State v. Baggs
CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketCAAP-25-0000631
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
18-NOV-2026
08:11 AM
Dkt. 50 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI
STATE OF HAWAIʻI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
SARAH BAGGS, Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT
KONA DIVISION
(CASE NO. 3DTA-24-01547)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Hiraoka, Presiding Judge, McCullen and Gluck, JJ.)
On September 14, 2024, Defendant-Appellant Sarah Baggs
was arrested for Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an
Intoxicant and was released after posting $500.00 bail. Baggs
argues that the District Court of the Third Circuit, Kona
Division (District Court) should have dismissed the charge. On
appeal, Baggs raises eleven points of error, which we
consolidate into three broad arguments: (1) the charge should
have been dismissed because trial did not commence within six
months of the complaint, as required by Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal
Procedure (HRPP) Rule 48 (eff. 2000); (2) the charge should have
been dismissed with prejudice because Baggs's constitutional
right to a speedy trial was violated, and the District Court
further erred in not entering findings of fact (FOFs) and
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
conclusions of law (COLs) as required by HRPP Rule 12(e) (eff.
2007); and (3) Baggs's constitutional right to counsel was
violated, and the District Court further erred in not entering
FOFs and COLs as required by HRPP Rule 12(e).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs
submitted by the parties and having given due consideration to
the arguments advanced and the issues raised, we conclude that
the District Court erred in failing to make the requisite FOFs
and COLs regarding Baggs's constitutional rights to counsel and
to a speedy trial. As such, we vacate the District Court's
July 7, 2025 Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order
(District Court's FOFs/COLs) denying Baggs's Motion to Dismiss
(MTD), as well as the Judgment and Notice of Entry of Judgment
entered against Baggs, and remand to the District Court for
further proceedings consistent with this summary disposition
order.
I. BACKGROUND
Baggs was arrested on September 14, 2024 and arraigned
on October 10. At the arraignment, Baggs was referred to the
Kona Office of the Public Defender (OPD).
On October 24, 2024, before OPD was appointed to
represent Baggs, OPD filed a "[Proposed] Recommendation and
Order Appointing Private Counsel Due to Conflict of Interest"
(OPD's Request) (brackets in original). OPD informed the
District Court that severe staffing shortages at OPD created a
conflict between Baggs's interests and "the personal interests
of the attorneys at OPD," and that OPD was "unable to act."
OPD's Request cited Hawaiʻi Revised Statutes § 802-1 (entitled
"Right to representation by public defender or other appointed
counsel") and recommended appointment of private counsel "in the
interest of justice."
2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
The District Court denied OPD's Request on October 31,
2024, but did not appoint OPD to represent Baggs. 1 On
November 4, 2024, Baggs appeared at her plea hearing with Deputy
Public Defender Lezlie Kiaha (DPD Kiaha). The entirety of the
hearing was as follows: 2
THE BAILIFF: Calling out of order number 4, Sarah
Baggs.
THE COURT: Ms. Kiaha, in this matter, [OPD] filed
conflict docs, but the proposed order was denied by another
judge.
MS. KIAHA: Oh, by -- was this Judge Schlueter?
THE COURT: Yes.
MS. KIAHA: Okay.
THE COURT: So you're still counsel of record.
MS. KIAHA: All right. In that case, we will be
entering a not guilty plea.
THE COURT: Not guilty plea is entered. We'll
continue for a pretrial conference on December 2nd, 2024 at
8:30.
MS. WALKER [for the State]: Your Honor, for the
record, the defendant's driver's license has been
administratively revoked for one year, from October 15th,
2024 to October 14th, 2025.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. WALKER: Thank you.
On November 6, 2024, OPD filed a "Renewed [Proposed]
Recommendation and Order Appointing Private Counsel Due to
Conflict of Interest" (OPD's Renewed Request), making the same
request for the appointment of private counsel for Baggs due to
OPD's staffing shortage. (Brackets in original.) The District
Court did not immediately act on OPD's Renewed Request.
1 The Honorable Dalilah E. Schlueter denied OPD's Request.
2 The Honorable Ann S. Datta presided.
3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Baggs returned to District Court on December 2, 2024
for her pretrial conference. Baggs was not accompanied by
counsel at this hearing. The District Court 3 stated:
I understand that you've completed your application
with [OPD], and that due to staffing issues, they've
requested that the Court appoint you private counsel. The
Court is in the process of doing so, but we have not
located and secured you private counsel yet. So I'm going
to continue this matter so that we can attempt -- continue
to attempt to -- well, so we can continue to locate private
counsel for you.
So how that's going to work is once counsel is found,
they will be -- contact you once they receive their
appointment. We're not going to enter your plea at this
time so that you can speak with your attorney prior to
doing so.[4]
(Emphasis added.) The District Court continued the matter to
January 13, 2025.
On January 13, 2025, Baggs returned to District Court.
Baggs was still without counsel. The District Court 5 stated:
"We're still looking for private counsel to represent you.
We're continuing your case to February 24th, 2025. You're
ordered to appear on that date and time." The prosecutor once
again stated that Baggs's driver's license had been
administratively revoked for one year, beginning on October 15,
2024.
On February 21, 2025, the District Court entered the
Proposed Order attached to OPD's Renewed Request and appointed
Joanne Hicks as private counsel for Baggs. 6 On February 24,
2025, Baggs appeared with Hicks and requested a continuance of
3 The Honorable Dalilah E. Schlueter presided.
4 As previously noted, Baggs had entered a plea of not guilty on
November 4, 2024.
5 The Honorable Ann S. Datta presided.
6 The Honorable Mahilani E.K. Hiatt entered the Proposed Order
attached to OPD's Renewed Request.
4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the pretrial conference due to counsel's recent appointment.
The District Court granted the continuance to March 31, 2025.
On March 27, 2025, Baggs (through counsel) filed an
"[MTD] for Violation of Speedy Trial and/or Rule 48." She
argued that the case should be dismissed pursuant to HRPP
Rule 48 because trial had not commenced within six months of
September 14, 2024 (the date of arrest with bail set); she
further argued that her constitutional rights to counsel and a
speedy trial had been violated. The District Court heard the
MTD on April 28, 2025 and entered its FOFs/COLs denying the MTD
on July 7, 2025. 7 The District Court's FOFs included the
following:
7. On November 4, 2024, [OPD] appeared on behalf of [Baggs],
entered a "Not Guilty" plea and the Court set the case for
Pre-trial Conference on December 2, 2024.
8. On November 6, 2024, [OPD] filed [its Renewed Request].
. . . .
10. During the hearing on December 2, 2024, . . . the Court
noted [OPD filed its Renewed Request] and informed [Baggs]
that the Court is looking for conflict counsel to appoint
to [Baggs's] case.
11. At the December 2, 2024, hearing the Court did not grant
[OPD's Renewed Request] and [OPD] remained [Baggs's]
counsel of record.
. . . .
14. On January 13, 2025, the Court informed [Baggs] that the
Court was still looking for successor counsel to appoint to
their case. [OPD] remained [Baggs's] counsel of record.
The Court continued the case to February 24, 2025.
. . . .
16. On February 21, 2025, the Court[] signed [OPD's Renewed
Request] and appointed [Hicks].
17. On February 21, 2025, [OPD] was removed as [Baggs's]
counsel of record.
18. On February 24, 2025, [Hicks] appeared on [Baggs's] behalf
. . . .
7 The Honorable Ann S. Datta presided.
5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
(Emphases added.) The District Court's COLs stated:
6. On November 6, 2024, [OPD filed its Renewed Request,]
effectively asking the Court for permission to withdraw
from [Baggs's] case.
7. The Court did not rule on that request and [OPD] remained
the counsel of record.
8. The pending withdrawal of counsel and the pending
appointment of [Hicks] are collateral proceedings involving
[Baggs] which caused the delay in the commencement of trial
or resolution of [Baggs's] case.
9. [Hicks] was not obtained and appointed until February 21,
2025, at that time [OPD] was removed as counsel of record.
10. At all times between October 24, 2024, and February 21,
2025, [OPD] was [Baggs's] counsel of record.
11. There is good cause for the delay between November 6, 2024,
and February 21, 2025, due to the unanticipated and
unforeseeable delay in obtaining appointing [sic] of
private counsel after [OPD] withdrew as counsel which
caused legal excuse since [Baggs] qualified for the public
defender services and is entitled to an attorney before the
case can proceed.
12. Therefore, time between the pending withdraw[al] of counsel
and the appointment of [Hicks] is excludable pursuant to
Rule 48 (c)(l), (c)(3), (c)(8), and (d)(l), and in
accordance with State v. Senteno, 69 Haw. 363, 742 P.2d 369
(1987); State v. Choy Foo, 142 Hawaiʻi 65, 76, 414 P.3d 117,
128 (2018); State v. Gillis, 63 Haw. 285, 288, 626 P.2d
190, 192 (1981); and State v. Estencion, 63 Haw. 264, 625
P.2d 1040 (1981).
. . . .
17. [Baggs's] rights to a speedy trial have not been violated
and there is no prejudice to [Baggs], and it is in the
interests of justice for the case to proceed.
(Emphases added.)
On July 25, 2025, Baggs entered a conditional no
contest plea, reserving the right to appeal the District Court's
denial of the MTD. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. HRPP Rule 48 Dismissal
A trial court's [FOFs] in deciding an HRPP 48(b) [MTD] are
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. An
FOF is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence to support
the finding, the appellate court is left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.
6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
However, whether those facts fall within HRPP 48(b)'s
exclusionary provisions is a question of law, the
determination of which is freely reviewable pursuant to the
"right/wrong" test.
State v. Alkire, 148 Hawai‘i 73, 85, 468 P.3d 87, 99 (2020)
(quoting State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai‘i 507, 514, 928 P.2d 1, 8
(1996)).
B. Interpretation of Court Rules
"The interpretation of a court rule is reviewed de
novo, Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 120 Hawai‘i 181, 197, 202
P.3d 1226, 1242 (2009), and '[w]hen interpreting rules
promulgated by the court, principles of statutory construction
apply.'" State v. Choy Foo, 142 Hawai‘i 65, 72, 414 P.3d 117,
124 (2018) (quoting Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai‘i
325, 331, 104 P.3d 912, 918 (2004)).
C. Questions of Constitutional Law
"Questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo,
under the right/wrong standard." State v. Tran, 154 Hawai‘i 211,
217, 549 P.3d 296, 302 (2024) (cleaned up).
III. DISCUSSION
A. HRPP Rule 48
Baggs was arrested and posted bail on September 14,
2024. Pursuant to HRPP Rule 48, trial had to commence within
six months of that date:
(b) By court. Except in the case of traffic
offenses that are not punishable by imprisonment, the court
shall, on motion of the defendant, dismiss the charge, with
or without prejudice in its discretion, if trial is not
commenced within 6 months:
(1) from the date of arrest if bail is set or
from the filing of the charge, whichever is sooner,
on any offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode for which the arrest
or charge was made [.]
(Emphases added.) See also State v. Hernane, 145 Hawai‘i 444,
450, 454 P.3d 385, 391 (2019) ("The six-month period under HRPP
Rule 48 is equivalent to 180 days.").
7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
HRPP Rule 48(c), however, provides that some periods —
such as continuances requested by the defendant — are excluded
in reaching that six-month limit:
(c) Excluded periods. The following periods shall
be excluded in computing the time for trial commencement:
. . . .
(3) periods that delay the commencement of
trial and are caused by a continuance granted at the
request or with the consent of the defendant or
defendant's counsel[.]
Baggs was arrested on September 14, 2024, and filed her MTD on
March 27, 2025 — a total of 194 days. However, Baggs requested
and received a continuance on February 24, 2025. That stopped
the clock pursuant to HRPP Rule 48(c)(3). Excluding the thirty-
one days attributable to Baggs's requested continuance (from
February 24, 2025 to March 27, 2025), only 163 days counted
towards the 180-day limit under HRPP Rule 48. The six-month
period never expired, and the District Court did not err in
rejecting Baggs's HRPP Rule 48 argument.
B. Constitutional Right to Speedy Trial
Baggs argues that the District Court erred in failing
to address her constitutional argument regarding her right to a
speedy trial. As a corollary, she argues that the District
Court violated HRPP Rule 12(e) ("Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
essential findings on the record."). We conclude that the
District Court erred in both respects.
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Hawai‘i Constitution guarantee a
defendant in a criminal case the right to a speedy trial[.]"
State v. Visintin, 143 Hawai‘i 143, 156, 426 P.3d 367, 380
(2018). An inquiry into whether this right has been violated is
context specific and therefore "necessitates a functional
analysis of the right in the particular context of the case[.]"
8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972). In analyzing whether
this right has been violated, Hawai‘i courts apply the four-
factor test articulated in Barker. See Visintin, 143 Hawai‘i at
156, 426 P.3d at 380. The four-factor test balances the
"[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. "No one factor 'is to be regarded as
either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.'" Visintin, 143
Hawai‘i at 156, 426 P.3d at 380 (quoting State v. Lau, 78 Hawai‘i
54, 62, 890 P.2d 291, 299 (1995)).
Here, the District Court ruled that "[Baggs's] rights
to a speedy trial have not been violated and there is no
prejudice to [Baggs], and it is in the interests of justice for
the case to proceed." However, the factual basis of the
District Court's decision regarding Baggs's right to a speedy
trial is unclear, and the record does not demonstrate that the
District Court performed the required Barker analysis. As the
Hawaiʻi Supreme Court held in Visintin, the trial court "is
certainly better positioned than an appellate court to make
factual findings as to the causes of delay and the allocation of
responsibility between the parties." 143 Hawaiʻi at 158, 426
P.3d at 382. Accordingly, we vacate and remand to the District
Court to consider Baggs's argument that she was denied her
constitutional right to a speedy trial. On remand, the District
Court shall render FOFs and COLs consistent with Barker and
Visintin. If the District Court concludes that Baggs's
constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated, then the
case shall be dismissed with prejudice. See State v. Wasson, 76
Hawaiʻi 415, 418, 879 P.2d 520, 523 (1994) ("The only remedy for
the violation of an accused's right to speedy trial is dismissal
with prejudice." (cleaned up)).
9
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
C. Constitutional Right to Counsel
A defendant "has a right to counsel under the sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article I,
section 14 of the Hawai‘i State Constitution[.]" State v. Luton,
83 Hawai‘i 443, 448, 927 P.2d 844, 849 (1996) (cleaned up). The
right to counsel "attaches at critical stages of the criminal
prosecution, only at or after the initiation of adversarial
judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment."
Id. (cleaned up). The United States Supreme Court has explained
that once attachment of the right occurs, "counsel must be
appointed within a reasonable time after attachment to allow for
adequate representation at any critical stage before trial, as
well as at trial itself." Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., Tex.,
554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). Delays in appointing counsel can be
prejudicial. See, e.g., Betschart v. Oregon, 103 F.4th 607, 620
(9th Cir. 2024) ("Lack of counsel not only interferes with
indigent criminal defendants' progression to critical stages by
delaying those stages but also prevents any meaningful
advocacy."). Without counsel being appointed within a
reasonable time, defendants may not know what rights they
possess and may not be able to begin establishing their defense.
Id. at 622.
The United States Supreme Court has also been clear
that mere appointment of counsel is not enough to satisfy this
right. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86
(1984) ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at
trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy
the constitutional command. . . . '[T]he right to counsel is
the right to the effective assistance of counsel.'" (quoting
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970))).
10
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Baggs contends that the District Court erred in not
addressing her constitutional argument regarding her right to
counsel — that although DPD Kiaha was present in court with her
on November 4, 2024, Baggs was, in fact, without an attorney
from the time she requested counsel on October 10, 2024 until
Hicks was assigned on February 21, 2025. She further argues
that determining whether she had counsel involves questions of
fact beyond whether an attorney was counsel of record (such as
whether DPD Kiaha was actually acting as Baggs's counsel when
entering a plea, and the practical effect of any period in which
Baggs was without counsel), and that the District Court failed
to make necessary findings as required by HRPP Rule 12(e). The
State responds that there was no violation because nothing
substantive occurred while Baggs lacked counsel.
Baggs's argument has merit. Although the District
Court concluded that "[a]t all times between October 24, 2024,
and February 21, 2025, [OPD] was the Defendant's counsel of
record," merely having a "counsel of record" is not sufficient
to satisfy a defendant's right to counsel. See Strickland, 466
U.S. at 685. The record reflects that Baggs attended court on
December 2, 2024 and January 13, 2025 unaccompanied by an
attorney. The District Court continued the matter both times —
no critical stages occurred at either hearing — but the absence
of counsel suggests a lack of counsel during this period. 8
Further, although DPD Kiaha was present with Baggs at the
November 4, 2024 plea hearing, DPD Kiaha was never appointed as
Baggs's counsel.
The District Court, however, never ruled upon Baggs's
constitutional right to counsel argument. Further, even if the
8 For the purposes of pretrial procedures, "'[c]ritical stages'
[are] those pretrial procedures that would impair defense on the merits if
the accused is required to proceed without counsel." Luton, 83 Hawai‘i at
449, 927 P.2d at 850 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975)).
11
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
District Court had considered Baggs's arguments, the District
Court did not make FOFs regarding Baggs's right to counsel as
required by HRPP Rule 12(e). There are no factual findings in
the record as to whether Baggs had counsel prior to February 21,
2025, and whether that lack of counsel hampered her defense in
any way. As such, this court cannot effectively review Baggs's
constitutional argument regarding her right to counsel. The
Judgment is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded to the
District Court. See Visintin, 143 Hawai‘i at 157, 426 P.3d at
381 ("This court has repeatedly stated that 'cases will be
remanded when the factual basis of the lower court's ruling
cannot be determined from the record.'" (quoting State v.
Anderson, 67 Haw. 513, 514, 693 P.2d 1029, 1030 (1985))).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District
Court's July 7, 2025 Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and
Order denying Baggs's Motion to Dismiss, as well as the Judgment
and Notice of Entry of Judgment entered against Baggs, and
remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent
with this summary disposition order.
Dated: Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, November 18, 2026.
On the briefs:
Joanne S.C. Hicks, /s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
for Defendant-Appellant. Presiding Judge
Charles E. Murray III, /s/ Sonja M.P. McCullen
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Associate Judge
County of Hawaiʻi,
for Plaintiff-Appellee. /s/ Daniel M. Gluck
Associate Judge
12