State of Idaho v. Darren Lyle Weeks
CourtIdaho Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket52051
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 52051
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: November 18, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
DARREN LYLE WEEKS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Hon. Stevan H. Thompson, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance,
misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of
drug paraphernalia, affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Chief Judge
Darren Lyle Weeks appeals from his judgment of conviction for felony possession of a
controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officers executed a search warrant for controlled substances at the house where Weeks was
staying. Upon entering Weeks’s room, officers immediately found a marijuana bong with burned
marijuana. Officers also found a glass pipe underneath Weeks’s wallet, and a second pipe was
found close to his wallet. In addition, three spoons with residue that tested positive for
methamphetamine and empty baggies containing methamphetamine residue were also found in
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Weeks’s room. In other areas of the house and property, officers found marijuana,
methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, and evidence of drug manufacturing and distribution.
Based on the items found in Weeks’s room, the State charged him with felony possession
of a controlled substance, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor
possession of drug paraphernalia (Idaho Code §§ 37-2732(c)(1), -2732(c)(3), -2734A(1)). The
State filed a motion in limine asking the district court to preclude Weeks from presenting evidence
of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of his room. The State also sought
to admit redacted laboratory notes showing only the results for the controlled substances found in
Weeks’s room. The State argued this evidence was irrelevant and would either be a “waste of
time” or would “confuse the issue.” Weeks objected, arguing the evidence was relevant to his
defense and that precluding him from presenting the evidence would prejudice his defense.
Concluding that the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room was
irrelevant, the district court granted the State’s motion. The district court recognized it was
possible that “somebody else put” the controlled substances in Weeks’s room but also stated that
this possibility was not a defense under a constructive possession theory because the dispositive
question was whether Weeks knew the controlled substances and paraphernalia were in his room.
The district court clarified that its ruling did not prevent Weeks from presenting testimony showing
that he lacked knowledge of the contraband in his room. Finally, the district court found that any
relevant evidence would be outweighed by the danger of “confusing the jury” and would be
prejudicial to Weeks under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. A jury found Weeks guilty of all three
counts. Weeks appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 358, 470 P.3d
1162, 1167 (2020); State v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012). A
trial court’s determination under I.R.E. 403 will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown to
be an abuse of discretion. State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 406, 807 P.2d 610, 624 (1991); State v.
Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1059, 772 P.2d 263, 266 (Ct. App. 1989).
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When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Weeks argues the district court abused its discretion in granting the State’s
motion in limine. Weeks specifically argues the district court erred by precluding evidence of
controlled substances and paraphernalia found inside the house but outside of his room because
that evidence was relevant to his theory of the case and undermined the State’s theory that he
possessed the controlled substances and paraphernalia found in his room. Weeks also argues the
district court abused its discretion by finding the probative value of the evidence was outweighed
by the risk of confusion and unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403. The State responds that Weeks has
failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by granting the State’s motion in
limine. Alternatively, the State argues that, even if the district court erred in precluding the
evidence, any error was harmless. We agree with the State that the district court properly granted
the motion in limine.
The district court granted the State’s motion to preclude evidence of the controlled
substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room, concluding the evidence was
irrelevant. Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged
is generally admissible. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670-71, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134-35 (2020).
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. I.R.E. 401; Garcia, 166 Idaho at 670, 462 P.3d at 1134. Whether a fact is of
consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented by the
parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). Further, whether an
issue is relevant is framed by the parties’ theories concerning the crime charged, the elements of
that crime, and the ultimate issue the jury must decide. State v. Ogden, 171 Idaho 843, 857, 526
P.3d 1013, 1027 (2023). The ultimate issue to be proven here was whether Weeks knowingly
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possessed and had the power and intention to control the contraband discovered in his room.
Evidence bearing only on others’ unrelated drug activity elsewhere in the residence did not speak
to that issue and, although the “minimally relevant” threshold is low, it still requires “some”
relevancy--that is, a tendency to make facts more or less probable. Id. at 858, 526 P.3d at 1028.
During the hearing on the State’s motion in limine, Weeks argued that he should be able to
present evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of his room to
establish his defense that, if “those people are also in the house and there’s drugs found in the
house, it’s relevant to show the jury that they had possibly [sic] possession of drugs, and so they
could have had access to the room, and they could’ve brought drugs in that room without
[Weeks’s] knowledge.” At trial, the jury was asked to decide whether Weeks possessed the
controlled substances and paraphernalia found in his room. The district court instructed the jury
that: “A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical
control of it, or has the power and intention to control it.” The district court also instructed the
jury that: “More than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence
and has the power and intention to control it.” Possession of a controlled substance may be actual
or constructive. State v. Gomez, 126 Idaho 700, 706, 889 P.2d 729, 735 (Ct. App. 1994). When a
defendant is not in actual physical possession, the State must prove that the defendant had such
knowledge and control of the substance as to establish constructive possession. Id.
At trial, the State was required to prove that Weeks knowingly possessed and exercised
control of the contraband found in his room, not whether other individuals possessed different
controlled substances and paraphernalia somewhere else in the house. However, because Weeks
was not in exclusive possession of the residence, his knowledge of the contraband in his room
could not be inferred from its presence alone and the State was required to show other
circumstances supporting an inference of his knowledge and control. See id. Here, those
circumstances were the location of the contraband among Weeks’s own belongings, which were
located under and beside his wallet and identification in the room he was staying in, rather than
inferring his knowledge from the volume of unrelated drugs held by others elsewhere in the house.
Although there is no requirement that evidence be relevant only to a disputed issue under
I.R.E. 401, the evidence must still be probative and material. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 671, 462 P.3d
at 1135. Here, the evidence of controlled substances and paraphernalia in other locations of the
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house is neither probative nor material to whether Weeks knowingly possessed and exercised
control over the contraband found in his room. Weeks contends the district court’s analysis
improperly reduced possession to mere knowledge of the contraband’s presence. However, the
record reflects that, although the district court framed its relevancy inquiry around Weeks’s
knowledge, its ruling left him free to contest both knowledge and control through direct evidence
and the jury was correctly instructed that possession requires knowledge together with the power
and intention to control. Thus, the district court’s relevance ruling did not relieve the State of
proving control.
Weeks’s theory was that the pervasiveness of drugs elsewhere in a shared residence was
relevant because it made it more probable that the contraband in his room belonged to, or was
introduced by, another occupant. Because the relevance threshold under I.R.E. 401 is minimal,
the question is not whether that inference is strong but whether the proffered evidence has any
tendency to make Weeks’s knowing possession less probable. We conclude it does not meet even
that minimal tendency here because the presence of other individuals’ drugs in other spaces says
nothing about whether those individuals had access to Weeks’s room.
Weeks also emphasizes the prosecutor’s acknowledgment that the jury could unfairly
conclude that Weeks was not in possession if it heard the other drug-related evidence and,
therefore, he asserts that such evidence met the minimal relevancy threshold and should have been
admitted. However, the State’s observation is a comment on the risk that the jury would draw an
unwarranted inference from another’s greater culpability and is not a concession that the evidence
was probative of Weeks’s knowledge and control over the contraband. A party’s concern that
evidence may invite an improper inference is not an admission of its relevance, and the inference
Weeks sought depended on access to his room, not on the quantity of drugs found elsewhere. In
addition, as stated above, the district court specifically ruled that Weeks was not prevented from
presenting testimony or evidence that other individuals were responsible for the controlled
substances and paraphernalia in his room, without his knowledge. The district court, therefore,
did not err in concluding that the evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found
outside of Weeks’s room was irrelevant.
Even assuming the other drug evidence met I.R.E. 401’s minimal threshold, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it under I.R.E. 403. Idaho Rule of Evidence 403
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allows a trial court to exclude “relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” We note that
the district court’s ruling that the evidence’s relevance was outweighed by potentially “confusing
the jury” combined two of the reasons to exclude relevant evidence under I.R.E. 403--confusing
the issues and misleading the jury. Under either of those reasons, or both, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in prohibiting evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found
outside of Weeks’s room under an I.R.E. 403 analysis. Both the risk of confusing the issues and
misleading the jury were appropriate factors to be considered by the district court. The prohibited
evidence would have potentially misled the jury as to why the evidence was being discussed since
Weeks was not charged with possessing it and would have also confused the issue of possession
of the contraband found in his room with who was responsible for the contraband in the remainder
of the house. Furthermore, the risk of unfair prejudice to Weeks, as raised by the district court,
would have been significant if the jury was presented with evidence that he had been residing in
“an entrepôt stuffed full of drugs”--as the State describes on appeal. The jury would have been
required to ignore the additional controlled substances and paraphernalia evidence for any purpose
that would have established Weeks’s knowledge of the controlled substances and paraphernalia
located in his room. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit
evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room pursuant
to I.R.E. 403 because it would have confused the issues, misled the jury, and potentially been
unfairly prejudicial to him.
Alternatively, the State argues that, even if the district court abused its discretion in
precluding the evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s
room, any error was harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v. Stell, 162
Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows an error
based on a contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has the
burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017).
Thus, we examine whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See
id. Harmless error is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the
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issue in question, as revealed in the record. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. This
standard requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the
erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error. Id.
If the error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict
rendered and is harmless. Id. On this record, when weighing the probative force of the record as
a whole while precluding the erroneous evidence and at the same time comparing it against the
probative force of the error, any error in precluding the evidence of the controlled substances and
paraphernalia found outside of Weeks’s room was harmless.
At trial, the jury heard that officers executed a search warrant on the house, Weeks rented
or occupied one of the rooms in the house, and that he had been living there for “a few months.” In
his room, officers found Weeks’s identification and wallet. Officers also found a glass pipe
under his wallet and a second pipe was found close to his wallet. Officers further found three
spoons with residue that tested positive for methamphetamine, empty baggies containing
methamphetamine residue, and other drug paraphernalia. Turning to the second part of the inquiry,
we weigh the probative force of the excluded evidence itself. Garcia, 166 Idaho at 674-75, 462
P.3d at 1138-39. Had the jury learned that drugs and paraphernalia were found elsewhere in the
shared residence, that evidence would have invited the jury to consider whether another occupant
was responsible for the contraband in Weeks’s room. But its probative force on that question is
slight when considering that the location of the other drugs in spaces controlled by others did not
tend to show those individuals had access to Weeks’s room, and such evidence did not undercut
the direct evidence tying the contraband to Weeks’s own belongings. Measured against the
untainted evidence of Weeks’s knowledge and control, the probative force of the excluded
evidence was minimal, and its exclusion, beyond a reasonable doubt, did not contribute to the
verdicts. Untainted by error, the evidence showed, beyond a reasonable doubt, Weeks’s
knowledge and control of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found among his own
possessions in his room. Accordingly, any error in precluding evidence of the other controlled
substances did not contribute to the jury’s verdicts and was harmless.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
Weeks has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in declining to admit the
evidence of the controlled substances and paraphernalia found outside of his room. Accordingly,
Weeks’s judgment of conviction for felony possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor
possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia is
affirmed.
Judge FLEMING and Judge PETTY, CONCUR.
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