Walker v. State

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion. In the Supreme Court of Georgia No. S26A0732 Jamarius Walker v. The State On Appeal from the Superior Court of Richmond County No. 2022RCCR01460 Decided: September 22, 2026 PINSON, Justice. Jamarius Walker was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Geter. 1 On appeal, Walker claims that the trial court erred by al- 1 Geter was killed on April 13, 2020. On October 25, 2022, a Richmond County grand jury indicted Walker for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder predicated on armed robbery (Count 3), felony murder predicated on aggra- vated assault (Count 5), two counts of possession of a firearm during the com- mission of a felony (Counts 7 and 10), aggravated assault against another vic- tim, Carnell Phillips (Count 8), criminal damage to property in the second de- gree (Count 11), and six counts of violating the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act related to the other charges (Counts 2, 4, 6, 9, 12, and 13). Counts 11, 12, and 13 — the criminal-damage count and two of the Gang Act counts — were nolle prossed before trial. Walker was tried before a jury from January 22 to 24, 2024, and he was found guilty on all remaining counts. The trial court initially sentenced Walker on January 24, 2024, but it later issued a corrected sentence after Walker and the State raised certain sentencing er- rors while litigating Walker’s motion for new trial. After making those correc- tions, the trial court sentenced Walker to life in prison for malice murder, 20 lowing a police investigator to testify about his opinion as an ex- pert that Walker was a gang member, as well as by admitting evidence of Walker’s prior use of Facebook messaging to arrange gun sales and plan robberies. He also claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to move to suppress ev- idence obtained from Walker’s Facebook account. Those claims fail. The trial court did not abuse its discre- tion in concluding that the police investigator satisfied the appli- cable standards for an expert witness. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in admitting Walker’s Facebook messages as intrinsic evidence relevant both to his motive to advance Walker’s standing in his criminal street gang by robbing and murdering Geter, and to his membership in the gang. And Walker has not established that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to move to suppress evidence obtained from Facebook because a mo- tion to suppress on the only basis that Walker offers would not years in prison for the associated Gang Act count, to be served consecutively to the sentence for malice murder, 20 years in prison for aggravated assault, to be served concurrently, and five years of probation for each of the firearm-pos- session counts, each to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of life in prison plus 20 years followed by 10 years of probation. The remaining counts merged for sentencing or were vacated by operation of law. The court’s sentence-correcting order is inconsistent as to whether Walker’s 20-year sentence for aggravated assault will run concurrently with his life sentence for malice murder or concurrently with his 20-year sentence for the Gang Act count. Because neither party has raised this issue on appeal, and because it does not affect Walker’s total sentence, we do not resolve that inconsistency. Walker filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended through new counsel. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion and then denied it on July 1, 2025. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal, which he amended later that same day. The case was docketed to the April 2026 term of this Court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 clearly have succeeded. So Walker’s convictions are affirmed. 1. Evidence at Trial The evidence at trial showed the following. On April 13, 2020, Geter was driven by an acquaintance named Carnell Phillips to a street corner in Augusta. On the way, Geter made a phone call to learn exactly where he was supposed to go, and Phillips heard him mention a “Glock 19” on that call. Phillips realized that Geter was going to buy a gun. He asked Geter if Geter knew the person he was going to buy the gun from, and Geter said he knew him from Facebook. Geter then called a third party to confirm that the gun seller was trustworthy. Geter and Phillips arrived at a cul-de-sac and encountered a young man later identified as Walker. They pulled over. Walker came to the driver’s door, but Phillips told him, “No, go around to the back. I don’t have nothing to do with this.” Walker went to the back passenger side and opened the door. In that instant, Phillips heard Walker say, “Give it up,” followed by a gunshot. Phillips ducked down and drove away, returning fire as he went. From the back seat, Geter told Phillips “he was hit.” Phil- lips sped out of the neighborhood and, once he got to safety, called the police. When investigators arrived, they found Geter dead from a single gunshot wound to the chest. Next to him was a handgun that had not been fired. Phillips gave a statement to investiga- tors, which was largely consistent with his trial testimony. He also gave police his own gun, which he had fired defensively as he fled. Footage from a neighbor’s surveillance camera generally showed the encounter that Phillips described, although the cam- eras were not close enough to identify anyone or to show in detail what happened. Based on Phillips’s account and the surveillance 3 footage, police tested the doors of Phillips’s car for fingerprints, and they recovered prints that were later matched to Walker. In- vestigators then determined that Geter and Walker had been in communication before the murder. One of the last communica- tions made by Geter’s cell phone was with a number associated with Walker. And on March 31, 2020 — two weeks before the murder — a video was sent to Geter’s Facebook account that showed Walker pointing two guns at the camera and saying, “No- body.” The State introduced evidence showing Walker’s connec- tion with a criminal street gang. That evidence came through the testimony of Investigator Stefan Hegg, who was qualified as an expert in gang identifications and gang investigations. Investiga- tor Hegg testified that, in his opinion, Walker was a member of the Sex Money Murder gang, a subset of the United Blood Nation. To support that conclusion, he explained certain symbols and sig- nifiers that are important to the Sex Money Murder gang, includ- ing a “pistols up” hand sign and the number five or a five-pointed star, and he explained certain terminology used by the gang, like replacing or crossing out the letter C in messages and using the acronyms B-L-A-T-T, for “Blood Love All The Time,” and S-L-A- T-T, for “Slime Love All The Time.” Investigator Hegg then de- scribed photos and messages that had been retrieved from Walker’s Facebook account, which were shown to the jury. One photo showed Walker and two other men making signs associated with different Bloods subsets, and the caption said, “we went brazy,” replacing the C in crazy with a B. Other photos showed a suspected high-ranking Bloods member, Christian Robinson, and other men making Bloods-related signs, with captions using gang language. Videos showed Walker, Robinson, and other men hold- ing guns and making gang signs associated with the Bloods and Sex Money Murder. 4  Through Investigator Hegg, the State also introduced evi- dence of Walker’s history of using Facebook messages to discuss and plan robberies, although Investigator Hegg acknowledged that it was unknown whether any of the message exchanges ac- tually resulted in a robbery. In one exchange from March 25, 2020 — less than a month before Geter was killed — Walker and Rob- inson planned to rob someone known as “Flip Gee,” who was thought to be carrying about $1000 with him. Walker said, “Let’s do it right now,” and Robinson replied, “All right. Finna set it up.” In another exchange that started on the following day, a Facebook user under the name RicoLand Kae messaged Walker that he had “a mean a** lick,” meaning a robbery, in mind. Walker responded, “I need to come down there BSAP,” which Investigator Hegg said was likely a gang-related communication because the A in ASAP was replaced with B for Blood. The next morning, Walker mes- saged RicoLand Kae, “Me and three was talking about that lick yesterday. We might as well do it.” Walker and other Facebook users then exchanged messages using gang language in which they planned the robbery. Investigator Hegg also testified about the importance of guns to gangs. He explained that gang members can get guns in different ways, including by stealing them. Referring to the fact that Walker was only 16 years old when he shot Geter, Investiga- tor Hegg noted that “juveniles, especially, are very, very attrac- tive to gangs,” because they are prosecuted less severely for gun offenses. And he discussed more Facebook messages from Walker’s account related to this topic. On April 3, 2020 — 10 days before Geter was killed — Walker posted a photo on Facebook ad- vertising a handgun for sale. Other Facebook users messaged Walker that he was likely “trying to slime somebody,” meaning he was using the supposed gun sale as bait for a robbery victim. One user, Kenneth Williams, whom Investigator Hegg described 5 as a “very, very, very famous Blood in Augusta,” messaged Walker, “$80,” and Walker responded, “I’m finna slatt some, twin, just chill.” A similar exchange with another user, Maurice Hol- land, happened later that same day: Holland inquired about the gun, and Walker replied, “Finna slatt some, twin.” Investigator Hegg explained that in these messages, Williams and Holland were offering to buy the gun, and Walker was telling them that he was actually trying to rob someone and the gun was not really for sale. By contrast, an hour later, when a third user, Devin Al- len, offered $100 for the gun, Walker responded, “You tryin’ to buy it?” Investigator Hegg explained that Allen belonged to a gang that was in a feud with Williams’s local gang, and that robbing Allen could help Walker gain favor with Williams. 2. Qualification of Expert in Criminal Street Gangs Walker contends that the trial court erred in qualifying In- vestigator Hegg as an expert on criminal street gangs. A trial court’s decision to allow expert testimony (or not) is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Peavy v. State, 324 Ga. 295, 300 (2026). The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by OCGA § 24-7-702(b) (Rule 702(b)). That rule allows a witness who is qualified as an expert “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to testify in the form of opinion or otherwise if (1) his “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,” (2) his testimony is “based upon sufficient facts or data,” (3) his testimony is “the product of reliable principles and meth- ods,” and (4) the expert has “reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” OCGA § 24-7-702(b). Those standards, which enact the principles identified in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 (1993), require the trial court to “act as a gatekeeper” to ensure that an expert is 6 qualified and his testimony is going to be reliable and helpful to the factfinder. Peavy, 324 Ga. at 300. The proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of showing that the proposed expert meets these standards. See id. at 300. The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in conclud- ing that Investigator Hegg’s testimony met these standards. At the pretrial hearing on Walker’s motion to exclude Investigator Hegg’s testimony, Hegg testified about the bases for his knowledge, skill, experience, and training with respect to crimi- nal gang culture: He had received formal training in the area of gangs and gang identification, and he had been an investigator with the sheriff’s office and the district attorney’s office for about six and a half years, where he had worked on over 500 investiga- tions concerning gang members, including over 100 in which he was the lead investigator, and had contact with gang members in the area over 300 times. He also worked with the recently created gang unit in the Attorney General’s office. As for his methods, In- vestigator Hegg explained that when trying to identify gang mem- bers, he looked for “clusters of identifiers,” a method also used by other gang investigators. An identifier could be a person’s name, a photo of someone “throwing up a hand sign,” words and conver- sations on social media, or conversations that use specific verbi- age. And Investigator Hegg explained that, because a single iden- tifier does not mean that a person is a gang member, “we look for the clusters.” To aid in this process, Investigator Hegg referred to a database of gang information that is shared among law enforce- ment agencies. Considered as a whole, this evidence supported the trial court’s decision to allow Investigator Hegg to testify as an expert under Rule 702. Walker primarily argues that Investigator Hegg’s methods — looking for “clusters of identifiers” and reviewing shared law 7 enforcement databases of gang information — were not reliable because they were “subjective”: they were not peer-reviewed, could not be tested, and did not have a known rate of error. But the United States Supreme Court has explained that these con- siderations “do not constitute a definitive checklist or test,” and that they “may or may not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert’s particular ex- pertise, and the subject of his testimony.” Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 US 137, 150 (1999) (cleaned up). 2 When the sub- ject matter is something sociological, like the behaviors of people in criminal street gangs, the “ideal experimental conditions and controls” that are part of hard scientific study may not apply. See Carrizosa v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 47 F4th 1278, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 2022). Instead, courts evaluating potential expert tes- timony about gangs may look to other indicia of reliability, like the expert’s personal knowledge and experience, training, and ed- ucation. See id.; Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F3d 1329, 1336 (11th Cir. 2010). And by those measures, the court here was within its discretion in concluding that Investigator Hegg was qualified. He spent years as an investigator of gang cases, worked on hundreds of cases, and interacted with hundreds of gang members. He demonstrated knowledge of gang culture, indicators, and individ- ual figures. And he explained his methods — which he testified were also used by other gang experts — and how he arrived at his conclusion. So it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to conclude that his methods were sufficiently reliable under Rule 702. 2 Because Rules 701 and 702 of our Evidence Code are modeled after Rules 701 and 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, “we look to the decisions of federal appellate courts, especially the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit, that have construed and applied these Rules.” Miller v. Golden Peanut Co., LLC, 317 Ga. 22, 26 (2023). 8  Walker’s other arguments fail, too. Walker asserts that In- vestigator Hegg was not an “objective” expert because he worked for the prosecution, but he offers no authority to support that someone who works for law enforcement cannot be an expert, and, to the contrary, such experts are frequently qualified in Georgia courts. See, e.g., Chapple v. State, 323 Ga. 830, 834–35 (2026) (GBI agent qualified as expert to discuss “the use of infrared pho- tography to detect gunshot soot, particles, and residue on black polyester clothing”); Arnold v. State, 321 Ga. 434, 441 (2025) (GBI agent qualified as expert in fingerprint examination); Reddick v. State, 321 Ga. 73, 83 (2025) (GBI agent qualified as expert in bul- let-trajectory analysis); Pritchett v. State, 314 Ga. 767, 769 (2022) (GBI agent qualified as expert in crime scene analysis); Clark v. State, 309 Ga. 473, 476 (2020) (four different GBI employees qual- ified as experts in, respectively, forensic pathology, DNA testing, latent fingerprint analysis, and firearms identification). He con- tends that Investigator Hegg testified to an “ultimate issue” at trial when he opined that the evidence presented to him showed that Walker was “a member of the Blood Nation, United Blood Nation” and “more specifically ... Sex Money Murder,” but an ex- pert is allowed to give his opinion about an ultimate issue of fact as long as he does not simply “tell the jury what result to reach.” United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F3d 1296, 1310 (11th Cir. 2014). See also OCGA § 24-7-704(a) (“[T]estimony in the form of an opin- ion or inference otherwise admissible shall not be objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact.”). Finally, he appears to argue that the trial court erred by qualifying Investigator Hegg without applying the Rule 702 standard. It is true that the court did not address that Rule when it qualified Investigator Hegg before trial, but in its order denying Walker’s motion for new trial, the court acknowledged that mis- take and concluded that Investigator Hegg was qualified under 9 Rule 702. Because the court eventually found that Investigator Hegg was qualified under the right standard, this is not a reversi- ble error. See Bustamente v. State, 323 Ga. 862, 864, 865–66 (2026) (concluding that the trial court did not rely on “improper considerations” in enhancing the defendant’s sentence due to lack of remorse because, although the trial court had advised the de- fendant during the sentencing hearing that an apology before sen- tencing could “seriously harm [his] appeal,” the court “clarified” in its order denying the motion for new trial that it did not con- sider the defendant’s lack of remorse at the sentencing hearing but rather his lack of remorse at trial and in his police interview); Ash v. State, 312 Ga. 771, 784 (2021) (affirming the trial court’s ruling on an evidentiary claim in denying the defendant’s motion for new trial, because although the court cited a decision that pre- dated the new Evidence Code, the court “ultimately applied the appropriate evidentiary standard”). 3. Admission of Facebook Messages Walker claims that the trial court erred in admitting evi- dence of Walker’s prior use of Facebook to sell guns and plan rob- beries. We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See Smith v. State, 322 Ga. 881, 883 (2025). (a) Background Early in its opening statement, the State said that “the ev- idence will show that Mr. Jamarius Walker routinely bartered, sold, stole guns from people[.]”Walker objected that the State was referring to uncharged conduct that was “nothing but … charac- ter assassination” and that the State had not provided the pre- trial notice required for introducing evidence of the defendant’s “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” under OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (Rule 10 404(b)). The State responded that Rule 404(b) did not apply be- cause Walker’s prior use of Facebook to communicate about buy- ing and selling guns was intrinsic to the charged offenses. In the State’s view, the prior messages were part of the same series of transactions as the charged offenses because they showed that Walker was “constantly selling guns” and that “[t]hat’s how he lures our victim to the incident location, is under the auspices of purchasing a gun.” The State also argued that evidence of that practice was intrinsic to the gang-related charges, because selling guns was a “common practice” for Walker’s gang and he engaged in that practice to increase and maintain his status in the gang. And the State argued that the prior sales were intrinsic to the murder charge because they showed the motive for the killing: “a robbery that turned into a homicide.” The trial court ruled at trial that the evidence was intrinsic and admissible. The court determined that the evidence was in- trinsic because it was being offered “to prove the circumstances immediately surrounding the crime charged, particularly mo- tive.” Speaking to motive, the court noted that the “real issue” in the case would likely be “who was trying to rob whom.” And the court rejected Walker’s argument that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and thus subject to exclusion under OCGA § 24-4-403 (Rule 403). We address the Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 issues in turn. (b) Rule 404(b) The question whether this evidence is “intrinsic” is a ques- tion about whether Rule 404(b)’s particular limits on admitting evidence apply. Rule 404(b) limits the purposes for which “[e]vi- dence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be admitted, and it generally requires the State to give the defendant notice before introducing such evidence at trial. OCGA § 24-4-404(b) (emphasis 11 added). But if the evidence in question is not merely evidence of “other” crimes that help prove the charged crimes, but is instead “intrinsic” to the charged crimes, Rule 404(b)’s limits do not apply. See Callaway v. State, 321 Ga. 186, 191 (2025). Evidence may be considered “intrinsic” to a charged crime when it “pertains to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime.” Hamilton v. State, 323 Ga. 779, 788 (2026) (quotation marks omitted). Intrinsic evidence need not relate directly to the victims of the charged offenses to be part of the same “chain of events,” and no “bright-line rule” prescribes how close in time to the charged offenses the evidence must be. See id. (quotation marks omitted). We have said that evidence is intrinsic if it is “linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime,” an “integral and natural part” of an account of the crime, or “necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). And evidence is “necessary” to tell the story of the offense if it is “reasonably necessary” for the State to complete the story of the crime. Harris v. State, 310 Ga. 372, 379 (2020). The trial court here determined that Walker’s prior use of Facebook to set up robberies with other victims was intrinsic to Walker’s charges for murder and participation in criminal street gang activity. We will address this determination as to each crime in that order. 3 3 Evidence does not always have to be intrinsic to every charged crime in order to be admissible as intrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 856–57 (2024) (concluding that evidence of criminal gang activity commit- ted by other gang members was intrinsic to the Gang Act charge against the defendant because it went to the existence of a criminal street gang, while not addressing whether that evidence was intrinsic to the other charges against 12  (i) Murder The trial court’s determination that the Facebook mes- sages were evidence intrinsic to the murder was not an abuse of discretion. The “story” of this crime, in the State’s view, was that Walker shot Geter in the midst of an ongoing scheme he was car- rying out in connection with his criminal street gang: He was ad- vertising guns for sale on Facebook to lure victims to an in-person meeting, where he would rob them. And Geter’s murder was one such robbery gone wrong. Although the State might have been able to explain what happened with Geter without getting into Facebook messages about other gun sales or potential robberies, those messages — which went back only a few weeks before Geter’s murder — could be considered a “natural” part of, or “rea- sonably necessary” for the State to give the jury the complete pic- ture of, “the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime.” Hamilton, 323 Ga. at 788 (quotation marks omitted). Put another way, the State’s theory was that the Face- book messages were part of an ongoing criminal scheme related to a criminal street gang, of which the transaction with Geter was just the latest part. And we have said that separate offenses with different victims may be intrinsic to a charged offense if they are part of the same “crime spree,” especially where the defendant is shown to have committed similar crimes using similar methods against different victims over a relatively short period. See, e.g., Callaway, 321 Ga. at 192 (evidence that defendant shot two vic- tims from his car in Fulton County was intrinsic to the charged the defendant). But here, we address whether the Facebook evidence was in- trinsic to both the murder and the gang charges because that question matters for our consideration of whether the evidence satisfies Rule 403, as explained further below. 13 similar shootings of other victims in DeKalb County, where the Fulton County shootings took place within “five miles and four hours” of the charged crimes and evidence relating to the identi- fication of the defendant as the shooter came from the Fulton County victims); Brown v. State, 307 Ga. 24, 29 (2019) (evidence that defendant contacted someone by phone, lured him to leave his home, and then burglarized the home while he was out was intrinsic to charged crimes that also involved “contacting men by telephone to set them up to steal from them”). That is something like what the trial court found was happening here. Walker’s on- going scheme to lure potential robbery victims over Facebook is not exactly like the kind of “crime sprees” we have recognized in our past intrinsic-evidence decisions, but it is not so different that the trial court could not draw a parallel. Thus, although the Fa- cebook messages here may fall close to the line between intrinsic evidence of the charged crime (here, murder) and evidence to which Rule 404(b)’s limits apply, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Facebook messages were intrin- sic to the murder under the circumstances of the case. (ii) Gang Act Charges The trial court’s conclusion that the Facebook messages were intrinsic to Walker’s charged violations of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act stands on even firmer footing. Ev- idence of Walker’s prior gang-related activity was directly rele- vant to the Gang Act charges because it showed that Walker was part of the gang, and association with a criminal street gang is an element of a Gang Act charge. See OCGA § 16-15-4(a) (making it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with a crimi- nal street gang to conduct or participate in criminal gang activity through the commission of any offense enumerated in paragraph (1) of” OCGA § 16-15-3); Pierce v. State, 319 Ga. 846, 851 (2024) 14 (to obtain a conviction under the Gang Act, the State must prove, among other things, the defendant’s association with the gang); Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 245 (2016) (same). And the prior Fa- cebook messages were intrinsic as to those Gang Act offenses. See Pierce, 319 Ga. at 856–57 (evidence of other gang members’ crimes was intrinsic to the Gang Act charges against the defend- ant, because the State had to prove the existence of a gang and that the gang engages in criminal activity). And the same is true of evidence showing that Walker engaged in actual gun sales over Facebook (as opposed to posting guns for sale to lure victims to rob them). Just like the robberies, Walker’s actual gun sales were intrinsic to the Gang Act charges: the gun sales were crimes, be- cause Walker was under 18 and could not legally possess a gun, see OCGA § 16-11-132(b), and they were “criminal gang activity,” because the statutory definition of that term includes “[a]ny crim- inal offense … that involves violence, possession of a weapon, or use of a weapon[.]” OCGA § 16-15-3(1)(J). Because Walker was engaging in criminal gang activity even when he was just selling guns over Facebook, evidence of those sales was relevant to estab- lishing elements of the Gang Act charges, and so the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the Facebook mes- sages were intrinsic to those charges. See Pierce, 319 Ga. at 856– 57. (c) Rule 403 Walker claims that the prior Facebook messages should have been excluded under Rule 403. That rule says that relevant evidence may be excluded if, among other things, “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju- dice.” OCGA § 24-4-403. Walker is correct that intrinsic evidence still must satisfy Rule 403, see Williams v. State, 302 Ga. 474, 485 (2017), but he has not shown that his prior Facebook messages 15 had to be excluded under that rule. The probative value of the messages was high: they tended to show that Walker was in a criminal street gang, which was an element that the State had to prove, and they also tended to show his motive for robbery and murder. And although evidence that Walker was in a gang was certainly prejudicial, the danger of unfair prejudice was low, be- cause the Facebook messages were relevant to and highly proba- tive of Walker’s guilt of the charged crimes. See Pierce, 319 Ga. at 851, 858 (risk of unfair prejudice from evidence of defendant’s gang membership did not outweigh “significant probative value” because defendant’s membership in a gang was an element the State had to prove); Fleming v. State, 306 Ga. 240, 245 (2019) (risk of unfair prejudice from evidence of defendant’s gang membership did not outweigh probative value because defendant’s gang affili- ation “establish[ed] a connection between [defendant] and the shooters” and “provide[d] context for his participation in” the charged offenses). The evidence that Walker was in a gang was not evidence of “scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect” — that is, the kind of evidence Rule 403 was designed to exclude. See Pierce, 319 Ga. at 858. And in the case of Facebook messages showing actual gun sales, the danger of unfair prejudice was even lower, because selling or buying guns does not inherently reflect badly on a per- son’s character, see Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 543 (2017), and a minor-in-possession crime is much less serious than mur- der, see Willis v. State, 315 Ga. 19, 28 (2022) (evidence of defend- ant’s prior convictions for relatively minor crimes was unlikely to sway the jury against him given the seriousness of the charged offenses). So the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conclud- ing that Rule 403 did not require it to exclude the Facebook mes- sages. 16  4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Walker claims that his trial counsel provided constitution- ally ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress the Facebook messages on the ground that the search warrants that produced them were not supported by probable cause. To establish that counsel was constitutionally ineffective, a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance was professionally deficient and that he suffered prejudice as a result. See Strickland v. Washing- ton, 466 US 668, 687 (1984); Williams v. State, 324 Ga. 15, 20 (2026). To show deficiency, the appellant must show that his law- yer performed “in an objectively unreasonable way,” Heyward v. State, 319 Ga. 588, 592 (2024) (quotation marks omitted), which generally means showing that “no reasonable lawyer would have done what his lawyer did, or would have failed to do what his law- yer did not,” Evans v. State, 315 Ga. 607, 611 (2023) (quotation marks omitted). To show prejudice, he must show that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there was a “reasonable proba- bility” that the result of the trial would have been different. Hey- ward, 319 Ga. at 592 (quotation marks omitted). The messages from Walker’s Facebook account were ob- tained under two search warrants. In the affidavit for the first warrant, the requesting officer attested that (1) Phillips said that while he was driving Geter, he heard Geter on the phone with an unknown man say he would be at their destination with a gun to sell; (2) Phillips said that Geter was shot at their destination by an unknown man who had touched or opened the doors of Phil- lips’s car; and (3) Walker’s fingerprints were found on Phillips’s car doors. The second warrant was almost the same, except that rather than mentioning the fingerprints, it just said the shooter was “later identified as Jamarius Walker.” Both warrant applica- tions requested Facebook records associated with three user IDs: 17 ola.walk.52, LILGETER, and espn.walk.1, and both said that in- vestigators wanted those records “due to communication that could have occurred between Geter and Walker and other[s] asso- ciated with this investigation.” At the motion-for-new-trial hear- ing, counsel testified that he did not move to suppress the mes- sages because he believed the warrants were supported by prob- able cause. When a defendant claims that his counsel performed defi- ciently by failing to file a motion to suppress, he must show that a motion to suppress on the “specific basis” that he proposes “would clearly have succeeded” if counsel had raised it. Moss v. State, 322 Ga. 757, 767 (2025) (quotation marks omitted). The only specific basis for suppression that Walker proposes is that the warrant applications did not show with evidence that Walker and Geter had communicated through Facebook, but instead said only that such communications “could” have happened. In Walker’s view, that means the warrants lacked probable cause because they were “merely relying on possible evidence of crimi- nal activity” with “no concrete link between what officers knew at the time and the information that was to be found.” A motion to suppress on that basis would not clearly have succeeded. Probable cause does not require proof that a search will uncover evidence of a crime, but only “the fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Jones v. State, 321 Ga. 137, 142 (2025) (cleaned up). And when a magistrate reviews a warrant application to determine whether probable cause exists, he may take into account not only all the evidence set forth in the affidavit, but also reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the affidavit, “factual and practical con- siderations of everyday life,” and “common-sense conclusions about human behavior.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Under 18 that standard, the warrant applications here were supported by probable cause. Consider what the magistrate had in front of him. The probable-cause statements in the applications said that Geter got a ride with Phillips to a specific location, that along the way Geter spoke on the phone to someone who said he would be at that location with a gun to sell, and that when Geter and Phil- lips arrived at the location, Geter was shot by Walker. Based on those facts, a magistrate could reasonably conclude that a search for communications between Geter and Walker had a fair proba- bility of turning up evidence of a crime. And the magistrate could presume, as a “practical consideration of everyday life,” id., that many people use Facebook to communicate, and so there was a fair probability that Geter and Walker did, too. The fact that the magistrate and law enforcement were not certain that the search would turn anything up did not mean there was not a “fair prob- ability” that it would. See, e.g., Pugh v. State, 318 Ga. 706, 714 (2024) (warrant for defendant’s cell phone records was supported by probable cause where the affidavit showed evidence that the defendant was connected to the crime and that he was using his cell phone around the time of the crime, even though the affidavit did not tie the phone records themselves to the investigation of the crime). A reasonable lawyer could therefore determine, as Walker’s counsel did, that a motion to suppress was not likely to be granted. This claim of error therefore fails. See Moss, 322 Ga. at 768–69 (appellant did not show his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress because “a reasonable lawyer could look at the search warrant in this case and conclude that it satisfied the Fourth Amendment, or at least that a motion to sup- press asserting the contrary claim would not clearly succeed”). Walker also claims — in one half of one sentence — that the warrants lacked particularity. See US Const. Amend. IV (a search warrant must “particularly describ[e] the place to be 19 searched, and the persons or things to be seized”); Jones, 321 Ga. at 147–48. But “[i]t is the appellant’s burden to show error by identifying in the record the thing that he challenges on appeal and citing authority to show why that thing represents an error.” Williams, 324 Ga. at 21. Walker does not make any separate ar- gument about particularity, discuss or quote the warrants’ state- ments of places to be searched or things to be seized, or cite any authority other than the general particularity standard. To the extent that Walker has asserted a separate claim that counsel should have moved to suppress the Facebook messages because the warrants lacked particularity, he has not met his burden to show that counsel performed deficiently. Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur. 20