State v. Okada
CourtHawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
DocketCAAP-24-0000551
StatusPublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Electronically Filed
Intermediate Court of Appeals
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
20-NOV-2026
08:18 AM
Dkt. 96 SO
NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN OKADA, Defendant-Appellant
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
HONOLULU DIVISION
(CASE NO. 1DTC-24-003022)
SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
(By: Nakasone, Chief Judge, Leonard and Hiraoka, JJ.)
Defendant-Appellant Kevin Okada (Okada) challenges his
conviction for driving without a license (DWOL) and sentencing
as a repeat DWOL offender. We vacate and remand for new trial,
based on the trial court's failure to make a voluntariness
determination as required by Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS)
§ 621-26.1
1 HRS § 621-26 (2016) precludes the admission of a confession into
evidence at trial unless the court first finds that the confession was
"voluntarily made."
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Okada appeals from the July 31, 2024 "Notice of Entry
of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment" (Judgment), entered
by the District Court of the First Circuit (District Court).2
Following a bench trial, Okada was convicted of DWOL in
violation of HRS § 286-102 (2020) and sentenced as a third-time
DWOL offender to seven days jail and six months of probation,
pursuant to HRS § 286-136.3
On appeal, Okada raises three points of error (POEs),
which we have reorganized for clarity, contending that the
District Court erred by (1) "receiving into evidence a
confession without making a voluntariness finding, in violation
of HRS § 621-26 and Okada's constitutional right to due
process"; (2) admitting Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaiʻi's
(State) exhibits regarding Okada's prior DWOL convictions and
traffic record into evidence because they were inadmissible
hearsay, not self-authenticating, and/or violated Okada's right
of confrontation; and (3) "sentencing Okada as a [full]
misdemeanor offender" under HRS § 286-136(b) "based on
insufficient evidence."4
Upon review of the record and the briefs submitted by
the parties and having given due consideration to the arguments
2 The Honorable Ann S. Isobe presided.
3 Relevant here, HRS § 286-136(b) (2020 & 2022 Supp.) prescribes
the mandatory penalty for a third DWOL conviction, of a $500 to $1,000 fine,
and/or imprisonment of up to one year, "if the person ha[d] two or more prior
convictions" for DWOL "in the preceding five-year period."
4 Because Okada's HRS § 621-26 challenge is dispositive, we do not
address his remaining POE that the District Court erred by "conducting
arraignment and amending the charge" when Okada had no counsel, an error for
which Okada requested the identical remedy we otherwise grant here, which was
to vacate and remand for a new trial.
2
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
advanced and issues raised, we resolve Okada's points of error
as follows.
Following Okada's January 17, 2024 citation for DWOL,
Plaintiff-Appellee State of Hawaiʻi (State) filed a Complaint
against Okada as a repeat DWOL offender under HRS § 286-136(b).
The following record is from Okada's July 31, 2024
bench trial. Honolulu Police Department Officer Nolan Saffery
(Officer Saffery) testified that on January 12, 2024, he pulled
Okada over for driving a vehicle with an expired safety check.
Over Okada's running HRS § 621-26 objection that a finding of
voluntariness had not been made, the District Court allowed
Officer Saffery to testify that when he asked Okada for his
driver's license and proof of insurance, Okada told him that he
did not have them, and that Okada provided Officer Saffery with
his name, date of birth, and the last four digits of his social
security number. The District Court reasoned that HRS § 621-26
did not apply because the statute "speaks to a confession[,]"
and that Okada's statements were "admission[s] against interest
[admissible] as an exception to the hearsay [rule]."
Maria Oandasan (Oandasan), a custodian of records for
the Division of Motor Vehicle, Licensing and Permits at the City
and County of Honolulu (DMV), testified that the DMV
"maintain[s] driver's license records of individuals"; that the
"records [are] made and kept in the regular course of business
at the [DMV,]" and that the "records [are] generated at or near
the time of the occurrence of events and matters described
therein[.]" The State then moved to enter into evidence Exhibit
1, a "Drivers License Root Maintenance" print-out (DMV Print-
out). The DMV Print-Out was a one-page document prepared by the
DMV, certified by Nilda Ocreto, a DMV custodian of records, and
3
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
appeared to show that the driver's license of an individual
named "Kevin Kalai Okada" had expired in 1996.
Okada objected to the DMV Print-Out's admission,
citing "hearsay, lack of foundation, lack of personal knowledge,
and also a violation of the confrontation clause[.]" On cross-
examination by Okada's counsel, Oandasan testified that she "did
not produce th[e] document," that she did not personally
"update" the information in the document, and that the document
was generated on February 20, 2024.
The District Court overruled the objection, finding
that the DMV Print-Out fell under "the business records, public
records [hearsay] exception[s]" and its admission would not
violate Okada's right of confrontation because "the ministerial
pulling of the information by the [certifying custodian of
records] does not affect [its] substantive content."
The State also submitted into evidence Exhibit 2,
which was Okada's traffic abstract (Traffic Abstract). The
Traffic Abstract was a 123-page document prepared by the
district court, containing its records of Okada's prior moving
violations and infractions, certified by the district court
clerk. For similar reasons as the DMV Print-Out, Okada objected
to its admission; the District Court admitted the Traffic
Abstract over Okada's objection.
Finally, the State moved to admit State's Exhibits
3 through 7, certified copies of District Court judgments in
which Okada pled no contest to previous DWOL citations in five
different case numbers, all entered in the preceding five years
(collectively, the Prior Judgments). Okada objected, stating,
"Same objection." The Prior Judgments were admitted over
Okada's objection.
4
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Okada did not testify or call any witnesses.
At the trial's conclusion, the District Court found
Okada guilty as charged "under [HRS §] 286-102 and that there
were two prior convictions within a five-year period[,]" as
follows:
[Officer Saffery] credibly testified that . . . he asked
[Okada], who he identified in court[,] for his driver's
license, safety and registration, and [Okada] made an
admission against interest, and provided him with the last
four digits of his Social Security number and his date of
birth, and all of those vitals are correspondingly and
accurately memorialized on all of the State's Exhibits,
which include the [Traffic Abstract] and the [Prior
Judgments], which were entered in 2022 and 2023 for
[Okada]'s entry of no contest in prior DWOLs.
. . . .
[C]oupled with [Okada]'s admission, plus the information
produced through the CRS databank and the credible
testimony of the [DMV] custodian of records . . . that
[Okada]'s license had been expired from 1996 . . . is
persuasive to the Court that the State has born [sic] its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Okada timely appealed the July 31, 2024 Judgment.
(1) Okada contends the District Court erred by
admitting Okada's statement that Okada did not have a driver's
license, and his statements providing his name, date of birth,
and the last four digits of his social security number, "without
making a voluntariness finding, in violation of HRS § 621-26 and
Okada's constitutional right to due process."
The State concedes that the District Court erred by
not holding a hearing or making "a factual determination of the
voluntariness of [Okada's] statement[s]" before their admission
into evidence. The State, however, presents various arguments
that the error was harmless, which are unavailing in light of
the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court's recent State v. Tolentino decision.
5
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
In State v. Tolentino, 158 Hawaiʻi 321, 332, 592 P.3d
209, 220 (2026), the supreme court held that "Article I,
sections 5 and 10 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution, and HRS § 621-26
(2016) independently require a pretrial evidentiary hearing to
establish voluntariness before the factfinder hears an
inculpatory statement." Inculpatory statements include "any
words spoken by the defendant that allows the factfinder to
infer guilt[,]" such as "[e]xpress admissions relating to the
charged or included offense, or facts establishing material
elements[.]" Id. at 341, 592 P.3d at 229. The erroneous
admission of an inculpatory statement without a mandatory HRS §
621-26 voluntariness determination is "evaluated under the
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at 338, 592
P.3d at 226 (citation modified). Tolentino also clarified that
the remedy for failure to hold a pretrial voluntariness hearing
is a remand for a new trial, not a remand for a post-trial
hearing. Id. at 339, 592 P.3d at 227.
Here, Okada's statements regarding not having a
driver's license and giving his name, date of birth, and the
last four digits of his social security number are "facts
establishing material elements" for repeat DWOL offender status
under HRS § 286-136(b), consistent with Tolentino's definition
of an "inculpatory statement." See id. at 341, 592 P.3d at 229.
The District Court's conclusion that HRS § 621-26 did not apply
was erroneous. See State v. Alvarez, 138 Hawaiʻi 173, 181, 378
P.3d 889, 897 (2016) (reviewing a trial court's conclusions of
law under the right/wrong standard (citation omitted)). Under
Tolentino, we further conclude that because the required
voluntariness determination was not made and the District Court
expressly referenced the inculpatory statements in convicting
6
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Okada, the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See 158 Hawaiʻi at 332, 592 P.3d at 220; State v. Jones, 148
Hawaiʻi 152, 170, 468 P.3d 166, 184 (2020) (holding that "[i]n
applying the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the
court is required to examine the record and determine whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the error complained of
might have contributed to the conviction" (citations omitted)).
Because "the protections a pretrial [voluntariness] hearing
provides cannot be retroactively restored," and the lack of a
voluntariness determination was not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, "[t]he remedy is a new trial." Tolentino, 158 Hawaiʻi at
340-41, 592 P.3d at 228-29.
In this case, Okada raises a sufficiency challenge in
POE 3, and various evidentiary challenges in POE 2. Where we
remand for a new trial and the defendant has raised an
evidentiary sufficiency challenge, as here, we conduct an
evidentiary sufficiency review. See State v. Davis, 133 Hawaiʻi
102, 104, 324 P.3d 912, 914 (2014) (holding that "a reviewing
court is required to address an express claim of insufficiency
of the evidence prior to remanding for a new trial"). As such,
we address the sufficiency challenge raised in POE 3. Because
review for evidentiary sufficiency must be based on admissible
evidence, we also address the evidentiary challenges raised in
POE 2. See State v. Wallace, 80 Hawaiʻi 382, 412, 910 P.2d 695,
725 (1996) (reviewing sufficiency of evidence for substantial
admissible evidence and by "[d]isregarding the erroneously
admitted evidence").
(2) Okada raises various evidentiary challenges to the
admission of the Prior Judgments in Exhibits 3 through 7, and
Okada's traffic records in Exhibits 1 and 2.
7
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
Authentication challenge
Okada argues that the Prior Judgments were "not self-
authenticating" under Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 902,
because they did "not have an impressed seal[,]" did not have a
"wet signature[,]" and lacked personal review by the court
clerk, and thus did not meet the requirements under HRE Rule
902(1) and (4).5 The record reflects that Okada lodged a general
objection at trial to the Prior Judgments' admission on "lack of
foundation" grounds, and did not raise the specific objections
that he raises on appeal. These arguments are waived. See
State v. Spies, 157 Hawaiʻi 75, 91, 575 P.3d 708, 724 (2025)
("[A] 'lack of foundation' objection generally is insufficient
to preserve foundational issues for appeal because such an
objection does not advise the trial court of the problems with
foundation." (citation omitted)); State v. Moses, 102 Hawaiʻi
449, 456, 77 P.3d 940, 947 (2003) ("As a general rule, if a
party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be
deemed to have been waived on appeal[.]" (citations omitted)).
Confrontation clause challenge
Okada challenges the admission of all the exhibits --
the Prior Judgments in Exhibits 3 to 7, and the two traffic
records in Exhibits 1 and 2 -- under the Confrontation Clause.
Regarding the admission of the Prior Judgments, Okada relies on
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) to argue that he
"should have been allowed to cross-examine the clerks who
attested to th[o]se documents[,]" because the clerks'
"attestations" were "testimonial." Regarding the DMV Print-Out
in Exhibit 1, Okada claims that "[t]he document was created for
5 Okada does not raise an authentication challenge to the traffic
records in Exhibits 1 and 2.
8
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the purposes of prosecuting Okada[,]" and that Oandasan
testified regarding the document but "was not the person who
created it" and did not "know the name of the person who created
the document." Okada raises similar arguments to the Traffic
Abstract in Exhibit 2, that "Okada should be able to cross-
examine the clerk . . . on how the [T]raffic [A]bstract was
created," and how the various pieces of identifying information
on the Traffic Abstract "are linked to" the Prior Judgments.
Citing State v. Fields, 115 Hawaiʻi 503, 516, 527-28, 168 P.3d
955, 968, 979-80 (2007), Okada alternatively argues that even if
the Prior Judgments are not testimonial, their admission still
violated Okada's right of confrontation under the Hawaiʻi
Constitution because admission of non-testimonial hearsay
requires "a showing that (1) the declarant is 'unavailable,' and
(2) the statement bears some indicia of reliability" under Ohio
v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
The State responds that the Prior Judgments are not
testimonial, because they were "not specifically created for
future use in court" and "were produced in the course of past
litigation and are kept as part of the [d]istrict [c]ourt's
record-keeping duties." With regard to the DMV Print-Out, the
State responds by pointing to decisions by this court that this
type of record is not testimonial. See State v. Saxton, No.
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2020 WL 507965, at *2 (Haw. App. Jan. 31, 2020)
(SDO) (DMV printout not testimonial); State v. Hardoby, No.
CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2015 WL 755866, at *2 (Haw. App. Feb. 23, 2015)
(SDO) (same).
The State maintains that the Traffic Abstract is
similar to the DMV Print-Out in that it "is a summary of
[Okada]'s traffic records that is kept by the [d]istrict [c]ourt
9
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
as part of its record-keeping duties" and that those records
were "not specifically created for future use in court[,]"
citing HRS §§ 604-17 (2016) (providing that district courts
shall be "courts of record" that preserve in writing their
proceedings and judgments) and 287-3 (2020 & Supp. 2024)
(providing that district courts have a duty to furnish traffic
abstracts to any person requesting them, including for
insurance, employment, and other purposes). As for Okada's
non-testimonial hearsay argument, the State responds that the
Confrontation Clause is "satisf[ied]" when non-testimonial
hearsay "qualifies for a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule," and that all of the exhibits were public records, which
"fall within a firmly rooted exception to hearsay within the
meaning of HRE Rule 803(b)(8)."
Here, the admission of the Prior Judgments and the
traffic records did not violate the Confrontation Clause because
the exhibits were non-testimonial public records. See Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (A statement is
"testimonial" when its "primary purpose . . . is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution."); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,
322 (2009) ("[A] clerk's certificate authenticating an official
record" is "traditionally admissible" even "though prepared for
use at trial[.]"). Public records such as the Prior Judgments,
the DMV Print-Out, and the Traffic Abstract in this case "are
generally admissible absent confrontation" because they have
"been created for the administration of an entity's affairs" and
not for a testimonial "purpose of establishing or proving some
fact at trial." See State v. Cruz, 135 Hawaiʻi 294, 297, 349
P.3d 401, 404 (App. 2015) (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at
10
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
324); State v. Ho, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2022 WL 1684279 at *3
(Haw. App. May 26, 2022) (SDO) (notice of administrative review
decision created in the regular course of an unrelated prior
proceeding not testimonial); Saxton, 2020 WL 507965 at *2 (DMV
printout not testimonial).
Okada's alternative argument -- that the admission of
Exhibits 1 through 7 as non-testimonial hearsay did not comply
with the Confrontation Clause and Roberts' admissibility
requirements -- also lacks merit. The 2007 State v. Fields
decision adopted the Crawford v. Washington requirements of a
showing of unavailability and prior opportunity for cross-
examination for the admission of testimonial hearsay statements
consistent with the Confrontation Clause. 115 Hawaiʻi at 513,
168 P.3d at 965. With regard to non-testimonial hearsay
statements, however, the Hawaiʻi Supreme Court affirmed the
"continued viability" of the two-part Roberts test for such
statements' admission. Fields, 115 Hawaiʻi at 516, 168 P.3d at
968 (citing, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 179
(3d Cir. 2005) ("[U]nless a particular hearsay statement
qualifies as 'testimonial,' Crawford is inapplicable and Roberts
still controls.")). For admission of non-testimonial hearsay
statements, Roberts requires a showing of (1) witness
unavailability (unavailability requirement) and (2) statements
bearing "adequate indicia of reliability" (reliability
requirement) for admission. Fields, 115 Hawai‘i at 512, 516, 168
P.3d at 964, 968.
Because Roberts continues to apply to non-testimonial
statements, pre-Fields Hawai‘i law applying Roberts to non-
testimonial statements, such as this court's decision in State
v. Ofa, 9 Haw. App. 130, 828 P.2d 813 (App. 1992), is
11
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
instructive. With regard to the unavailability requirement of
Roberts, Ofa explained that this first requirement does not
"extend . . . to all out-of-court statements[,]" but is only
applicable "when the challenged out-of-court statements were
made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding." Ofa, 9 Haw.
App. at 138, 828 P.2d at 818 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502
U.S. 346, 354 (1992)). Here, the non-testimonial statements in
the Prior Judgments, the DMV Print-Out, and the Traffic Abstract
were not "made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding" and
the unavailability requirement of Roberts does not apply.
As for the reliability requirement of Roberts, Ofa
explained that "where proffered hearsay has sufficient
guarantees of reliability to come within a firmly rooted
exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is
satisfied." 9 Haw. App. at 138, 828 P.2d at 818 (quoting White,
502 U.S. at 356). This court noted that "[t]he public records
and reports exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted in
our jurisprudence." Id. Here, Exhibits 1 through 7 were
admissible under the firmly rooted public records exception to
the hearsay rule in HRE Rule 803(b)(8). The admission of the
non-testimonial statements in Exhibit 1 through 7 thus satisfied
the Roberts reliability requirement, and Okada's Roberts
challenge lacks merit.
Hearsay challenge
Okada challenges the traffic records in State's
Exhibits 1 and 2 as "inadmissible hearsay" that does not "fall
under HRE Rule 803(b)(6) and 803(b)(8) hearsay exceptions."
Okada argues that there was "insufficient evidence" that the
exhibits "were made in the course of a regularly conducted
activity" and that rather, they were "created for purposes of
12
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
the trial of Okada[,]" and therefore the exhibits were hearsay
that did not "fall under HRE Rule 803(b)(6) and 803(b)(8)
hearsay exceptions."
Here, the DMV Print-Out and the Traffic Abstract were
both documents signed by an appropriate custodian of records,
certifying that the documents reflect official records
containing Okada's driving record. Okada's arguments go to the
weight and not the admissibility of these exhibits, which met
the requirements for admission under the HRE Rule 803(b)(8)
public records exception to the hearsay rule.
(3) Okada argues there was insufficient evidence to
sentence Okada as a repeat DWOL offender under HRS § 286-136(b)
because "[t]he Prior Judgments are not sufficiently linked to
. . . Okada" and "[t]he Traffic Abstract does not adequately
prove a prior conviction." Although the Prior Judgments name
the defendant as "Kevin Okada" or "Kevin K Okada," Okada
contends there is not sufficient evidence to show that the
defendant was the same Kevin Okada in the instant case, because
the Prior Judgments do not contain "date of birth or social
security information" and the "Defendant's signature, address,
and phone number are left blank." Okada acknowledges that State
v. Nishi, 9 Haw. App. 516, 527, 852 P.2d 476, 482 (App. 1993)
held that "a certified copy of a person's traffic abstract is
satisfactory evidence to establish" a prior conviction, but
urges this court to "reconsider" Nishi due to "changes in both
the law and technology[.]"
Okada's arguments challenging the sufficiency of
evidence go to the credibility and weight of the evidence that
we have concluded was properly admitted. See Fisher v. Fisher,
111 Hawaiʻi 41, 46, 137 P.3d 355, 360 (2006) ("[A]n appellate
13
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
court will not pass upon issues dependent upon the credibility
of witnesses and the weight of evidence; this is the province of
the trier of fact." (citation omitted)); Nishi, 9 Haw. App. at
526-27, 852 P.2d at 481-82 (holding that defendant's traffic
abstract was "satisfactory evidence" of defendant's prior
conviction because traffic abstracts include a "clerk's
notation," their use was authorized by HRS Chapter 287, and they
include the person's name, driver's license number, social
security number, and date of birth).
"Evidence adduced in the trial court must be
considered in the strongest light for the prosecution." State v.
Kalaola, 124 Hawaiʻi 43, 49, 237 P.3d 1109, 1115 (2010) (citation
modified). "'Substantial evidence' as to every material element
of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of
sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of
reasonable caution to support a conclusion." Id. (citation
omitted).
Here, the citing officer identified "Kevin Okada" in
court as the person he cited for DWOL. The citation identified
the license plate number of Okada's vehicle as "PNY748," which
matches the number noted in five different cases in the Traffic
Abstract, in which a defendant named "Kevin Okada" or "Kevin K
Okada" was convicted of DWOL within the preceding five years.
The case numbers and names in the Traffic Abstract match those
in the Prior Judgments. The social security number and date of
birth of "Kevin Kalai Okada" noted in the Traffic Abstract match
that in the DMV Print-Out, which shows Okada's license was
expired. We conclude there was substantial admissible evidence
to sentence Okada as a repeat DWOL offender under HRS § 286-
14
NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAIʻI REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER
136(b). See Davis, 133 Hawaiʻi at 104, 324 P.3d at 914; Wallace,
80 Hawaiʻi at 412, 910 P.2d at 725.
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the July 31, 2024
"Notice of Entry of Judgment and/or Order and Plea/Judgment,"
entered by the District Court of the First Circuit, and remand
for new trial.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai‘i, November 20, 2026.
On the briefs:
/s/ Karen T. Nakasone
Sara K. Haley,
Chief Judge
Deputy Public Defender
for Defendant-Appellant.
/s/ Katherine G. Leonard
Associate Judge
Robert T. Nakatsuji,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
/s/ Keith K. Hiraoka
City & County of Honolulu
Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.
15