Vanderpool moved to dismiss his case after he waived his right to a preliminary hearing; he then requested that the district court dismiss the case pursuant to I.C.R. 48(a)(2) based upon a lack of evidence. Idaho Criminal Rule 48(a)(2) authorizes the dismissal of criminal cases if the court concludes that “dismissal will serve the ends of justice and the effective administration of the court’s business.” A defendant may not have a case dismissed before trial based on discovery responses indicating that the State cannot prove the crime charged. Stewart, 149 Idaho at 388, 234 P.3d at 712. Similarly, a defendant cannot prevail on a pretrial motion to dismiss when the issue deals with an ultimate fact to be proven at trial, thereby creating a form of summary judgment not 3 provided for under the Idaho Criminal Rules. State v. Alley, 155 Idaho 972, 981, 318 P.3d 962, 971 (Ct. App. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by State v. McKean, 159 Idaho 75, 356 P.3d 368 (2015). Vanderpool asked the district court to weigh and assess the evidence and determine that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges, which is the precise analysis that is expressly prohibited by Alley. In Alley, the defendant sought dismissal of his charges pursuant to I.C.R. 48. This Court held: The Idaho Criminal Rules do not have a provision comparable to a motion for summary judgment found in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. A defendant may not have a case dismissed before trial based on discovery responses indicating that the state cannot prove the crime charged. Similarly, the defendant cannot prevail on a pretrial motion to dismiss when the issue deals with an ultimate fact to be proven at trial, thereby creating a form of summary judgment not provided for under the [Idaho] Criminal Rules. The only somewhat comparable motion would be a motion to dismiss on the ground that the evidence at the preliminary hearing did not show probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the felony charged. Of course, that motion would require that there be a preliminary hearing, which is not appropriate when a defendant is charged by grand jury indictment, as in this case. Alley, 155 Idaho at 981, 318 P.3d 962 at 971 (internal citations omitted). By waiving his right to a preliminary hearing, Vanderpool admitted that there was probable cause to believe he committed the crime of felony possession of a controlled substance. He is procedurally precluded under Stewart and Alley from challenging the existence of sufficient evidence to sustain the charges in a pretrial motion to dismiss. Consequently, the district court did not err in denying Vanderpool’s motion to dismiss. IV. CONCLUSION Vanderpool waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and, by waiving this right, admitted to the existence of sufficient evidence to find probable cause that he committed felony possession of a controlled substance. Vanderpool is therefore precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a pretrial motion to dismiss when the ultimate fact is to be proven at trial. Vanderpool’s judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance is affirmed. Judge LORELLO and Judge PETTY, CONCUR. 4