State of Idaho v. David Adam Crossett

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 51221 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: November 10, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) ) DAVID ADAM CROSSETT, ) ) Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Derrick O’Neill, District Judge. Judgment of conviction for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and one count of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, affirmed. Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Jason C. Pintler argued. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; T. Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. T. Michael MacEgan argued. ________________________________________________ LORELLO, Judge David Adam Crossett appeals from his judgment of conviction for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and one count of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Crossett is the father of R.C. and the former stepfather of M.W. In 2020, R.C. disclosed to her family that Crossett had abused her throughout her life. Days later, R.C. disclosed the allegations to M.W., who revealed that she too had been abused by Crossett throughout her life. 1 Shortly thereafter, R.C. reported the allegations to law enforcement. At R.C.’s request, law enforcement contacted M.W. to discuss the allegations she made against Crossett. The State filed a complaint charging Crossett with lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, and sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, all stemming from the abuse alleged by R.C. Thereafter, a grand jury indicted Crossett on the three charges alleged in the complaint, along with three additional charges based on the abuse alleged by M.W. In total, Crossett was indicted on six charges: two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, one count of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, and one count of battery with the intent to commit a serious felony. Prior to trial, Crossett filed a motion seeking to sever the charges, contending he was prejudiced by the joinder of charges because the jury could cumulatively consider the testimony and evidence presented by both victims. Crossett also argued joinder was improper because it allowed the State to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in separate trials. The State objected to Crossett’s motion, asserting joinder was proper because the evidence established a common scheme or plan and was relevant to a material and disputed issue. The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which it heard additional argument from both parties. Ultimately, the district court denied Crossett’s motion, concluding joinder was proper and that he failed to show he was prejudiced by the joinder. The district court also determined that any risk of prejudice could be minimized by jury instructions. Crossett filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. The case proceeded to trial. Ultimately, a jury found Crossett guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508; two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen, I.C. § 18-1506; and one count of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age, I.C. § 18-1508A. The jury acquitted Crossett of battery with the intent to commit a serious felony. Crossett appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW Whether joinder is proper under I.C.R. 8 is reviewed de novo. State v. Nava, 166 Idaho 884, 889, 465 P.3d 1123, 1128 (2020). However, whether joinder is prejudicial under I.C.R. 14 is 2 reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Nava, 166 Idaho at 900, 465 P.3d at 1129. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018). III. ANALYSIS Crossett argues the district court erred in denying his motion seeking relief from joinder. Specifically, Crossett contends the district court erred in finding joinder proper under both I.C.R. 8(a) and I.C.R. 14. The State argues Crossett has “failed to preserve his challenge to joinder under I.C.R.8(a).” Alternatively, the State asserts the record and applicable law support the district court’s denial of Crossett’s motion because joinder was proper under both I.C.R. 8(a) and I.C.R. 14. We hold that Crossett has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion. A. Joinder Pursuant to I.C.R. 8 Idaho law provides two independent grounds for challenging joinder. A defendant can challenge joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a) by arguing that the requirements of the rule have not been met. Nava, 166 Idaho at 888, 465 P.3d at 1127; State v. Chacon, 168 Idaho 524, 529, 484 P.3d 208, 213 (Ct. App. 2021). Idaho Criminal Rule 8(a) authorizes charging two or more offenses by the same defendant in a single indictment or information if the offenses “are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” In reviewing whether joinder was proper under I.C.R. 8(a), courts may consider information other than what is contained in the charging documents. Nava, 166 Idaho at 891, 465 P.3d at 1130; State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565, 165 P.3d 273, 279 (2007). Prior to trial, Crossett filed a motion seeking “relief from prejudicial joinder.” Crossett argued joinder was improper because the jury could cumulate the evidence and “believe the testimony of R.C. or M.W. simply because” another allegation of abuse was made against him. The State objected to the motion and argued joinder was proper because the evidence of each victim’s alleged abuse was so intertwined and the charges were so related to each other that the probative value of trying the six charges together was high. Additionally, the State asserted the 3 evidence established a common scheme or plan. Following a hearing, the district court entered an order denying Crossett’s motion. The district court began by noting that Idaho law provides two independent grounds for addressing prejudicial joinder--I.C.R. 8 and I.C.R. 14. Because the charging documents alone lacked enough information to resolve the issue of whether joinder was proper, the State provided “additional factual information” in its objection that ultimately formed the basis of the district court’s decision. The district court concluded the evidence was “substantially intertwined at the time of disclosure” and that “the pattern of conduct and grooming [was] substantial and established over the years.” Regarding the intertwined evidence, the district court noted that “R.C. disclosed [the abuse allegations] to her half-sister, M.W., before [R.C.] talked to the police.” In response, M.W. “explained that the same thing had happened to her,” which was “why she moved out.” Following R.C.’s disclosure, law enforcement interviewed M.W., during which she “described abuse which mirrored that experienced by R.C.” The district court found that “both victims described a pattern of sexual innuendo, sexually loaded suggestions, and sexual contact directed at them by” Crossett. The district court also noted that “R.C. confronted [Crossett] about both his conduct against her” and M.W. in a “series of phone calls recorded by R.C.” During the calls, Crossett “admitted to ‘pushing boundaries,’” admitted it was possible “he ‘brushed’ [R.C.’s] vagina,” and “admitted [to] fondling M.W.” Crossett’s “explanation for his abuse of both victims was his ‘curiosity’ about girls’ bodies.” The district court therefore found that “the evidence of the disclosures overlap[ped]” because “R.C. went to M.W. before [R.C.] contacted the police.” The district court also emphasized the timing of the allegations, noting that “the alleged sexual abuse committed against M.W. occur[red] when she was twelve to fourteen, between the years of 2003-2005” while the “abuse committed against R.C. allegedly began when she was much younger, aged seven or eight,” and “continued until she was sixteen or seventeen.” The district court indicated that “the same sexual behavior against M.W. continued into her adulthood,” which overlapped with “the period where R.C. [was] allegedly suffering similar sexual abuse.” As a result, the district court found “substantial overlap in the evidence at the time that R.C.” made her initial disclosure “to M.W., which [led to] confront calls covering alleged crimes against both victims.” Regarding the pattern of conduct and grooming, the district court determined that both “alleged victim[s] [were] exposed to an environment created by” Crossett in which he “attempted 4 to normalize his repeated fondling of their bodies and attempts to engage in more intense sexual activity as one of education.” The district court found that “the abuse was frequent” and “the same kind of abuse: groping and grabbing [their] breasts, buttocks, hips, thighs or torso” as well as “a more aggressive attempt” of “manual genital penetration or sexual battery.” Additionally, both R.C. and M.W. “described a sexually charged environment that lasted over the years” and both “experienced more significant sexual contact occurring frequently, which they resisted.” The district court noted “the abuse began with M.W. and moved to R.C. with the same pattern of type, timing, nature of abuse repeating,” as well as Crossett’s efforts to “normalize his behavior.” The district court also acknowledged that the allegations of abuse were “not close in time” but found “the other aspects of the pattern of abuse [were] markedly similar.” For example, Crossett would “enter into the girls’ bedrooms while their mother was absent and frequently place[d] his hands on their breasts and under their underwear.” Both R.C. and M.W. also “alleged to have been subjected to manual-genital contact” and alleged that Crossett “‘cuddled’ with [them], made sexually inappropriate comments, and engaged in normalizing the behavior.” The district court found this was “a classic grooming pattern” and concluded “the offenses [were] properly joined.” Crossett argues the district court erred in determining that the charges were properly joined under I.C.R. 8(a) because the charged conduct was “not based on the same act or transaction” nor was it “based on two or more acts ‘connected together.’” Crossett also asserts “the charges do not constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” In response, the State argues Crossett has failed to “preserve his challenge to joinder under I.C.R. 8(a).” Alternatively, the State contends the district court was correct in finding that the charges “were properly joined as a common scheme or plan” and “as transactions connected together.” We hold that Crossett has failed to show the district court erred in finding joinder proper under I.C.R. 8(a). We first address the State’s argument that Crossett has failed to preserve his I.C.R. 8(a) challenge to joinder. Appellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below. State v. Garcia Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). A party’s specific arguments may evolve over time without raising preservation concerns so long as the substantive issue was properly raised before the trial court. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 224, 443 P.3d 231, 238 (2019); State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 98, 439 P.3d 1267, 1270 (2019). An issue is preserved for appeal if a party properly presents the issue with argument 5 and authority to the trial court and notices it for hearing or if the trial court issues an adverse ruling. State v. Miramontes, 170 Idaho 920, 924-25, 517 P.3d 849, 853-54 (2022). Both are not required. Id. at 925, 517 P.3d at 854. In his motion, Crossett argued he was prejudiced by the joinder because the jury could cumulate the evidence and find him guilty based on his criminal disposition. At the hearing on the motion, Crossett also argued joinder was improper because the State failed to establish a common scheme or plan. The district court held that joinder was proper and that Crossett failed to establish prejudice. The State nevertheless argues Crossett failed to “present the issue of improper joinder under I.C.R. 8(a) with argument and authority to the trial court below.” According to the State, “Crossett should have filed a separate motion for relief” under “I.C.R. 8(a) to challenge the initial joinder either concurrently with, or after the filing of his I.C.R. 14 motion.” However, we have held that a party seeking relief from joinder need not file separate motions under each authority providing a basis for relief to preserve the argument for appeal. See Chacon, 168 Idaho at 529, 484 P.3d at 213 (rejecting State’s argument that the appellant was required to file a separate motion pursuant to I.C.R. 14 in order to preserve his argument for appeal because appellant presented his arguments within the context of joinder in the first instance and because the district court addressed appellant’s arguments). Consistent with this precedent, we conclude the district court’s ruling preserved the issue for appeal and will address the merits of Crossett’s challenge to joinder under I.C.R. 8(a), beginning with his assertion that the charges were not “connected together.” The Idaho Supreme Court has held that joinder of criminal charges is appropriate under a connected-together theory when the charges are logically related and involve a large amount of overlapping proof. State v. Fox, 170 Idaho 846, 858, 517 P.3d 107, 119 (2022). Where charges are linked by a common nexus of witnesses, evidence or time, joinder under I.C.R. 8(a) may be appropriate. Fox, 170 Idaho at 858, 517 P.3d at 119; see also State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359, 362, 63 P.3d 485, 488 (Ct. App. 2003) (noting that charges may be sufficiently connected together if they are connected by overlapping evidence or witnesses and would be most efficiently presented by a joint trial). Crossett argues the charges were not “connected together” because “they are not linked by a common nexus of witnesses, evidence, or time, and there is not a large or substantial amount of overlapping proof.” Crossett’s argument is belied by the record. 6  Prior to contacting law enforcement, R.C. disclosed her allegations of abuse to her family, including M.W., who subsequently revealed that she too had been abused by Crossett. During her talk with law enforcement, R.C. discussed both her allegations against Crossett as well as those raised by M.W. At R.C.’s request, law enforcement reached out to M.W. and discussed her allegations against Crossett. We agree with the district court that the evidence related to Crossett’s criminal charges was “substantially intertwined at the time of disclosure.” The record therefore shows that Crossett’s charges were logically related and linked by a common nexus of witnesses, evidence, and time. The record also shows that the charges against Crossett involve overlapping evidence. Following her disclosure to law enforcement, R.C. conducted a series of “confront calls” during which she confronted Crossett about “both his conduct against her and against M.W.” In response, Crossett “admitted to ‘pushing boundaries’ and possibly that he ‘brushed’ her vagina.” Crossett also admitted to “fondling M.W.” Accordingly, we agree with the district court that there is “substantial overlap in the evidence at the time that R.C. makes her disclosures to her [family] and to M.W. which ends up in confront calls covering alleged crimes against both victims.” As a result, Crossett has failed to show the district court erred in finding joinder proper under a connected-together theory. Crossett further asserts the district court erred in finding joinder proper because “the charges do not constitute parts of a common scheme or plan.” Crossett contends “there is simply no evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that [he] allegedly abused M.W. sometime between 2003 and 2005 and then allegedly abused R.C. sometime between 2008 and 2016.” According to Crossett, “the fact that [M.W. and R.C.] described similar conduct is ‘sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a ‘common scheme or plan.’” We disagree. Under the common scheme or plan theory, at a minimum, there must be evidence of a common scheme or plan beyond the bare fact that sexual misconduct has occurred with children in the past. Nava, 166 Idaho at 891, 465 P.3d at 1130; State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 668, 227 P.3d 918, 922 (2010). The events “must be linked by common characteristics that go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must objectively tend to establish that the same person committed all the acts.” Johnson, 148 Idaho at 668, 227 P.3d at 922. Essentially, a common scheme or plan embraces the commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other. Nava, 166 Idaho at 891, 465 P.3d at 1130. 7  The Idaho Supreme Court has developed case law addressing whether the conduct underlying various sexual abuse charges is similar enough to constitute a common scheme or plan. For example, the Court has held that joinder of sexual abuse charges was proper because the facts were similar and demonstrated a “common plan.” State v. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho 89, 93, 685 P.2d 830, 834 (1984) (superseded by rule and overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Chambers, 166 Idaho 837, 846, 465 P.3d 1076, 1085 (2020)). Specifically, the Court held that a common plan was established because the defendant frequented “areas where young boys [could] be found, befriend[ed] boys with no father figure in the home, entice[d] them from their home, lower[ed] their natural inhibitions through the use of drugs and alcohol,” and committed sex acts upon them. Schwartzmiller, 107 Idaho at 93, 685 P.2d at 834. As a result, the Court found “no error in the joining of the offenses.” Id. Similarly, in Nava, the Court held that the following facts presented “sufficient common characteristics to constitute a common scheme or plan,” stating: Here, the State alleged, and the district court found, the following similarities: (1) the assaults occurred in the same room of the same house; (2) the assaults occurred within one or two days of each other; (3) both victims were twelve-year-old girls; (4) they were both asleep when the assaults occurred; (5) there were other young children sleeping in the room at the time; and (6) [the defendant] had been grooming both girls. Nava, 166 Idaho at 892, 465 P.3d at 1131. The Court also noted there were several children in the room where the assaults occurred and the defendant “passed over other children of various ages specifically to target” the victims in that case. Id. Additionally, the Court concluded the evidence suggested that the defendant “intended to foster trust and lower the girls’ defenses,” which “constituted ‘grooming’ behavior.” Id. at 893, 465 P.3d at 1132. Accordingly, the Court held that the defendant’s “grooming behavior, paired with the other characteristics, [was] sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan.” Id. By contrast, in Field, 144 Idaho at 566-67, 165 P.3d at 280-81, the Court held that the facts alleged by the State were insufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. There, the trial court joined a charge of lewd conduct against a seven-year-old victim with a charge of sexual battery against a seventeen-year-old victim. Id., at 563-64, 165 P.3d at 277-78. The Idaho Supreme Court rejected the State’s argument that the two charges were connected as a common scheme or plan because “the incidents occurred at different times, under different circumstances, and involved different parties with significantly different ages.” Id. at 566, 165 P.3d at 280. The 8 Court highlighted the difference between the charges, noting that the victims “had different ages (one was a young child, the other was almost an adult), the type of sexual contact was different (digital vaginal penetration and the rubbing of buttocks), and the incidents occurred two years apart.” Id. The Court also acknowledged the “similarities that both girls were only temporarily in the household, that the acts occurred in [the defendant’s] home, and that the abuse began with ‘innocent’ touching.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court reasoned there was “nothing to show that at the time [the defendant] committed the offense against [one victim] he had a plan to also commit an offense against [the other victim] specifically.” Id. As a result, the Court held that the charges were erroneously joined. Id. at 567, 165 P.3d at 281. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669, 227 P.3d at 923, when it held that the facts failed to establish a common scheme or plan. In that case, the defendant was charged with abusing his young daughter. Although the case did not address joinder but instead involved a determination under I.R.E. 404(b), it is instructive as to what appellate courts in Idaho have previously found to be insufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan. See Nava, 166 Idaho at 892, 465 P.3d at 1131 (stating Johnson was instructive when evaluating whether facts are sufficient to demonstrate a common scheme or plan for purposes of joinder). At trial, the State presented testimony that the defendant molested his younger sister when he was between the ages of fifteen and sixteen, arguing the evidence “corroborated the victim’s claims” and was therefore relevant. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667, 227 P.3d at 921. The trial court identified the following similarities that “linked the current charged conduct to the prior bad acts to which” the defendant’s sister testified: (1) both victims were about seven to eight years old; (2) both victims viewed the defendant as an “authority figure” because he was an older brother or father; and (3) both courses of conduct involved the defendant requesting the victim to touch his penis. Id. at 669, 227 P.3d at 923. The Court held that these similarities were “sadly far too unremarkable to demonstrate a ‘common scheme or plan.’” Id. According to the Court, “the facts that the two victims in this case [were] juvenile females and that [the defendant] is a family member” was “precisely what [made] these incidents unfortunately quite ordinary.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held the prior acts were irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. Id.; see also State v. Pepcorn, 152 Idaho 678, 690, 273 P.3d 1271, 1283 (2012) (holding that admission of I.R.E. 404(b) testimonial 9 evidence that defendant, over span of forty years, had sexually abused his wife’s siblings and the siblings’ children, was admissible to show a common scheme or plan). In Crossett’s case, the State alleged, and the district court found, numerous similarities. As previously detailed, the similarities between the allegations of abuse raised by R.C. and M.W. include: (1) both were exposed to an environment Crossett created where he “attempted to normalize his repeated fondling of their bodies and attempts to engage in more intense sexual activity as one of education”; (2) both were exposed to “frequent” abuse that involved “groping and grabbing [their] breasts, buttocks, hips, thighs or torso”; (3) both “described a sexually charged environment that lasted over the years”; (4) both experienced the “same pattern of type, timing, [and] nature of abuse” where Crossett would “enter into the girls’ bedrooms while their mother was absent and frequently place[d] his hands on their breasts and under their underwear”; and (5) both alleged that Crossett “‘cuddled’ with [them], made sexually inappropriate comments, and engaged in normalizing the behavior.” The district court concluded these similarities established “a classic grooming pattern” and were sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan. We agree that these facts presented sufficient common characteristics to constitute a common scheme or plan. Unlike the victims in Field, R.C. and M.W. were subjected to similar abuse by Crossett and both testified they were exposed to a “sexually charged environment that lasted over the years.” Additionally, both incidents of abuse occurred in the victims’ respective bedrooms while their mother was absent. Although it is true Idaho appellate courts have previously held assaults occurring in a similar location are insufficient to establish a common scheme or plan, the facts of this case present a unique set of circumstances. Specifically, the record shows that neither of the male children in Crossett’s family were subjected to any sort of abuse, sexually charged environment, inappropriate comments, or normalizing behavior alleged by both R.C. and M.W. This indicates Crossett specifically targeted R.C. and M.W., which would demonstrate a common scheme or plan connecting the two charges. See Nava, 166 Idaho at 892, 465 P.3d at 1131 (holding that evidence showing defendant passed over several other young children sleeping in same room where the assaults occurred demonstrated a common scheme or plan connecting the joined charges). 10  Moreover, unlike in Field and Johnson, the State’s evidence in this case indicates that Crossett’s actions toward R.C. and M.W. constituted “grooming” behavior. The Idaho Supreme Court has defined “grooming” as conduct intended to foster trust and remove defenses over time through a pattern of seduction and preparation, resulting in the child being willing and compliant to the defendant’s sexual abuse. Nava, 166 Idaho at 892, 465 P.3d at 1131. At trial, R.C. and M.W. testified about Crossett’s sexualized comments toward them. Specifically, M.W. testified that, when she was thirteen or fourteen years old, Crossett advised her to “touch [the] penis” of any boy she kissed “to make sure it is big if you were to ever marry him.” R.C. testified that, when she was in middle school, Crossett called her “sexy” and offered to show her how to masturbate. R.C. further testified Crossett once commented that it “would be funny as a joke” if “anytime [she] brought someone home as in like a boyfriend, that [her and Crossett] made out.” According to R.C., Crossett indicated that, “if [she] ever told anyone what [they] were doing,” he “would go to jail.” Crossett does not challenge the district court’s finding that this evidence showed “a classic grooming pattern,” and we will not presume error. We therefore hold that this type of grooming behavior, paired with the other common characteristics, is sufficient to constitute a common scheme or plan. Crossett has failed to show the district court erred in concluding joinder was proper pursuant to I.C.R. 8(a). B. Joinder Pursuant to I.C.R. 14 Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides a second, independent ground for challenging joinder by permitting relief when “it appears that a defendant or the State is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in a complaint, indictment or information.” In other words, a defendant can argue that, even if joinder is proper under I.C.R. 8(a), the charges should be severed under I.C.R. 14 because joinder is prejudicial. Nava, 166 Idaho at 888, 465 P.3d at 1127; Chacon, 168 Idaho at 529, 484 P.3d at 213. Notably, I.C.R. 14 presumes joinder was proper in the first place. Field, 144 Idaho at 564-65, 165 P.3d at 278-79. For purposes of I.C.R. 14, Idaho appellate courts have recognized three potential sources of prejudice: (1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, rather than keeping the evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in presenting defenses; and (3) the jury may conclude the defendant is guilty of one crime and then find the defendant guilty of the other crime because of criminal disposition. Chacon, 168 Idaho at 529, 484 P.3d at 213. 11  In his motion, Crossett argued he was prejudiced by the joinder because the jury could “improperly consider the allegations made by R.C. when deciding [his] innocence or guilt related to the allegations made by M.W. or vice-versa.” Crossett also maintained that joinder of the offenses allowed the State to introduce I.R.E. 404(b) evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible in separate trials. The State objected to the motion, arguing that Crossett was not prejudiced by the joinder because evidence of the allegations involving one victim would be admissible in a separate trial involving the other as evidence of a common scheme or plan. Ultimately, the district court agreed with the State and denied Crossett’s motion. The district court determined that the “pattern of conduct and grooming [was] substantial and established over the years.” Specifically, the district court found that “each alleged victim was exposed to an environment created by” Crossett in which he “attempted to normalize his repeated fondling of their bodies and attempts to engage in more intense sexual activity as one of education.” The district court found that “the type of conduct alleged” by both R.C. and M.W. was “basically the same: repeated incidents of fondling each child’s breasts, buttocks, hips and thighs.” The district court acknowledged the allegations of abuse were “not close in time” but found “the other aspects of the pattern of abuse [were] markedly similar” and reflected “a classic grooming pattern.” The district court also determined that Crossett failed to establish prejudice resulting from the joinder. Although frequent incidents of abuse can be “difficult for a witness to tie to a specific date,” the district court found that “both alleged victims, as adults, should be able to achieve a greater level of clarity about the general time period.” According to the district court, “child witnesses, the younger they are, significantly lack the ability to communicate time in a way that most adults understand.” The district court indicated that “each purported victim is old enough now to be capable of describing the abuse she is alleged to have suffered since both are now adults.” “Because of the current age of both alleged victims,” and because “the risk of confusing or cumulating the evidence is less significant when the alleged victim is an adult,” the district court found there was less of a “risk of confusion and cumulation of evidence.” The district court also recognized that the State was required to prove “not only the actual acts but that they were done with the specific intent of gratifying [Crossett’s] sexual desires or those of the minor [children] or both.” The district court found that “the acts coupled with the normalizing behavior strongly” 12 presented a “pattern or plan and the absence of accident or mistake but, more importantly, point[ed] to intent.” As a result, the district court determined the evidence was “highly probative as to the lack of mistake or accident and as to intent.” The district court therefore found that Crossett failed to meet his burden of establishing “that the offenses should be severed into separate trials.” The district court further found that the “jury instructions [could] minimize the risk of unfair prejudice.” Accordingly, the district court concluded “the offenses [were] properly joined” and that “their trial together [would] not result in unfair prejudice.” Crossett argues the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion seeking relief from joinder pursuant to I.C.R. 14 because he was unfairly prejudiced. Specifically, Crossett contends “the jurors were apt to cumulate the evidence and/or find” him guilty because of his criminal disposition. In response, the State argues joinder “presented little risk of confusion or cumulation of the evidence because the evidence was simple and distinct, as demonstrated by the mixed verdict.” The State further asserts that the risk of the jury convicting Crossett based on his criminal disposition was minimal because “the evidence of each victim’s charges would be admissible at separate trials under the theories of common scheme or plan, intent, and absence of mistake.”1 We agree with the State. Appellate courts have held that a defendant cannot show prejudicial effect from joinder where “the facts relating to each incident” are “distinct and simple.” State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 868, 664 P.2d 772, 775 (1983); see also Drew v. United States, 331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (holding that, even if evidence would not have been admissible in separate trials, federal courts have found no prejudice from joinder when evidence of each crime is simple and distinct). Additionally, when the record reflects different verdicts on joined charges, appellate courts have recognized that the verdicts indicate “the jury properly differentiated and separated the evidence relative to each count.” Abel, 104 Idaho at 868, 664 P.2d at 775; see also Nix v. State, 653 P.2d 1093, 1099 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982) (evaluating defendant’s acquittal from a joined offense when determining whether trial court erred in denying his motion to sever). 1 The State also asserts that, “even if this Court concludes Crossett has met his burden of showing error, any such error is harmless.” Because we hold Crossett has failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion, we do not address this argument. 13  The record shows that R.C. and M.W. each testified about the separate conduct Crossett directed toward them. Additionally, there was little risk the jury would confuse or cumulate the evidence because Crossett admitted to conduct alleged by both R.C. and M.W. in a series of confront calls. Specifically, Crossett stated: That night--yes, I pushed my hands down, I probably went under your underwear line, and I’m accepting that yes that could have happened. I am telling you, I don’t remember actually going far enough to touch your vagina. But I’m not saying that I didn’t. I very well could have. And the fact that I apologized and ran after you is probably a pretty good indication that I did. I violated some serious boundary. During another confront call, Crossett admitted: I have curiosities. I crossed the lines. I’ve crossed that boundary. Like you asked, I have crossed that once before. It scared me very much because that’s not a boundary that I want to cross, that’s not the kind of person I want to be, and I don’t want to hurt anybody. But I was curious once before, and I looked under somebody’s shirt, so that was not good. And then I had this incident with you, and that’s not good, but that’s, I mean, that is it. Crossett confirmed that the person whose shirt he looked under was M.W. Crossett explained that, “if [he] did anything with [M.W.], it would have been similar to” what he did with R.C. Crossett indicated he “may have rubbed [M.W.’s] stomach down to her . . . pubic hairline” and “stopped right there.” The record supports the conclusion that the evidence in this case was simple and distinct. This conclusion is reinforced by the mixed verdict--the jury found Crossett guilty of two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, two counts of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen and one count of sexual battery of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years of age but acquitted Crossett of battery with intent to commit a serious felony. Additionally, the jury was instructed that “each count charges a separate and distinct offense” and that the jury was required to “decide each count separately on the evidence and the law that applies to it, uninfluenced by [its] decision as to any other count.” This jury instruction and the mixed verdict indicate that the jury properly differentiated and separated the evidence relative to each count. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 868, 664 P.2d at 775 (holding that different verdicts and “properly instructing” jury that each count charged a separate offense are “indicia that the jury properly differentiated and separated the evidence relative to each count”). 14  Crossett relies on Johnson and argues that, “had [he] been charged with offenses related to R.C.’s allegations and offense [sic] related to M.W.’s allegations, evidence that the other alleged victim had made similar allegations would not be admissible in each respective trial.” Because R.C. and M.W. were different ages when the alleged abuse began, Crossett asserts “compliance with the Johnson opinion compels the conclusion that the evidence” would be inadmissible. However, as explained above, the facts in this case are distinguishable from Johnson and present sufficient common characteristics to constitute a common scheme or plan. Moreover, we agree with the district court that the evidence of the allegations raised by R.C. and M.W. would be admissible at separate trials under the theories of “intent” and “absence of accident or mistake.” Crossett’s explanation of his “curiosities” reveal why: Young girls are better than old ladies. You know, I mean, for real. That’s . . . I don’t think that that’s that unnormal. I think that I’m just the idiot that says it out loud. But I know I’m not the only one that thinks that. And so. I mean I’m talking like teenagers and stuff. I mean, mom, mom’s been in situations where we’re at a water