Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 50833 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: November 6, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED MIRIAM ANNA BAUMGARTNER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Derrick J. O’Neill, District Judge. Judgment of conviction for aggravated assault, affirmed. Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ LORELLO, Judge Miriam Anna Baumgartner appeals from her judgment of conviction for aggravated assault. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND The State charged Baumgartner with aggravated assault following an incident where she revved her vehicle and swerved it toward the victim. Baumgartner was appointed a public defender, who requested a competency evaluation that found Baumgartner competent to proceed. The relationship between Baumgartner and the public defender became difficult, prompting Baumgartner to “fire” her public defender. The district court appointed Baumgartner a second public defender and that attorney requested a second competency evaluation, which the district court ordered. While the second competency evaluation was pending, Baumgartner told the 1 district court she wanted substitute counsel. The district court did not consider Baumgartner’s request for substitute counsel because of the pending evaluation. The second competency evaluation concluded that Baumgartner was not competent. The district court initially allowed Baumgartner to receive treatment in the community. After treatment was unsuccessful, the district court ordered Baumgartner’s commitment to restore her competency. Months later, Baumgartner’s competency was restored and her commitment was terminated. Thereafter, Baumgartner sent a letter to the district court expressing her disagreement with her public defender and requesting substitute counsel. The district court treated Baumgartner’s letter as a motion and held an ex parte hearing to allow Baumgartner to offer her reasons and evidence in support of her motion. After hearing from Baumgartner and her public defender, the district court determined it would not appoint substitute counsel and denied the motion. The district court also informed Baumgartner of her right to hire private counsel or represent herself. Baumgartner later renewed her complaints about her public defender and again requested substitute counsel. The district court denied the request and reiterated Baumgartner’s three options for representation: (1) continue being represented by her public defender; (2) hire private counsel; or (3) proceed pro se. Baumgartner submitted a series of letters to the district court renewing her complaints about her public defender, which included allegations of delay, lack of communication, and objections to being subjected to competency evaluations. Baumgartner continued to request substitute counsel, which the district court denied. Thereafter, Baumgartner filed additional letters requesting substitute counsel, restating her prior complaints, and alleging she had evidence of misconduct by the public defender’s office. As the district court was discussing Baumgartner’s letters and the implications of self-representation, the public defender interjected and moved for another competency evaluation. The district court ordered the competency evaluation and indicated it was “passing any decision” on Baumgartner’s request for substitute counsel until the third evaluation was complete. Baumgartner filed additional letters indicating she fired her public defender and expressing her intention to represent herself “until the issue of counsel [was] heard further by the court.” At a subsequent hearing, the district court inquired whether Baumgartner wished to represent herself, to which she responded affirmatively. The district court accepted Baumgartner’s invocation of her right to self-representation and allowed the public defender to withdraw. Ultimately, the 2 evaluation found Baumgartner competent. Baumgartner’s case proceeded to trial and a jury found her guilty of aggravated assault. I.C. § 18-1905. Baumgartner appeals. On appeal, Baumgartner was originally represented by the Office of the State Appellate Public Defender (SAPD). After the SAPD filed a sixth motion for extension of time to file the appellant’s brief (which motion was granted) Baumgartner, acting pro se, filed a seventh motion for extension of time. In that motion, Baumgartner represented that she fired the SAPD and requested additional time to hire an attorney. In a supporting addendum, Baumgartner articulated several complaints about the SAPD and stated that the SAPD “is fired.” Thereafter, the SAPD withdrew from representing Baumgartner and she proceeded pro se. In response to Baumgartner’s pro se motion, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order suspending this appeal, which directed that Baumgartner’s motion be transmitted to the SAPD and ordered the SAPD to “confirm in writing whether counsel intends to file a brief on behalf of [Baumgartner], or file a Motion to Withdraw from this matter.” The order also notified Baumgartner that the Court would “reject all further pro se filings from [Baumgartner] until the [SAPD] files written confirmation that counsel intends to file a brief on behalf of [Baumgartner], or files a Motion to Withdraw.” The SAPD filed a response to the Court’s suspension order, stating: While Ms. Baumgartner is displeased with the representation she has received from undersigned counsel to date, she has not expressed a desire to represent herself on appeal. Accordingly, the SAPD does not intend to file a motion to withdraw as her attorneys, as any such withdrawal would leave her unrepresented. Ms. Baumgartner wants to retain private counsel. She has not been able to secure substitute counsel yet, but she continues to try. To that end, Ms. Baumgartner hopes the Court will continue the present suspension of the appeal to give her additional time to hire a new attorney. If/when Ms. Baumgartner retains a new attorney, the SAPD will facilitate the substitution of counsel and make every effort to make the transition as seamless as possible. In the meantime, as noted above, undersigned counsel has completed an Appellant’s Brief for Ms. Baumgartner. That brief can be filed as soon as this Court unsuspends the appeal and requires that it be filed; however, as noted, Ms. Baumgartner would prefer that the appeal remain suspended to allow her additional time to secure substitute counsel. (footnote omitted). The SAPD also noted that it did not “intend to assign this case to conflict counsel” based on his “determin[ation] that there is no conflict of interest within the meaning of Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7.” 3 After receiving the SAPD’s response, the Court lifted the suspension and ordered Baumgartner’s brief to be filed forthwith. The Court’s order further advised “that new counsel for [Baumgartner] may file a substitution of counsel if, and when, new counsel is retained.” The SAPD filed the appellant’s brief the same day. Two days later, the SAPD filed a motion to withdraw, indicating that Baumgartner advised appellate counsel that he was “fired,” asked him to withdraw, and said she wanted to represent herself on appeal. At Baumgartner’s request, the motion asked that “she be allowed to file a substitute brief pro se.” The Idaho Supreme Court granted the motion and directed Baumgartner to file a notice of appearance within twenty-one days “along with a Motion requesting that the previously filed Appellant’s Brief filed by counsel be withdrawn.” The Court’s order further stated: “If no appearance is filed, the Court will assume Baumgartner wishes to proceed pro se. Further, if no motion to withdraw the previously filed brief is filed, the Court will assume the appeal will proceed on the brief previously filed.” Baumgartner did not file either a notice of appearance or a motion to withdraw the SAPD’s brief within the twenty-one-day period prescribed by the Court. However, more than one month later, Baumgartner filed a motion for extension of time to hire an attorney. The Court granted the motion, again suspended the appeal, and set a new deadline for filing a notice of appearance and motion to file a substitute brief. The order also stated: [I]f an attorney does not appear on Appellant’s behalf on or before January 5, 2026, the due date for Respondent’s Brief will be reset. After the filing of Respondent’s Brief, the due date for Appellant’s Reply Brief will be set. The appeal will be decided based on the briefs filed, including the Appellant’s Brief filed by the State Appellate Public [D]efender prior to withdrawal. On January 2, 2026, Baumgartner filed a pro se motion requesting an extension of time to file an addendum to the appellant’s brief. The Court gave Baumgartner fourteen days to file an addendum. Baumgartner did not file an addendum within this timeframe but did file a motion to accept a late addendum, which the Court denied. The State subsequently filed a respondent’s brief; Baumgartner did not file a reply. This appeal was assigned to this Court for disposition. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether substitute counsel should be provided is a decision that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. State v. 4 Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 702, 215 P.3d 414, 422 (2009). When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). When a violation of a constitutional right is asserted, this Court will accept the trial court’s factual findings unless such findings are clearly erroneous; however, this Court will freely review whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, 613, 389 P.3d 155, 158 (2016). III. ANALYSIS Baumgartner asserts the district court erred by not giving her a “full and fair opportunity” to present evidence in support of her motion for substitute counsel. Baumgartner also contends the district court erred in allowing her to appear pro se, arguing the waiver of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not “knowing, intelligent, or voluntary.” The State argues the district court’s inquiry into Baumgartner’s motion was sufficient and that her waiver of her right to counsel was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. We hold that Baumgartner has failed to show the district court erred in denying her motion for substitute counsel or in accepting her waiver of her right to counsel. A. Motion for Substitute Counsel The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee the right to counsel. The right to counsel does not necessarily mean a right to the attorney of one’s choice. State v. Clark, 115 Idaho 1056, 1058, 772 P.2d 263, 265 (Ct. App. 1989). Mere lack of confidence in otherwise competent counsel is not necessarily grounds for substitute counsel in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho 727, 729, 620 P.2d 300, 302 (1980); State v. Peck, 130 Idaho 711, 713, 946 P.2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. App. 1997). However, a trial court may, in its discretion, appoint a substitute attorney for an indigent defendant upon a showing of good cause. State v. Clayton, 100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980); Peck, 130 Idaho at 713, 946 P.2d at 1353. The trial court must afford the defendant a full and fair opportunity to present the facts and reasons in support of a motion for 5 substitution of counsel after having been made aware of the problems involved. Clayton, 100 Idaho at 898, 606 P.2d at 1002. The trial court must also conduct a meaningful inquiry to determine whether a defendant possesses good cause for his or her request for substitute counsel. State v. Lippert, 152 Idaho 884, 887, 276 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2012). Specifically, the trial court must make some reasonable, nonsuggestive efforts to determine the nature of the defendant’s complaints and to apprise itself of the facts necessary to determine whether the defendant’s relationship with appointed counsel has deteriorated to the point that sound discretion requires substitution or even to such an extent that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right would be violated but for substitution. Id. Even when the trial court suspects that the defendant’s requests are disingenuous and designed solely to manipulate the judicial process and to delay the trial, perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. Id. Good cause includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict. Id. Factors to be used in examining constitutional implications of a total breakdown in communication include: (1) whether the defendant’s motion for new counsel was timely; (2) whether the trial court adequately inquired into the defendant’s reasons for making the motion; (3) whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and (4) whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the communication breakdown. Id. If good cause is shown, the defendant is constitutionally entitled to the appointment of new counsel. Id. A defendant may not, however, manufacture good cause by abusive or uncooperative behavior. Id. The district court granted Baumgartner’s first request for substitute counsel and appointed a second public defender. Baumgartner requested substitute counsel again after her public defender asked for a second competency evaluation. The district court ordered the evaluation and, as a result, declined to address Baumgartner’s request. After Baumgartner was found competent, she sent a letter to the district court renewing her request for substitute counsel. The district court treated Baumgartner’s letter as a motion and held an ex parte hearing. At the hearing, Baumgartner cited disagreement with her public defender over the evidence to present at trial, delays in her case, and a lack of communication as reasons for requesting substitute counsel. The district court also heard from the public defender who noted that many of the delays in Baumgartner’s case were 6 attributable to “the COVID shutdowns” and competency evaluations. The public defender also maintained that the evidence Baumgartner sought to present at trial would be inadmissible and the public defender indicated he was willing to continue representing Baumgartner. The district court denied Baumgartner’s motion for substitute counsel and noted that whether to present evidence at trial is “a strategy decision that needs to be made by counsel.” The district court explained that Baumgartner had three options regarding representation: (1) continue being represented by her public defender; (2) hire private counsel; or (3) proceed pro se. Baumgartner later renewed her complaints about her public defender, primarily concerning the competency evaluations, and once again requested substitute counsel. The district court denied the motion and reiterated Baumgartner’s options regarding counsel. Baumgartner subsequently filed two letters requesting substitute counsel, alleging she had evidence of misconduct from the public defender’s office and restating her prior complaints. The district court again denied Baumgartner’s request and reiterated her options for counsel. Baumgartner argues the district court erred in denying her request for substitute counsel because she did not get “a full and fair opportunity to present facts and reasons in support of her motion.” We disagree. The record shows that, throughout the case, the district court afforded Baumgartner a full and fair opportunity to be heard regarding her request for substitute counsel. Baumgartner acknowledges as much on appeal by recognizing that “the district court repeatedly provided an opportunity for [her] to state her concerns, and it appeared to take those concerns seriously.” First, the district court ordered substitute counsel for Baumgartner when there was a breakdown in communication between her and her first public defender. At a later hearing regarding Baumgartner’s competency evaluation, she expressed her frustrations with her newly appointed public defender. After some discussion, Baumgartner indicated she understood that her public defender had “spoken on [Baumgartner’s] behalf” and that she “appreciate[d]” the public defender’s representation. Months later, Baumgartner submitted a letter to the district court requesting substitute counsel and detailing the reasons for Baumgartner’s request, including her frustration with the competency proceedings, delays in the case, disagreements in trial strategy, and general complaints alleging a lack of communication. The district court indicated it “read [the] letter carefully,” treated it as a motion for substitute counsel, and held an ex parte hearing 7 during which Baumgartner spoke about the reasons supporting her request. The district court also heard from Baumgartner’s public defender, who indicated that he was “willing and able to work with” Baumgartner, had “no issues proceeding,” and was “happy to remain her counsel.” Ultimately, the district court denied Baumgartner’s request for substitute counsel but informed Baumgartner of her rights to either hire private counsel or represent herself. Baumgartner renewed her request for substitute counsel at a subsequent hearing. The district court denied the request and reiterated Baumgartner’s right to hire private counsel or represent herself. Thereafter, Baumgartner filed two letters renewing her request for substitute counsel. The district court discussed the letters at a hearing where the following exchange occurred: BAUMGARTNER: I need to have a hearing in person so I can speak to you about the misconduct from the public defender’s office and show you the proof that I have: The e-mails that [an individual at the public defender’s office] has who said that she’s working with [my public defender] on this case accidentally sent me an e-mail meant for another public defender. THE COURT: Ms. Baumgartner, are you firing [your public defender]? Is that where we are? BAUMGARTNER: I’ve asked you--I’ve tried to fire him every time I’ve been before you, and you won’t allow me to fire him. You said that I have to stick with him despite the fact that he will not meet with me. We have done zero trial prep. THE COURT: Ms. Baumgartner, I’m going to ask you not to interrupt me. Okay? I did not tell you you could not fire him. I did say I would not require the public defender to appoint you alternative counsel. If you want a public defender, an attorney provided at the public’s expense, it is [your current public defender]. If you wish to proceed pro se and represent yourself or if you wish to hire private counsel that would be your decision, and that is what I have said. So I am not going to require the public defender to provide alternative counsel. If you wish to fire [your public defender] and proceed pro se, you will be required to comply with all of the rules that lawyers are required to comply with. BAUMGARTNER: As long as I’m given those rules. THE COURT: Okay. I cannot help you. So let’s set it for a hearing--well-- BAUMGARTNER: Can it be in person, please, so I can show you the proof that I have of gross misconduct? 8 THE COURT: Ms. Baumgartner, that is not necessary. If you are simply looking to fire [your public defender]. If you wish to-- BAUMGARTNER: How could-- THE COURT: Again, please do not interrupt me. BAUMGARTNER: Excuse me. THE COURT: It is not necessary for you to fill me in with those details. If you wish to fire [your public defender], there’s a colloquy I will go through with you. It is fairly lengthy because it is important that you realize that trying a case in a court of law is a difficult and challenging process even for a trained professional. The district court began to advise Baumgartner of the implications and requirements before she could represent herself. However, Baumgartner insisted on presenting her evidence of “gross misconduct,” prompting the following discussion: THE COURT: Again, you seem to fail to appreciate what I am telling you. You can be represented by the State. [Your public defender] has represented to this Court that notwithstanding your concerns he would be willing to represent you. If you wish to have alternate counsel that would need to either be privately employed or at your expense. BAUMGARTNER: I have a right to be defended by the public defender’s office. I have the right to be actually defended. I have not been shown any evidence. I have not been--absolutely nothing. I do not have a law degree. I do not know how to properly defend myself. I do not know how to gather evidence. If he--I’m not the one who showed gross misconduct. THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Baumgartner, I am sure that you are frustrated by the way this goes. Anybody that’s accused of a crime that believes they are not guilty is frustrated by that process. You just got done telling me you don’t know and you’re not trained in the law, so your concerns over the way [your public defender] is handling your case are at best speculative. BAUMGARTNER: No. That’s not what I said. THE COURT: So you are welcome to get--no, that’s what I am telling you. So you are welcome-- BAUMGARTNER: You won’t let me show you the proof? THE COURT: You are welcome to hire--I am not here to try a case against [your public defender], Ms. Baumgartner. I am here 9 for the criminal trial . . . which at this point . . . may or may not be taking place the second week of March. BAUMGARTNER: Well, if I’m representing myself, how could it possibly take place the second week of March? Baumgartner asserts that the district court erred when it “denied her the opportunity” to present evidence of “gross misconduct” by the public defender’s office. However, the record shows that the evidence Baumgartner sought to present was an email accidentally sent to her regarding a separate case of hers, and the email was not sent by her public defender. The district court did not err when it determined it was “not necessary” for Baumgartner to provide the details of her allegations against the public defender’s office because the matter did not pertain to her representation in the case before it. The above colloquies reveal that the district court afforded Baumgartner a full and fair opportunity to be heard regarding her request for substitute counsel, was familiar with the reasons Baumgartner provided in support of her request, and acted within its discretion in denying the motion. Baumgartner has failed to show the district court erred in denying her motion for a second substitution of counsel. B. Waiver of Right to Counsel A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963); State v. Blevins, 108 Idaho 239, 241-42, 697 P.2d 1253, 1255-56 (Ct. App. 1985). An accused also has the right to waive the assistance of counsel and to represent himself or herself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006). A waiver of the right to counsel is valid only if it was effected knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356. The burden is upon the State to show that the waiver satisfied this standard. State v. Hunnel, 125 Idaho 623, 625, 873 P.2d 877, 879 (1994). There is no uniformity in American courts as to the precise requirements for a valid waiver of the right to counsel or even whether a specific judicial admonition regarding the risks of self-representation is necessary in all situations. State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 639, 97 P.3d 1025, 1028 (Ct. App. 2004). Idaho courts examine the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a waiver of the right to counsel is valid. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64, 90 P.3d 278, 289 (2003); State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998). The analysis 10 of whether a defendant’s waiver is valid rests upon the individual facts of the case. Hunnel, 125 Idaho at 625, 873 P.2d at 879; see also King, 131 Idaho at 376, 957 P.2d at 354 (holding that a valid waiver of counsel is a question of fact turning upon the defendant’s state of mind). For a waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the nature of the charges filed against him or her, the penalties that may result from those charges, and the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 64, 90 P.3d at 289; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781 P.2d 197, 202 (1989); see United States v. Harris, 683 F.2d 322, 324-25 (9th Cir. 1982). Before a defendant waives the right to counsel and proceeds pro se, the trial court has a duty to make the defendant aware of the problems inherent in self-representation so that such waiver is knowingly and intelligently made. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Meyers, 164 Idaho 620, 623, 434 P.3d 224, 227 (2019); Clayton, 100 Idaho at 897, 606 P.2d at 1002. Faretta warnings, however, do not need to be given contemporaneously to the defendant’s waiver. State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628, 634, 167 P.3d 765, 771 (2007). Instead, such warnings must be given so that the record will establish that the defendant knows what he or she is doing and that the choice is made with eyes open. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Dalrymple, 144 Idaho at 634, 167 P.3d at 771. While contemporaneous Faretta warnings are perhaps the most prudent means to ensure the defendant’s grasp of the disadvantages of self-representation, we look to the record as a whole to determine if a waiver of the constitutional right was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho at 634, 167 P.3d at 771; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 64, 90 P.3d at 289. Baumgartner argues the district court erred in allowing her to represent herself because her waiver of her right to counsel was not “knowing, intelligent and voluntary” based on the totality of the circumstances. Baumgartner asserts the district court’s “Faretta warnings were inadequate” and that there could be no “knowing, intelligent and voluntary” waiver while competency proceedings are pending. We disagree. A review of the record establishes that Baumgartner knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her right to counsel. During the ex parte hearing on Baumgartner’s request for substitute counsel, the district court informed Baumgartner of her options regarding representation, including retaining her “own counsel” and “proceed[ing] on [her] own,” which the district court 11 “advise[d] against.” The district court also cautioned Baumgartner that there is “a difference between having an awareness and street smarts and book smarts” and “knowing your way around the inside of a courtroom.” Baumgartner agreed with the district court, stating “exactly” in response to the district court’s caution. Thereafter, Baumgartner filed letters with the district court reiterating her complaints about her public defender and renewing her request for substitute counsel. The district court determined it was “not going to require the public defender to provide alternative counsel” and noted that, if Baumgartner elected to represent herself, she would “be required to comply with all of the rules that lawyers are required to comply with.” Baumgartner responded, “as long as I’m given those rules.” The district court began discussing Baumgartner’s right to counsel and the implications of proceeding pro se: THE COURT: If you wish to fire [your public defender], there’s a colloquy I will go through with you. It is fairly lengthy because it is important that you realize that trying a case in a court of law is a difficult and challenging process even for a trained professional. BAUMGARTNER: Exactly. THE COURT: You will be held to the same exact standards that [the prosecutor] and [your public defender] would be held to. If you fail to make an appropriate objection to evidence, that evidence will come in. If you fail to provide sufficient foundation for evidence, that evidence will not come in. You will not be allowed to abrogate the Rules of Civil [sic1] Procedure. You will not be allowed to abrogate the Rules of Evidence. You will be your own attorney. If that is how you wish to proceed, then I will release [your public defender] from this case and allow you to proceed pro se. Is that what you’re telling me you wish to do? BAUMGARTNER: Yes. And you’ve told me previously that I cannot represent myself, that I cannot fire [my public defender]. It’s in the court record. THE COURT: Ms. Baumgartner, every citizen in the State of Idaho has the right to represent themselves. I would never have said, you can’t represent yourself. I would have told you it is a bad idea, and I would have told you that I was not going 1 It is unclear whether the reference to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a typographical error in the transcript or a misstatement by the district court, but we presume the district court was referring to the Idaho Criminal Rules. 12 to require [your public defender] to appoint alternative counsel in his office, which was your original request. BAUMGARTNER: So-- THE COURT: If that is your desire, I am going to ask you a series of question[sic]. Okay? BAUMGARTNER: All right. I have some questions beforehand. THE COURT: I’m not asking for your questions. I’m going to ask you a series of questions. Have you ever studied the law? BAUMGARTNER: No. THE COURT: Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal matter? BAUMGARTNER: Yes. THE COURT: Do you understand that the crimes that are charged in this case are aggravated assault and that that carries a potential prison sentence of up to five years and a potential fine of up to $5,000? BAUMGARTNER: Yes. And I am not asking to represent myself. I have a right to be represented by the public defender’s office. The district court and Baumgartner discussed her request for substitute counsel. However, the public defender interjected and moved for a competency evaluation. The district court ordered the evaluation and indicated it was “passing any decision” on Baumgartner’s request for substitute counsel until after the evaluation was complete. Baumgartner subsequently sent the district court more letters indicating that she intended to represent herself “until the issue of counsel is heard further by the court.” At the next hearing, Baumgartner told the district court that she “fired” her public defender, prompting the following discussion: THE COURT: I gave you the option of proceeding pro se. You rejected that. BAUMGARTNER: No, I didn’t THE COURT: Explicitly. I said, Do you wish to proceed--I will ask you right now. Do you wish to proceed and represent yourself? BAUMGARTNER: Yes. THE COURT: Do you remember all the admonitions I gave you previously? BAUMGARTNER: Yes. THE COURT: You are not trained in the law? BAUMGARTNER: No. THE COURT: You understand that you will be held and bound by the Rules of Civil [sic] Procedure, the Rules of Evidence, and all the other rules of trial? 13 BAUMGARTNER: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. And it’s your desire to fire [your public defender], and proceed pro se? BAUMGARTNER: Yes. The district court accepted Baumgartner’s waiver of her right to counsel and allowed her public defender to withdraw. The district court indicated it was “still going to order the [competency] evaluation,” prompting Baumgartner to ask the district court how she could obtain “all the documents and info that is given to the psychologist now that [she was] representing” herself. The district court responded: That raises a really good point that I’ve made with you several times now. I can’t give you legal advice. You have to abide by the rules of the Court. Okay? The fact that you may not be well trained is unfortunate because that’s going to make it a lot more difficult for you, but when you go to introduce a document that you think is really important, and it’s really great evidence, if it’s not admissible or if you fail to appreciate why it’s not admissible, I can’t help you. Okay? If you go to defend yourself and you want to get in statements from witness[es] who you believe are really, really helpful but you don’t understand the hearsay rule, I can’t help you. So all those things, okay, those are the things that are going to prohibit you or impede your ability to bring information before this Court which you may think is really, really important. That is why I advised you strenuously multiple times to obtain counsel to represent you. .... Now you’ve chose not to work with [your public defender]. That is your decision. I understand that. But you will not receive any assistance from the Court advising you as to how to bring