Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO Docket No. 53413 STATE OF IDAHO, ) ) Filed: November 5, 2026 Plaintiff-Respondent, ) ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk v. ) ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED JUAN JOSE GIL, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Benjamin J. Cluff, District Judge. Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed. Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Abigael E. Schulz, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Jeff Nye, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. ________________________________________________ LORELLO, Judge Juan Jose Gil appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance. We affirm. I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Multiple parole officers went to Gil’s residence for a home visit in accordance with the terms of his supervision. The officers searched a bedroom in the residence after seeing Gil exit that room. In the bedroom, officers found a backpack that contained a small, clear bag with a crystal residue that later tested positive for methamphetamine. Gil admitted to the officers the backpack was his. The State charged Gil with one count of possession of a controlled substance. I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). 1 Gil filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the bedroom searched by the officers was not the specific unit he lived in. The district court denied the motion. Gil thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to challenge the denial of his motion to suppress. Gil appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). III. ANALYSIS Gil asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. More specifically, Gil argues that, because the room searched did not belong to him, it could not be searched pursuant to the terms of his parole supervision and that, as a result, the officers needed a warrant or an applicable exception to the warrant requirement. Gil makes this argument “mindful” of State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 906, 454 P.3d 543, 548 (2019), in which the Court stated that, in order to have standing to challenge a search, a defendant must demonstrate the search violated his constitutional rights, rather than a third party’s rights.1 The State responds that the standing principle set forth in Maxim “resolves Gil’s appeal.” We agree with the State and hold that Gil has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 1 After briefing was submitted in this case, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled Maxim in State v. Al-Mafrachi, ___ Idaho ___, 596 P.3d 1209 (2026). The Court’s decision in Al-Mafrachi did not, however, disturb the standing principle stated in Maxim. Gil acknowledges that he signed a Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of his parole and does not challenge the efficacy of the wavier on appeal. 2 Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal and violative of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, such an entry or search may be rendered reasonable by an individual’s consent. State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998). Consent is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, including when the consent stems from a Fourth Amendment waiver contained in a probation or parole agreement. State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 370, 347 P.3d 1025, 1031 (Ct. App. 2015). To prevail on a Fourth Amendment suppression claim, a defendant must come forward with evidence sufficient to show there was a Fourth Amendment search, the defendant has standing to challenge the search, and the search was illegal. State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 220-21, 443 P.3d 231, 234-35 (2019). To have standing, the defendants themselves must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched. Maxim, 165 Idaho at 905, 454 P.3d at 547. A defendant cannot vicariously assert privacy rights through another person. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 85-91 (1998) (holding that defendants present in another person’s apartment for a couple hours to package drugs had no expectation of privacy). Gil does not assert his privacy rights were violated as a result of the warrantless search of the residence. Instead, Gil argues that the officers violated his roommate’s privacy rights because Gil maintains the bedroom searched belonged to the roommate. Gil’s claim is foreclosed by Maxim, a point he acknowledges on appeal. Gil has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. IV. CONCLUSION Because Gil did not have standing to challenge an alleged violation of his roommate’s Fourth Amendment rights, he has failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Gil’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed. Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge FLEMING, CONCUR. 3