Full Opinion

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A1334 William Trammell, Jr. v. The State. On Appeal From the Superior Court of Floyd County No. 25CR000102 Decided: November 3, 2026 ELLINGTON, Justice. In his sole claim of error, William Trammell, Jr., argues that OCGA § 16-11-131(b), 1 pertaining to the possession of 1 OCGA § 16-11-131(b) provides: Any person who is on probation as a felony first offender pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 8 of Title 42, who is on probation and was sentenced for a felony under subsection (a) or (c) of Code Section 16-13-2, or who has been convicted of a felony by a court of this state or any other state; by a court of the United States including its territories, possessions, and dominions; or by a court of any foreign nation and who receives, possesses, or transports a firearm commits a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than ten years; provided, however, that upon a second or subsequent conviction, such person shall be imprisoned for not less than five nor more than ten years; provided, further, that if the felony for which the person is on probation or has been previously convicted is a forcible felony, then upon conviction of receiving, possessing, or transporting firearms by convicted felons and first offender probationers, violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 2 when, as applied to him, it permanently disarms a non-violent felon. As explained below, we do not reach the merits of this appeal because Trammell failed to serve the Attorney General with notice of his challenge to the constitutionality of the statute, as required by OCGA § 9-4-7(c). Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to resolve Trammell’s constitutional challenge. For this reason, we vacate in part the trial court’s order denying Trammell’s motion for new trial and remand the case to the trial court. The facts of this case are undisputed. As pertinent here, the record shows that Trammell was indicted by a Floyd County grand jury and, following a jury trial, he was convicted of possession of less than one ounce of marijuana (a misdemeanor) and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under OCGA § 16-11-131(b). 3 He was sentenced to 12 months in prison on the marijuana conviction and to ten years (four years in prison and the remainder on probation) on the firearm conviction. The firearm conviction was predicated on three prior felonies: second- a firearm, such person shall be imprisoned for a period of five years. 2 The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” US Const. Amend. II. 3 The grand jury returned an indictment charging Trammell with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute (Count 1), theft by receiving stolen property (Count 2), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 3), possession of less than one ounce of marijuana (Count 4), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 5). The trial court entered a directed verdict of not guilty on Count 2, and the jury returned not guilty verdicts on Counts 1 and 3. 2 degree criminal damage to property, theft by taking, and fleeing and attempting to elude. Prior to trial, Trammell filed a general demurrer to the charge alleging possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (“Count 5”). He argued that OCGA § 16-11-131(b) is unconstitutional as applied to him because the statute creates a permanent and complete ban on firearm possession for a class of people (convicted felons) without distinguishing between violent and non-violent offenders. There is no evidence in the record showing that Trammell notified the Attorney General of his constitutional challenge to the statute, and Trammell does not dispute the Attorney General’s assertion that notice was not given. In his demurrer, Trammell argued that he committed only non-violent offenses. The trial court asked for briefs on the issue, which the parties provided. After reviewing the briefs, and following a hearing, the trial court denied Trammell’s general demurrer. Citing our decision in Landers v. State, 250 Ga. 501 (1983), the trial court explained that “OCGA § 16-11-131(b) has been upheld as constitutional under Georgia’s Constitution.” After reviewing United States Supreme Court precedent, the trial court found that “regulations that prohibit the possession of firearms by felons presumptively [do] not implicate the plain text of the Second Amendment at the first step of the Bruen[4] test.” The court then concluded: [F]elons as a class are presumptively excluded from firearm possession. The Defendant is undisputedly a member of that class and has not overcome the 4 New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 US 1 (2022). 3 presumption that as such he should be excluded from firearm possession. Accordingly, the Court need not perform the second Bruen step to determine whether OCGA § 16-11-131(b), as applied to him, is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The trial court revisited the demurrer to Count 5 in Trammell’s motion for new trial and denied it for the same reasons, concluding that OCGA § 16-11-131(b) is constitutional as applied to Trammell. On appeal, Trammell argues that OCGA § 16-11-131(b) violates the Second Amendment, as applied to him, because his disqualifying convictions are for alleged non-violent felonies that do not carry a life sentence. The Attorney General filed an amicus brief, raising an issue that was not raised below: whether Trammell’s failure to serve the Attorney General notice of the constitutional challenge pursuant to OCGA § 9-4-7(c) deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to decide the constitutional challenge. The Attorney General raises a threshold issue concerning subject-matter jurisdiction that cannot be waived by Trammell or the District Attorney. See State of Ga. v. Federal Def. Program, Inc., 315 Ga. 319, 343 (2022) (explaining that a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time). Code Section 9-4-7(c), pertaining to declaratory judgments, requires a party challenging a statute’s constitutionality to serve the Attorney General before the trial court rules: If an Act of the General Assembly, a statute of the state, any order or regulation of any administrative body of the state, or any franchise granted by the state is alleged in an action for declaratory judgment 4 or as a part of any other action to be unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, the Attorney General of the state shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be heard in defense of said Act, statute, order, regulation, or franchise, which may include appearing as a party as of right as he or she determines is appropriate. The purpose of this Code section is to “ensure that the State has the opportunity to defend its laws in court before they are declared invalid.” Daniel v. Amicalola Elec. Membership Corp., 289 Ga. 437, 440 (2011). Failure to serve the Attorney General deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to resolve the constitutional claim. See Williams v. Kaylor, 218 Ga. 576, 578–79 (1963) (holding that compliance with this Code section is “mandatory and goes to the jurisdiction of the court”). Originally enacted in 1945, the pre-2022 version of OCGA § 9-4-7 (c) provided: If a statute of the State, or any order or regulation of any administrative body of the State, or any franchise granted by the State is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney General of the State shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and shall be entitled to be heard. See Ga. L. 1945 at 137, § 6. This Court held that this pre-2022 notice provision applied to declaratory judgment actions in civil cases only. Daniel, 289 Ga. at 440. See also Woodes v. Morris, 247 Ga. 771, 772 (279 SE2d 704) (1981); Daniel v. Fed. Nat. Mtg. Assn., 231 Ga. 385, 387 (202 S.E.2d 388) (1973). In 2022, the General Assembly amended the statute to expand the notice requirement beyond declaratory judgment 5 actions to reach a constitutional challenge raised as “part of any other action.” Chestnut Ridge, LLC v. Hall County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 323 Ga. 150, 155 (2025) (holding that OCGA § 9-4-7(c)’s service requirement applies to any action or part of an action where a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional). As we explained in Chestnut Ridge, [W]hen the General Assembly changes the language of a statute, that typically signals an intent to change the meaning of the statute. And when construing a statute, we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant. In doing so, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning, we must view the statutory text in the context in which it appears, and we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way. When applying these principles, if the statutory text is clear and unambiguous, we attribute to the statute its plain meaning, and our search for statutory meaning is at an end. 323 Ga. at 154–55 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Reading the statute in context and applying its plain language, we conclude that Trammell was required to serve the Attorney General with notice of his constitutional challenge. Trammell contended in his demurrer and in his motion for new trial that OCGA § 16-11-131(b) is “unconstitutional” as applied; thus he was clearly challenging the constitutionality of a statute, as contemplated by OCGA § 9-4-7(c). Although Trammell’s constitutional challenge was made in a demurrer to a criminal prosecution, the challenge was 6 nevertheless brought “as a part of any other action” within the meaning of this provision. First, as used in this title, “action” expressly includes both civil and penal actions. OCGA § 9-2-1 provides As used in this title, the term: (1) “Action” means the judicial means of enforcing a right. (2) “Civil action” means an action founded on private rights, arising either from contract or tort. (3) “Penal action” means an action allowed in pursuance of public justice under particular laws. Penal laws, “strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state,” which is the classic description of the criminal law. See Huntington v. Attrill, 146 US 657, 667 (1892). A criminal prosecution is the paradigm enforcement of penal law brought by the State in the pursuit of public justice. Thus, a criminal prosecution, as the action required to enforce the penal law, falls within the ambit of a “penal action.” See id. Second, the words “any other,” as used here, indicate that the phrase “any other action” is meant to apply broadly. “Other” is defined, in pertinent part, as “being the one (as of two or more) remaining or not included.” Other, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/other (last visited October 27, 2026). “Other” is already an expansive word, yet here it is further modified by the word “any,” which means “one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” Any, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/any (last visited 7 October 27, 2026). Thus, given the expansive language chosen by the legislature, we can only conclude that “any other action” plainly includes challenges to the constitutionality of a statute raised in a criminal prosecution. And OCGA § 9-4-7(c) plainly and unambiguously provides that the notice requirement applies when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged as “a part of any other action.” Because Trammell did not comply with OCGA § 9-4-7(c), “the trial court and, consequently this Court, lack jurisdiction to consider” the constitutional question. See Chestnut Ridge, 323 Ga. at 151, 155–56. Therefore, we vacate that portion of the trial court’s order denying the motion for new trial concerning its ruling on Trammell’s Second Amendment challenge to OCGA § 16-11-131(b). We remand the case to the trial court so that Trammell can serve the Attorney General under OCGA § 9-4-7(c) with a copy of the proceeding, and the trial court can give the Attorney General the opportunity to appear and defend the constitutionality of the statute before the trial court rules on it. See Daniel, 289 Ga. at 440–41 (explaining that service requirement was met when at summary judgment hearing, defendant first complained about lack of compliance with service requirement; the Attorney General was served the next day; and the trial court waited for five months before ruling on the summary judgment motion). Also, because we conclude that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to reach the merits of the constitutional challenge absent the required notice to the Attorney General, we express no opinion on the merits of the constitutional question or the trial court’s analysis of that question. Order denying motion for new trial vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur. 8