State v. Kalavi
CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketCAAP-25-0000633
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
18-NOV-2026
08:32 AM
Dkt. 44 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
SENETI MALIPOLO KALAVI, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
KONA DIVISION
(CASE NO. 3DTA-24-01550)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Guidry and Gluck, JJ.)
On October 1, 2024, the State of Hawai‘i (State) filed
a complaint charging Defendant-Appellant Seneti Malipopo Kalavi
with Driving Without a License (DWOL) and Operating a Vehicle
Under the Influence of an Intoxicant, as a second offense
(OVUII). Kalavi argues that the District Court of the Third
Circuit, Kona Division (District Court) 1 should have dismissed
the charges. On appeal, Kalavi raises eleven points of error,
which we consolidate into three broad arguments: (1) the
charges should have been dismissed because trial did not
commence within six months of the complaint, as required by
Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (eff. 2000);
1 The Honorable Ann S. Datta presided.
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(2) the charges should have been dismissed with prejudice
because Kalavi's constitutional right to a speedy trial was
violated, and the District Court further erred in not entering
findings of fact (FOFs) and conclusions of law (COLs) as
required by HRPP Rule 12(e) (eff. 2007); and (3) Kalavi's
constitutional right to counsel was violated, and the District
Court further erred in not entering FOFs and COLs as required by
HRPP Rule 12(e).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we conclude that
the District Court should have dismissed the charges pursuant to
HRPP Rule 48. We therefore vacate the District Court's July 7,
2025 Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order
(FOFs/COLs) denying Kalavi's Motion to Dismiss (MTD), as well as
the Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment entered against
Kalavi, and we remand for the District Court to determine
whether dismissal should be with or without prejudice. If the
District Court dismisses the charges without prejudice, the
District Court must also enter FOFs and COLs regarding Kalavi's
constitutional speedy-trial right (and must dismiss the charges
with prejudice if that right was violated). Based on our
disposition of Kalavi's first two points of error, we need not
reach the third.
I. Background
On November 17, 2023, Kalavi was arrested and released
without bail. On October 1, 2024, the State filed a complaint
charging Kalavi with DWOL and OVUII. Kalavi was arraigned on
October 31, 2024, and the District Court's October 31, 2024
Order and Notice of Entry of Order states: "Court referred
Defendant to the Office of the Public Defender." 2
2 The Honorable David Harada-Stone presided.
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On November 15, 2024, the Kona Office of the Public
Defender (OPD) filed a "[Proposed] Recommendation and Order
Appointing Private Counsel Due to Conflict of Interest" (OPD's
Request) (brackets in original). OPD informed the District
Court that severe staffing shortages at OPD created a conflict
between Kalavi's interests and "the personal interests of the
attorneys at OPD," and that OPD was "unable to act." OPD's
Request cited Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes (HRS) § 802-1 (entitled
"Right to representation by public defender or other appointed
counsel") and recommended appointment of private counsel "in the
interest of justice." The District Court did not immediately
act on OPD's Request.
On November 25, 2024, Kalavi appeared for an entry of
plea hearing. Kalavi was not represented by counsel at this
hearing, and the District Court continued the matter to
January 6, 2025. Kalavi returned to court on January 6, 2025.
He was still without counsel, and the District Court continued
the matter to February 24, 2025.
On February 21, 2025, the District Court entered the
Proposed Order from OPD's Request and appointed Joanne Hicks as
private counsel for Kalavi, 3 pursuant to HRS § 802-1. On
February 24, 2025, Kalavi returned to court with Hicks and
entered a plea of not guilty.
On March 31, 2025, Kalavi (through counsel) filed an
"[MTD] for Violation of Speedy Trial and/or HRPP Rule 48. 4" He
argued that the case should be dismissed pursuant to HRPP Rule
48 because trial had not commenced within six months of the
complaint being filed; he further argued that his constitutional
3 The Honorable Mahilani E.K. Hiatt entered the Proposed Order from
OPD's Request.
4 The District Court's FOFs incorrectly state that Kalavi filed his
MTD on March 27, 2025.
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rights to counsel and a speedy trial had been violated. The
District Court heard the MTD on April 28, 2025 and entered its
FOFs/COLs denying the MTD on July 7, 2025. 5 The District Court's
FOFs included the following:
6. At the hearing on November 25, 2024, the Court noted
[OPD]'s Request for conflict counsel based on a
conflict of interest cited by [OPD], and the filing [of
OPD's Request], and informed [Kalavi] that alternative
or conflict counsel would be appointed.
7. However, the Court did not sign the Order granting
[OPD's Request], and [OPD] remained [Kalavi's] counsel
of record.
. . . .
10. On January 6, 2025, [Kalavi] appeared in court and the
Court informed [Kalavi] that counsel had not yet been
appointed and continued [Kalavi's] case to February 24,
2025. [OPD] remained [Kalavi's] counsel of record.
. . . .
12. On February 21, 2025, [Hicks] was appointed to
represent [Kalavi]'s case and [OPD'S Request] was
signed by the court. Dkt. #17.
13. On February 21, 2025, [OPD] was removed as [Kalavi's]
counsel of record.
(Emphases added.) The District Court's COLs stated:
6. At all times between November 15, 2024, and
February 21, 2025, [OPD] was [Kalavi's] counsel of
record.
7. The pending withdraw[al] of counsel and the pending
appointment of [Hicks] are collateral proceedings
involving [Kalavi] that caused the delay, and this time
is excludable pursuant to Rule 48(c)(1) and (d)(1).
8. There is good cause for the delay due to the
unanticipated and unforeseeable delay in obtaining
appointing [sic] of private counsel after [OPD]
withdrew as counsel which caused legal excuse since
[Kalavi] qualified for the public defender services and
is entitled to an attorney before the case can proceed.
9. Therefore, the time between the pending withdraw[al] of
counsel and the appointment of [Hicks] is excludable
pursuant to Rule 48 (c)(1), (c)(3), (c)(8), and (d)(1),
5 The Honorable Ann S. Datta presided.
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and in accordance with State v. Senteno, 69 Haw. 363,
742 P.2d 369 (1987); State v. Choy Foo, 142 Hawaiʻi 65,
76, 414 P.3d 117, 128 (2018); State v. Gillis, 63 Haw.
285, 288, 626 P.2d 190, 192 (1981); and State v.
Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 625 P.2d 1040 (1981).
. . . .
12. [Kalavi's] rights to a speedy trial have not been
violated and there is no prejudice to [Kalavi], and it
is in the interests of justice for the case to proceed.
(Emphasis added.)
On July 25, 2025, Kalavi entered a conditional no
contest plea, reserving the right to appeal the District Court's
denial of the MTD. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. HRPP Rule 48 Dismissal
A trial court's [FOFs] in deciding an HRPP 48(b) [MTD] are
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. An
FOF is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support
the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
However, whether those facts fall within HRPP 48(b)'s
exclusionary provisions is a question of law, the
determination of which is freely reviewable pursuant to the
"right/wrong" test.
State v. Alkire, 148 Hawai‘i 73, 85, 468 P.3d 87, 99 (2020)
(quoting State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai‘i 507, 514, 928 P.2d 1, 8
(1996)).
B. Interpretation of Court Rules
"The interpretation of a court rule is reviewed de
novo, Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 120 Hawai‘i 181, 197, 202
P.3d 1226, 1242 (2009), and '[w]hen interpreting rules
promulgated by the court, principles of statutory construction
apply.'" State v. Choy Foo, 142 Hawai‘i 65, 72, 414 P.3d 117,
124 (2018) (quoting Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai‘i
325, 331, 104 P.3d 912, 918 (2004)).
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C. Questions of Constitutional Law
"Questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo,
under the right/wrong standard." State v. Tran, 154 Hawai‘i 211,
217, 549 P.3d 296, 302 (2024) (cleaned up).
III. DISCUSSION
A. HRPP Rule 48
The State charged Kalavi on October 1, 2024. Pursuant
to HRPP Rule 48, trial had to commence within six months of that
date:
(b) By court. Except in the case of traffic
offenses that are not punishable by imprisonment, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with
or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not
commenced within 6 months:
(1) from the date of arrest if bail is set or
from the filing of the charge, whichever is sooner,
on any offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode for which the arrest
or charge was made . . . .
(Emphases added.) See also State v. Hernane, 145 Hawai‘i 444,
450, 454 P.3d 385, 391 (2019) ("The six-month period under HRPP
Rule 48 is equivalent to 180 days.").
HRPP Rule 48(c) and (d), however, provide that some
periods — such as the time needed for the trial court to hear a
motion for withdrawal and substitution and to appoint new
counsel — are excluded in reaching that six-month limit:
(c) Excluded periods. The following periods shall
be excluded in computing the time for trial commencement:
(1) periods that delay the commencement of
trial and are caused by collateral or other
proceedings concerning the defendant[.]
. . . .
(d) Per se excludable and includable periods of
time for purposes of subsection (c)(1) of this rule.
(1) For purposes of subsection (c)(1) of this
rule, the period of time, from the filing through the
prompt disposition of the following motions filed by
a defendant, shall be deemed to be periods of delay
resulting from collateral or other proceedings
concerning the defendant: motions . . . for
withdrawal of counsel including the time period for
appointment of new counsel if so ordered[.]
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This exclusion in HRPP Rule 48(d) for withdrawal of
counsel does not apply here, however, because OPD never
represented Kalavi. OPD was never appointed as counsel for
Kalavi, such that OPD's Request was not a motion for withdrawal.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that Kalavi
had a statutory entitlement to representation by a public
defender. HRS § 802-1 (Supp. 2024) provides:
Right to representation by public defender or other
appointed counsel. (a) Any indigent person who is:
(1) Arrested for, charged with, or convicted of an
offense or offenses punishable by confinement
in jail or prison or for which the person may
be or is subject to the provisions of chapter
571 . . .
. . .
shall be entitled to be represented by a public defender.
If, however, conflicting interests exist, or if the public
defender for any other reason is unable to act, or if the
interests of justice require, the court may appoint other
counsel.
This statutory guarantee of indigent representation by OPD
provides for the appointment of "other counsel" if OPD is
"unable to act" or "if the interests of justice require," id.,
which were the reasons given in OPD's Request. Here, no one
represented Kalavi until the District Court appointed Hicks on
February 21, 2025. OPD was never Kalavi's counsel. OPD,
therefore, did not withdraw as his counsel, and the time that
elapsed while the District Court considered OPD's Request was
not excludable under HRPP Rule 48 as time needed for "withdrawal
of counsel."
Instead, this case concerns the initial appointment of
counsel. The Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held that time to appoint
counsel is not excluded from HRPP Rule 48's six-month clock.
Noting that "withdrawal of existing counsel and initial
appointment of counsel are procedurally quite different[,]" the
Court held that "[t]he fact that initial appointment of counsel
was not placed among the examples of 'collateral or other
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proceedings' in subsections (c)(1) or (d)(1) suggests that it
was not intended to be treated like the items on those lists."
Choy Foo, 142 Hawaiʻi at 74, 414 P.3d at 126; see also id. at 74-
75, 414 P.3d at 126-27 ("Continuances for the appointment of
counsel . . . are not identified as excludable periods in HRPP
Rule 48(c)(1) or (d)(1). . . . [I]f a time period is not
excluded from calculation by the rule, it is included in the
calculation."). Here, the six-month clock continued to run
while Kalavi waited for the initial appointment of counsel.
Nothing in the record here suggests that Kalavi did
anything to delay proceedings: he showed up for his court
hearings, there is no suggestion of any intentional delay, and
there are no factual findings in the record to justify excluding
any periods pursuant to the "good cause" exception in HRPP Rule
48(c)(8). The time to appoint counsel was not excludable under
HRPP Rule 48.
Our application of Choy Foo's holding here is
consistent with the purpose of HRPP Rule 48. See State v.
Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 268, 625 P.2d 1040, 1043 (1981) ("The
purpose of Rule 48 is to ensure an accused a speedy trial, which
is separate and distinct from [a defendant's] constitutional
protection to a speedy trial." (footnote omitted)).
Furthermore, the Choy Foo Court made clear that "[e]ven if HRPP
Rule 48 were ambiguous with respect to its excludable time
periods, the rule of lenity would require us to construe it
strictly, and in favor of the defendant." 142 Hawaiʻi at 75, 414
P.3d at 127.
The State filed its complaint against Kalavi on
October 1, 2024, and trial needed to commence within 180 days —
that is, by March 30, 2025. Kalavi filed his MTD on March 31,
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2025. Pursuant to HRPP Rule 48, the case should have been
dismissed. 6
Accordingly, we vacate the District Court's FOFs/COLs
denying Kalavi's MTD. We remand this matter to the District
Court to determine whether dismissal of the State's complaint is
with or without prejudice, because HRPP Rule 48(b) "reposes
discretion in the trial court" on that question. Estencion, 63
Haw. at 269, 625 P.2d at 1044; HRPP Rule 48(b) ("[T]he court
shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with or
without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not commenced
within 6 months[.]"). See also State v. Fukuoka, 141 Hawaiʻi 48,
55–56, 404 P.3d 314, 321–22 (2017) (setting forth the
determinative factors for dismissing a case with or without
prejudice).
B. Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial
Our inquiry does not end with HRPP Rule 48, however:
The Rule 48 violation entitles [a criminal defendant] to
have the charges against him dismissed "with or without
prejudice at the court's discretion." HRPP 48(b) (emphasis
added). But [the defendant] also appeals the denial of his
[MTD] on constitutional speedy trial grounds. "The only
remedy for the violation of an accused's right to speedy
trial is dismissal with prejudice." State v. Nihipali, 64
Haw. 65, 67 n. 4, 637 P.2d 407, 408 n. 4 (1981) (emphasis
added). Thus, were we to find a violation of [the
defendant's] constitutional speedy trial right, the charge
against him would have to be dismissed with prejudice.
State v. Wasson, 76 Hawaiʻi 415, 418, 879 P.2d 520, 523 (1994).
Kalavi argues that the District Court erred in failing to
address his constitutional speedy-trial argument and failing to
make necessary findings as required by HRPP Rule 12(e). If
6 The State argues that HRPP Rule 48 is unconstitutional — and that
it violates HRS § 602-11 (2016) — because it enlarges or modifies a
defendant's right to a speedy trial. The State did not make this argument
before the District Court, and we decline to address it for the first time on
appeal. See State v. Gonzalez, 128 Hawaiʻi 314, 317, 288 P.3d 788, 791 (2012)
("Our precedent clearly demonstrates that a party can waive an argument by
failing to raise it at trial even if the party ultimately prevails on that
issue.").
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Kalavi is correct that his constitutional right to a speedy
trial was violated, then the case must be dismissed with
prejudice.
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Hawai‘i Constitution guarantee a
defendant in a criminal case the right to a speedy trial[.]"
State v. Visintin, 143 Hawai‘i 143, 156, 426 P.3d 367, 380
(2018). An inquiry into whether this right has been violated is
context specific and therefore "necessitates a functional
analysis of the right in the particular context of the case[.]"
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). In analyzing whether
this right has been violated, Hawai‘i courts apply the four-
factor test articulated in Barker. See Visintin, 143 Hawai‘i at
156, 426 P.3d at 380. The four-factor test balances the
"[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. "No one factor 'is to be regarded as
either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.'" Visintin, 143
Hawai‘i at 156, 426 P.3d at 380 (quoting State v. Lau, 78 Hawai‘i
54, 62, 890 P.2d 291, 299 (1995)).
Here, the District Court ruled that "[Kalavi's] rights
to a speedy trial have not been violated and there is no
prejudice to [Kalavi], and it is in the interests of justice for
the case to proceed." However, the factual basis of the
District Court's decision regarding Kalavi's right to a speedy
trial is unclear, and the record does not demonstrate that the
District Court performed the required Barker analysis. The
trial court "is certainly better positioned than an appellate
court to make factual findings as to the causes of delay and the
allocation of responsibility between the parties." Visintin,
143 Hawaiʻi at 158, 426 P.3d at 382. Accordingly, we vacate and
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remand to the District Court to consider Kalavi's argument that
he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. 7 On
remand, the District Court shall enter FOFs and COLs consistent
with Barker and Visintin. If the District Court concludes that
Kalavi's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated,
the case shall be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District
Court's July 7, 2025 Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and
Order denying Kalavi's Motion to Dismiss, vacate the Judgment
and Notice of Entry of Judgment entered against Kalavi, and
remand to the District Court to determine whether dismissal
should be with or without prejudice pursuant to HRPP Rule 48.
If the District Court dismisses the charges without prejudice,
the District Court shall then consider Kalavi's constitutional
speedy trial argument.
Dated: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, November 18, 2026.
On the briefs:
Joanne S.C. Hicks, /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
for Defendant-Appellant. Chief Judge
Charles E. Murray III, /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
County of Hawaiʻi,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Daniel M. Gluck
Associate Judge
7 To be clear, the District Court does not need to perform this
analysis if it determines that the charges should be dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to HRPP Rule 48.
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