Wilson v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A1067 George James Wilson v. The State On Appeal from the Superior Court of Richmond County No. 2022RCCR00197 Argued: August 26, 2026 — Decided: September 22, 2026 PETERSON, Chief Justice. George Wilson appeals his convictions for malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, stem- ming from the December 2021 fatal stabbing of his wife’s daugh- ter, Kelly Lewis. 1 He argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial judge erred in denying 1 The crimes took place in the early morning hours of December 11, 2021. On February 15, 2022, a Richmond County grand jury returned an in- dictment charging Wilson with malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. At a June 2023 trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. On June 7, 2023, the trial court sen- tenced Wilson to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus a consecutive five-year prison sentence for the weapon-possession count. The trial court purported to merge the felony-murder count, but that count was actually vacated by operation of law. See Hulett v. State, 296 Ga. 49, 53 (2014). On June 13, 2023, Wilson filed a motion for new trial through trial counsel, which was amended by new counsel on February 3, 2025. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion in an order entered on November 13, 2025. A timely notice of appeal was filed on November 23, 2025. The case was docketed to this Court’s April 2026 term of court and argued on August 26, 2026. Wilson’s motion for mistrial and motion to recuse, based on the trial judge’s “coaching” of the State at trial. We conclude that the evidence was sufficient and the trial judge did not abuse his dis- cretion in denying the motion for mistrial. But because the motion to recuse was sufficient to trigger the trial judge’s obligation to refer the motion to another judge, we vacate the denial of the mo- tion for new trial and remand the case for another judge to con- sider the motion to recuse. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the evi- dence at trial showed the following. On December 11, 2021, police were called to an apartment in Richmond County, where they found Lewis had been stabbed and was unresponsive. Lewis ulti- mately died as a result of multiple stab wounds to the torso, in- cluding a wound that penetrated her heart. One of the first police officers to respond to the scene found Wilson sitting outside of the apartment building. As captured on video from body-worn cameras, which was played for the jury, Wilson made an unsolicited comment — “I’m the guy” — as dep- uties approached him. When a deputy asked Wilson if he had stabbed Lewis, Wilson replied, “yes.” Darlene Wilson, who was Wilson’s wife and Lewis’s mother, testified at trial as follows. Darlene suffered significant physical and emotional abuse during her marriage to Wilson. At the time of the fatal stabbing, Lewis was living with Darlene and Wilson. Darlene sometimes accompanied Lewis when she drove for a ride-share service, which Wilson disliked, as he thought that Darlene “needed to be home with [her] husband.” On the night that Lewis was stabbed, Darlene and Lewis had returned home after Lewis’s shift ended. Darlene and Wilson had a conversation about their marriage in their bedroom, in which Wilson stated that it would be his “way or no way.” Darlene left the bedroom 2 and joined Lewis in the living room. Wilson then emerged from the bedroom, stopped on Lewis’s right side, and questioned Dar- lene, “Oh, that’s how it is? That’s how you want it?” before stab- bing Lewis on her left side with a steak knife as she sat. The three scuffled until Wilson extricated himself and left the apartment. Darlene locked the door, called 911, and attempted to render aid to Lewis, who by then was unconscious. The medical examiner testified that one of the stab wounds indicated the knife went in through Lewis’s chest “front to back and slightly down” and two wounds entered Lewis’s left side, one penetrating her left lung and the other “entering and following a left to right and slightly downwards direction once inside the body.” Lewis also had a sharp-force injury to her palm, consistent with a defensive motion. As for Wilson, there was evidence of recent scratches to his head and face, blood on his face and collar, and bruising on his cheek, but no other evidence of injury. Other than the blood re- sulting from a small scratch, the blood on Wilson’s face, which included blood on his nose, cheek, and brow, did not appear to be his own. At the scene, Wilson did not complain of pain or ask for medical assistance. Blood on a bathrobe that Wilson had been wearing tested positive for Lewis’s DNA. After his arrest, Wilson made a phone call from jail to his sister, which was recorded. Wilson stated on the call, “I got a body,” “They say I got a body,” and “I murdered somebody.” Wilson testified at trial that he did not kill Lewis and pointed to Darlene as the killer. According to Wilson, he went to the kitchen to get a drink of water, and Darlene “whacked me over the head because she wanted my wallet, or some more money[,]” causing blood to “drip[ ] down.” As he “turned around and started after her[,]” Darlene approached him with a knife and a piece of 3 a cane, before stabbing Lewis when Lewis got up and stood in front of Wilson to protect him. Wilson claimed that, after leaving, he attempted to find a police officer before returning to the front of his building and sitting on the curb. Wilson also testified at the outset of his testimony that he was a convicted felon. Wilson denied stating that he was “the guy” and claimed his affirmative response to the deputy’s question of whether he stabbed the victim was given because he “misinterpreted” the question. Regarding the recording of the jail call to his sister, Wil- son denied saying, “I murdered somebody,” explaining that he in- stead said something to the effect of, “they said that I killed some- body[.]” Wilson in his testimony alluded to drug use by Darlene and Lewis. Wilson acknowledged “smack[ing]” Darlene previ- ously and acknowledged that he “might” have choked her. The State asked Wilson about his 2020 guilty plea for simple battery family violence against Darlene, in which he admitted to grabbing her by the throat and striking her in the eye with a closed fist; although he initially stated that he did not “remember the chok- ing out,” he later acknowledged having admitted to those actions by pleading guilty. 1. Citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 US 307 (1979), Wil- son argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convic- tions. We disagree. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of constitutional due process, we view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the verdicts and ask whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a rea- sonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 US at 319. Wilson argues that the State failed to meet its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the one who stabbed Lewis. Wilson first points to his own self-serving testimony that 4 he did not stab Lewis. But Darlene testified that Wilson was the one who stabbed Lewis. The testimony of a single witness is gen- erally sufficient to establish a fact. See OCGA § 24-14-8. And Dar- lene’s testimony was supported by Wilson’s own admission to hav- ing “murdered somebody” in his call to his sister from jail. Given the evidence of guilt that contradicted Wilson’s self-serving testi- mony, including Wilson’s own statements, the jury was author- ized to disbelieve Wilson’s testimony and also view his testimony as substantive evidence of guilt. See Mims v. State, 310 Ga. 853, 855 (2021) (defendant’s testimony “may itself be considered sub- stantive evidence of guilt when disbelieved by the jury, so long as some corroborative evidence exists for the charged offense”). Wilson also points to parts of the medical examiner’s testi- mony, specifically about Lewis’s wounds and the angle of the knife that killed her, that he claims were consistent with his version of events. But the resolution of any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, along with questions about the weight and credibility of evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it, are left to the jury. See Anderson v. State, 319 Ga. 56, 59 (2024). Because the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reason- able doubt that Wilson was guilty of the malice murder of Lewis and possessing a knife during the commission of that crime, Wil- son’s first enumeration of error fails. 2. Wilson’s only other enumeration of error is that the trial judge erred in denying a motion for mistrial and a motion for recusal of the trial judge that Wilson brought based on the trial judge’s “coaching” of the State at trial. We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for mis- trial but did err in failing to refer the motion to recuse to another judge for consideration. After the defense rested, the trial judge excused the jury 5 for lunch. The trial judge then asked the State whether it had any rebuttal evidence, and when the prosecutor responded that she did not, the trial judge asked, “Okay, no certified copies or any- thing?” The prosecutor suggested that she would introduce certi- fied copies of Wilson’s convictions only for sentencing purposes. When the trial judge suggested that he would allow the State to introduce evidence in rebuttal, defense counsel stated that there was “no need for” any evidence of Wilson’s felony convictions “to go back to the jury” given that Wilson was not charged with pos- sessing a weapon as a convicted felon. The trial judge stated, “Maybe I’m misunderstanding what y’all are saying. But felony convictions are a method of impeachment of a witness. That’s a precept of law that’s been with us for about 100 years. Are there any?” When the prosecutor said that she had used a “self-authen- ticating document” evidencing a misdemeanor conviction to im- peach Wilson, the trial judge stated that “[a] misdemeanor con- viction would not be — ever be the basis for a notice of intent to seek recidivist punishment under” OCGA § 17-10-7(a) and (c) and “[i]f, in fact, the State’s intention is to impeach the witness, then the impeaching self-authenticating record would have to be a part of the evidence in the case.” The trial judge then dismissed the lawyers for a lunch break, saying they would return for a charge conference and the judge would give the lawyers “a chance then to collect your thoughts.” After lunch, the State announced that it would not present additional evidence, and the defense announced that it was with- drawing its requested jury charge on impeachment by felony con- viction, as well as requested charges on justification. The follow- ing colloquy ensued: TRIAL JUDGE: I [am] just kind of curious. Why 6  would the State elect not to impeach the Defendant who has testified in this case? THE STATE: I don’t believe the certified convictions are proper. TRIAL JUDGE: You don’t believe that what’s proper? THE STATE: The certified convictions that I do have for recidivist punishment are proper for impeach- ment purposes. TRIAL JUDGE: Why do you think that? THE STATE: Because they do not go to his honesty or dishonesty, and some of them are older — TRIAL JUDGE: Are they felony convictions? THE STATE: Yes, Sir. TRIAL JUDGE: Did you read the request to charge from the Defendant? Any felony conviction can be used to impeach a witness. Has absolutely nothing to do with honesty or dishonesty. Any felony convic- tion. Any certified copy of a felony conviction can be used to impeach, and the definition of impeachment is significant. At the close of the charge conference, the conversation about impeachment continued: TRIAL JUDGE: Okay, counsel. I need y’all then to collect your thoughts. Any additional thoughts about 7  whether or not you would like to impeach the de- fendant? Why don’t you go see Steve Curry. 2 Why don’t y’all go and talk to Steve Curry. If there’s no one else in that office that you can talk to, you ought to go talk to Steve Curry and ask him about how to impeach a witness. Then I’ll meet with you again at two o’clock; okay? THE STATE: If I may, Your Honor, our understand- ing is that we cannot impeach him with the misde- meanor conviction that [the other trial prosecutor] told you about. The felony convictions, the ones that are within 10 years, she did not actually impeach him with on the stand. So that was our understand- ing of why we would not be putting them into evi- dence. TRIAL JUDGE: Aren’t they self-authenticating? THE STATE: Yes, Your Honor, they are. TRIAL JUDGE: Didn’t you just answer — didn’t you just contradict yourself? THE STATE: Yes, I did. Thank you. TRIAL JUDGE: Okay. So the State will have to make an announcement whether you wish to put on a rebuttal case or not. I will expect to hear that from you after you speak to someone in that office who 2 The judge appears to have been referring to a more senior prosecutor in the District Attorney’s office. 8  knows something about impeaching a witness. After the break and before the jury was brought back in, defense counsel moved for a mistrial and asked the trial judge to recuse himself based on the canon of judicial ethics that a judge “shall uphold the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of im- propriety[.]” Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 1. Wilson argued that instructing the State on how to impeach a witness was “very inappropriate” and that the judge had coached the prosecutor and violated the Judicial Code of Conduct, which required recusal and, thus, a mistrial. During discussion of the defense motion, the State tried to explain that it was intentionally not seeking to in- troduce Wilson’s felony convictions because he had admitted in his testimony that he was a convicted felon and because his con- victions were all for drug use 3 and their introduction might prompt him to volunteer statements about drug use by Lewis or Darlene, as he already had done on cross-examination. The State also emphasized that it was the State’s prerogative to decide what evidence to introduce and how to try the case. The trial judge denied the motion, saying that he was “mys- tified” by the State’s approach and suggesting that the judge’s re- marks related to preparation of the jury charges and the State’s intention to seek recidivist sentencing. The trial judge also re- marked that he was “quite concerned” about the defense with- drawing a justification defense, going so far as to confirm with Wilson himself that Wilson did not wish the jury to be charged on self-defense. 3 Wilson’s convictions, placed in the record for sentencing purposes af- ter the verdicts were reached, included various drug-related and firearms charges. 9  The jury was then brought into the courtroom for jury in- structions and closing arguments. The jury returned its guilty verdicts a little more than an hour after it started deliberating. After the jury was excused and before the trial judge proceeded to sentencing, the defense announced that while the jury had been deliberating, the defense had filed a written motion to recuse. 4 The defense asked that another judge sentence Wilson. The trial judge orally denied the motion as “frivolous and untimely.” The State, which had filed a notice of intent to seek recidivist punish- ment under OCGA § 17-10-7(a) and (c), tendered ten felony con- victions for Wilson into the record. The trial judge proceeded to sentence Wilson to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder, plus a consecutive five-year prison sen- tence for a weapon-possession count. (a) In arguing that the trial judge erred in denying the recusal and mistrial motions, Wilson cites OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1), which provides: “It is error for any judge, during any phase of any criminal case, to express or intimate to the jury the judge’s opin- ion as to whether a fact at issue has or has not been proved or as to the guilt of the accused.” One remedy for a violation of OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(1) is a mistrial. See OCGA § 17-8-57(a)(2). Wilson cites language in Court of Appeals case law about the “spirit” of the predecessor to that statute. See Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 537 (1979). But we have made clear that the statute “does not apply to comments made outside the presence of the jury.” Moore v. State, 315 Ga. 263, 273 (2022). To the extent that Wilson argues some other authority re- quired the trial judge to declare a mistrial here, we disagree. “The 4 The record shows that the jury began deliberating around 4:00 p.m., the motion was filed at 4:45 p.m., and the jury was excused from its service at 5:20 p.m. 10 decision to grant a mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a show- ing that a mistrial is essential to the preservation of the right to a fair trial.” Phillips v. State, 323 Ga. 374, 377 (2026) (quotation marks omitted). “Trial courts are vested with great discretion to grant or deny mistrials because they are in the best possible po- sition to determine whether one is warranted.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In considering whether a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a motion for mistrial, we often consider whether other remedies (e.g., a curative instruction) were suffi- cient to address any harm created by the alleged basis for the mis- trial. See id. at 377–78. But here there was no harm of the sort that would require a mistrial; the comments at issue by the trial judge were made wholly outside of the presence of the jury, and the State elected not to take the trial judge up on his suggestions about introducing additional evidence. Wilson points to no other possible ways in which the trial judge’s alleged bias prejudiced Wilson in front of the jury such that a mistrial would be required. (b) Turning to the question of recusal, the Uniform Supe- rior Court Rules require that “when the trial judge assigned to a case is presented with a recusal motion and an accompanying af- fidavit, ‘the judge shall temporarily cease to act upon the merits of the matter’ and determine ‘immediately’: (1) whether the mo- tion is timely; (2) whether the affidavit is legally sufficient; and (3) whether the affidavit sets forth facts that, if proved, would warrant the assigned judge’s recusal from the case.” See Post v. State, 298 Ga. 241, 243 (2015) (quoting Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.3). If all three criteria are met, “another judge shall be assigned to hear the motion to recuse.” Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.3. Whether the three threshold criteria have been met is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. See Post, 298 Ga. at 243. 11  Here, the trial judge denied the motion to recuse partly on the basis that it was untimely. We disagree. A recusal motion shall be filed and presented to the judge “not later than five (5) days after the affiant first learned of the alleged grounds for dis- qualification, and not later than ten (10) days prior to the hearing or trial which is the subject of recusal or disqualification, unless good cause be shown for failure to meet such time require- ments[.]” Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.1. This rule requires that a motion be both “filed” and “presented” to the judge whose recusal is sought, meaning that “the party must ensure in some fashion that the judge is made aware of the recusal issue.” Mondy v. Magnolia Advanced Materials, Inc., 303 Ga. 764, 769–70 (2018) (citing Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.1). Wilson filed a written motion to recuse the same day that the basis for the motion arose, and within an hour of filing he in- formed the trial judge in open court that the motion had been filed. The State does not meaningfully dispute that the motion was timely filed. The motion was timely. The trial judge also denied the motion to recuse on the mer- its, declaring it frivolous. “To be legally sufficient, an affidavit ac- companying a recusal motion must contain the three elements es- sential to a complete affidavit: (a) a written oath embodying the facts as sworn by the affiant; (b) the signature of the affiant; and (c) the attestation by an officer authorized to administer the oath that the affidavit was actually sworn by the affiant before the of- ficer.” Post, 298 Ga. at 243 (quotation marks omitted). “The affi- davit or affidavits accompanying the recusal motion must ‘fully assert the facts upon which the motion is founded’ and present ‘all evidence’ on the motion.” Id. (quoting Unif. Super. Ct. R. 25.1). “Allegations consisting of bare conclusions and opinions that the assigned judge is biased or prejudiced for or against a party are 12 not legally sufficient to support a recusal motion or to justify for- warding the motion for decision by another judge.” Id. at 243–44 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “In all other respects, however, the assigned judge must take the motion at face value, treating it as though ‘all of the facts set forth in the affidavit are true.’” Id. at 244 (quoting Unif. Super Ct. R. 25.3). In his written motion for recusal, Wilson alleged that dur- ing the charge conference, the trial judge had “expressed personal bias toward the parties” such that “should [he] fail to disqualify himself, his impartiality might be open to question[.]” In deciding whether this assumed state of facts would authorize an order re- quiring recusal, the assigned judge is guided by Rule 2.11(A) of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. See id. at 244. Rule 2.11(A) provides generally that “[j]udges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” followed by a non-exclusive list of specific situations in which recusal is required. This language “sets a general stand- ard that the appearance of partiality requires recusal.” Mayor & Alderman of City of Savannah v. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 121 (2012) (construing identical language in former Canon 3E(1)). The standard is an objective one that asks whether “a fair-minded and impartial person would have a reasonable perception of a judge’s lack of impartiality based upon objective facts set forth in the affidavit or reasonable inferences therefrom.” Post, 298 Ga. at 244 (quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, we conclude as a matter of law that the written motion for recusal was sufficient in substance under Uniform Superior Court Rule 25.3 to trigger a requirement that the motion be referred for reassignment to another judge to decide the motion. The State argues that the accompanying affidavit did not set forth facts that if proved would warrant the trial judge’s 13 recusal, because the affidavit “contained no evidence of extra-ju- dicial influence or specific bias against Appellant or his trial coun- sel.” We agree that neither the trial court record nor the affidavit filed in support of the recusal motion supports a conclusion that the trial judge here was actually biased in favor of or against ei- ther party. But that is not the standard for determining whether the trial judge should have referred the recusal motion for reas- signment to another judge. The standard is whether the party seeking recusal has alleged facts creating an appearance of im- partiality in the eyes of a reasonable person. And we have indi- cated that coaching of the prosecutor by a trial judge similar to the trial judge’s coaching here may “create an appearance of par- tiality” giving rise to grounds for recusal under the Code of Judi- cial Conduct. See Pyatt v. State, 298 Ga. 742, 749–53 (2016) (pos- iting that trial judge advising attorney about trial strategy “could create an appearance of partiality, which is a proper ground for a motion to recuse under our Code of Judicial Conduct[,]” while con- cluding that issue of Code violation was not properly preserved and appellant did not show probability of actual bias sufficient to show a due process violation). Whether the trial judge ultimately needed to be disquali- fied is another question. If “the judge to whom the motion should have been referred would have no choice based on [the] facts [in the transcript] but to grant the motion,” then we may simply de- cide for ourselves that recusal was required as a matter of law and declare void all proceedings after the point the recusal motion was filed. See Post, 298 Ga. at 253–58 (vacating convictions of cer- tain appellants with no need for new judge to consider recusal motion, given that “the relevant facts supporting [their] recusal motions — [the judge’s] statements at the hearing — are pre- sented in the hearing transcript, and the judge to whom the mo- tion should have been referred would have no choice based on 14 those facts but to grant the motion and order” recusal). See also Mondy, 303 Ga. at 777–80 (affirming judgment despite trial judge having erred in not ruling on recusal motion before entering con- tempt order, where the trial judge properly would have denied the motion as facially invalid). But if the question of disqualification turns on “how the judge to whom the recusal motion should have been referred de- cided the motion after holding a hearing and evaluating the evi- dence,” we must remand the case for another judge to decide the motion. Id. at 778. See also Post, 298 Ga. at 248–53. Such a re- mand for a hearing is necessary where the allegations require a determination of “what relevant facts are actually true and properly established, and what inferences from those facts should actually be made.” Post, 298 Ga. at 248–53. Here, the relevant facts — generally speaking, statements by the trial judge at trial — are largely all contained in the transcript. But what inferences may be drawn from the judge’s statements is itself a fact-finding exercise that we generally avoid performing in the first instance. Here, a finder of fact needs to consider the record, including the trial judge’s continued questioning of the State’s strategy and in- sistence that the trial prosecutors consult someone more senior, even after the charge conference had concluded, as well as the judge’s questioning of a strategic decision by the defense — spe- cifically, the decision to drop its request for a jury charge on jus- tification. The State also argues that the judge’s tone and de- meanor, as well as his ordinary practices in other cases, could un- dermine an inference of partiality — factors that are not con- tained in the record before us at all. Accordingly, we must remand for a fact finder to determine whether recusal was necessary. The State argued at points in its appellate briefing and at oral argument that a remand is unnecessary because any error in 15 the failure to recuse was harmless given that the State did not take the trial judge up on his suggestion to present additional ev- idence and the judge lacked discretion to impose any sentence other than the one that he did, given the recidivist notice filed by the State, see OCGA § 17-10-7(c). But the State does not cite any case in which we have concluded that there was error in a failure to recuse but nonetheless upheld a criminal conviction on the ground that the error was harmless. We have not identified any such case, either. And upon questioning at oral argument, even the State backed away from its argument that questions about harm would obviate the need for holding a hearing on the recusal motion. Indeed, the issue is not merely whether a particular ruling is infected by actual bias, but whether there is any “appearance of partiality” in the eyes of not merely the parties, but the public at large. Batson-Cook Co., 291 Ga. at 121. “Judicial integrity is a state interest of the highest order because the power and prerog- ative of a court to resolve disputes rests upon the respect accorded by citizens to a court’s judgment which, in turn, depends on the issuing court’s absolute probity.” Id. at 114 (quotation marks omitted). “It is vital to the functioning of the courts that the public believe in the absolute integrity and impartiality of its judges, and judicial recusal serves as a linchpin for the underlying proposition that a court should be fair and impartial.” Id. (citation and quota- tion marks omitted). We therefore vacate the trial judge’s denial of Wilson’s motion for new trial and remand for referral of the motion to recuse to a different judge for consideration, and addi- tional proceedings as necessary. Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices con- cur. 16