Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 52051 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: November 18, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED DARREN LYLE WEEKS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bingham County. Hon. Stevan H. Thompson, District Judge. Judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, affirmed. Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ TRIBE, Chief Judge Darren Lyle Weeks appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Officers executed a search warrant for controlled substances at the house where Weeks was staying. Upon entering Weeks’s room, officers immediately found a marijuana bong with burned marijuana. Officers also found a glass pipe underneath Weeks’s wallet, and a second pipe was found close to his wallet. In addition, three spoons with residue that tested positive for methamphetamine and empty baggies containing methamphetamine residue were also found in 1 Weeks’s room. In other areas of the house and property, officers found marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and evidence of drug manufacturing and distribution. Based on the items found in Weeks’s room, the State charged him with felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia (Idaho Code §§ 37-2732(c)(1), -2732(c)(3), -2734A(1)). The State filed a motion in limine asking the district court to preclude Weeks from presenting evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of his room. The State also sought to admit redacted laboratory notes showing only the results for the controlled substances found in Weeks’s room. The State argued this evidence was irrelevant and would either be a “waste of time” or would “confuse the issue.” Weeks objected, arguing the evidence was relevant to his defense and that precluding him from presenting the evidence would prejudice his defense. Concluding that the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room was irrelevant, the district court granted the State’s motion. The district court recognized it was possible that “somebody else put” the controlled substances in Weeks’s room but also stated that this possibility was not a defense under a constructive possession theory because the dispositive question was whether Weeks knew the controlled substances and paraphernalia were in his room. The district court clarified that its ruling did not prevent Weeks from presenting testimony showing that he lacked knowledge of the contraband in his room. Finally, the district court found that any relevant evidence would be outweighed by the danger of “confusing the jury” and would be prejudicial to Weeks under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. A jury found Weeks guilty of all three counts. Weeks appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW We review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 358, 470 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2020); State v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012). A trial court’s determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989). 2 When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). III. ANALYSIS On appeal, Weeks argues the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion in limine. Weeks specifically argues the district court erred by precluding evidence of controlled substances and paraphernalia found inside the house but outside of his room because that evidence was relevant to his theory of the case and undermined the State’s theory that he possessed the controlled substances and paraphernalia found in his room. Weeks also argues the district court abused its discretion by finding the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the risk of confusion and unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403. The State responds that Weeks has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by granting the State’s motion in limine. Alternatively, the State argues that, even if the district court erred in precluding the evidence, any error was harmless. We agree with the State that the district court properly granted the motion in limine. The district court granted the State’s motion to preclude evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room, concluding the evidence was irrelevant. Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged is generally admissible. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670-71, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134-35 (2020). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. I.R.E. 401; Garcia, 166 Idaho at 670, 462 P.3d at 1134. Whether a fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). Further, whether an issue is relevant is framed by the parties’ theories concerning the crime charged, the elements of that crime, and the ultimate issue the jury must decide. State v. Ogden, 171 Idaho 843, 857, 526 P.3d 1013, 1027 (2023). The ultimate issue to be proven here was whether Weeks knowingly 3 possessed and had the power and intention to control the contraband discovered in his room. Evidence bearing only on others’ unrelated drug activity elsewhere in the residence did not speak to that issue and, although the “minimally relevant” threshold is low, it still requires “some” relevancy--that is, a tendency to make facts more or less probable. Id. at 858, 526 P.3d at 1028. During the hearing on the State’s motion in limine, Weeks argued that he should be able to present evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of his room to establish his defense that, if “those people are also in the house and there’s drugs found in the house, it’s relevant to show the jury that they had possibly [sic] possession of drugs, and so they could have had access to the room, and they could’ve brought drugs in that room without [Weeks’s] knowledge.” At trial, the jury was asked to decide whether Weeks possessed the controlled substances and paraphernalia found in his room. The district court instructed the jury that: “A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or has the power and intention to control it.” The district court also instructed the jury that: “More than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it.” Possession of a controlled substance may be actual or constructive. State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706, 889 P.2d 729, 735 (Ct. App. 1994). When a defendant is not in actual physical possession, the State must prove that the defendant had such knowledge and control of the substance as to establish constructive possession. Id. At trial, the State was required to prove that Weeks knowingly possessed and exercised control of the contraband found in his room, not whether other individuals possessed different controlled substances and paraphernalia somewhere else in the house. However, because Weeks was not in exclusive possession of the residence, his knowledge of the contraband in his room could not be inferred from its presence alone and the State was required to show other circumstances supporting an inference of his knowledge and control. See id. Here, those circumstances were the location of the contraband among Weeks’s own belongings, which were located under and beside his wallet and identification in the room he was staying in, rather than inferring his knowledge from the volume of unrelated drugs held by others elsewhere in the house. Although there is no requirement that evidence be relevant only to a disputed issue under I.R.E. 401, the evidence must still be probative and material. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 671, 462 P.3d at 1135. Here, the evidence of controlled substances and paraphernalia in other locations of the 4 house is neither probative nor material to whether Weeks knowingly possessed and exercised control over the contraband found in his room. Weeks contends the district court’s analysis improperly reduced possession to mere knowledge of the contraband’s presence. However, the record reflects that, although the district court framed its relevancy inquiry around Weeks’s knowledge, its ruling left him free to contest both knowledge and control through direct evidence and the jury was correctly instructed that possession requires knowledge together with the power and intention to control. Thus, the district court’s relevance ruling did not relieve the State of proving control. Weeks’s theory was that the pervasiveness of drugs elsewhere in a shared residence was relevant because it made it more probable that the contraband in his room belonged to, or was introduced by, another occupant. Because the relevance threshold under I.R.E. 401 is minimal, the question is not whether that inference is strong but whether the proffered evidence has any tendency to make Weeks’s knowing possession less probable. We conclude it does not meet even that minimal tendency here because the presence of other individuals’ drugs in other spaces says nothing about whether those individuals had access to Weeks’s room. Weeks also emphasizes the prosecutor’s acknowledgment that the jury could unfairly conclude that Weeks was not in possession if it heard the other drug-related evidence and, therefore, he asserts that such evidence met the minimal relevancy threshold and should have been admitted. However, the State’s observation is a comment on the risk that the jury would draw an unwarranted inference from another’s greater culpability and is not a concession that the evidence was probative of Weeks’s knowledge and control over the contraband. A party’s concern that evidence may invite an improper inference is not an admission of its relevance, and the inference Weeks sought depended on access to his room, not on the quantity of drugs found elsewhere. In addition, as stated above, the district court specifically ruled that Weeks was not prevented from presenting testimony or evidence that other individuals were responsible for the controlled substances and paraphernalia in his room, without his knowledge. The district court, therefore, did not err in concluding that the evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room was irrelevant. Even assuming the other drug evidence met I.R.E. 401’s minimal threshold, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it under I.R.E. 403. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 5 allows a trial court to exclude “relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” We note that the district court’s ruling that the evidence’s relevance was outweighed by potentially “confusing the jury” combined two of the reasons to exclude relevant evidence under I.R.E. 403--confusing the issues and misleading the jury. Under either of those reasons, or both, the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room under an I.R.E. 403 analysis. Both the risk of confusing the issues and misleading the jury were appropriate factors to be considered by the district court. The prohibited evidence would have potentially misled the jury as to why the evidence was being discussed since Weeks was not charged with possessing it and would have also confused the issue of possession of the contraband found in his room with who was responsible for the contraband in the remainder of the house. Furthermore, the risk of unfair prejudice to Weeks, as raised by the district court, would have been significant if the jury was presented with evidence that he had been residing in “an entrepôt stuffed full of drugs”--as the State describes on appeal. The jury would have been required to ignore the additional controlled substances and paraphernalia evidence for any purpose that would have established Weeks’s knowledge of the controlled substances and paraphernalia located in his room. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room pursuant to I.R.E. 403 because it would have confused the issues, misled the jury, and potentially been unfairly prejudicial to him. Alternatively, the State argues that, even if the district court abused its discretion in precluding the evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room, any error was harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162 Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error based on a contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017). Thus, we examine whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See id. Harmless error is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the 6 issue in question, as revealed in the record. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. This standard requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error. Id. If the error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict rendered and is harmless. Id. On this record, when weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while precluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error, any error in precluding the evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room was harmless. At trial, the jury heard that officers executed a search warrant on the house, Weeks rented or occupied one of the rooms in the house, and that he had been living there for “a few months.” In his room, officers found Weeks’s identification and wallet. Officers also found a glass pipe under his wallet and a second pipe was found close to his wallet. Officers further found three spoons with residue that tested positive for methamphetamine, empty baggies containing methamphetamine residue, and other drug paraphernalia. Turning to the second part of the inquiry, we weigh the probative force of the excluded evidence itself. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674-75, 462 P.3d at 1138-39. Had the jury learned that drugs and paraphernalia were found elsewhere in the shared residence, that evidence would have invited the jury to consider whether another occupant was responsible for the contraband in Weeks’s room. But its probative force on that question is slight when considering that the location of the other drugs in spaces controlled by others did not tend to show those individuals had access to Weeks’s room, and such evidence did not undercut the direct evidence tying the contraband to Weeks’s own belongings. Measured against the untainted evidence of Weeks’s knowledge and control, the probative force of the excluded evidence was minimal, and its exclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not contribute to the verdicts. Untainted by error, the evidence showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, Weeks’s knowledge and control of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found among his own possessions in his room. Accordingly, any error in precluding evidence of the other controlled substances did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts and was harmless. 7 IV. CONCLUSION Weeks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in declining to admit the evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of his room. Accordingly, Weeks’s judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia is affirmed. Judge FLEMING and Judge PETTY, CONCUR. 8